Paris, 9 September 2004. – A delegation of the Assembly’s Political Committee led by its Chairman Pedro Agramunt (Spain, Federated Group) returned from a visit to Washington (30 August – 2 September) with the impression that there was insufficient understanding of the European Union integration process or the objectives of ESDP among US policy-makers. They were seemingly not worried about European autonomy, but rather feared that division would lead to an inefficient Europe, incapable of acting decisively in the event of an international crisis.

Pentagon Deputy Secretary-General Ian Brzezinski said it was wrong to accuse the US government of deliberately seeking to divide Europeans because they were already divided. The US government was worried about the situation. Other speakers considered, in the light of past experience, that the fact Europeans had shown they were good at setting up structures but not at implementing common policy raised doubts as to whether they could successfully improve military capabilities and significantly increase the number and quality of deployable forces.

In meetings at the State Department and the Pentagon and with leading think tanks, and following a number of discussions, members suggested more direct dialogue was necessary to bridge a number of gaps in strategic thinking and enable both sides to become more familiar with each other’s perceptions of the threats and challenges faced by their countries and with their priorities and preferred courses of action.

For the US government, Iraq was the top priority. A further concern was the nuclear programmes in North Korea and in particular in Iran. Here, there were doubts about the effectiveness of the European approach. Next came the issue of China, currently viewed mainly from the perspective of possible European armaments technology exports should there be a lifting of the current embargo. Americans felt that Europeans did not have a similar perception of China as a future strategic competitor. Issues that Europeans focus on, such as the situation in the Balkans or Afghanistan – two crisis regions to which European countries currently deploy vast numbers of troops – now occupied a much lower point on the American agenda. Differences of approach became apparent over ways of dealing with Afghanistan’s poppy harvest. The model for a Union of Serbia and Montenegro established under pressure from Europe (referred to by John Hulsman of the Heritage Foundation as “Solania”) was dismissed by Americans as unworkable.

Members received a mixed message from think tank specialists about US intentions for NATO and the transatlantic security partnership. One view was that Europeans would soon have to organise their defence themselves and that NATO was in trouble because Europeans wanted it to defend Europe while the US wanted it to be a global strike force that was relevant to its own policy (Charles Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations). However, NATO was not delivering much in Afghanistan and virtually nothing in Iraq. Others saw NATO as the only place for transatlantic strategic debate and the natural choice for joint policy initiatives, especially as there were no alternatives (Ted Carpenter, CATO). For many, Iraq was a massive diversion from the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and had made matters worse (Ambassador Robert Hunter, Rand Corporation).


The universal view on the American side was that if John Kerry was elected President, the way policy was presented could change, but there would be no significant change on the substance of major issues, given the political climate in both houses of Congress. Important policy changes on questions such as the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol or WTO affairs were unlikely. Europeans would, however, be faced with more pressing demands for deployable forces and participation in the management of Afghanistan and Iraq.

A series of briefings at the US Government Accountability Office (formerly the General Accounting Office) was preceded by a presentation from David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, who explained that both Bush and Kerry will face enormous budgetary challenges both on account of demographic developments and the spending programmes they are putting forward in the election campaign.

Members of the Committee tried to correct what they felt were misconceptions about the European integration process and European opinion on international issues. The EU Constitutional Treaty would not create a single European foreign policy. Member states had retained full autonomy over foreign and security policy and the Commission as a whole had been weakened (Lord Tomlinson (United Kingdom, Federated Group)). Members also felt there was a strong link between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and international terrorism. This was the overarching issue (Josette Durrieu (France, Socialist Group) on which the situation in Iraq would also depend (Andrea Manzella (Italy, Socialist Group). Lord Judd (United Kingdom, Socialist Group) warned that the prison in Guantanamo gave the wrong signal and was counterproductive in the fight for the hearts and minds of young people in the world. It created hostility towards US policy in the West and prepared the ground for the recruitment of new extremists among Muslims.

During a discussion with the delegation, Ambassador Dennis Ross, President Clinton’s chief negotiator for the Middle East, criticised the Road Map on the grounds that it was not a process as such and because nobody felt responsible for its implementation. Standards and conditions for dismantling unauthorised settlements had not been negotiated. Given that the current US government had no credibility among Palestinians, Europeans should become more involved. The message should be that Palestinians would not make progress if their current leadership did not change its policy. While the US would work on Israel, Europeans should develop stronger ties with the Palestinian Prime Minister and the reformers on the Legislative Council. The security fence so far had increased Israel’s security since there were fewer suicide attacks. However its impact on the Palestinians was disastrous. The fence was an idea that had already been developed by Yitzak Rabin who thought it could protect Israel if negotiations failed and troops had to be pulled out of the West Bank. Mr Ross believed that the fence was temporary. Israel had a history of building and removing fences while negotiating with neighbouring countries.

The delegation met with representatives of the Washington Embassies at the invitation of Ambassador Boudeweijn van Eenennaam (Dutch EU/WEU-Presidency).