



Conference on “Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach”

Brussels, 20-21 September 2005



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CONFERENCE

on

“Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach”

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PROCEEDINGS

“Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach”
Hemicycle of the Belgian House of Representatives
Brussels, 20-21 September 2005

PROGRAMME

Tuesday 20 September

09.30 **Opening addresses**

Mr Herman De Croo (Belgium), President of the Chamber of Representatives, Belgium

Mr Stef Goris (Belgium), President of the WEU Assembly

Mr François Roelants du Vivier (Belgium), Chairman of the Committee on External Relations and Defence of the Senate

10.00–12.30 **First sitting**

Chairman: Mr Stef Goris (Belgium) President of the WEU Assembly

Factors threatening peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa

Keynote speech: Armand De Decker (Belgium), Minister for Development Cooperation (Former President of the WEU Assembly)

Presentations by:

Mr Arnauld Akodjenou, Director of the Emergency and Security Service, UN High Commission for Refugees

Mr Matadi NENGA GAMANDA (Vice-President of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Congo)

Discussion

14.15–16.15 **Second sitting**

Chairman: Mr Philippe Monfils (Belgium), Leader of the Belgian Delegation and Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly

Experiences in military peacekeeping operations in Sub-Saharan Africa

Keynote speech: Lieutenant-General Frederic Vandingenen (Belgium), Deputy-Chief of the Defence Staff for Operations and Training

Introduction to the EU policy for the organisation of military peacekeeping in Africa:

General Jean-Paul Perruche, Director of the EU Military Staff

Presentations by:

General Bruno Neveux (France), Head of the Joint Services Combat and Training Division (Operation Artemis – Democratic Republic of Congo)

General Jean-Marie Mogoko, Peace and Security Advisor to the Head of State, Congo

General Emmanuel Beth (France), Head of the Planning and Operations Centre, Ministry of Defence (Operation Licorne – Côte d’Ivoire)

Discussion

16.30–18.15 **Third sitting**
Chairman: Mr Pedro Agramunt (Spain), Chairman of the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly

Experiences in crisis management and peacekeeping: Darfur – a case study

Presentations by:

Major General Henry Anyidoho, Head of the United Nations Assistance Cell in Addis Ababa,
Chief of Staff of the African Union Darfur Integrated Task Force

Mr Christian Manahl, Official with responsibility for Darfur,
European Union Task Force ‘Africa’

Mr Al Derderi Mohamed Ahmed (Sudan), Member of the National Assembly

Dr Alexia Mikhos, Crisis Management Policy Section, Operations Division, NATO

Discussion

Wednesday 21 September

10.00 **Fourth sitting**
Chairman: Mr Stef Goris (Belgium) President of the WEU Assembly

The way forward: Euro-African cooperation on peacekeeping

Speeches by:

Mr Koen Vervaeke, Head, European Union Task Force ‘Africa’

Presentations by:

Dr Sven Biscop, Senior Researcher, Royal Institute for International Relations

Mr Alain Deletroz, Vice-President (Europe), International Crisis Group

Discussion

Conclusions

Mr Charles Goerens (Luxembourg), Rapporteur, (Former Minister for Defence and Development,
Former President of the WEU Assembly)

12.00 **Closing address**

Mr Louis Michel (Belgium), European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid

OPENING ADDRESSES

Tuesday 20 September 2005

The conference was opened by Mr Herman De CROO (Belgium), President of the Chamber of Representatives.

Mr Herman DE CROO (Belgium, President of the Chamber of Representatives of the Belgian Parliament) (Translation) – Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour for me to be able to welcome you today to Brussels and to the Chamber of Representatives.

I should also like to say what a pleasure it is to see my colleague Stef Goris, the President of the Assembly of WEU, who is also a member of our Belgian assembly.

As you know, Belgium is developing a particular focus on Africa in general and on the Sub-Saharan countries in particular. The Minister for External Relations, the Minister for Development Cooperation and the Defence Minister all have a vital part to play in implementing this policy.

In that connection, and to illustrate just what is being achieved, let me briefly underline the importance of the Defence Department's contribution. Many members of our armed forces have already seen or are currently engaged in active service in countries such as Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Belgium also has a modest presence in Rwanda and Burundi.

Their task is to contribute to stabilising those countries, to keep the peace and to provide humanitarian assistance where needed.

In view of Belgium's strategic interest in this part of Africa and its military expertise in that region of the world, the Belgian Government decided progressively to re-establish the country's presence in Africa – a decision set out in a government statement in 1999 and confirmed in a further statement in 2003.

Today, a new wind of change is blowing through the main government departments involved in foreign policy, all of which are coordinating their work to ensure that that policy is coherent.

Here are some examples of this.

Because, of the importance, *inter alia*, of the Belgian military retaining its Africa expertise, it was decided to create a military and humanitarian partnership between Belgium and Benin. This partnership involved a number of aspects: training provided in Belgium at the Royal Military School; training provided locally; joint training programmes; participation by groups of armed forces from both countries in exercises staged in Belgium and Benin, and a clutch of civilian and military humanitarian cooperation projects (improvement of roads and tracks to open up certain regions, construction of a school, a dispensary and so on). The partnership with Benin was lively and original, not least thanks to Benin itself, which was able to finish off some construction projects under its own steam.

It is important to be clear that there is a world of difference between partnership and neo-colonialism. The two notions are entirely separate, and also quite distinct from the old idea of technical assistance. With a partnership, the partners accept their respective limitations and set themselves a common goal to be achieved within a set timeframe.

In Benin, there is a UNOCI (United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire) support programme involving the formation of a Benin peacekeeping battalion. Benin is to undertake a mission to the Congo in the framework of MONUC (the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Belgium's armed forces are making equipment available to both missions. Additionally, plans are afoot for cooperation with Benin over training in particular areas of action.

After Benin, attention turned to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where considerable progress has been made in the meantime. Following meetings between the Defence Minister and the leaders of the belligerent groups in early 2003, it was decided as a first step in the transition process to form an integrated army composed of units from the various combatant groups. For that purpose it was decided, as a next step, to establish a military partnership with the DRC, as the only solution for securing a successful transition.

In terms of the military aspects alone, it is a huge task. The original number of units had to be reduced and they had to be integrated into coherent structures, then given instruction with a view to training new brigades for the Congolese army.

In that framework Belgium participated in the setting-up of the first such brigade, a challenging task for which there was no guarantee of success. The first integrated brigade was deployed on the ground in the eastern province of Ituri where it successfully replaced a MONUC brigade.

At present a second brigade is being trained by Angola, while Belgium and South Africa are involved in the training of a third at Kamina. It should be noted in this respect that the instructors involved in those efforts were themselves trained in Belgium.

The action in the Congo calls for a balanced and transparent approach, involving contacts and information exchange among the relevant government representatives and all players involved in the transition. It is also essential for the neighbouring countries (Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola) as well as the international community to be kept fully informed. South Africa – which has concluded a tripartite agreement with Belgium and Congo – is the driving force in the community of African states, while Belgium stands in the same position vis-à-vis the countries of Europe.

The partnership with the Congo that was inspired by Belgium's experience with Benin also serves as a model for Rwanda, Burundi and Congo Brazzaville, and the aim is to apply also it to Niger. In each case a cooperation agreement is signed under the auspices of the relevant ministries in Belgium.

Belgium also makes military forces available to UNMIS (United Nations Mission in Sudan) and AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan). It also contributes to the emergency relief efforts in Niger, where it has provided trucks and offered training.

Ladies and gentlemen, I hope these examples serve to illustrate how the expertise of those in the field can support our policy and lead to concrete results and improvements for the populations of the countries concerned.

Thank you very much. I wish you a successful and productive conference.



Assembly President Stef Goris: “delighted” at the number of African parliamentarians attending the conference, but warning that “the scant results of the UN Summit underline the need for the EU to come up with a consistent European strategy to support peace and security in Africa”

Mr Stef GORIS (Belgium, President of the WEU Assembly) (Translation) – Mr Speakers, ladies and gentlemen, allow me first of all to express my heartfelt thanks and those of the Assembly as a whole to both Chambers of the Belgian Parliament for hosting this conference. I would like to warmly welcome all of the participants and express our deep gratitude to the Belgian Government for its active support for this event.

I am particularly happy to see so many participants from the Continent of Africa at this conference, whether they be guest speakers, Speakers or Members of Parliaments, Ambassadors or other representatives of African countries. Your presence here is absolutely essential, for the purpose of today's and tomorrow's discussions is above all to engage and strengthen the dialogue with you.

Indeed, up until now that dialogue has been lacking, although our Assembly has long been interested in the problems of Africa, as is evident for example from the major colloquy it organised in Lisbon in September 1998, or more recently from a report on “The European Union and Peacekeeping in Africa” that I submitted to the plenary session last December on behalf of the Defence Committee.

My activities in connection with the preparation of that report only strengthened my commitment in this area, as well as my conviction that while everyone -including us Europeans- has a fundamental interest in consolidating and enhancing the welfare, prosperity and security of all the peoples on the African Continent, we must, in order to prevent and find lasting solutions to the instability and conflict afflicting many African countries, couple a resolve to provide support and assistance to the countries concerned with a real understanding of the nature and causes of the practical difficulties that they face on the spot. Moreover, it is essential to take better account of the views of all players –African and European alike- with regard to the local situation, for their assessments do not always converge. This is why we have agreed to focus the presentations and debates during this conference on the practical problems arising in the different crisis zones in the context of Euro-African cooperation.



Assembly President Stef Goris in his opening address looks for ways of finding lasting solutions to the instability and conflict in many African countries and consolidating and enhancing the welfare, prosperity and security of all peoples on the African Continent

New prospects for cooperation should open up following the European Union's recent announcement of its resolve to treat peacekeeping in Africa as a priority, an intention which does not yet emerge as clearly from the text of the European Security Strategy.

Indeed, the International Community –which means ourselves- has delayed in setting about tackling Africa's security problems with the necessary determination and consistency, notwithstanding the many national and multinational operations conducted in a number of countries since the 1990's. Unfortunately, we proved to be unable to avert the armed conflict and humanitarian disasters on the Sub-Saharan Continent that claimed so many lives. Do I need to remind you that Angola, the Congo, Rwanda and Sudan lost more than 800,000 lives each and that in Senegal; Sierra Leone and Liberia to the West, as well as in Eritrea and Somalia to the East, the dead can be counted in their tens, or even hundreds of thousands? It was high time for the European Union to adopt a more determine stance.

However, the African Community too must shoulder its responsibilities. Indeed, the creation of the African Union with its Peace and Security Council demonstrates the African community's determination to assume its share of the burden in the area of African peacekeeping and to build the necessary capacities for that purpose. But to achieve its aims it needs the assistance of the International Community and Europe.

However, notwithstanding the work being done in the ESDP framework to implement an action plan aimed at supporting peace and security in Africa, there is no clear evidence of a consistent European Strategy in this area, either with regard to the approach to be adopted to the different problems, or to cooperation with the African Union on the one hand, and the other

international organisations engaged in Africa, such as the United Nations and NATO, on the other.

The need for the European Union to develop such a strategy has been brought home even more clearly by the scant results of the UN summit that ended last week without producing any tangible commitment to reform and to strengthening the UN's operational capabilities in the area of international peacekeeping and crisis management. It is not surprising, then, that the section concerning Africa in the summit final declaration is confined to a vague expression of encouragement and support for "the African regional and sub-regional organisations' initiatives to prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts with the assistance of the United Nations" and for developing and implementing a 10-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union.

Thus it is up to the European Union and other regional entities to implement the necessary measures in cooperation with the countries concerned, the African Union and of course the UN. Indeed this is the purpose of the last resolution on the prevention of conflict in African particular adopted by the UN Security Council last week at the UN Summit, calling for a regional approach, a strengthening of the capacities and responsibilities of organisations like the African Union and for the development of the AU intervention force. For the EU, the funding and training of African peacekeeping capacities are crucial components of the cooperation to be developed with the African Union. Many European countries have special bilateral relations with a number of African countries towards which they have particular responsibilities as former colonial powers. Some of those countries have specific economic and strategic interests in certain regions. Bilateral assistance is still very important, but it must part and parcel of a common European Policy geared to the principles of the UN Charter and UN resolutions, rather to national interests.

As representatives of an interparliamentary European defence body, we clearly take an interest in the military dimension of peacekeeping that is an essential component of crisis management. This is why we have among our guest speakers a number of national and international military experts who will be sharing with us their practical experience of the different crisis areas, so that together we may discuss the lessons to be learned. I urge all speakers to be very

frank, for only then will we have a fruitful discussion of the real problems being faced. I hope that many participants from African countries will take the floor and share their views with us, so that we can establish the necessary dialogue.

The results of this conference will be analysed in depth in a report that is to be submitted on behalf of the Political Committee to the plenary session of our Assembly at the beginning of December. The report will give rise to a number of recommendations to our governments. Thus the content of today's and tomorrow's discussions will shape the proposals that we will be presenting to the governments.

Mr Francois ROELANTS DU VIVIER (Chairman of the Committee on External Relations and Defence of the Belgian Senate) (Translation) – Mr President of the WEU Assembly, Mr Speaker, Mr Minister, honourable Members of Parliament, it is a great pleasure for me to participate on behalf of the Belgian Senate in the opening session of this very timely conference being organised by the Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly on peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa. The deliberations here will provide further input on the subject previously addressed by my honourable colleague from the Chamber of Representatives, Stef Goris, in the report that he submitted in December 2004.

You invited the speakers to be frank, Mr President, so allow me to begin with a somewhat provocative question: does the period 1990-2005 represent fifteen wasted years for Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular? With the cold war over, there were hopes for a political rebirth of this region. It was thought that having divested itself of its colonial heritage and cold war logic it was now ready to build a new era of peace, democracy and economic prosperity. Yet those hopes have been bitterly disappointed. What with failed states leaving their populations to the ravages of civil war, as in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and foreign intervention in neighbouring states leading even to genocide, as in Rwanda, Africa has been cut to the quick and has paid with its own blood for the greed, pillaging, lack of political judgement and the inhumanity of some of its leaders, and for the blindness and passiveness of the international community.

Those conflicts appear to us to be pointless and incomprehensible. In just a few months they have ruined the results of years of individual and collective development efforts. They are marked by their regional character and the fact that they involve a whole host of different (state and non-state) belligerents: government forces, rebel and criminal groups and militias, not to mention private military forces. But they are also characterised by their economic dimension, the major strategic issues at stake and military methods involving unrestrained brutality against civilians.

In spite of a number of failures on the part of the international community – I am thinking for example of Somalia, Rwanda and Angola – Africa has developed regional instruments for the prevention and management of conflicts. The European Union has supported that effort by cooperating extensively with regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa in order to promote their development. It has also funded training programmes for African military peacekeeping forces. Indeed, that training must continue, given the complexity of the situations in which the African forces are called upon to intervene. In recent years African forces have intervened more and more regularly in conflict situations calling for a specific peacebuilding and peace enforcement capability. Although for a long time the EU confined itself to using economic and trade assistance instruments, since the mid-1990s, following the tragedies in Somalia and Rwanda, it has developed a genuine conflict-prevention strategy, placing particular emphasis on the root causes of and structural reasons for those conflicts. For that it has been able to draw on the work done by WEU, which identified a number of areas for intervention, such as the supply of equipment, logistics, and communications. Its resolve needed to be translated into action, which meant coordinating national initiatives, developing relations with the United Nations and above all helping Africa to take its own destiny fully in hand. Indeed, there is growing recognition of the link between development and security, a point that Minister De Decker, a former President of the WEU Assembly, will most certainly emphasise later. A coherent development policy, an ambitious foreign policy and a security policy guaranteeing a peaceful environment are all elements which must be combined to make a lasting contribution to security in Africa and for the peoples of Africa. Europe has demonstrated through Operation Artemis its political resolve and military capacity for limited intervention in specific theatres of conflict in Africa. There are numerous advantages to conducting a military operation under the EU banner: not only the neutrality of the countries concerned, but also the fact that Europe has a range of instruments for implementing civilian support policies. The EU engagement in the Congo is an excellent illustration. The EUPOL mission in Kinshasa, following on quite naturally from Operation Artemis, has the task of training and advising the Integrated Police Unit responsible for the security of the government and interim institutions. The EUSEC mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo is assisting the Congolese authorities with security sector reform in this country. This is why we need to continue developing the instruments, capabilities and political will of the EU member states so that they can take practical action to promote the security and stability of the African continent. The WEU Assembly's role is not just to scrutinise decisions *a posteriori*, but also to contribute actively to determining the possibilities, highlighting the shortfalls and strengthening the resolve of politicians, so that they take appropriate decisions. In so doing the Assembly is fulfilling its democratic role of promoting developments and monitoring the policies implemented. Europe has a moral duty with regard to Africa. We must work side-by-side with the Africans in a spirit of genuine partnership in order to promote their development. We must help them build the security environment they need to secure their future. We now have all the necessary

instruments at our disposal. They must now be coordinated and used in a determined and pragmatic fashion in a spirit of solidarity. I wish your Assembly well in its efforts to contribute to that objective.

FIRST SITTING

Chairman: Mr Stef GORIS (Belgium) President of the WEU Assembly

Factors threatening peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa



Conference keynote speaker, Armand De Decker, assessing the results of the UN World Summit which he attended in his capacity as Belgium's Minister for Development Cooperation. The summit's final declaration could be seen as a major step towards recognition by the international community of its collective responsibility to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing and war crimes

Mr Armand DE DECKER (Belgium, Minister for Development Cooperation) (Translation) – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I should first of all like to thank my friend Stef Goris for inviting me to take the floor at this conference, which has been organised by the Assembly of WEU, an institution I hold dear because I was a member of it for over 18 years and even had the privilege of being its President.

There are sometimes happy coincidences in the timing of events which can imbue a speech with optimism and a ray of hope. If the parliamentary Assembly of WEU had convened this conference ten days earlier, I would be addressing you in a different frame of mind. I would without doubt be trying to persuade you of the need to find practical solutions for peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa but I would be speaking as someone with virtually no ammunition other than his personal hopes and convictions, able to cite as a model only those peacekeeping operations that depend solely on the goodwill of nations.

However, in the wake of the Millennium Plus Five Summit, which has just been held in New York, I am today addressing this conference with renewed hope and confidence as a result of the bold and ambitious decisions the United Nations has adopted as regards peacemaking and the responsibility to protect. This responsibility legitimises and establishes the international community's right of intervention, affords better

protection of human rights and recognises the principle of different sorts of threats being interconnected. Among other things it places the focus on the link between peace and development. That link is essential for preventing internal conflicts from escalating and is also indispensable for making peacekeeping operations the basis on which there can be peaceful and democratic reconstruction of states in crisis.

This conference is therefore most timely especially as there have just been elections in Burundi which have brought more than a decade of conflict to a close, and because the Democratic Republic of Congo too is now committed to the process of democratic transition.

I hope that our meeting today will help all of us to identify a number of points on which we should reflect for the future.

For my own part, I should like to mention three aspects which in my view should guide our considerations.

First of all, there is the fact that development cooperation can no longer be seen as something that depends on what used to be perceived as vaguely paternal charity, which eased the conscience of the wealthier countries at little cost. Today it involves an awareness of the change in our strategic environment and of the fact that the instability of the South now constitutes the main threat to the stability of the North. This was recently given prominence in the report produced by the high-level experts appointed by the UN Secretary-General and in the final declaration adopted last Friday in New York at the World Summit. This brings me back to the connection I mentioned earlier between peace and development, of which I shall speak at greater length in a few minutes. Our European development cooperation policy should therefore be considered in the wider framework of all the policies concerned, including the security and defence dimension.

The second aspect we need to consider is the fact that development depends on a number of fundamental preconditions which of course include good governance and free and fair trade and, above all, peace and security. It is illusory to imagine that there can be economic and social development in a country if its inhabitants are unable to move around freely, cultivate the soil, or trade in total freedom without being exposed to risks and the danger of atrocities. Not to mention the need for education, the establishment and maintenance of a health service, basic infrastructure, or of course the need for economic growth and research, vital for the future of the countries concerned but impossible in a situation of war when young people are usually the main victims.

The third aspect is the fact that the context in which we should be working for peace has changed considerably over the last decade. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, Africa had to contend with the effects of two main geopolitical trends: decolonisation and the cold war. Today it finds itself confronted with conflicts which now have no ideological basis. Sometimes they stem from inter-ethnic tensions, sometimes from atrocities carried out by armed groups which in many cases are not subject to any control or may be manipulated, but their barbaric actions are directed primarily against the civil population and mainly against those who are weakest: women, children and the elderly.

Peacekeeping operations in Central Africa have not always been successful. The dramatic, even scandalous, case of UNAMIR's failure in Rwanda is sufficient proof of this.

However, we know – as the example of ONUB, the United Nations Operation in Burundi, proved – that these missions can succeed and be significant provided they are carried out with resolve and are supported by the international community.

We all know of the difficulties MONUC, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is encountering. One particular problem is the lack of a good system of communications between the MONUC units and the Congolese people. But at least MONUC is present and the action it is taking, albeit criticised in some quarters, is essential for the transition that is taking place in the DRC.

Its role is all the more crucial in that it is covering a huge area and bringing to the towns and provinces where its soldiers are on patrol a minimum of the stability that is essential for the basic infrastructure to function properly. As the electoral process slowly gets under way, MONUC provides a military presence which ensures security for the electorate and the political classes and at the same time intimidates groups and individuals opposed to the process of democratic transition.

Belgium will continue to support the United Nations in this mission and to raise awareness in other countries and Europe as a whole in order to bring home the urgent need to keep making the financial contributions that enable MONUC – the biggest peacekeeping operation in the history of the United Nations – to continue and complete its mandate.

As you may know, Belgium is also ready, in the framework of trilateral action with the United Nations, to finance the deployment within MONUC of a battalion from Benin.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have already said on a number of occasions that Belgium fully intends to shoulder its responsibilities and carry out its duty of solidarity with the poorest countries, with a view to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals – a hugely important project as we were reminded only last week in New York. Belgium's public development aid will this year increase from 0.40% to 0.45% of its GNP and our objective remains 0.7% for the 2010 horizon.

Allow me to dwell for a few moments on the outcome of the World Summit held to review the Millennium Declaration, which I attended last week. I have already stressed the importance of the decisions taken in New York. I am personally very satisfied with the results that were achieved as they were much better than was feared at the outset.

Of course, they are not perfect and do not meet all our expectations, but what is important to my way of thinking is that we were able to set a new agenda for the future and come up with a recipe with the ingredients necessary for strengthening the role of the United Nations and deepening the reform process that is already under way.

The final document formally adopted last Friday contains a proposal based on a security consensus for a new conceptual framework enveloping development, security and human rights.

In their final declaration the member states reaffirm the Millennium Development Goals, condemn terrorism, decide to establish a Peacebuilding Commission, recognise the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, express the desire to reform the Security Council and agree to create a Human Rights Council.

Another issue giving cause for satisfaction is the concept of good governance which has a central place in the adopted text. As everyone knows, neither stability nor sustainable economic development is possible without good governance.

On the matter of peace and collective security, I should like to outline what I consider to be the most important issues.

The member states reaffirmed the concept of interconnected threats and in particular the link between peace and development, which was at the centre of the report of the High-Level Panel. This is in itself a major victory.

Regarding the use of force, the idea of developing specific criteria was not approved, but what is of crucial importance is the statement that the provisions of the UN Charter in this connection continue to be valid and to suffice. In other words, the message is that the 2002-03 Iraq crisis has not given rise to a fundamental challenge to the system of peace and security based on international law, which allows recourse to the use of force in only two cases: legitimate defence and where the Security Council gives its authorisation.

The member states were able to make a political statement consisting of a clear and unqualified condemnation of terrorism. In fact, for the first time they condemn terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes”. They undertook to conclude, during the 60th Session of the General Assembly, a Convention on International Terrorism. While they did not, it is true, manage to reach agreement on a common definition of terrorism, they did support the concept of a global strategy for fighting terrorism on the basis of a draft text proposed by Kofi Annan, whose main points could be described as the “5 Ds”: *detering* recourse to terrorism, *denying* terrorists the resources they need to act, *dissuading* states from supporting terrorism, *developing* the capability of states to take action and *defending* human rights in the fight against terrorism.

Without wishing to go so far as to claim that the causes of present-day terrorism can be attributed to extreme poverty and under-development – after all, there are very poor countries whose citizens do not resort to blind and gratuitous violence – it seems obvious to me that economic and social development and the fight against inequality and exclusion help to mitigate anger and frustration with the slow pace of social development and certainly help to prevent the growth of a culture of violence and terror.

As regards peacebuilding we should welcome the fact that a practical and operational decision was taken concerning the High-Level Panel’s most original proposal, namely, the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body which will have the task of helping countries emerging from an armed conflict.

It is true that some of the practical aspects will need to be fine-tuned over the months ahead, but the decision is in itself a signal that is strong enough for everyone to give it their support. In the weeks and months to come, the member states will have to keep up their political will and we must ensure that the supreme body which will supervise the new body, that is to say the Security Council or the General Assembly, does not scale down its ambitions or the resources before the Commission has even had time to act.

It is most important that the Commission’s mandate should be the subject of an agreement whereby countries emerging from a crisis will be assisted throughout the consolidation and reconstruction phase. To that end there should be an integrated approach based on strategic coordination between political authorities and those promoting development both within and without the UN system. I am thinking, for example, of the active involvement of international finance institutions. This new architecture should allow the international community to enter into a clearer and more sustained commitment for the duration of the transition phase during which countries emerging from a crisis are often prone to lapse back into violence, as we have seen happen in Africa.

For Belgium, the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission is extremely important and we strongly advocate that its scope for action be put to immediate use, subject to an analysis of its (future) *modus operandi*, in the region of the Great Lakes and in particular in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.

Finally, the adoption of the principle of the responsibility to protect puts the international community under an obligation to take action in the event of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes, thus making collective action in such cases legitimate, and this includes the use of force where necessary.

In conceptual terms it probably marks the most notable and significant advance made in the New York final document because until now the idea of “interference” in the internal affairs of a state was quite simply taboo in the United Nations.

At this point I would like to pay tribute to the resolve of all our EU partners, whose collective diplomacy was essential for these decisions to be adopted. At the same time, I welcome the fact that the United States was able to overcome its initial reservations and wholeheartedly support this remarkable step forward in international law.

It would of course be dishonest not to admit that the New York summit did not succeed in making more progress in other areas of key importance for international stability and for a more universal representation of the main international players in the Security Council.

As you know, it was not possible move forward on the question of disarmament and non-proliferation. This is the weak point in the final document as we were unable to reach agreement on a text on that issue. However, it does

contain one paragraph endorsing the programme of action to prevent combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and another on the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, two important subjects for Belgium.

No agreement was possible on the subject of reforming the UN Security Council. The heads of state and government merely stated that they supported “early reform of the Security Council ... in order to make it more broadly representative”. They committed themselves to continuing their efforts to achieve a decision to that end and requested the General Assembly to review progress on the reform proposals by the end of 2005. Belgium’s position on this matter is well known: we are in favour of a Security Council that is more representative of contemporary geopolitical realities.

What now needs to be done is to give rapid effect to what was agreed.

That is why the 60th session of the General Assembly, which is taking place this week under the Swedish Presidency, is so important. Its first task, in the field of peace and collective security, is to examine the United Nations’ global strategy for fighting terrorism and then move on to the procedure for ratifying and applying 12 universally applicable legal instruments, the international Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and, above all, the draft of a comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which is to be negotiated during the session.

Over and above the initiatives we are taking in the framework of our bilateral policy – and here I would mention the action we are taking with our African and European partners to reform the Congolese armed forces, Belgium has for six years consistently urged the international community to give Africa the right priority on its agenda. I think I can say that to a large extent we have succeeded and that this fits in with our perception of international solidarity and our wish to see a more European approach to development cooperation.

Even though there is at the present time some pessimism about Europe, I for one will not cease to argue in favour of “more Europe”, and my many official visits strengthen me in my belief that, particularly in Africa, many people want Europe to redress the balance in a world which has become too “unipolar”. To come back to the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, everyone will no doubt remember the success of Operation Artemis in 2002 in the Ituri region. In addition to its peacekeeping or even peacebuilding role in the field, it was a good example of what a European security policy could and should become.

The European Union is still present in the Democratic Republic of Congo with its EUSEC and EUPOL missions. Although these are not peacekeeping operations as such, they are certainly intended to restore the confidence of the Congolese in their army and police force.

I think we should keep up all these efforts even if some of our EU partners are a little reticent, or less enthusiastic.

As I see it there is a twofold challenge in this European dimension of our participation in endeavours to establish conditions conducive to restoring peace and stability. In the first place, there is the challenge of being what we wish to be – a power for peace and an example for others. Then there is the challenge, which is perhaps just as crucial, of generating interest and establishing solidarity among the peoples on both continents. Through our action we shall of course be showing solidarity with the countries in which we act together as the European Union. It should develop naturally and will grow in strength when, together, we take practical action for the well being of all those involved.

This European example will also lend force to our argument that Africa should itself set up cooperation arrangements and dare to act as Africa when the situation of a country on the continent so requires. We must welcome the political will of the African Union and the action it is taking today in Darfur to restore and maintain peace.

These examples of what the European Union can do and of what the African Union is trying to do should make us look towards the future and start thinking now about creating structures which will enable us to do our job for a long time to come.

Educating, training and equipping regular armies is a daunting but essential task for establishing a climate of peace and security. Some European and African countries have already carried out a number of joint military exercises. Such military cooperation is useful, particularly as its objective is to strengthen the peacekeeping capabilities of African units participating in the exercises and because it includes a course of instruction that goes further than tactical lessons and covers other areas such as humanitarian law and armed conflicts, or consolidating basic first aid skills. However, the scale of the task is well beyond the capabilities of any EU member state acting alone.

I therefore believe that there is a great deal of work to be done in order to carry through the “European project” and I submit to you for reflection the idea of creating in central Africa a large military base to be shared by the African Union and the European Union.

In addition to the considerable logistic advantages this would have, a permanent well equipped and maintained base of this sort would allow us to continue and deepen the process of educating and training African armed forces according to the highest criteria of effectiveness, operability and ethics. Furthermore, it would enable European armed forces to continue to train regularly in Africa and thus maintain their know-how and expertise in the field.

Ladies and gentlemen, the time when we might have indulged in having reservations and prevaricating is past. The human drama unfolding in Darfur, the persistent state of insecurity in eastern Congo or northern Uganda and the precarious security situation in Côte d'Ivoire require urgent action. But such action must be based on a long-term perspective and the European Union has a crucial role to play in this respect.

Peace is not an abstract concept and it is not just the absence of war. In the words of Saint Exupéry it can be said to exist only when children are born, when crops are harvested and when houses are in order. I hope that the European Union will see that its destiny lies in achieving that ambition and that it will carve out a role in the world as a power which can “cement cracks and pacify the force of volcanoes”.

Mr Arnaud AKODJENOU (Benin, Director of the Emergency and Security Service, UN High Commission for Refugees) (Summary) – speaking on behalf of the High Commissioner Mr Guterres who had been detained by last-minute obligations, remarked that the lack of good governance – to which he would also add the adjective “global” – was the main factor which exacerbated conflict in Africa. Other factors which might usefully be discussed were the terms of trade between Africa and the international community, the weakness of the national and international machinery for resolving conflicts, the failure to properly exploit the continent’s natural resources and the proliferation of light weapons. Armed conflict stood in the way of democratisation and development in Africa, and in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. It resulted in state failure, mass violations of human rights and flows of refugees and displaced persons. It exacerbated the effects of natural disasters, such as famine, used up scarce resources and was an obstacle to trade and tourism. It disrupted family structures, leading to traumatised children who became accustomed to a culture of violence.



Arnaud Akodjenou, Director of the Emergency and Security Service at the UN High Commission for Refugees referring to the devastating effects of small arms and light weapons in African conflicts. Both European and African countries have a responsibility to halt their proliferation

However nothing new needed to be invented in order to prevent armed conflict. The United Nations had produced a report containing some thirty recommendations and stressing, among other things, the important role to be played by regional organisations, states and the international community. The UN Security Council had adopted Resolution 57/337 in July 2003 highlighting the major role to be played by civil society in preventing conflict. Indeed this was important, because the members of society were not only the passive victims of conflict but sometimes also active players themselves.

Mr Akodjenou agreed with Mr De Decker that the “triptych” of development, security and respect for human rights provided the basis for peace. The power of peace resided in peoples’ minds, as Mr De Decker had said, and education was therefore a key factor. The EU and the international community must set an example in that regard. The notion of human rights must be inculcated and if necessary imposed at all levels of society.

Mr Matadi NENGA GAMANDA (replacing Mr Kamitatu) (Vice-President of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Congo) (Summary) apologised for the absence, due to other commitments, of his President, Mr Olivier Kamitatu, on whose behalf he was addressing the Conference. While peace was essential for full human development and social and economic progress it came at the price of collective agreement on common goals and shared interests. Since independence this situation had not obtained in Africa. Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa was a fragile commodity: interethnic divisions were rife, leading to armed conflict of one sort or another that continued today. War hindered Africa’s development. It choked off investment, destroyed countries’ social and economic fabric and provided untold opportunities for corrupt leaderships to milk their countries dry and favour their own. The main losers were the people, as war

aggravated poverty and disease in addition to depriving them of security. He advocated four practical approaches to helping found peace in the region. Firstly, African countries should practise diplomacy towards one another and seek to settle ethnic and other disputes through direct dialogue with one another, Diplomacy was something Africa practised only with the rest of the world. It should develop its own internal diplomacy to help create intergovernmental consensus. Secondly, on the military and humanitarian front, countries' should seek to disband armed militia operating within their territories and where appropriate integrate some of their members into viable national armies, capable of defending their countries from outside attack. Others should be demobilised and helped to find their place once again in civilian society. Lastly, ex-fighters should be encouraged to turn in their weapons. Congo was using this approach with some success with the assistance of the international community. Thirdly, there must simultaneously be a "good governance" approach. In Africa, examples of good governance did exist although they were perhaps insufficiently publicised. If African countries put their own house in order they would be able to make better use of their own resources and demand less aid. International assistance here was however vital for success. Fourthly, international aid was still needed. Much had been given, by the EU, the UN through its various missions, and others, and was much appreciated: but more was still needed. Africa wanted peace and development. A sick Africa would infect Europe and the rest of the world – illegal immigration from the one continent to the other attested to the fact. Africa looked to its European partners, particularly the Union, to continue to support it generously.

Discussion

Major General Cyrille NDAYIRUKIYE (Defence Attaché, Burundi) explained that when he had asked for the floor, he had not properly understood the theme of the conference. Burundi had little experience of peacekeeping. It was a very small and poor country and had had a two-year long civil war; it had looked as though a miracle was needed. Yet to the great surprise of the international community and Burundian society and notwithstanding all the difficulties, the peace process had yielded amazing results, with the election of the President and the establishment of democratic institutions. The international community's commitment should be underlined. Indeed the 2002 peacekeeping operation owed its success to the various forms of international aid that had been provided as well as, in particular, to the realistic and pragmatic approach that had been adopted. An important dialogue had been launched when the first South African unit had arrived in Burundi in order to make it possible for the country's political leader to return. That dialogue had continued, making it possible not only to set up the United Nations mission, and to take account of the will of the people and that of the various belligerent groups, but also take on board the various objective and subjective factors which had caused the war, making it possible to define priorities and tackle problems with the necessary means and expertise. The peace process had been launched in Burundi in all its complexity. However, not all the problems had been resolved, and he wondered how best to ensure the lasting success of that process.

Lord RUSSELL JOHNSTON (United Kingdom) referred to the question of the proliferation of small arms in Sub-Saharan Africa, which had been mentioned in passing by the Speaker, Mr Akodjenou. Lord Russell observed that these made a considerable contribution to the death toll. With reference to the speech given by Mr De Decker, and in particular to his comments on the European Union's efforts to play a constructive role in Africa, he remarked that there was another side to EU policy on the Continent of Africa, related to arms procurements. He recalled that the United Kingdom, France and Germany were among the biggest exporters of weapons in the world and asked Mr Akodjenou if he had any information about the supply lines and sources of small arms in Africa and whether he saw any way of preventing their proliferation.

Mr Laurent AKOUN (President of the Commission of National Security of the Parliament of Côte d'Ivoire) referred to the "trilogy" of development, security and human rights mentioned earlier by Minister De Decker. He noted that wars in Africa were based not on ideology, but on poverty. He likened the rebels to predators, whose sole concern was to empty the state's vaults. Mr Akoun cited his own country as an example, underlining that although 26% of the population was non-Ivorian, the reasons for their insurrection resided not in their segregation from the rest of society, but in their impoverishment. He stressed that endemic state poverty was the main security problem throughout Africa. Since 1980, he said, the state of Côte d'Ivoire had to all practical purposes disappeared, in the name of neo-liberal principles, although almost 80% of the population depended on it for their existence. This in his view explained the appearance of armed gangs and all the other the security problems in his country.

Mr Akoun recalled furthermore that the deployment of French troops in Côte d'Ivoire was confined to the south of the country, leaving the arms dealers operating in the north free to pursue their activities with impunity. It had been the government forces, he said, and not the French expeditionary force, that had protected the capital when it had been threatened by the rebels. Although there had been nine UN Security Council Resolutions on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, his country remained divided. Mr Akoun called on the European Union to take matters into its own hands and not to let everything be decided by France, simply because it happened to be the former colonial power in his region. He questioned France's good will in the matter, as well as its willingness to defend Ivorian interests when these ran counter to its own. He called for a genuinely multipolar approach to Africa's security issues in order to by-pass the traditional

role of France as Africa's "gendarme". This was in his view the only approach that would help matters in Africa and that would work in the interests of its peoples rather than those of its former colonial masters.

Mr Renzo GUBERT (Senator, Italy) drew attention to the two aspects of the security problem in Africa that he deemed to be the most important for the Europeans, simply because they had actually created them themselves.

The first was the fact that the European colonial powers had left Africa divided into more or less artificial nation states, with borders that had nothing to do with the ethnic and historical background of the regions concerned. Those artificial borders had initially been drawn not to secure peace and stability on the Continent, but to serve the powers' own strategic and economic interests. Even the very notion of the nation state, as it had been developed in 19th century Europe, was in his view entirely inappropriate for a continent that represented a huge mosaic of ethnic groups and tribal cultures. How then might it be possible to remedy those structural weaknesses of the African state model? Since for reasons of political pragmatism it was necessary to rule out the peaceful renegotiation of all country borders in Africa, the Senator favoured the solution of replacing existing states with loose confederations of states allowing a large degree of autonomy to their component parts while encouraging cross-border cooperation on a local community level. He asked whether the EU countries would be willing to examine and encourage such a radical solution to Africa's security problems that could entail the adoption of a state model closer to that of Switzerland than to that of the nation state.

The second factor was Europe's overwhelming cultural, political and economic influence over Africa. Mr Gubert wondered whether it was right for Europe to direct the entire African economy solely towards exporting mineral and agricultural products at a low cost and whether such a policy truly served the interests of the African people. He also questioned whether it made sense for the African countries to adopt European political forms, functions and ideologies to the letter. The African countries too had a rich history of communal self governance at a local level that should not be ignored in favour of copying European democratic institutions at state level. Furthermore he considered traditional communal forms of government to be far better adapted than the European nation state model to the mixed ethnic environment of Africa. He wondered whether the African countries were ready to place more trust in institutions rooted in their own political and cultural heritage and whether Europe would be willing to help them in that direction by admitting that its system of governance was too closely related to its own historical background to always be able to serve as a model for establishing political institutions elsewhere in the world.

Mr José MENDES BOTA (Portugal) referred to the 2000 Cairo Summit that had established the multilateral political framework for European-African relations. He claimed that a strong development policy was the only real tool for securing peace in Africa by combating the root causes of conflict and terrorism on that continent: poverty, misery and under-development. He stressed the useful role to be played by the EU-AU joint committee, in particular as regards helping the African states to understand the new opportunities as well as complexities linked with the development of the ESDP and EU enlargement. It was important, particularly in light of the lack of interest in Africa's strategic importance that had been shown within the EU in recent years, that these new realities should not change EU priorities as regards contributing to African development and stability. Mr Mendes Bota urged European countries to overcome their reluctance to become directly involved in resolving major crises like those in Somalia in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, and especially to commit the necessary ground forces for stabilising the situation.

On the other hand, Mr Bota strongly supported the idea of the African Union acquiring its own means for autonomous intervention in crises and underlined that the funding of the AU Peace Facility should not be discontinued. Conflict prevention was preferable to crisis management, and the AU peacekeeping institutions had an important role to play for that purpose. In his view, therefore, the EU's development policy and the ESPD were and should remain closely related, in order to tackle not only the symptoms, but primarily the causes of conflict and terrorism.

Finally, he found it regrettable that no representatives of Angola or Mozambique had been invited to the Conference, since he felt they would have had much to say on the subject of resolving crises by peaceful means and negotiation.

Mr Andebrhan WELDEGIORGIS (Eritrean Ambassador) cited the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia as one which had been left to deteriorate due to the international community's passivity and lack of interest. After a two-year war between the two countries, a peace treaty had been signed in 2000 under UN auspices. The EU, AU, UN and US had established a Boundary Commission whose decisions were supposed to be final and binding. However, due to Ethiopian opposition the border that the Commission had come up with in April 2002 for demarcation by October 2003 had yet to be finalised, in spite of repeated UN Security Council resolutions calling on Ethiopia to cooperate in this matter. The Eritrean representative deplored the fact that in the face of Ethiopian intransigence the international community had done nothing but issue toothless resolutions.

Mr Weldegiorgis asked whether in the light of these developments the international community and the EU in particular were prepared to shoulder the responsibility for enforcing or at least facilitating the implementation of the

provisions of the peace treaty which Ethiopia had so far failed to abide by, in order to avert a fresh outbreak of war between the two countries.

Mr Charles GOERENS (Rapporteur, former Cooperation Minister of Luxembourg and former President of the WEU Assembly) said that it was important to distinguish between the direct and indirect causes of conflicts. He would concentrate on the former. He asked whether there had ever been a crisis that had not been prevented solely due to the lack of or late reception of the relevant information on the part of the international community. If the answer was yes, he would like to know when this had been the case, and if it was no, he wondered what other explanations could be given for the international community's failure to intervene in time.

Mr Arnauld AKODJENOU replied that he had no answer to that question and that he thought no-one had. There had not been any conflicts over the past fifteen years which could be attributed to a single cause. On the contrary, crises had always had multiple causes. Referring to his personal experience as UN mediator during the crises in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, he claimed that in both cases the outbreak of hostilities had been clearly foreseeable. The same thing was true for the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region. However, should one wish to pinpoint the primary cause of all the conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, it would have to be the absence of good governance, and the resulting failure to ensure the fair distribution of important natural resources even when these were available nearby. Hence the population found itself deprived of such fundamental resources as food and water, and the provision of law and order. It was therefore crucial to provide African nations with the necessary resources to accomplish these basic state functions. It was important to educate their populations on both their civic duties and their human rights, but also to educate local elites and governments about their basic and unavoidable obligations towards the citizens of their countries. Nigeria and Liberia were a case in point: they were countries with rich oil reserves, and yet their population saw little of the profits from the exploitation of those reserves. Thus crisis prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa was closely linked to overcoming these deficiencies and the lack of good governance in the upper echelons of those societies. This should be a major aim of the international community.

Mr Charles GOERENS, Rapporteur, replied that he totally agreed with Mr Akodjenou, who had set out the best way of dealing with security issues in the long term. However, his question had been intended to elicit an answer to the question of whether the international community had received sufficiently early warning of the Rwandan or Nigerian crisis to be able to effectively respond before things got out of hand. His question had been rhetorical, as in his view Europe always knew what was happening on the ground well before it decided to intervene militarily. He concluded that the problem was a considerable lack of key military resources on the part of the EU, which therefore needed to be remedied.

Mr Ebenezer SEKYL-HUGHES (Speaker of Parliament, Ghana) explained that his comments would focus on West Africa. That part of the continent included some of the poorest countries with a strong colonial past. It included Nigeria, with its considerable oil reserves, and medium-sized countries like Niger. Those countries were composed of many different ethnic groups whose loyalty to a modern state was difficult to obtain and which were easily manipulated by their elites. The countries' wealth was unevenly distributed in both rural and urban areas. Following independence these countries might have been expected to develop economically, but that had been an illusion. Their leaders' attitude had often had a negative impact that had been aggravated by the cold war. The end of the latter had not led to the hoped-for democratisation. The leaders had mismanaged their countries and fallen far short of their promises in the area of security. In some cases ethnic differences had been manipulated. Thus West Africa had been plunged into instability during the period from 1989 – date at which the United States had decided to intervene in order to avoid an escalation – to 1992 and the conflict in Sierra Leone, which was not necessarily linked to the Liberian conflict. Since then the African Union had endeavoured to intervene, but without any real success. Nevertheless that institution should not be neglected and it was important to promote transparency, which was lacking in certain transition countries.

Mr Lluís Maria DE PUIG (Spain) said a new dimension to cooperation with Africa was necessary and that a commitment from Europe was needed to resolve its problems. It was a sad comment on the state of the world that it was constantly necessary for Europe to envisage providing military assistance to Africa. The presence of troops from the international community could also be useful for humanitarian and even peacemaking purposes. WEU had made efforts in that area which had not been followed up. However peace required more than one-off military interventions. It also had to be seen in the context of globalisation. Latin America was a telling example: there formerly poor and undemocratic countries were now emerging from their situation of crisis. There was no denying the fact, however, that Africa had been left on the sidelines. Why had it not been possible for the African countries to emerge? All the different players were to blame, the European countries and the West in general, but also the Africans themselves. How did undemocratic and corrupt countries receive aid without any control being exercised over the use to which it was put? The African states had a long way to go. The European Union was already the main contributor to the security of the continent. But this was still not enough; it fell short of expectations. Spain had declared at the UN that its priority in the area of cooperation and development was Africa. This was to be welcomed, but it was not enough. Africa's geo-strategic situation called for a democratic and cultural commitment on the part of the international community as a whole, including to conducting peacekeeping operations whenever necessary.

Mr Cheik FITA FITA DIBWE (Democratic Republic of Congo) remarked that he would have been disappointed had Mr Akodjenou not mentioned what in his view was the key priority: that of education. He noted that while he was addressing the conference the children of his country, the Democratic Republic of Congo, were not at school but on the streets. The government was unable to pay the teachers. The country was still paying the price of a situation which had been going on for ten years.

It was in this lack of education that the seeds of violence were to be found. It was urgent to tackle that violence at the roots in order to resolve the country's problems. There were numerous deficiencies to be deplored. The parliamentarians of the DRC had never been democratically elected and hence had no legitimacy to speak on behalf of the country's citizens. Members of parliament were appointed by the executive, so how could they exercise scrutiny over it? The enemies of the electoral process were the parliamentarians themselves. This explained why the people did not feel involved and were weary of the present system. An "independent" electoral committee was now running everything from the top and had no direct contacts with citizens. It was important to turn once again towards the sovereign people so that they could live in a genuine representative democracy.

Another seed of violence was the fact that all the media were muzzled. There was still no freedom of expression in the DRC. Furthermore, legislation was adopted without consulting the many Congolese who lived abroad. They had no representatives in parliament despite the fact that they contributed a billion dollars to the country's economy, whereas the government was unable to mobilise even 100 000 dollars per year. A congress of expatriate Congolese had recently been organised at which parliamentarians had been called on to put pressure on the government to remedy the situation. Mr Fita declared that he would continue to fight the cause of the DRC and promote it elsewhere in the world.

Mr João MOTA AMARAL (Portugal) found that the present conference provided a useful forum for dialogue which he welcomed, although he thought that his parliamentary colleagues from the Great Lakes Region would also have liked to air their views. He proposed soon to organise a meeting with them.

He noted that Europe and Africa had many common interests. During the cold war the USSR had had a strong presence in Africa. Now there was a newcomer to this zone of influence: China. The European countries nevertheless had a number of strategic interests to defend: rejecting colonialism and promoting solidarity between the two continents.

Africa was afflicted by many problems: diseases, civil wars, proliferation, poverty, corruption. This is why a stronger EU presence was necessary, if need be in cooperation with the AU and with the support of the United Nations. To be effective Europe must be cautious but active in its approach.

He ended with two remarks: attention should be paid to the recent presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau; the EU needed to keep an eye on that country. On the other hand high hopes were pinned on developments in southern Africa. South Africa was making big efforts to overcome the legacy of apartheid, while Angola and Mozambique were taking numerous constructive initiatives in order to improve the situation at national level.

Replies

Mr Arnaud AKODJENOU thanked the speakers and proposed to directly answer the question concerning small arms. He agreed that in most cases the producers of those weapons were not the countries involved in conflicts themselves, but the major arms-exporting countries. There was no document within the UN system concerning the ways in which arms trading took place and the channels through which those weapons entered the countries.

He took the view that the EU should become active as of the initial phases of tension, as in most regions or countries of conflict the first signs of crisis became evident very early on. The approach had to be one of conflict prevention: arms-producing countries should develop a mechanism in order not to export any arms into countries where a conflict was likely to erupt. Early prevention was in his view imperative.

Mr Matadi NENGA GAMANDA observed that there had been more comments than questions. With reference to a comment about the structures inherited from the colonial era and which led to conflicts, and the proposal to create a federal system, he remarked that this was a good analysis, but that in reality there was strong opposition to federal systems, due to the fear of secession or falling apart. Indeed, while such proposals were certainly well intended, they were not always harmless, as a state within the federation could easily aspire to become a state in its own right, which could generate a conflict. Nigeria, as a state structure based on the religious characteristics of its regions, might provide a model. The Berlin conference, however, could not be undone. Africa had been shaped according to the interests of the colonial powers, not those of the Africans themselves, giving rise to problems of cohabitation. An experiment on extensive decentralisation or 'light' federalism was currently being conducted in the DRC. Under that system the provinces were to receive a certain degree of autonomy, in particular as regards finances. This would make it

possible to decentralise the administration to some extent. However, the choice of provincial administrators was of the utmost importance.

SECOND SITTING

Chairman: Mr Philippe Monfils (Belgium), Leader of the Belgian Delegation and Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly

Experiences in military peacekeeping operations in Sub-Saharan Africa



Lieutenant-General Frédéric Vandigenen, Deputy-Chief of Defence Staff, Head of Operations and Training, Belgium, discussing post-conflict measures in the Democratic Republic of Congo and support to the formation of the first integrated brigade in Kisangani

Lieutenant-General Frédéric VANDINGENEN (Belgium, Deputy-Chief of the Defence Staff for Operations and Training) (Translation) – Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to say first of all that I have the honour of being here today to address you on behalf of Mr André Flahaut, Minister of Defence of Belgium, who, because of other commitments, regrets he is unable to be present on this occasion.

It is also a very great pleasure for me to take part in this Conference, which has been organised by the Assembly of Western European Union. I am the more happy to be present given that the title of your Conference is: “Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach”. My own view, in fact, is that it is most important, in a process as significant as integrating the army in a country emerging from a prolonged, intense and bloody conflict that the emphasis should fall on the highly practical measures that need to be taken to support that process. Too often, the international community concentrates its attention on overall plans and programmes, on the bigger picture, on making sure the transition process passes off smoothly while the implementation of practical measures tends to be overlooked. The Belgian Government for its part decided rather to take the opposite approach: to take practical measures in consultation and partnership with the authorities concerned, to implement them quickly so as to move things forward gradually to take the heat out of crisis situations and lower the level of tension. As far as Belgium is concerned, we are either taking part or have taken part, directly or indirectly, in peacekeeping operations in a number of countries: in Afghanistan,

Bosnia, Kosovo, and Côte d’Ivoire by supporting the Benin force. But I shall confine my remarks today to our operations in Central Africa and more particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In July 2003, when the present government of our country was formed, it reaffirmed as a body in its manifesto its intention of developing a Military Partnership Programme (MPP) with the DRC armed forces. By referring to it in this way, as a partnership programme, the Belgian Government wanted deliberately to emphasise the originality of the relationship and the fact of its being on a new footing.

This was first of all a programme, not a collection of *ad hoc* initiatives to meet specific needs that were unconnected in themselves. The aim was to create, through a programme, a real and lasting relationship between both of our armed forces.

Secondly, it was a partnership programme. It was not simply a revival of military technical cooperation as we knew it in the past. It was intended to create ties between:

- partners with common aims,
- partners that shared knowledge and experience,
- partners working together to develop projects both wanted to carry out, and
- partners taking joint responsibility for them.

Therefore we used the partnership programme concept to define our new relations clearly. This was extremely important but not in itself enough. As I said in my introduction, the important thing was to be practical. Very quickly, therefore, our Defence Minister, André Flahaut, made it clear that the partnership programme would in no way be merely a theoretical exercise but one that actually got things done.

Thus some weeks after the adoption of the partnership programme, in September 2003, a Military Partnership Programme (MPP) cell was set up in Kinshasa to coordinate the programme on the spot. Similarly, in February 2004, a Congolese liaison officer took up his post in our HQ at Evere, to strengthen coordination between our two armies.

Also in November 2003, various reconnaissance missions to Kinshasa and Kisangani prepared the way for the formation of the first integrated brigade. In spring 2004, 190 Belgian soldiers were involved in setting up this first integrated brigade in Kisangani. By the beginning of June, the brigade, bringing together fighting men from various factions and from the regular army, had been formed, and partially equipped through the partnership programme. It was then ready for deployment in the Eastern Congo. This first mixed, integrated RDC armed forces brigade anticipated the transformation that all troops destined to become part of the integrated Republic of Congo Army were to undergo. It is now deployed in Ituri province where it is involved, with MONUC, in peacekeeping in one of the country's most volatile regions. It also facilitates contact between MONUC and the local population.

Again within the MPP, alongside training the first integrated brigade in Kisangani, various extremely practical development projects, (CIMIC projects) for restoring and refitting buildings have been carried out tying the humanitarian action in with the work of the military, while respecting the roles of both parties. Thus hundreds of cubic metres worth of equipment, medicines and other supplies provided by NGOs and the Department have been transported to the Congo from Belgium, wells have been sunk and infrastructure rebuilt. Moreover, in view of the success of the training given to the integrated First Brigade, but also of the material and financial difficulties of running a similar operation again for all the brigades that are to make up the future Congolese Army, a training method had to be found that impacted quickly on a larger number of brigades. By mutual agreement, therefore, we decided to speed up training for Training Officers from the various different components so that once trained themselves they could go on to help train future brigades for integration. Hence, a Train the Trainers scheme began at Elsenborn, Belgium, in September 2004. In only five weeks, just over 280 officers received in-depth training, with an emphasis on peacekeeping capabilities. These officers were thus able within a short period of time to assist with the next intake. The Train the Trainers course was repeated a second time in the first half of 2005 with Belgium supervising the training given in Kinshasa of some 300 new trainers, supported by several dozen Congolese trainers who had trained at Elsenborn a few months earlier. The Congolese army thus had a pool of some 500 trainers to draw on for organising training at its integration centres.

For in parallel to all this, a comprehensive plan was drawn up for organising the integration of the entire Congolese army and the resultant demobilisation process. The Congolese authorities prepared this plan in conjunction with the World Bank and donor countries. For months MPP missions lent regular support to the Congolese armed forces at that level. Strategic reflection went on and proposals were developed and adopted, gradually building up a comprehensive joint plan to integrate soldiers from different components which would also constitute a demob process for those intending to re-enter civilian life. In practical terms, this led to six integration centres being set up, along with related employment advisory services.

During the first half of 2005, other brigades were integrated and trained in this manner: the second at Kitona, with support from Angola; the third at Kamina, supervised and trained by Belgium, working with the Republic of South Africa. Today, three further brigades integrated under direct DRC responsibility, graduated from the integration centres in eastern Congo (at Mushakati, Nyaleke and Luburesi). Those centres were re-equipped with the support of the Netherlands and South Africa. The integration of these five new brigades was the work of Congolese trainers who had taken part in one or other of the Train the Trainers programmes.

In the coming weeks and months, Belgium's Armed Forces will continue to support the process of integrating the Congolese army through two large scale practical operations:

- Equipping the 3rd brigade trained in Kamina so that it can be deployed in eastern Congo (transport and communications equipment) and training it in the use of that equipment. At this point, fording equipment and the equipment the DRC is to supply to other integrated brigades will also be sent.
- Setting up in-service training for the senior and junior officers of the various integrated brigades. This training should be geared towards creating a cohesive command and up-grading levels of attainment for those who are to be involved in brigade training for the new Congolese army. Officer in-service training will take place in Kamina and Kinshasa and Belgium's Armed Forces will be supported in this task by France and Canada.

All officer training (Train the Trainers or Officer In-service Training) will direct the attention of senior and junior officers towards their basic responsibilities. They must pass on to the troops they train both the technical

information they themselves have acquired through their own training and also, and perhaps more significantly: the importance of mutual respect among troops from different components, the feeling of unity and the esprit de corps that should pervade the integrated army and that vital sense of duty and responsibility which should be the hallmark of its members.

This goes to the very heart of our common endeavour in undertaking this military partnership programme. The aim is to establish and strengthen a Congolese army loyal to the republic and respectful of the rule of law, which safeguards legitimate institutions, abides by the country's laws, defends the integrity of national territory and is ready to stand up for and protect the rights of the individual and of the citizens of the Republic of Congo.

Lastly, in parallel with the development of its Military Partnership Programme with the DRC, Belgium's Armed Forces are involved in other forms of action to stabilise peace in the country. They have seconded a Belgian soldier to play an on-going part in the joint team established under the cooperation arrangement with Belgium to support, assist and train the national demobilisation programme (DDRRP) under World Bank aegis. On the basis of their experience in Cote d'Ivoire, they are preparing and equipping a Beninese battalion to be deployed as part of MONUC. They have seconded one of their officers who is particularly au fait with the situation in DRC to be second in command of the European Union mission (EUSEC DR Congo). The mission is initially tasked with setting up machinery to ensure the soldiers of the integrated brigades are paid regular wages. An audit team made up of Belgian military experts has just finalised a proposal for this.

Over the longer term, thirty or so Congolese officers are to undergo more extensive academic in-service training at the Royal Military School and the IRSD (Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense).

These therefore are some examples of the practical action Belgium is taking. As you will appreciate, they all complement one another and are mutually reinforcing of the essential objective: integration and the formation of a Congolese Republican Army.

Furthermore, the international community is in complete agreement in this respect: integration of the armed forces is vital in building democracy in the DRC, where the army must break with the past and once again become the guarantor of democratic institutions, a symbol of the country's return to stability and an institution that respects individual rights.

The fact that Belgium was among the first to commit actively to this process of armed forces integration, particularly in Kisangani, gave rise to a feeling that it wanted to seize for itself the opportunity of managing external support to the process. The spirit in which the practical, transparent measures I have just been describing to you are being carried out shows abundantly clearly that this was never the intention. Our first thought was that the process of integrating the army and demobilising a section of it is a crucial, urgent and Herculean task. Belgium took a decision to become involved early on, while others still hung back, and its commitment will continue. Belgium is well aware, however, that it alone cannot provide the support the Congo needs in this process and that it must endeavour, along with its Congolese partners, to mobilise the maximum resources possible to create the conditions for successful integration. Belgium also knows that integration must be based first and foremost on African experience in this sphere since it is essentially in the African context that it will go forward in future.

This process of integrating the army, like that of demobilisation, is obviously not perfect. There are shortcomings and hold-ups, some of which must be laid at the door of our Congolese partners, and we insist at all times that partnership means shared responsibility.

However, one should be aware that these shortcomings and hold-ups are also substantially the fault of the international community (unwillingness to contribute, slowness in coming up with resources – for example in regard to the Beninese battalion).

Over and above the practical action we are involved in, which I have described briefly to you, we have also committed ourselves along with our South African and Congolese partners, each from within our own political and military situation (for our own part within the European Union and the South Africans within the SADC (South African Development Community) to impress upon our various contacts the importance of wholehearted involvement in the process of bolstering peace and stability in the DRC.

We shall continue therefore to mobilise our European colleagues, to cooperate with the South African and Angolan partners who are today showing willing to take part in the project. We are continuing to seek out other potential partners and pursuing discussions with the Congolese about how better to bring the international institutions in on the process.

Our good bilateral relations through the Military Partnership Programme give us a certain leverage which should enable us together to mobilise potential partners and international institutions in order to gather the resources necessary to ensure that this vital task is carried out successfully.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are all agreed on the fact that reform of the Congolese armed forces is a crucial and necessary stage in the transition process Congo is currently involved in. This stage has to be negotiated successfully.

Belgium reaffirms that, subject to the wishes of the Democratic Republic of Congo itself, Belgium will continue to be a resolute partner in helping that country achieve full and effective integration of its armed forces.

Introduction to the EU policy for the organisation of military peacekeeping in Africa



General Jean-Paul Perruche of France, Director of the EU Military Staff, describing current EU military advisory action in support of African peacekeeping operations

General Jean-Paul PERRUCHE (Director, EU Military Staff) (Summary) – recalled the two principles underlying all ESDP action in Africa. The first was that of *African ownership*, which meant that Africans were themselves responsible for peacekeeping on their continent and that the Union’s task was to support their efforts towards attaining that strategic objective. Operation Artemis was an exception, in that it involved providing support to the United Nations on a one-off basis during the redeployment of the UN mission. Thus the direct engagement of ESDP military units in Africa was not the rule, although the EU remained prepared to respond to exceptional circumstances, in particular by deploying its battlegroups (1 500 men). The second principle was that all ESDP action should take place in response to precise requests from the UN, AU, sub-regional African organisations or African states.

In November 2004 the Council had approved an action plan on supporting peace and security in Africa which took stock of the practical means needed to help the African organisations acquire autonomous crisis-management prevention and management capabilities. The plan dealt with the setting-up of capabilities, planning support, the concept of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). The EU had, for example, drawn up a list of documents that the African organisations could take as a basis for drafting their own planning documents.

The EUMS was ready to participate in developing the concepts currently being drawn up for the AU force which would be divided into four regional components (West, East, Centre and South). Finally, the EU had a permanent liaison officer at the AU and could extend that liaison system to include the sub-regional organisations at their request.

In keeping with the spirit of providing support to Africans to enable them to promote peace and security in Africa, the EU was conducting numerous advisory missions, such as the EUPOL police mission, leading to the setting-up of a first integrated police unit (IPU) in Kinshasa. That mission could be extended, in particular with a view to the forthcoming elections in DRC.

The EUSEC advisory mission in DRC, which had an initial one-year mandate during which a team of experts provided advice to the Congolese civil and military authorities in a range of areas such as the drawing-up of the country’s strategic plan and the management of pay and supplies for the armed forces in the process of being restructured. Outside the capital, EUSEC had contributed to selecting the locations for the six military orientation and integration centres set up in order to ensure the integration of the restructured Congolese armed forces. The initial results had been encouraging and the mission could be extended to a new technical assistance programme in the DRC. The EUSEC mission in DRC was the first concrete manifestation of advisory actions in the area of security sector reform (SSR), which the EU was currently endeavouring to codify in the form of an EU SSR concept being drafted by the EUMS. The aim was to finalise the concept by the end of the current Presidency and to adopt a first body of EU doctrine as a basis for advisory activities in this area, in Africa and elsewhere.

In addition to its advisory activities in Africa the EU’s military action also involved providing active support to African peacekeeping operations, in full compliance with the principle of African ownership. Efforts were currently focused on providing the AU with support for its AMIS II mission in the Darfur region. At the International Donors’ Conference in Addis Abeba on 26 May 2005, the EU made a substantial global offer of support to that mission. Following the joint action adopted on 18 July 2005, the EU agreed to provide, in addition to its major financial contributions and contributions in kind (92 million euros): logistic support (20 experts), some of the strategic and tactical air lift of African units (one battalion and three police units) and 11 military observers to strengthen the AU’s observation capabilities (the figure might be increased to 16 in the future). Thanks to that support the AU had been able to boost the strength of AMIS II to 5 700 men in three months. This had made it necessary to have a pause in operations so as to adapt the logistics accordingly. The EU Political and Security Committee (composed of the Ambassadors of the 25 member states) was monitoring the situation as regards the resumption of the mission.

Another example of support activities was the RECAMP programme, whose fifth edition was under preparation. This programme initiated by France was being conducted in partnership with the European Union and African Union. The aim was for the first time to closely involve the AU and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the whole programme with a view to making the most of the conflict-prevention and crisis-management structures of those organisations. It was proposed that the EU should play an active role in the conception and organisation of a first politico-militaire seminar in Brazzaville in May 2006. This would constitute a major contribution to peace and security in Africa through a programme which had already proven its worth. Indeed, RECAMP was based on precisely the same principles as those which inspired European action, namely, those of African ownership and the creation of capabilities.

In conclusion, the range of EU action was already very broad. All ESDP activities were closely coordinated with community activities and those being conducted under Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement, so as to guarantee a global and integrated approach during the conflict-prevention phase, during crises and during the post-conflict stabilisation phase. The 250 million euros allocated to the Peace Facility for the period 2004-2007 demonstrated the effective results that could be achieved by well-coordinated action on the African continent. The EU's commitment to supporting African peacekeeping capabilities was in any case to be seen as part of a long-term process.

Mr Bruno NEVEUX (France, Head of Joint Services Combat and Training Division, Operation Artemis – Democratic Republic of Congo) (Summary) – former commander of Operation Artemis, explained that this operation had been emblematic in many regards. It had been the first rapid-reaction operation to be launched outside Europe on the basis of the lead nation concept (although subsequently it had become an autonomous EU operation under UN auspices). It offered answers to two questions in the area of European defence: what command structures and what rapid reaction capabilities were required?



General Bruno Neveux of France, Head of the Joint Services Combat and Training Division, discusses lessons learned from Artemis, the EU's military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The operation had been conducted in the Ituri province in the north-west of the DRC, the scene of an ancient conflict between the Lendu (farmers) and Hema (shepherds). Intervention had taken place in a context of heavy fighting among several militia groups, with the involvement also of neighbouring states attracted by the region's gold and diamond resources. In 1997 the region had been occupied by Uganda which was delaying its withdrawal in spite of the Luanda agreements signed in 2002. MONUC had been unable to control the situation and at the request of the UN Secretary-General it had been agreed to deploy the EU force to Bunia (capital of Ituri) on 1 December 2003 (Resolution 1484 of 20 May 2003) in order to give the United Nations the time to strengthen its presence. This had entailed deploying the EU force by air to a distance of 6 000 km from its home base, with Bunia airport as the

sole point of access. Operation Artemis had been launched on 12 June 2003 with France as the lead nation. The force had remained in place until the beginning of July 2003, in accordance with the UN mandate.

Operation Artemis had satisfied the need for a rapid response in terms of planning, decision-making and deployment, in order to put a stop to the killing, dissuade neighbouring states from intervening and safeguard the fragile peace process. France as lead nation had benefited from a pragmatic and flexible approach on the part of the EU, which had allowed the first elements to be deployed six days after the adoption of the Resolution and before the decision of the Council. A number of steps in the process had been shortened or eliminated.

On the downside, although the pace of the force generation process had been generally satisfactory, only 17 nations in all, including 14 EU member states, had deployed forces to Bunia. Additional airlift would have been useful, particularly for the redeployment process. The PSC and EUMS had recognised the need for a strategic reserve, but it had never been set up due to a shortage of contributions. It had been difficult to get information on the politico-military and strategic dimensions of the situation (concerning, for example, the intentions of the neighbouring states and

developments in the capital). All these problems, in particular, that of information-sharing, were typical of multinational operations and needed to be resolved for the future.

The risks of the operation had been both military (uncertain situation, child soldiers, refugees, weather conditions, logistic flows) and political (some experts had called for an extension of the mandate on the grounds that the force could not withdraw by 1 September). However, those risks had been collectively assumed and the mission had significantly reduced the level of violence both in and around Bunia and enabled many refugees to return. Political control had been exercised by the relevant EU politico-military bodies (PSC, EUMC etc.) in a continuous fashion, each at the appropriate level and without interfering in the conduct of the operation on the ground. The chain of command had been entirely European. Politico-military and civil-military cooperation had been effective for the purpose of re-launching the peace process. Artemis had made an indirect contribution to the putting in place of the interim government on 30 June in Kinshasa. All the EU instruments (political, military, diplomatic, economic and financial) had been deployed as part of a global approach in support of the peace process at local and national level. Those efforts had been made possible thanks to the support of Mr Solana, the EU member states' embassy staff in Uganda and Kinshasa, the European Commission heads of mission, the Secretary-General's special representative, Mr Ajello, and the United Nations.

The task of Artemis had been to stabilise the situation in Ituri, then hand over to a reinforced MONUC. The UN command had taken over on 1 September. The intervention had been swift and effective and this form of EU-UN cooperation had been recognised as a model in a declaration issued on 24 December 2003. The EU had also made a major contribution (205 million euros, support for the police and security mission) during the post-conflict phase. While it should be remembered that the lead nation had had to assume most of the risks and the bulk of the financial burden, Artemis had nonetheless demonstrated the EU's resolve to engage in peacekeeping operations and served as a model for the decision-making process. It had highlighted the requirements in terms of rapid planning, decision-making and deployment and had paved the way for future rapid-reaction operations at the request of the United Nations, while validating a number of essential components of the ESDP.

General Jean-Marie MOGOKO (National Security Adviser to the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo) (Translation) – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting my country to participate in this important conference and for doing me the honour of inviting me to address it.

Yesterday evening I was asked to say a few words about the Congolese experience of peacekeeping operations and cooperation with the European Union. Let me set the context by explaining the Congolese authorities' state of mind with regard to the new collective security architecture in Africa. As you know, no effective solutions for establishing peace, security and stability on our continent – a concern of the founding fathers of the African Union - could be found at the time of the OAU. At the AU's constitutive summit in July 2002 in Durban, the African heads of state therefore decided to grasp the bull by the horns and to frame a common African security and defence policy and create a Peace and Security Council. My country, the Congo, which had just been ravaged by a disastrous civil war, fully supported both ideas.

You may recall the text known as the pan-African pact against aggression that President Denis Sassou N'Guesso proposed to his peers at the AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003. This document of exceptional quality provided the basis for what became the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact. This effort of my country, through its President, to promote peace and security in Africa, was in line with the stance it has always taken in favour of peacekeeping diplomacy. The quadripartite Brazzaville Agreement, which put an end to the South African intervention in Angola, the deployment under an OAU mandate of Congolese troops in Chad in 1981 to act as a buffer force between the troops of Goukouni Wedeye and those of Hissène Habré, its recent participation in the negotiations which helped resolve the Sao Tomé and Príncipe crisis, and the good offices of the Congolese President on behalf of the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC) on the eve of 30 June, the date of the official end of the transition to the Democratic Republic of Congo, are perfect illustrations. The Congo has had two peacekeeping experiences, in addition to its sending of military and civil observers under UN auspices to Angola, Rwanda and Côte d'Ivoire, and today under an AU mandate to Darfur. The first, at the time of the OAU, was in Chad, and the second more recent experience took place under a CEEAC mandate in the Central African Republic. Let us look at the first OAU-mandated mission in Chad in 1981, when three countries – Congo, Guinea and Benin – were designated to provide a buffer force between the troops of Goukouni Wedeye and Hissène Habré. Their mandate was to guarantee a cessation of hostilities in order to clear the way for OAU diplomacy. Congo was the only one in present N'Djamena, in considerable strength for a country its size: a mechanised battalion equipped with light armoured vehicles, supported by a mixed artillery unit. This 700-strong unit was deployed at my country's own cost using aircraft chartered from the Angolan and Algerian armed forces. Unfortunately, due to a poorly defined mandate and constant provocation designed to get the Congolese troops involved and to change their mandate on the grounds of self-defence, the Congolese authorities, given the failure of the OAU's mediation efforts and the uncooperative attitude of the protagonists, were forced to withdraw their troops when hostilities resumed. Our troops, caught in the cross-fire between the two belligerents, nevertheless withdrew in an orderly fashion, leaving behind only one person who had been killed by a

stray bullet. Although that Congolese intervention ended in failure, it nevertheless demonstrated the capacity of a small African state to take action without outside assistance, which proves that today, if the African armed forces had the necessary logistics, they could resolve some of the problems arising on the continent.

The second more recent peacekeeping operation took place in the Central African Republic shortly before the fall of President Patassé. It was conducted under a CEEAC mandate in compliance with the provisions defined by the AU Peace and Security Council: a contingent the size of a battalion composed of troops from Equatorial Guinea, to be withdrawn once the mandate had changed. Initially there were also units from Gabon and the Congo. This Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) was deployed to Bangui to guarantee the security of the institutions pending a dialogue between the government, faced with social unrest due to unpaid salary arrears, and the opposition. Unfortunately before the dialogue could start the President was overthrown by a coup de d'état and CEEAC had change the mandate to one of guaranteeing peace and security in the capital, protecting the transitional institutions and ensuring the proper conduct of the elections which were to lead to the establishment of democratic institutions. This second peacekeeping effort was supported by France, which provided additional peacekeeping training for the force as well as support in the area of logistics and communications.

We see from those two peacekeeping experiences, the first of which dates back 20 years, that apart from Operation Artemis there was no peacekeeping cooperation between Sub-Saharan Africa and the European Union as such in the eighties. There were bilateral defence agreements, for example with France, but there was no systematic cooperation in this area. However, since the creation of the AU there has been a partnership based on dialogue and cooperation. Under AU auspices the conditions have been created for practical action towards building a collective security system in Africa. The AU roadmap makes provision for regional regiments and headquarters for the end of the first half of 2006. The EU's assistance is welcome in order to support that process. Current efforts in the area of Africa's collective security concern building the capacities that will enable African states to engage effectively in peacekeeping operations under a UN, AU or regional organisation's mandate.

The AU, the regional organisations and the African states themselves are torn between bilateral cooperation, which is soon stretched to the limits given the enormous initial needs, and multilateral cooperation, for it is true that the establishment of effective crisis-solving capacities is essential for the stabilisation of the African continent. Moreover, to avert and settle crises forces must be rapidly deployable as soon as they receive a mandate so that they can separate belligerent forces and guarantee a cessation of hostilities using a range of instruments, and if necessary by force. What the African countries also need to help them take full responsibility for complex peacekeeping operations is, in particular, assistance with defining security structures and drafting the complex doctrines and concepts needed for creating such standby forces. With assistance from the different organisations they should be able to acquire capabilities in the area of situation analysis and the planning, control and command of complex operations, in order to strengthen their capacity to intervene, either through preventive diplomacy or preventive military deployments. Assistance in the area of training in humanitarian law and the management of civilian and military contingents is also required. This is why in the Congo we welcome the civil-military training course that is to become available in a few months' time, because our country needs assistance in the area of strategic intelligence gathered and transmitted using modern means which are cruelly lacking in Africa at the moment. Intelligence is a prerequisite for crisis management. Cooperation in this area based on observation of the factors that lead inexorably to crises would be conducive to prevention.

In the case of my country, the refusal to organise elections within the constitutional timeframe and the unilateral decision to extend the President's mandate in 1997 led to violent and serious conflict. The absence of logistic capabilities – this is my final remark – is a weak point in the system that the AU wishes to put in place. Finally – this point was already mentioned by a previous speaker – another proposal would be to establish a network of high-level officials both within the regional brigades and at AU level. This then concludes my presentation of our diplomatic and military peacekeeping experience and our vision of future cooperation with the European Union.



General Emmanuel Beth, Head of the French Ministry of Defence Planning and Operations Centre, discussing lessons learned from Operation Licorne which he commanded in Côte d'Ivoire

General Emmanuel BETH, Head of the Planning and Operations Centre, Ministry of Defence (Operation Licorne – Côte d'Ivoire) (Translation) – I would like to thank all the participants for their support for France's action in connection with Operation Licorne. I will be speaking with two hats, as I directed Operation Licorne for a year and I am also head of planning operations in France, which means that I am familiar with the different crises types of crises in the world. I wish to speak to you in both a personal and an official capacity, because one cannot conduct such an operation without leaving part of oneself behind. The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire appears to me to be symptomatic of the crises in Africa and is instructive as regards the presence of the European Union on the African continent.

My presentation will be divided into three parts. The first concerns the historical context and the position of France and of the international community:

Côte d'Ivoire is two thirds the size of France. 1 900 French troops were stationed there at the start of the crisis. There are now 4 000, which is very little for a territory that size. The centre of the country is a zone of military conflict. In the south, the situation in Abidjan remains sensitive. And finally in the west there are inter-ethnic conflicts, or something very similar. However we must avoid a Manichean approach, dividing people into friends and enemies. It is important to maintain relations with all the different players and to show consideration for their sensibilities.

The Ivorian crisis did not begin on 19 September 2002, but dates back to President Houphouët-Boigny's ill-prepared succession. It was then that situation became volatile. In 1999, General Gueï organised a *coup d'état*. Following international pressure, elections were held in October 2000. In 2002 there were a number of military actions designed to

destabilise the country and almost half of Côte d'Ivoire was occupied. Following the French forces' intervention the crisis can be divided into three phases:

- First of all, a gradual and increasingly fast deterioration of the situation from September 2002 to February-March 2003. This period was marked by the desperate efforts to gain the upper hand with the Lomé and Marcoussis agreements, which are fundamental and necessary, and the Accra agreement;
- From April to autumn 2003, a period of stabilisation, with neutral forces regaining control of the west of the country. This phase led to ongoing efforts to re-launch the peace process;
- The process moved forward in spurts until November 2004. So far the developments had been positive. There were by now 4 000 French forces and 6 000 forces. The international community played a crucial role through the different sub-regional entities, whose action was complementary. Without them I do not know where we would stand today.

In what spirit was this operation conducted? Its first objective was to protect and guarantee the security of French nationals. At the very beginning of the crisis those efforts were supported by the Ivorian army. Its aim was also to support the mission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). President Gbagbo asked France for help with the surveillance and control of the ceasefire line, which it provided over some 800 kilometres. Finally, the aim of the operation was also to enforce compliance with the UN resolutions designed to support all efforts stabilise the country, and to monitor the arms embargo.

The second part of my presentation concerns the politico-military environment:

I do not believe that there is a military solution to this crisis. Every effort must be made to ensure that the international players once again play a role. No solution to the crisis would be possible without France and the international community. The Licorne force should as a priority be geared to the protection of nationals, which would avoid it having to take sides, as each party to the conflict is trying to get us to do. Furthermore it is essential not to create a situation in which there is no turning back. Indeed, all the different players are endeavouring to control the use of force, even though this is sometimes difficult.

Any action taken must be reversible and priority must be given to peace initiatives, even if the different players want to push us towards confrontation. A good sense of judgement is called for. An essential aspect is the complementarity of the different players: France, the UN and all the African players, through ECOWAS, have an important part to play. Crisis management on the African continent calls for this interaction of the different players, without which it is impossible. The same is true at local level: it is important to maintain contact with all parties, whether they represent the government or the rebels.

I do not believe that there is a military solution to the crisis. International organisations and NGOs, such as the Red Cross, have an important part to play. The French concept of peace enforcement and peacekeeping to which General Neveux referred is relevant. This will be conducive to developing the role of ECOWAS.

The third and last part concerns the lessons learned from this intervention:

I would like to stress the importance of the notion of subsidiarity, in a situation in which things can easily get out of control.

Another lesson we have learned is that the EU's role in conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa needs to be developed. As regards the involvement of the French and international forces, I think the result is positive:

- it was possible to avoid evacuating the troops¹, which would have meant abandoning the country to its fate;
- the administration and the economy are functioning in the south of the country. The different economic players are now successfully building the conditions for re-launching the economy once peace has been restored;
- there have been no reports of any wide-scale massacres, although these were feared at the start of the crisis.

Their engagement is important for all West African states and their action is beneficial. However, Africa remains a challenge for the EU.

Discussion

Mr Laurent AKOUN thanked the panellists for their interesting presentations. He remarked that there was a “golden hour” during which a sick person could be treated in a timely fashion and cured. But if one waited too long, there was a smaller chance of the person recovering and the costs of his convalescence would be greater. He wondered whether, in the case of Africa, that “golden hour” had not been missed.

Mr Alain DELETROZ (Vice-President Europe, International Crisis Group), responding to General Perruche's presentation, agreed that the lead nation concept was essential at this stage of European engagement in Africa. However, he wondered whether it might not also constitute an obstacle to the involvement of other states, which might be less inclined to share the political and military responsibilities of an operation if they saw one country – France in this instance – shouldering them on its own. He attributed the success of Operation Artemis to the fact that its mandate was clearly delimited geographically and in terms of its duration and wondered whether that might be a useful lesson for the international community and the UN Security Council in particular. Finally, with reference to Operation Licorne, he remarked that if a buffer force being deployed in a complex operation was perceived as being too close to certain protagonists in a conflict, then it made sense to replace it as soon as possible with a more international force under UN auspices. While the French deployment was understandable in terms of historical affinities and should remain until it could be replaced, it had strongly interfered with the South African mediation efforts. Involvement by other EU states would be a good thing.

Mr Cheik FITA FITA DIBWE (Democratic Republic of Congo) had a question for General Vandingenen concerning a documentary on the Kisangani integrated brigade which he, together with many other Congolese citizens living abroad, had seen on RTBF and TV 5 and which in his view presented a number of shortcomings. He wondered whether the presence of journalists had been planned in advance. Furthermore, while he appreciated the excellent presentations of the military representatives, he regretted the absence of political leaders from the debates as they were

¹ There were, however, two partial evacuations.

the ones to take the important political decisions. Perhaps that point could be taken into account when organising future conferences.

Mr Charles GOERENS, Rapporteur, remarked that the complexity of these issues reminded him of General de Gaulle when he had said “to the complicated East I fly with simple ideas”. He thanked the military representatives for their excellent presentations and in particular for their pioneering efforts in the field. If France had not intervened in Côte d’Ivoire then we surely would have had to fear the worst. Regarding General Neveu’s presentation and the question of whether the cost of Artemis was not a deterrent to participation by other states, he remarked that the members of the Assembly wanted Europe to move ahead which meant that all member states must be prepared to assume a share of the responsibilities. Indeed, the Commission was about to submit a document to the Council on sharing the financial burden for this operation, the costs of which, as compared with those of the operation in Iraq, were modest. It was to be hoped that with the Assembly’s help it would be possible to encourage decisions that were worthy of the 25 EU member states.

Mr Matadi NENGA GAMANDA (Vice-President of the National Assembly, Democratic Republic of Congo), welcomed the training of 500 officers for the DRC under the “Train the Trainer” programme. He wondered, however, whether an inventory had ever been drawn up of the numerous officers that the late President Mobutu had had trained in military academies around the world. Perhaps not all of them were retired or deceased and had skills which could still be used with a view to enhancing the country’s military capabilities.

Replies

General BETH (France) remarked that as a military man he was not competent for the first aspect of the question, which was of a political nature. He stressed however that France could not have managed the crisis on its own. Neither the Ivorian government nor the regional authorities would have agreed. Hence France had always endeavoured to take action in conjunction with all the other players.

Regarding the military operation, the “surgeon’s” work had been done between September and March 2003, when France had checked rebel action on the ground to avoid an escalation of the conflict. Following that “first aid” it was now up to all the players (and there were many of them, including South Africa) to help heal the patient’s wounds.

He had sometimes been asked why more significant military action had not been taken. He wished in order to provide a balanced view to give two examples, one which tended in favour of military action, one against:

- at the beginning of the crisis, the Licorne Force could – albeit with some difficulty – have forced the rebels back to the northern border but this would not have resolved the fundamental political problems of the country and a coup d’état would have remained possible six months later. Thus such an approach, although technically possible, would have been politically unacceptable.
- In January 2003 the French forces, who had to contend with all sorts of violence and insults, could have decided that they had had enough and withdrawn. But this would have meant leaving the country in the hands of rebels who could have gone south and set up a regime not recognised by the international community. Politically that would not have been acceptable either.

It was, however, true that long-term care was now needed.

General PERRUCHÉ (France) noted, with regard to the question of whether the lead nation concept was a deterrent to engagement by other countries, that there were two decisive factors:

- a nation’s willingness to engage depended on its interests. Not all were prepared to intervene in all cases and with the same level of engagement;
- the key factor was the level of risk: the higher the risk, the greater the need for strong political direction to be able to accept the risk. When urgent action was required, the most efficient solution was intervention by a single nation because the decision-making process was much easier (Artemis was a good example, for it would have been difficult to convince other nations to intervene if one nation had not first been prepared to intervene and risk the lives of its soldiers on the ground).

Furthermore, interests evolved. Attitudes were changing within the EU. Eighteen months previously the EUMS would not have sent anyone to Africa, whereas now there were five and a half pages worth of actions! There was a growing awareness of common interests. The representative of the European forces in Addis Abeba was a German colonel, which would have been unthinkable two years previously.

The General was convinced that these operations could soon be conducted by the EU itself. It was essential to tackle the causes and not just the effects of crises.

General NEVEUX (France) explained that the lead nation concept did not exclude participation by other nations. Artemis, for example, had brought together seven countries. The concept made high demands in terms of assets on structures on the country that took on the role of lead nation, which limited the list of potential candidates for the task. The battlegroup concept offered a promising solution in that regard.

Regarding the limited mandate of Artemis, the General underlined that this had not been a risk-free operation and had had to be collectively approved. The operation had to be seen in a broader spirit than the strict terms of the mandate set out in Resolution 1484, as part of a medium- and long-term European engagement. While the exceptional nature of the operation had been underlined, there had been other successful bridging operations, for example in Timor and Haiti. Moreover the operation had acted as a trigger for Resolution 1493 which had increased MONUC's strength and extended its mandate (DDRRR process, embargo). Hence one's perspective should not be confined strictly to the letter of the mandate.

General VANDINGENEN (Belgium) indicated that the quality of the 1st integrated brigade was the result of an initial integration process conducted by the Congolese. Belgium had contributed its own experience of ten years of peacekeeping in order to create a fully-equipped brigade which could then be deployed to the eastern part of Congo in order to stabilise the region.

There had been an amazing mix of cultures and languages which in his view was not talked about enough: the media tended rather to focus on the shortcomings of the operation and did not give the overall picture. MONUC considered the brigade to have fulfilled its objectives. Not everything was perfect and in many cases the problems had been the result of the fact that the troops thus trained had not been regularly fed and paid by the Congolese authorities. It was essential to work in a spirit of partnership.

In answer to Mr Matadi Nenga Gamanda's question about the training of officers abroad under Mobutu, the General did not think that there were any official figures. Such an inventory went beyond the purely military aspects and would have to be put to the administrative authorities. It would indeed be a good thing if the people concerned could make themselves useful to their country.

THIRD SITTING

Chairman: Mr Pedro Agramunt (Spain), Chairman of the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly

Experiences in crisis management and peacekeeping: Darfur – a case study

Major General Henry ANYIDOHO (Head of the United Nations Assistance Cell in Addis Ababa, Chief of Staff of the African Union Darfur integrated Task Force).

“Without stability there will only be war, poverty and the continued marginalisation of Africa and little chance for economic development and growth in Africa. In the meanwhile, Africans will have to prepare to share the burden of peacekeeping on the continent but will this happen in isolation from or in partnership with the global community”.

Cillers and Mills: from peacekeeping to complex emergencies.

Introduction



Henry Anyidoho, Head of the United Nations Assistance Cell in Addis Ababa and Chief of Staff of the African Union Darfur Integrated Task Force, points out that the operation in Darfur, the African Union’s biggest military deployment so far, needs more resources

Conflicts in Africa vary in nature from inter-state to intra-state. Whilst pre-colonial history has recorded a number of revolutionary wars for independence, the cold war, on the other hand, held together segments of ethnic, religious or tribal groupings under a “state” structure. In Sub-Saharan Africa in recent times the more dominant type of conflict has been intra-state conflicts which have become more pronounced particularly after the end of the cold war when different ethnic, religious or tribal groupings began to assert their own influence or greater identity, or indeed in the quest for fair share of national power and wealth.

Every sub-region of Africa, East, West, North and South had either experienced conflict in the past or is currently experiencing conflict in one form or the other. Certainly Africa through its first continental grouping –

the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – had as its main focus decolonisation. That goal was achieved through various means. Whilst, for example, some countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda gained independence through negotiations, quite a number, such as Algeria, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa had to fight for liberation from colonial domination. The emergence of new states subsequently focused attention on economic advancement: hence the formation of collective security or collective defence organisations with which OAU interacted. The OAU in many respects recognised five main sub-regional organisations in Africa and prioritised only one corresponding organisation for each area²:

- The Inter-Governmental Development Authority (IGAD) in the East;
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West;
- The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA) in the North;
- The Southern Africa Development Corporation (SADC) in the South;
- The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the Central African sub-region.

² From *Peacekeeping to complex emergencies* edited by Jackie Cillers and Greg Mills, p. 12.

The five sub-regional organisations enumerated above were all perhaps initially conceived as economic groupings but suddenly found themselves engulfed within conflicts. In West Africa, ECOWAS was compelled to launch massive peacekeeping operations in Liberia in 1990 and stayed on for seven consecutive years, only to return in 2003 following the atrocious and poor governance of Charles Taylor. ECOWAS also had to become involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone (1997-1999). The SADC felt compelled to intervene in the Lesotho crisis of 1998, in the face of imminent coups d'état. The same SADC rather unfortunately was divided in its approach to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, when some member states, in particular Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, went into the DRC in defence of the government against invading forces from Rwanda and Uganda, while other members, notably South Africa, did not support the idea of intervention. In East Africa, Tanzania supported Museveni's forces in ousting the dictatorial regime of Idi Amin in 1979. The interventions on the part of ECOWAS and SADC initially lacked an institutionalised crisis-prevention and management mechanism. As a result, regional military involvement in conflict resolution in those years was on *ad hoc* basis and not in accordance with specific operating procedures. Mandates were unclear but the desire to maintain peace in a member state was the driving force. The sub-regional organisations in pursuit of peace were mindful of Article 24 of the UN Charter which states that "in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security..." Despite that provision in the UN Charter, the organisation was not able in the past to respond promptly or adequately to African conflicts, hence the intervention of sub-regional organisations, notably ECOWAS.

The OAU, having found itself confronted with conflicts in almost all the sub-regions of Africa, formally established in 1993, through the Cairo Declaration, the "OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution" as a vehicle for furthering the Peace Agenda of the Organisation³.

On 8-10 July 2000, in Durban, South Africa, the OAU was replaced by a new continental organisation, the African Union (AU). Naturally the AU inherited the ongoing conflicts in Africa even as new disputes emerged. Whilst some of the conflicts resulted in open hostilities, it must be stated that there were quite a number of cases in Africa where negotiations resulted in the resolution of conflicts. The border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria is a case in point. On the other hand, the intra-state conflicts have been the most protracted and difficult to solve. On the whole, Africa entered the 21st century in a state of dilemma: freed from being a pawn in the cold war struggles for power and influence, yet a prisoner of that legacy; freed from being a superpower battleground, and now a battleground for the challenges posed at the cross-roads⁴.

Sub-Saharan African conflicts: origins

One subject that has enjoyed much interest and attention, particularly in the post-cold war era, is natural resource-based conflicts. There are three primary reasons for this interest. First, the drastic increase in the number of such conflicts is caused in part by the downward spiral in the economic fortunes of many states, particularly in Africa, and in part by the structural problems of governance that exist in many of these countries. Secondly, many of these conflicts are related to other major security problems especially the proliferation of small arms, the activities of warlords and the re-emergence of mercenaries. Finally, resource-based conflicts are often mired in complexities surrounding the collapse or near-collapse of many states. From Liberia and Sierra Leone to the Democratic Republic of Congo; the politics of resources control have played an important part in the weakening of institutional and administrative structures⁵. Also behind ethnic or national identity struggles are basic economic and social grievances. The failure of the state to protect people from want has exacerbated the insecurity situation and provided a rallying point for deprived groups to wage violence with varying intensity⁶. Behind ethnic or national identity struggles are basic economic and social grievances. The 1994 ethnic conflicts in Ghana between the Konkombas, Dagomba, Nanumba and Gonja were essentially conflicts over land ownership. Poverty and injustice as factors in conflict are very well known. The conflict in the whole of Sudan, for example, manifests itself as fundamentally religious or racial, yet it has the dimensions of poverty and injustice and indeed the struggle for power and peace⁷. Hence another problem connected with governments in Africa is the policy of exclusion. This policy has again and again produced conflict, yet governments continue to use it. Unless there is the awareness to involve or to make all parties feel that they are involved in a process, the cycle of violence will continue.

³ Among other things, the framework mechanism established the mandates of the OAU Central Organ (16 member states) and the Conflict Management Centre, later designated the Conflict Management Division (CMD) under the Political Affairs Department in 1999, as part of the programme of enhancing the OAU capacity for peace support missions.

⁴ Josephine Odera in *Out of Conflict, from War to Peace in Africa*, p. 144.

⁵ Abiodun Alao and Funmi Olonisaki in *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century*, Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Spiram eds, p. 23.

⁶ Josephine Odera in *Out of Conflict, from War to Peace in Africa*, p. 143.

⁷ *Ibid.*

External actors

Governments in Africa have been known to fan and fuel conflicts on the territory of their neighbours. The smuggling of weapons through neighbouring states to a country that is already in turmoil is a common phenomenon in Africa. The conflicts in West Africa for example, have been partly due to the willingness of neighbouring states to allow free passage of small arms through their territories and the harbouring of rebel groups that easily used those countries as launch pads for destabilising operations. In the Sudan conflict, rebel groups have always found sanctuary in neighbouring states sympathetic to their cause. Again one could argue about the sources of weapons, especially small arms, that have had such a devastating effect on conflicts in all sub-regions of Africa. Very few countries in Africa produce weapons, yet the proliferation continues. Foreign countries that produce and sell small arms and land mines to Africa are to a large extent responsible for the escalation of conflicts there. In Africa today there are more small arms in the hands of bands of bandits, insurgents etc, than those held legally by the security forces.

Internal struggle

As injustice coupled with policies of extinction marginalised sections of societies in Africa and created poverty, most deprived groups decided that the only way to assert their influence was to wage war. Examples are not difficult to find. In West Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia are clear examples. For many years the ruling class in both countries ignored the majority of the citizenry and used the countries' resources as if those resources belonged to them. The diamond trade was a major source of conflict and actually helped in financing the rebel movements of both Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor. Successive mining ministers agreed to provide mining concessions to various foreign entrepreneurs for large bribes, or joined in the mining and smuggling themselves⁸. Social amenities such as schools, hospitals and electricity were non-existent outside the capital cities. The greed and avarice encouraged those that felt deprived to stage coup d'états, seize governments and attempt to govern, but in both cases the innovative military janitors failed and those countries found themselves in protracted wars. In like manner, the Great Lakes Region where Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of Congo belong, various ethnic groups have always fought for supremacy and identity and refugees keep on shifting from one country to the other. Even where the situation appears to be showing signs of stability, most probably it will only be a question of time and conflicts will recur because governments have never been prepared to learn from the history of their own countries.

In Rwanda it will be recalled that a Peace Agreement was negotiated and signed in Arusha Tanzania in 1993. It was that Agreement that led to the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda and should have laid the foundation for democratic governance, but that was not to be the case. The April 1994 horrors in Rwanda stunned the world. Books have been written, countless interviews have been held, journalists from all over the world have given their views with very revealing and horrifying pictures. Broadcasting stations across the world have run documentaries. The Best Practise Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has carried out its own post-mortem, the United Nations and OAU instituted their separate investigations and many institutions of highest learning have carried out in-depth research on the genocide in Rwanda. Still the question lingers: what went wrong? The answer in brief is that the world could not protect the Rwandese, let alone prevent genocide. That was a complete failure of humanity. We all know that what started as a mere accident involving the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi and immediately after as a military confrontation between the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) and the militia on one side and RPF on the other, actually turned out to be *genocide* directed against Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Of all the post-cold war civil conflicts in Africa, none reflects the complexities of the connection between natural resources and conflict like the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The war that began as an effort to remove the tyranny of the Mobutu regime had by the end of 1999 resulted in multidimensional conflicts involving more than five Congolese factions and up to seven countries within the region⁹. After the invasion of the DRC by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, three southern African countries – Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia – “intervened” on behalf of the government of the day (all for different reasons and largely accused of plundering Congolese resources). Their entry maintained a sort of balance that prevented the recognised Congolese government from being toppled. As the crisis lingered on in the DRC, the UN mandated a European Union force led by France to enter the DRC's Ituri province in June 2003 to restore some form of stability, paving the way for the deployment of the UN Mission on 30 November 1999, following the Lusaka Agreement. In Burundi's conflict that had been going on for over twelve years, the involvement of Tanzania and South Africa in 1998 resulted in the signing of two agreements and the deployment of international peacekeeping forces became necessary in order to monitor the ceasefire and facilitate the peace-building process. The African Union, in a bold attempt, established a peacekeeping mission in Burundi in April 2003 with South Africa in the lead and later on handed over to the UN on 15 May 2004.

Resolving conflicts with other than military means

⁸ John L. Hirsh, *Diamonds and struggle for Democracy*, p. 25.

⁹ Adebajajo and Landsberg, in *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st century*, p. 179.

There have been many instances in which conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa were resolved without resort to the deployment of peacekeeping troops. For example, in Nigeria in 1993, when General Sani Abacha annulled the election results and reversed the transition to civilian rule, civil society rose up and protested against that decision. Trade unions, journalists and professional associations played an active role in trying to restore the democratic process. That action on the part of civil society, even though not successful, immediately gave hope to the population at large that the military regime could not continue acting with impunity, without a challenge or being confronted by members of society. Take the border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, for example. For a number of years relations between neighbouring Cameroon and Nigeria have been strained over issues relating to their 1 600 km land boundary extending from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula, and their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea. Among the issues involved are rights over the oil-rich land and sea reserves and the fate of local populations. For example, as Lake Chad dried up due to desertification, local populations relying on the Lake for their livelihood have followed the receding waters, further blurring the boundary lines. Tension between the two countries escalated into military confrontation at the end of 1993 with the deployment of Nigerian military to the 1 000 km² Bakassi Peninsula. In 1994 Cameroon brought the case of the border dispute between the two countries to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 10 October 2002, the ICJ, citing agreements between the United Kingdom and Germany in the early 20th century, issued its irrevocable judgement on the entire land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. The ruling confirmed Cameroon's sovereignty over portions of the territory in question and delineated the border. Nigeria also made certain land gains according to the ruling. Weeks before the ICJ judgement, the UN Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr Kofi Annan, invited Presidents Paul Biya of Cameroon and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria to meet with him on 5 September 2002 in Paris. During that meeting, the two Presidents agreed to respect and implement the anticipated ICJ decision and to establish an implementation mechanism. They also agreed on the "need for confidence-building measures, including the eventual demilitarisation of the peninsula, possibly with international observers to monitor the withdrawal of all troops" with the support of the United Nations. After the ICJ judgement, the Secretary-General facilitated a further meeting between both Presidents in Geneva on 15 November 2002. In a joint communiqué, the two leaders agreed to ask the Secretary-General to establish a Mixed Cameroon/Nigeria Commission and urged the United Nations "to consider ways of following up on the ICJ ruling and moving the process forward". The Secretary-General designated his Special Representative for West Africa, Mr Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, as Chairman of the Cameroon/Nigeria Mixed Commission¹⁰. The Mixed Commission, with its tripartite group of observers from the UN, Cameroon and Nigeria, continues to work towards a final and peaceful resolution of the dispute.

Thus the cases referred to so far have been a mix of peaceful resolution of conflicts through negotiations, establishment of good offices, Special envoys, mixed commissions, settlement by ICJ and/or a leadership role played by certain individuals. On the other hand, other conflicts such as the one in Sierra Leone necessitated the deployment of sub-regional forces (ECOMOG) and UN forces in large numbers before stability could be established. Again, the ongoing process in Burundi where African Union deployed troops in 2003 and later-on handed over to the UN in 2004 is a classic example of co-operation between the UN and a regional organisation. This type of cooperation is essential since the UN's peacekeeping successes and failures are often contingent on the domestic, regional and extra-regional dynamics of conflict situations.

The case of Darfur

The origins of the conflict in Darfur can be traced back to the British colonial administration which began in 1916 and beyond that period. Before the colonial era, Darfur was an independent sultanate with the ruling group being the Fur. Other tribes in Darfur in this period included the Masahit, Zaghawa, Berti, Tama, Gimir, Tunjur, Meidob, Daja, Birgid, Burgs and others. The Fur, who are essentially farmers, occupied the slopes of the Jabel Mara Mountains and the surrounding areas. The Fur expanded south and westwards, absorbing in the process other smaller ethnic groups, including both Arabs and non-Arabs. *A key issue in the conflict is land.* During the British colonial administration, they introduced the idea of tribal "dars", or homeland with defined territories under Community Paramount Chiefs who had jurisdiction over land allocations. This arrangement presented two problem areas: one, it was never formally recognised by subsequent Sudanese laws, and two, the nomadic groups found in the central belt of Darfur were not granted their own "dars" owing to their way of life. With the expanding population and the attendant ecological degradation, nomadic groups were compelled to start looking for pasture outside their traditional grazing areas. At the same time, the farmers were expanding land for cultivations and fencing off parcels to conserve pasture for their own animals. The inevitable result was conflict, which since the 1980's successive federal and state governments have been unable to stop. The camel-herding Arabs' expansion southwards and westwards destroying farms and water sources for irrigation in an attempt to exert pressure for land ownership is one of the principal causes of the conflict.

The other principal reason for the conflict is the neglect and marginalisation of the people of Darfur in national politics which was exploited by the Islamist movement when it broadened its influence beyond its traditional

¹⁰ United Nations Office for West Africa, Background on Cameroon Nigeria Mixed Commission <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev-dip/africa/office-for-srsg/CNMC/bkground.htm> .

heartland among the Nile Valley Arabs to spread its ideology to the people of the West. Following a misunderstanding and split of the movement with the government, the fallout took on regional/ethnic dimensions. Political realignments emerged, with the Nile Valley Arabs making opportunistic alliances with the Janjaweed militia north of Darfur. The other groups went into opposition, leading to the formation of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/SLM). The SLA/JEM insurgency against the ruling regime in Khartoum began in 2003. The humanitarian crisis which resulted from displacement, massacres and famine moved the world to act. The UN Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Kofi Annan visited Darfur on 29th June 2004, followed by General Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, on 30th June 2004.

On 8 April 2004, the Government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement signed the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) in N'djamena, the capital of Chad, under the auspices of the African Union, with the Government of Chad as mediator. This was further followed by the signing of the Agreements and Modalities for the Establishment of a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the deployment of observers in Darfur, signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 28 May 2004. Article 3 and 4 of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement mandated the formation of a ceasefire Commission which was tasked to monitor and report to a Joint Implementation Commission (JIC), with Chadian mediation. The international community was tasked with monitoring the Parties' compliance with the Agreements. Between 7 and 13 May 2004, the AU dispatched an assessment mission to Darfur which recommended the immediate establishment of a Humanitarian Ceasefire Commission. Within the same month the AU deployed a contingent of 60 military observers and members of the Ceasefire Commission, together with a small, 310-strong protection force whose main task was to provide the military observers and members of the Ceasefire Commission, together with security protection in the conduct of their duties. No sooner had the AU Mission (AMIS) in Sudan been deployed than the AU recognised how inadequate that force was. The capacity to provide direction and support to AMIS was stretched to the limit.

In the communiqué adopted by the thirteenth meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 27th July 2004 on the crisis in Darfur, the PSC requested the Chairperson of the Commission to prepare and submit to it for consideration a comprehensive plan for enhancing the effectiveness of AMIS. The decision finally led to the creation of AMIS II with a new structure and also called for increasing the force level to 3 320, with 670 observers, 1 703 Protection Force, 815 Civilian Police (CIVPOL) and 132 Civilian Staff.

The AU Mission in Darfur was established with the following command and control elements: the strategic level is the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), based at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, to give strategic direction to the operations. The Mission Headquarters is in Khartoum where the special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) is based in order to establish and maintain contact with the government of Sudan (GoS) and coordinate activities with the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), as well as to oversee and manage all mission activities, including logistics and procurement support and air support coordination. This Mission Headquarters reports to the DITF in Addis Ababa. The forward mission headquarters is at El-Fasher, the Capital of North Darfur, and the whole Darfur Region (the size of France) is divided into eight operational sectors. All the sectors have been assigned the following tasks:

- Liaise with the local authorities of all parties in the conflict within the Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR).
- Investigate and report back on allegations of violations of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA).
- Monitor and verify the activities of all parties, each in its respective TAOR.
- Monitor and verify the provision of security for returning Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) and in the vicinity of existing IDP Camps, through the GoS.
- Monitor and verify the cessation of all hostile acts by all the parties.
- Monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population.
- Monitor, verify and report attempts of the GoS to disarm government-controlled militias.
- Protect AMIS personnel, equipment and installations.
- Be prepared to protect civilians under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity, within their means and capabilities and in accordance with the Rules of Engagement (ROEs).

- Provide visible military/civilian police presence by patrolling and by the establishment of temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population.

Since its inception, AMIS has been trying to cope with the above tasks, but it was obvious that the size of the force needed to be increased one more time. In March 2005, the AU-led Joint Assessment Mission visited Khartoum and Darfur and carried out a visit to all sectors and interviewed all parties to the conflict. Included in the Joint Assessment Team were the EU, UN and the US and the UK also sent a separate representative. The report of the Joint Assessment Team increased the force level from 3 320 to 8 565, comprising a 6 171-strong Protection Force, 702 MILOBS, 1,560 CIVPOL and 132 Civilian Staff.

The deployment of that expanded AMIS is in progress right now. Despite logistics constraints, which temporarily suspended the deployment, the greater part of the enhanced force and CIVPOL components are in Darfur.

In all these efforts, what level of international cooperation has the AU Mission been receiving? First of all, the various Resolutions on Darfur passed by the UN Security Council place responsibility on the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to assist AMIS. For example, operative paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005 clearly “requests the Secretary General to report to the Council on options for how UNMIS can reinforce the effort to foster peace in Darfur through appropriate assistance to AMIS including logistical support and technical assistance, and to identify ways in liaison with the AU to utilise UNMIS’s resources, particularly logistical operations support elements as well as reserve capacity towards this end”. In order to fulfil the above requirement, a UN Assistance Cell for the AU has been established in Addis Ababa, which in many ways is helping to enhance cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. The Assistance Cell includes military, police and logistics experts and provides a more suitable basis for assistance that has been available to date. In addition, a UN military liaison officer has been attached to the African Union Ceasefire Commission headquarters at El-Fasher, North Darfur. UNMIS has also established several offices throughout Darfur to coordinate and facilitate liaison and cooperation with the African Union Mission in Darfur, especially in the humanitarian sector. The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) meet often in Khartoum, where both are based. In April 2005, the Secretary-General dispatched his Special Envoy, Lakdar Brahimi, to AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa to discuss with the AU Commission Chairperson the way forward with regard to the operations in Darfur. The Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, also visited the AU headquarters and Darfur in May 2005. The Secretary-General H.E. Mr Kofi Annan followed this up with a visit to AU headquarters in Addis Ababa on 25-26 May, where he co-chaired the pledging conference for the funding of the enhanced AU mission in Darfur. The SG went on to Darfur to see for himself the efforts being made by AMIS to restore stability in that region of Sudan.

The United Nations has not been alone on this level of cooperation. There has been overwhelming goodwill from the International Community towards the AU Mission in Darfur. At the strategic level in Addis Ababa there are two important cooperative groups that meet very regularly to discuss and assist AMIS operations: the Liaison Group, which meets at the AU on Mondays and Thursdays and is often chaired by the head of the DITF, Ambassador Ki Doulaye Coentrin, a senior police officer of the AU together with his senior Military, Police, and Political Affairs Officers, is regularly attended by representatives of the European Union, Canada, the United States and comprises both EU and UN experts. The Partners Technical Support Group meeting for its part is normally held on Wednesdays and is chaired by a senior member of the European Union delegation in Addis Ababa and attended by experts from the delegation, representatives from the Embassies of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, the United Nations and lately NATO. The aim of these two fora is to identify the needs and coordinate support for the AU Mission in Darfur. The mechanisms, developed empirically as initial attempts at assisting the AU had been so fragmented that they tended to confuse the AU senior staff members instead of assisting them. Through the Liaison Group and the Partners Support Group, AMIS has continued to receive the necessary technical support in terms of experts and training of MILOBS, staff officers and Civilian Police. The recently concluded MAP-EXERCISE conducted jointly by the AU, UN, EU, NATO and USA was another effort to strengthen the command and control structures of AMIS.

Critical issues connected with AMIS operations in Darfur

The AU Mission in Darfur has recorded significant successes in stabilising the situation. It is widely accepted that the presence of AMIS troops has curbed the violence in the various sectors and the level of fighting among the various factions has also been reduced to the point that only occasional clashes are reported. Thanks to the assistance of the partners, the deployment of the enhanced AMIS II progressed well until major logistics problems emerged. Indeed, despite the positive achievements of AMIS there continue to be many obstacles to the overall success of the mission:

- *Logistics:* Logistics support for AMIS is reliant on contract services. Commanders in the field therefore have very little influence on delivery of essential combat supplies to the troops. Medical support is not up to standard. At present there is only one level II hospital facility located at Al-Fasher for the entire force in

Darfur, even though the force level is increasing beyond 8 000. There are no dry rations to sustain patrol teams and quite recently the shortage of aviation fuel suspended the deployment of the expanded mission. Accommodation is largely in tents throughout the area of operations. Adverse weather conditions have made life quite unbearable. Maintenance and repair of vehicles and equipment is another major problem area. In Darfur, there are no locally trained mechanics that could be easily engaged by contractors to service and repair AMIS vehicles and equipment. The main contractor, PA&E, therefore has difficulty in coping with these areas of support.

- *Air Support:* This is provided by Canada (15 X M18 helicopters) and the Netherlands (3 X M18). AMIS has also entered into a contract with VEGA Aviation to provide fixed-wing aircraft for troops and cargo lift between Khartoum and Darfur. Technical difficulties such as lack of maintenance and insufficient supply of batteries often ground some of the helicopters. Recently, owing to heavy rainfall, these same helicopters became the only means of transporting food to the various sectors. The shortage of aviation fuel therefore led on many occasions to a shortage of food. In like manner, critical operational tasks could not be undertaken owing to the lack of aviation fuel and to a number of the helicopters being grounded due to lack of maintenance.
- *Communication Equipment:* One major problem that AMIS faced and continues to face is the lack of adequate communication equipment and communication links between the various levels of command. Only recently did the UN provide telephone communication between Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El-Fasher. Internet connections are very erratic. VSAT terminals have been installed but not activated owing to contractual difficulties.
- *Personnel:* The AU took a very bold decision in rushing to deploy in Darfur. However, the recruitment of essential staff to undertake specialist tasks in the management of the operations has not occurred at the same pace. Critical areas such as contract management, budget preparation and financial reporting are now being seriously addressed through technical assistance from the partners and with the AU's own recruited staff. The presence of experts is only a stopgap solution and AU staff should be in a position to assume full responsibility in the course of time.
- *The Parties to the Conflict:* Cooperation of the parties to the conflict has always been a key factor. Representatives of the GoS, SLA/M, and JEM are included at all levels of operational command in Darfur. It had been stated that this arrangement was to ensure transparency and instil confidence in the AU. Unfortunately, the close involvement and presence of the parties create suspicion and fear among witnesses. All the party representatives have satellite phones which are used to give advance information on AMIS projected operations, hence rendering such operations ineffective.
- *Critical Operational Documents:* Even though AMIS has been in operation for over a year, critical documents such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement (ROEs) have taken a long time to be produced, whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the AU and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) are still pending. The lack of SOMA has continued to some extent to hinder the full participation of technical experts from the partners. Customs clearance for deliveries of supplies and equipment into Darfur has also remained a major obstacle.
- *Political Talks:* The long delay in assuming the Abuja talks (resumed on 15 Sept.) had a negative impact on the operations in Darfur. The signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on 5 July 2005 gave hope to the peace process. Only a proper political process can end the conflict: no amount of peacekeeping troops deployed in Darfur can bring a final resolution to the crisis. It is therefore anticipated that as the expanded AMIS II continues to deploy, the resumption on 15th September 2005 of the political talks on the important issues of power sharing, wealth sharing, human rights, land, past grievances, equal representation and security issues will bear fruit.
- *Financial Support:* The greater part of AMIS operations rely on donor funding. The partners have been giving the AU substantial support in cash and kind. The majority of the equipment, vehicles, aircraft and camp accommodations have been delivered to troops in the field. The major problem currently is the shortage of cash. The Commissioner for Peace and Security has appealed to the partners on many occasions to make good the some 200 million US dollars shortfall in order to assist the AU in sustaining its operations in Darfur.

Conclusion

Crisis situations in Sub-Saharan Africa have been a major hindrance to development. The post-colonial era saw Sub-Saharan Africa as a cold war battle ground for the struggle for power and influence. Having been freed from being a pawn in that struggle, the continent began to experience mainly very protracted intra-state conflicts. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the first continental organisation, tried to manage some of these conflicts during the period of its existence. The African Union (AU), which replaced the OAU in July 2000, is now faced with the responsibility of ensuring peace and stability throughout the continent. Although the United Nations has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security all over the world, it has not always been able to immediately deploy troops to Sub-Saharan Africa when conflicts escalated. The AU and its sub-regional organisations have therefore been playing a crucial role in stabilising conflict situations before ultimately handing over to the United Nations in some cases. Whilst some of the crises were settled through peaceful means, other cases necessitated the deployment of peacekeeping troops. The ongoing crisis in Darfur has engaged the attention of the world. The African Union, with the support of the UN, EU, Canada, the US and NATO, is playing a positive role in managing the crisis in Darfur. There are however critical issues of logistics, air support, communication, qualified AU staff and cash donation to sustain the mission. Above all, the necessary legal documents connected with the operations must be negotiated and signed. The importance of the Parties' cooperation at the Abuja talks cannot be overstressed.

Recommendations:

- the use of good offices and special envoys in effecting peaceful resolutions to conflicts must be encouraged, since it is less expensive and often done without acrimony;
- as Sub-Saharan Africa struggles to manage conflicts of various dimensions, it is important that the UN continue to work closely with the AU and its sub-regional organisations – ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD and ECCAS – to strengthen security mechanisms already established;
- it is important for those that govern to learn from history and know that unless policies of exclusion in governance are eliminated, conflicts will continue to emerge and escalate in Africa;
- issues of land, security, wealth and power-sharing must be properly addressed;
- the production, sale and proliferation of small arms must be checked by the international community as a whole;
- structural problems of governance throughout Africa call for a critical study;
- the problems of greed and corruption has continued to plague most African countries. Political leaders must do more than pay lip service to combating these immoral practices;
- the spirit of cooperation between the AU, EU, UN, NATO, Canada, the US and other partners on the Darfur crisis is positive and should continue.

Mr Christian MANAHL (Austria, European Task Force Africa) (Translation) – The EUMS general has described the complex circumstances surrounding the conflict in Darfur. I would like to present the EU's assessment of the development of this ongoing crisis and outline the fundamental aspects of the joint operations there.

The AU-led peace support mission in Darfur, AMIS, is the biggest operation of this kind undertaken so far by the AU. It has grown in less than one year from a small monitoring mission to a 5 539 strong operation, including 862 CivPol and 669 MilObs. When the AU decided last year to launch a mission of this scope and complexity, it took a daring decision: In essence, it launched a UN-style PKO without a DPKO. The AU had to deploy and at the same time build up its own planning and management capacity. No wonder the result has been pretty messy.

Nevertheless, AMIS can be considered a success: It has stabilised the military situation and – together with the political pressure – put an end to the massive campaign of destruction and displacement. There have been no major military clashes since February. I would like to pay tribute to the soldiers and officers all over Darfur – mostly African, but also our own: they have worked hard in very difficult circumstances.

But tremendous challenges remain: security for civilians remains highly problematic in many parts of Darfur, there are daily attacks on humanitarian agencies, there is no question of IDPs returning home in any significant numbers. A fully deployed and functional AMIS will go along way in addressing some of these challenges, but AMIS alone cannot bring a comprehensive solution. I shall come to this in a moment.



Christian Manahl of the EU Council Secretariat, who has responsibility for Darfur, contemplating a possible worst case scenario: collapse of negotiations, disintegration of rebel groups into factions headed by warlords and “a new escalation of violence and ‘Somalisation’ of Darfur”

Before, let me mention that the EU is the most important partner of the AU, providing funding in excess of 120 M€ to AMIS and a broad range of military and civilian expertise: the VP of the Ceasefire Commission and 11 MiObs, 20 military officers embedded in the Joint Logistic Structure created to support AMIS, and 18 CivPol officers. In addition, the EU has provided strategic airlift, training support and equipment. With the ongoing expansion of AMIS, the EU will provide additional support in terms of personnel, materiel, and funding.

What lessons have we learned?

Darfur is an ongoing experience, the outcome at present quite uncertain: as long as the AMIS mission is on the ground, the risks of mission drift and mission failure exist. There is never a guarantee of success.

What is success? AMIS was deployed to monitor the ceasefire, stabilise the military situation, improve the overall security situation and, above all, to create a conducive environment for negotiations with a view to a political solution. AMIS by itself cannot solve the problems of Darfur; military means alone cannot be an exhaustive response to a conflict that is essentially political and socio-economic in nature. The deployment of AMIS was necessary to stop the fighting and the atrocities, but only negotiations, coupled with inter-community reconciliation, SSR and DDR, can bring a comprehensive solution.

First lesson: Our operational support to AMIS needs to be coupled and synchronised with other actions, notably with the political process. For instance, the

Abuja negotiations seem to be floundering, and this raises the question of how long AMIS – or a follow-on mission by another organisation – needs to stay on the ground. Obviously, if we are talking about a mission for two, three, four or more years, we have to think about sustainability in terms of financing and personnel. Hence, the need for comprehensive planning that encompasses military means, civilian crisis-management aspects and the political and socio-economic dynamics relevant for the conflict.

In the same context, it is important to recognise the need for adjusting the structure and mandate of our activities to the dynamics of the conflict and of the conflict resolution efforts. If the Abuja process moves forward, the mandate of the mission would need to be revisited: AMIS will need less protection forces, and perhaps fewer MiObs, but more Civ-Pol, and more military officers to engage with the parties in SSR – integration of rebel militia into the civilian and military security forces and DDR. Or, in the worst case, if the Abuja talks collapse, or if the rebel groups disintegrate into warlord-like militias with no overall coordination and command, AMIS could be faced with a new escalation of violence, perhaps even with a “Somalisation” of Darfur, and it would need to be mandated and equipped to respond to this challenge.

Second lesson: Crisis management is shooting at moving targets; we need to be flexible and imaginative, and adjust to an evolving – sometimes a very rapidly evolving – reality. While it is necessary to develop certain standard procedures, there are no “handbook solutions” to conflicts,

Another point: AMIS is not an ESDP mission, like, for example, Operation Artemis. It is a “supporting action” – EU Member States have insisted on this wording. The African Union is in the lead, not the EU. This corresponds to our general policy of encouraging the AU to assume leadership in crisis management in Africa and assisting the AU in doing whatever is necessary. We encourage and support African ownership.

Third lesson: Wherever the EU supports a third party, it has to accept that the objectives, structure, scope and mandate of crisis-management activities are decided by the third party, not by us; we only have a limited influence on those decisions. In any crisis-management activity – in fact, in any human activity – one has to match ambitions with abilities. But in the case of support to a third party we have to match our ambitions with their abilities. Such abilities can be developed where they are lacking, but this cannot be done overnight.

To sum up:

- 1) Coherence and complementarity of all actions undertaken, in the military, civilian, political and even humanitarian and socio-economic fields;
- 2) Flexibility, imagination, rapid-response capacity;
- 3) Matching ambitions with abilities; sound judgement of what a given organisation can achieve at a given time.

Mr Al Derderi Mohamed AHMED (Member of the National Assembly, Sudan) (Summary) – wished to place the crisis in its political context. He noted that a political settlement existed, yet the conflict was still raging. Indeed, an agreement giving the Darfur provinces extensive autonomous powers had been announced by the Sudanese Government in Tripoli on 18 October 2004 and accepted. That agreement had been guaranteed by the comprehensive peace agreement adopted at the Nairobi Summit. The land issue remained central to the conflict. On 9 July 2005 a new constitution based on the principles of federalism and land reform had been adopted. Darfur had been attributed a share of power and wealth commensurate with its population. The office of Speaker of the newly established Senate had been given to a well-known Darfuri lawyer. The situation on the ground remained tense, but it was improving. The ceasefire agreement was still holding, in spite of regular violations by the rebels. There had been no major fighting for nine months. That, however, was the bright side of the picture. The darker side of the picture concerned events around the negotiating table at Abuja, Nigeria. The rebels were not being encouraged even to attend the talks, let alone to accept the agreement. They wished to see the profile of the conflict elevated even further in order to place further pressure on the government and squeeze further concessions from it. The disagreement within the UN Security Council between France and the United States about whether it should be NATO or the EU that intervened only encouraged the rebels to continue their delaying tactics. The peace agreement had been backed by the international community, but now that same international community was undermining the agreement by insisting that as long as the conflict was not resolved, everything else would be held in abeyance. The rebels preferred blue berets to white ballot papers as a means of ascending to power and were holding the whole country hostage. They were being rewarded for continuing the insurgency by receiving a higher political profile and the promise of more blue berets. Military means alone were not the solution. The Darfur conflict had originally been triggered by the proliferation of small arms in the country, yet no-one now was paying any attention to this problem. As long as the country's borders with its neighbours remained open to weapons smugglers, as long as the disarmament process was not properly implemented and above all, as long as the exporting countries continued sending these weapons to Africa, the conflict would continue unabated.



Dr Alexia MIKOS (Greece, Crisis management Policy Section, Operations Division, NATO) (Summary) – explained that following the AU decision to expand its peacekeeping force in Darfur to 7 700 troops, AU Commission President Konaré had written to NATO on 26 April 2005 to enquire about the possibility of its providing logistic support to AMIS. This had marked the start of the process of reflection within NATO on contributing to the mission.

On 17 May 2005, during the first visit ever by an AU official to NATO headquarters, Mr Konaré had laid out the details of the assistance required by the AU.

On 26 May the NATO Secretary-General had attended the Major Donors' conference in Addis Ababa, where he had expressed NATO's willingness to provide logistical support and training. Following further consultations with AU on its precise requirements, as well as with the EU, UN and other players, the North Atlantic Council had agreed on 8 June to provide support

to AMIS in three areas: 1. coordination of the airlift of AU troops and civilian police personnel into the region; to be done in close coordination and constant consultation with EU; 2. staff capacity-building workshops for AU officers at the DITF; 3. support in organising a UN-led mapping exercise (MAPPEX).

The results had been as follows:

- the coordination of strategic airlift of troops and civilian police personnel was going according to the AU schedule;
- cooperation on strategic airlift was working very well: six battalions had already been lifted, five of them by NATO, as well as 40 civilian police personnel;
- the feedback had been extremely positive;
- the staff capacity-building efforts had yielded positive results. Attendance by AU personnel (military and civilian police) had been greater than initially expected;
- MAPPEX had also been a success.
- NATO’s aims were as follows:
 - to work in close coordination and full transparency, consultation and complementarity with the EU, UN, AU and all other relevant actors;
 - to constantly tailor its efforts to the express needs of the AU, in particular as regards training;
 - to strengthen the capacity of the AU to meet the challenges;
 - to support the AU’s efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur, while ensuring that the AU remained “in the driver’s seat”.

Discussion

Mr Yassir ARMAN (Sudan) referred to an ongoing debate concerning the justification for a full-scale military peacekeeping operation now that a peace agreement had been signed between the SPLM and the Sudanese Government. The cost of the operation had been estimated at some six to seven billion dollars for the six-year period. That was a lot of money that could be usefully used to address the root causes of the conflict. Would it not be possible, given that there had not been a single ceasefire violation since the peace agreement had been signed, to reduce the military presence and use the funds thus saved to tackle those underlying problems? Furthermore, although a comprehensive peace agreement for the whole country was necessary, it was important to focus on implementing the Naivasha agreement in the south. Indeed, this would inject momentum into the peace process in Darfur and could provide the model for a settlement there, since the problems – social and political marginalisation, cultural and land issues – were the same. It was important to establish this positive link between the two, rather than to link them negatively by inferring that the international community would not support the agreements signed so far unless a solution was also found for Darfur.

Mr Elobeid Mohamed ELOBEID (Sudan) remarked that if the EU’s role was confined to the political sphere this would be less costly than all the military peacekeeping operations. What could the EU do to push the government and rebel groups towards a political agreement?

Mr Charles GOERENS, Rapporteur (Luxembourg) was grateful for the presentations as well as the information provided by the different speakers in the run-up to the conference, which provided valuable input for his report. He explained that one should indeed talk in terms of two peace agreements for Sudan, the first being the one in the south signed in January 2005. Now it was important that the donor countries should live up to their commitments in order to make it clear to the different protagonists that such a political solution was indeed in their interests.

A second agreement was now needed to provide the basis for peace and stability in Darfur. Could the member of the Sudanese parliament explain how that agreement might differ from the first one? Was the starting point the same? It should be remembered that under the first agreement the south could decide after a five-year period whether it wanted to remain part of Sudan or not.

Mr Al Derderi Mohamed AHMED (Sudan), explained that the so-called Blue Nile agreements were intended to be comprehensive and to address all the issues, including those of self-government, autonomy and federation. They granted autonomous government to the south in the framework of a federal system. That model could offer a solution for Darfur. If the Darfur rebel movements wished to negotiate additions or amendments to the comprehensive agreement, there was room for doing this around the negotiating table. However, the Darfur agreement remained subordinate to the comprehensive agreement signed in Nairobi.

Major General Henry ANYIDOHO observed that there were differences between the situations in the North and South. The Darfur rebel movements were not seeking to have separate armed forces, for example, unlike those in the south. There were a number of different issues that must be addressed separately. It was important now to put pressure on both sides in order to reach agreement during the forthcoming negotiations in Abuja. This was essential in order to put an end to peoples’ suffering and enable them to leave the refugee camps and return to their homes. As long

as they remained away from their lands and farms they would become more desperate and the “dependency syndrome” would worsen.

Mr Christian MANAHL, on the same issue, and in response to criticism that the EU had spent too much money and effort on peacekeeping and peace-support operations when an equivalent effort on African development policies might be more effective in the long term, agreed that military action alone would not solve all the political and social problems. Nevertheless, there were crisis scenarios in which the military component remained indispensable to prevent an escalation. Political and military stability was an essential prerequisite for social and economic development. The AMIS operation was necessary to put a stop to the ongoing conflict and if successful would make it possible to implement the development projects that the EU planned for the immediate future. The fragmentation of one of the rebel movements endangered the negotiation process, and the EU would like to see this problem addressed by helping the SLM sort out its internal differences in order to give the movement an effective leadership respected by the commanders on the ground and able to enter into commitments around the negotiating table and to uphold them.

FOURTH SITTING

Chairman: Mr Stef Goris (Belgium), President of the WEU Assembly

The way forward: Euro-African cooperation on peacekeeping.

EU support to peace and security in Africa.

Mr Koen VERNAEKE (Head of the EU Task Force “Africa”). Recent significant evolutions in Africa within the EU and the UN converge and tend to indicate that the EU should take advantage of the momentum that seems to be building.

I. Shifting policy principles

Africa

- **Increased efforts** by African countries to resolve conflicts; ownership.
- Progress in setting up **structures focusing on security** (AU, African Peace and Security Council, NEPAD, also regional level ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC).

EU

- **ESS:** underlines that security is the first condition to development. But also important for Europe’s own security: state failure and conflicts not only sustain poverty, they can also fuel organised crime, illicit trafficking and terrorism. In addition: principles of effective multilateralism and advocating a proactive, comprehensive and integrated approach bringing together all instruments (development, trade, economic, diplomatic, politico-military). Tackling both root causes and crisis management.
- The **Council Common Position concerning conflict prevention**, management and resolution in Africa is on the same line. It identifies specifically security issues (African peace support capabilities, SSR, DDR).
- The **Cotonou Agreement and EDF** provide already important support for a broad range of peace building activities. About 55% of the total world aid is annually provided by the EU. Addressing the shortcoming of previous agreements by reinforcing the political dimension of ACP-EU cooperation.

Conclusion: Interesting case of policy changes and shifting priorities. What was an almost exclusive focus on economic and social development has increasingly developed into a more complex and comprehensive policy, where the political and security has gained importance, partly due to the recognition of the “failure” of development policies. The link between peace, stability, development and respect for human rights, rule of law, democratic principles and good governance was reinforced.

UN

- UN has a direct and obvious interest in peace and security in Africa. It is assisting the AU in developing its peace and security capacity. It examines UN and bilateral roles and resources involved in the restructuring and training of defence capabilities in the wider context of security sector reform.
- **Trilateral cooperation** (EU/UN/AU). The EU is the largest financial contributor to the UN system. It pays 37% of the regular budget and 2/5 of the cost of UN PKO. EU recognises a primary role for the UN in the management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. Unlikely that the EU would engage in major peace efforts outside the UN framework, or without approval or endorsement of the UN SC.

II. Strengthened tools/capabilities

CFSP/diplomatic/political

- Growing involvement in Africa. Recognition that only comprehensive approach, combining first and second pillars can lead to durable results.
- Growing role played by PSC and HR Solana. How to attain more coherent and effective action by combining the different efforts of member states through the available mechanisms of the CFSP and ESDP. Even bigger member states experience and recognise that they cannot deal with African crises on their own. Notion of “pré carré” loses importance; need to mobilise EU support. Logical continuation would be EEAS.

Peace Facility

- E 250M allocated from the European Development Fund (EDF) to the Africa Peace Facility: principle of African solidarity. Can be seen as the centre of the EU-AU partnership. Should be combined with logistical and technical (ESPD) support. Financing such political delicate operations requires operational awareness of what is happening.

ESDP

- Continuation of CFSP with civilian and military capabilities.
- Artemis June 2003: turning-point. Ground-breaking in terms of the EU's commitment to answering collectively the challenges of peace and security in Africa.
- The EU started assessing what additional capacity (military and civil) available through ESDP could be envisaged as a contribution to the integrated approach the EU pursues in conflict prevention and management in Africa.
- Following sectors for possible ESDP:
 - **Autonomous EU military and civil crisis operational means** – Battlegroup concept. While the long-term goal of both Europe and Africa is for African-led solutions (or UN), the EU needs to be prepared to respond to immediate crises, especially when no one else can or will. EU must be able to deploy its forces at short notice to developing crises to save lives and to allow time for the UN and/or the AU to deploy appropriate forces to manage the situation.
 - **Strengthening African peace-support operations capabilities:** E 35M of Peace Facility for capacity building. A number of EU members are already involved in building the peacekeeping capabilities of various African states through bilateral or broader training assistance (Benin, G8, RECAP). The nascent AU peace and security mechanisms, including the African Standby Force, will require far greater coordination and support throughout the continent to realise the AU's ambitious vision.
 - Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (**DDR**) and **SSR** (Security Sector Reform [military and police]). IPU/EUPOL-EUSEC. Developing a concept. Entails either the return of former combatants and adversaries to civilian life, or their integration into new security mechanisms. WB, UNDP and EC are focussing on the challenges of DDR, but attention is often lacking when former fighters are integrated into new security organs. The enormity of securing reform challenges in Congo requires far greater coordination of efforts and comprehensive EU action.
 - **Other:** early warning capacity, combating arms trafficking, removal of landmines.

III. Challenges and limitations

EU

- Issue of **political will**. Enlargement versus focus on Africa.
- Issue of **EU capabilities**: headline goals military and civilian.
 - Military: Few member states, apart from France and the UK have the capacity to deploy, support and command operations such as Artemis. Battle group concept.
 - Civil-military planning cell in Kortenbergh which would allow the EU to better prepare for operations which require a mixture of civilian and military instruments.
 - Civilian capabilities: area where EU has already developed considerable experience. It has established pools of national specialists in the area of police, rule of law, civil protection, civil administration and monitoring.
- Issue of **financing** for CFSP (very limited budget) and ESDP (purely intergovernmental and not covered by the EU budget) operations: crucial. Immediate implications but also longer term (Stability Fund, ODA versus non-ODA).
 - Military: one of the limitations of the "framework nation" concept is financial. Except some common costs, cost lay where they fall. New mechanism ATHENA for EU led operations with military and defence implications.
 - Grey zone: SSR advisory mission –CFSP or not (cfr EUSEC). Military or not? Need to adopt our concepts: EU support to third organisations (logistic, technical etc), SSR, DDR.
 - Civil: police missions, in field of training, monitoring. Commission developed some competence (RRM/EDF funding): training police, DDR.

AU

- Danger that political expectations will overstretch capacity and undermine the credibility and development of AU initiatives.
- MOU AU and REC.

UN

- Support to African peacekeeping capacity is in the interest of the UN as could be EU operations, but this does **not** replace, in the view of the UN, EU and African participation in UN operations.

IV. Commission for Africa

Tackling the causes of conflict and building the capacity of African States to manage:

- Arms control;
- Management of conflict resources;
- Corporate activities in conflict areas and the role of foreign companies in conflict zones

Capacity-building of regional and continental organisations for conflict prevention, management and resolution:

- Support the African peace and security architecture;
- Strengthening the capacity of the UN to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts (UN Peace building commission).

Post-conflict peace building:

- Focus on governance, DDR, SSR;
- Rapid clearance of debt arrears.



Sven Biscop, Senior Researcher with Belgium's Royal Institute for International Relations, warns that the "responsibility to protect" scenario could involve deployment of large numbers of peacekeepers that the EU would need to find quickly

Mr Sven BISCOP (Belgium, Senior Researcher, Royal Institute for International Relations) (Summary) – noted that it was a great pleasure for him as a Belgian to be speaking in such a prestigious setting. Normally he could only address his parliament through the ballot box, so he was very pleased to have been invited to speak in the Chamber today! Unlike the preceding speaker, Mr Verwaeke, and most of the participants in the conference, he was not an expert on Africa as such, but would be addressing the EU's role as an international security actor, with a particular focus on the implications for the ESDP of the EU's engagement in Africa. This was to be seen in the context of EU-UN cooperation, the UN Security Council being the core of the system of effective multilateralism referred to in the European Security Strategy. Clearly the EU had the ambition to engage in promoting security in Africa, to which it had close geographic but also emotional ties.

The EU cooperated actively with the African Union through the Peace Facility and ongoing operations, but more needed to be done. There may be other crises in the future calling for intervention in compliance with the "responsibility to protect" principle that had now been accepted by the United Nations. Hence the demand for well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers and peace-enforcers able to react rapidly might well exceed the supply. The principle must be the empowerment of the AU, while being aware that AU operations depended to a large extent for the moment on external funding and logistic support. Moreover there was a problem of sustainability: given the current state of AU capabilities, the AU might need for long-term operations to be relieved by the UN, by African regional organisations or indeed by the EU, acting as a subcontractor.

Some 60 000 to 70 000 European troops were currently deployed in crisis zones around the world. 4 000 to 4 500 of these were deployed in UN operations. This may seem little in comparison with the EU's 40% contribution to the UN budget, but it had to be remembered that some 30 000 more troops were deployed in operations being conducted either

by NATO (ISAF, KFOR) or the EU (Althea) under a UN mandate. Some 25 000 to 30 000 troops were currently deployed in Iraq and for various national operations, including in Africa (Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire).

Many European forces were deployed in the Balkans, which was logical given the need to guarantee security at the EU's borders, while Afghanistan was an "out-of-area" operation conducted pursuant to Article 5. It might look as though Europe was not taking its share of the burden for the rest of the world, but it was important to remember various national operations, Operation Artemis and the battlegroup concept in the process of being developed. The latter was important for a "responsibility to protect" scenario, but was not a panacea: such forces would need to be appropriately equipped for high-intensity operations (intervention decided by the UNSC against the will of the national authorities) and some situations would call for a longer-term presence on the ground, in which case the battlegroups would have to be replaced by EU, UN or AU forces or a combination of all three.

It might be considered that the EU, in addition to Artemis, should also participate in MONUC, but this required a political decision. The European Security Strategy and the Petersberg Declaration adopted by WEU defined the types of operations, but a political decision on the precise objectives was required: how many operations of which type should the EU be able to conduct simultaneously? This had implications for planning decisions. For the moment the requirement was to have two battlegroups on standby at any time. Expectations should not be too high, for the EU could not intervene all over the world in all situations. The current operations currently involved one third of European deployable forces, not taking into account troop rotations, so there was little margin for manoeuvre.

The military side was just one aspect. The EU's innovative approach involved combining a range of objectives and instruments, in compliance with the principle that security was closely linked with development and human rights. The EU had defined four areas for simultaneous action: physical security (freedom from fear); economic security

(freedom from want); the social dimension (access to health and education and to a hazard-free environment); the political dimension (rule of law, respect for human rights). These were public goods to which every individual must have access. If even one was missing, the other three could not be enjoyed, hence the need for simultaneous action in all areas. The EU had responded to that need by setting up a civil-military Situation Centre and a Civil-Military Cell (indeed there was even question of NATO having access to the EU's civilian capabilities!). Moreover the EU had a number of civilian operations under way, such as its SSR and police missions in the Congo. In addition its integrated approach embraced development policy, trade policy. All operations were a combination of civil and military aspects: even if high-intensity military operations were necessary as a first step they always needed to be followed up by other types of action to attain the objectives in the four abovementioned areas.

The trend so far had been positive: the EU had strengthened its commitment to Africa in more areas than before. However, one could not rely on this always being the case and conferences like the present one were valuable for keeping up the pressure on the EU to maintain its level of commitment to helping Africa secure a better future.

Mr Alain DELETROZ (France, Vice-President Europe, International Crisis Group) (Summary) – explained that the International Crisis Group had been created ten years previously by former statesmen and stateswomen following the genocide in Rwanda and the massacres in the Balkans, in response to the lack of precise and independent information that they had deplored during their period in office. The Group now comprised 110 full-time analysts and some thirty consultants permanently based on the ground in some 40 conflict zones around the world. On the basis of their analyses the Group drew up practical recommendations on the ways and means of averting or resolving crises which it submitted to the different players involved. The conflicts in the Balkans and West Africa had given it its baptism of fire as well as focusing the attention of the international community.



Alain Déletroz, Vice-President (Europe) of the International Crisis Group, hails AU “doctrinal progress” but regrets the reluctance by the region’s heads of state to take appropriate measures in the face of abusive government by one of their number

For the Group, Africa was a source of concern but also hope. While the former Organisation for African Unity (OAU) had not had the authority to settle the armed conflicts in Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia and elsewhere, the constitutive texts of the African Union (AU), which had been set up in 2002, gave it the right to intervene in national or regional conflicts. This organisation embodied the resolve of the states concerned to shoulder responsibility for the peace and stability of their continent and marked a revolution in the concept of multilateralism. Aware of the role of the political classes in the ongoing conflicts, the AU was founded on the principle that it was the collective responsibility of the African states themselves to guarantee good governance and respect for human rights, and that they could be sanctioned by their peers.

The AU was still in the teething stages. Its intentions were clearly stated in the texts but there remained reluctance on the part of the heads of state of the region to take the necessary action when one of their number lost his sense of reality and began destroying his own country.

The EU, in order to cooperate effectively with Africa, needed to focus its commitment on the AU. The best-known of the eight AU Commission departments was the one in charge of peace and security, and it was towards that department that the bulk of aid from Brussels should be channelled. The AU had taken on a higher profile since its involvement in Darfur through the AMIS mission, although it had been slow to deploy. The deployment process had also been hampered by the debates in Europe on whether support should be provided under NATO or ESDP auspices, and all the while the massacres had continued.

Darfur was a good example both of the hopes connected with Africa – with an AU engagement based

on the principle of African ownership of peacekeeping operations – and of the security problems confronting it. The EU

should help consolidate the AU, in particular by promoting democracy. In March 2004 it had set up the Peace Facility and allocated 250 million euros by way of direct aid. Perhaps even more important for Africa than conflict prevention and peacekeeping was its economic development, which meant giving thought in Washington and Brussels to opening up markets to African exports. The EU should establish links with the AU Commission's agriculture and economic affairs departments as strong as its ties with the department for peace and security.

Finally, it was urgent to give fresh thought to the deployment of peacekeeping missions around the world, for there were many requests for intervention and not all EU member states were ready to respond. The development of the ESDP was to be welcomed. The creation of the AU was also a positive step, as long as it was able to avoid the pitfalls which had prevented the OAU from being effective.

Discussion

Mr Damian THWAITES (United Kingdom) speaking on behalf of the UK WEU/EU Presidency welcomed the initiative of this particularly well-timed conference. The UK Presidency and Prime Minister Blair were devoting substantial time and energy to African issues and a number of complementary initiatives were being taken to foster peace and security. Mr Thwaites was pleased so many eminent speakers from Africa were present to take part in the dialogue. He himself was aware of the action the EU was taking in relation to Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo and believed the programme was set to expand rapidly.

Mr Valens MUNYABAGISHA (Rwanda) was pleased to have been invited to speak. 60% of Rwanda's population lived on less than 1 euro per day. Poverty was compounded by illiteracy. As well as peacekeeping, these problems also needed to be tackled. There were a number of reasons for the situation: the failure of government characteristic of the region, tribal tensions and the formation of armed militia with support from other countries. Proliferation of small arms was extensive. It was unthinkable that such weapons were issued to those responsible for the massacres in Rwanda. There had been different types of peacekeeping operation but these were not always effective. The UN operation had been a failure and Operation Turquoise had been given the somewhat nebulous task of "contributing to the safety of displaced persons" but no mandate to stop genocide. The African Union was sending troops into the crisis zone and Rwanda was also supplying peacekeeping forces, as in Sudan. A conference had been held on peace in the Great Lakes Region and the AU had decided to send troops to the RDC to work alongside forces from that country and with MONUC. Mr Munyabagisha felt that the EU would do better to support such operations, particularly that of the AU and train the RDC army to assist the transition. He also pointed to the various initiatives being taken by national parliaments which were due to hold a meeting shortly in Kigali. This, he felt, was something the EU should support.

Dr Gerhardus KOORNHOF (South Africa) was sorry no representative from the African Union was present to contribute to the debate. He did not want to discuss South Africa's experience in peacekeeping which, although quite extensive, had not always been up to scratch in operational and logistic terms. South Africa's first democratic elections 11 years ago and the adoption of the country's new Constitution had instituted civilian control over the military. The country was committed to helping put an end to conflict in Africa. He thought three things should be done: The security sector needed overhauling and post-conflict reconstruction made a part of it. Taking Burundi as an example, he felt that civilians, NGOs and other actors had a part to play. He asked whether this aspect could relevantly be included in the debate. On the subject of the African brigades, Mr Koornhof wanted there to be better information exchange between governments and for real cooperation to come into play between standing armies, combat groups and sub-regional brigades. Lastly, he wanted exchange programmes with NATO to be organised.

Mr Ebenezer SEKYI-HUGHES (Ghana) explained that many problems with peacekeeping operations had been resolved and these could now provide useful lessons. He felt that the new strategies were increasingly effective. There was an immediate need for standing peacekeeping forces. Procedures needed to be set up now and identifiable units established within member states. This required time, equipment, infrastructure, training, fuel etc. Forces needed to be able to intervene more rapidly on the ground. Air, land and sea capabilities were all essential.

Cooperation between regional organisations and other donors made certain logistic demands. He wanted to highlight the problem of equipment. ECOWAS had set up a fund. Support for this would be helpful. He felt that there was an obligation to do more than act as a buffer between troops, impose curfews or secure borders. The army could not do everything. Training civilian and administrative staff was imperative for sorting out the various procedures. In addition, there were cultural and linguistic issues affecting decision-making. Steps therefore had to be taken to promote diplomatic cooperation in support of peace. There should be early warning systems and machinery for preventing the outbreak of conflict. He concluded by explaining that Ghana had set up a centre, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, to train specialists in peacekeeping and crisis management. Officers from 78 countries were taking advantage of this facility. This worthwhile project should receive support from friends and partners alike.

Mr Eric KPADE (Togo) was pleased to take part in the present discussion as a representative of his country as Togo had peace in the region very much at heart. The feeling that the continent had been abandoned was gradually

being dispelled. The two continents, Europe and Africa, were bound by their shared past. Peacekeeping and preventing war was an attempt to alleviate peoples' suffering. Economic problems were as much a cause of that suffering. Togo had never recovered from the 12-year break in its relations with the EU, which had created as much havoc for it as war. Although the EU had a duty to hold out a hand to Africa, Brussels must understand that what was needed rather was economic support (help in negotiating with international financial institutions, negotiations on the terms of trade). Mr Kpade explained that although military assistance was needed, Africa was also desperately short of qualified people, public finance experts and the like.

Mr Damien HELLY (European Policy Coordinator for the NGO "Safer Road"), spoke about the efforts of the NGO he represented to eradicate the deep-rooted cause of small arms trafficking in Africa. He enquired as to how much money was left in the African Peace Facility programme and how its participants planned continue its funding. He also wanted to know whether the EU was planning to allocate funds to African peacekeeping operations on a more permanent basis, through the creation of a dedicated account in its budget. Lastly he expressed his deep concern over the fact that the security dimension of Africa's instability was overshadowing the importance of peace *per se* for the development and the prosperity of the Continent. He also noted that, although the urgent necessity of peacekeeping operations was evident, one should never lose sight of the overall goal, of durable and sustainable peace in Africa, through long term investment in social and economic development.

Mr Robert WALTER (United Kingdom) noted the important part South Africa had to play in maintaining peace and stability in Africa, and its responsibility to do so as the continent's richest country. He then referred to the situation in Zimbabwe which he felt was deteriorating and potentially dangerous. He concluded by raising the issue of Chinese penetration of Africa, both economic and political, and particularly about China's presence there as one of the biggest arms importers to the continent.

Mr Laurent AKOUN (Côte d'Ivoire) expressed his concern as to how to convince all those who had taken up arms to hand them over to the authorities. He cited the example of his own country, where armed gangs still existed, even though the situation was now relatively stable, and concluded that this was one of the main challenges any future DDR policy in the region would have to deal with. He then raised the question of the difficulty of distinguishing the specific role and function of every mediator in a conflict, while wishing that the African Union would play a more active mediating role in the conflict ravaging his country.

Mr Al Derderi Mohamed AHMED (Sudan) thanked the WEU Assembly for inviting the Sudanese National Assembly to take part in the conference, especially in the light of the recent change of government in that country. He expressed concern about the image presented by speakers during the Conference of the African Union as "the local sheriff". Mr Ahmed stated his strong conviction that even if earlier policies of non-interference had proved ineffective, the AU should not be allowed to turn into a police force, or a sort of continental despot replacing the existing local ones. The AU should be an organisation that promoted and disseminated democracy, stability and the principles of good governance throughout Africa. He urged it not give up on these longer term aspects of its mission in Darfur, once cessation of hostilities had been achieved. He wondered finally whether AU members had a true vision of the organisation's role as something more than a mere police force.

Mr Koen VERVAEKE (Belgium) replying to questions from the South African, Ghanaian and Sudanese representatives felt that the African brigades were an essential factor. Thought needed to be given to the African Union's role in peacekeeping. Too much should not be expected but there needed to be more discussion. For the moment, the AU was obviously concentrating on security and peacekeeping because of the present situation. A better balance was needed between intervention and good government and financial help, and between the AU's different responsibilities.

Mr Sven BISCOP (Belgium) allowed that the Ghanaian representative had a point, but present principles should make for quicker action. Replying to the South African representative he felt that the EU and NATO were doing the same job. He referred to a new player on the African continent in the form of China and wondered at the effect its involvement might have.

Mr Alain DELETROZ (France) maintained that, as had been said in Washington, light arms were weapons of mass destruction, yet it was clear that exporter countries did not want them to be traceable. He warned against the view that a disarmament process alone would be effective. There needed to be agreement and a political resolve on the part of all those involved.

Conclusions



Rapporteur Charles Goerens outlining proposals for the Assembly's report on security in Africa – central to them the need to offer Africans “the means of achieving development”

Mr Charles GOERENS (Luxembourg, Rapporteur for the Assembly) (Translation) – The highly informed nature of the debate makes my task easier, but it is difficult to draw conclusions that are clear-cut. We need to take the measure of the complexity of the problem. Europe has experience worth sharing but not necessarily anything to teach anyone. Think back to Bosnia and Kosovo with their train of violence, pillage and rape. But think back also to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) where conflict prevention was crowned with success. However, this is the Achilles' heel – prevention – because of failure to communicate. In the case of Africa, there is a tendency to become fixated on the problems: AIDS, famine and conflict. However, there is another side. Some countries like Senegal, Cape Verde or South

Africa have come though with flying colours. Others are doing pretty well, like Mozambique, the country the most likely to fulfil the Millennium Development Goals, with 5% growth in 2004.

When reaching our conclusions, let us bear in mind that since the cold war ended in 1989 there are increasingly fewer extenuating circumstances for when conflicts arise. Of Darfur, as of Rwanda, we cannot say there were no warning signs. The famine in Niger could have been foreseen. We must show ourselves more responsible in future, and know our own limitations. I should like at this point to ask a question: what can be done to extend the benefits of globalisation to everyone? Without the efforts of the Council, and Louis Michel here, we would be even further away from our target of cutting poverty by half by 2015. But there will still be that other frustrated half, a continuing source of conflict.

I am surprised to note that, over the last two days, there has been only one reference to the international financial institutions. However, they have an overwhelming responsibility. We should be aware of the responsibility that the international system bears and where a new balance must be struck. The task to be done is Herculean and the first step is distinguishing between the direct and underlying causes of conflict. We have to make sure that the countries in question can meet their citizens' basic needs and put an end to the sort of globalisation that simply magnifies inequality.

A great window of opportunity is opening up to us. We can look for solutions to some of the formulas Europe has devised, like the ACP agreements and the European investment funds. There is a truly desperate lack of development investment. Let us hope that the 0.7% target will be reached soon. We also have to think about risk and cost sharing and make sure that the 25 EU countries genuinely commit.

Provided interventions are in accordance with the United Nations Charter, I can see no reason for not becoming involved in conflict resolution. However, we cannot always be the ones to proffer solutions. Africans must have the means of achieving development. I hope that future European interventions will not be “strapped for cash” as it were. Ways of financing and extending Europe's efforts over time have to be found. This has given rise to the idea of setting up a common management fund in Africa. We should pay tribute to all that has been done so far and publicise successes. It is up to us to remind the general public that they need to continue to make the effort; that not everything that goes on makes the headlines. It is in our interests that globalisation should benefit all of us.

As well as intervening where necessary, we must put more pressure on our governments to develop further conflict monitoring and management interests. Emphasis should be placed on controlling small arms production. This is one area where we must not let down our guard. And once again, we must put pressure on our governments. Our aim should be to succeed in the most rewarding undertaking of the decade: sharing our experience! I shall now hand over to Commissioner Louis Michel here, a staunch and faithful ally.

Closing address



Mr Louis MICHEL (European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid) (Translation) – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, there have been more armed conflicts in Africa than on any other continent over the past forty years. Those conflicts have aggravated poverty and exclusion. They have hampered growth and development. They have robbed many people of their right to life, freedom, dignity and security. According to the Copenhagen Consensus, countries in conflict show a drop in per capita GDP of 2%. Since conflicts in Africa last an average of seven years, it takes 21 years on average for the countries concerned to get back to the economic level they had prior to the conflict.

These past few years there has been a growing awareness in Africa and in the international community of the close link that exists between security and development. We have seen that conflicts remain the principal obstacle to development. Hence we have concluded that in order to invest in development, we must first invest in peace. But what does that mean in practical terms? How can that academic conclusion be translated into political action? How can we develop a policy to support peace and security within the framework of development policy, but without subordinating one to the other and without losing sight of the specific objectives of development?

Let me briefly mention the basic approach which must be the leitmotiv for any action we take. The most important lesson we have learnt from 50 years of development aid is that development policies and strategies cannot be imposed from outside. In order to have a long-term impact, development aid must be founded on a political resolve on the part of the Africans themselves, on African ownership, African institutions and African processes.

Peace and security are no exception to that rule. If we want lasting peace to be restored to Africa, we must help it meet that challenge.

In recent years the African regional economic communities have demonstrated a remarkable resolve and ambition to put an end to the conflicts in their regions. ECOWAS has intervened in a number of regional conflicts over the last ten years (in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire).

Its counterpart in East Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), directed the mediation efforts during the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia.

Three years ago the African Union was created. At the time there was a certain amount of scepticism about this new acronym and additional layer of bureaucracy. Three years on, however, we note remarkable progress in all areas, in particular that of peace and security. The AU has become a major – and indeed vital – strategic player on the continent of Africa. In less than three years the AU Peace and Security Council has become the authority for resolving African crises and conflicts.

Let us take the case of the operation currently being conducted in Darfur under AU auspices. This is a 5 600-strong operation (and in a few months' time it will be increased to 7 000). The crisis in Darfur is far from having been resolved, but in those areas where AU troops have been deployed the population is living in greater security.

That determination on the part of Africa to face up to its challenges by itself has obviously changed the nature of Europe's role, but not its level of commitment.



The Belgian Chamber of Representatives

In 2003 the African states asked us to set up a new instrument for funding African peacekeeping operations conducted by and for Africa. The European Commission did not hesitate to follow up that request. In March 2004 we took the decision to set up a Peace Facility of 250 million euros financed from the European Development Fund.

The AU operation in Darfur that I mentioned a moment ago was the first test case for our partnership in the Peace Facility framework. The European Commission agreed to provide 92 million euros for implementing the mission (more than 50 million of which have already been paid out). The Peace Facility was used to fund the daily allowances and food rations for troops as well as fuel and insurance for the peace mission in Darfur.

After eighteen months of existence the Peace Facility constitutes a sound basis for African leadership. The availability and flexibility of resources have enhanced the credibility of the African Union in assuming that leadership and making the principle of African ownership a reality.

Even more importantly, the Peace Facility provides the core for a new strategic partnership between Africa and Europe. It is a more political, more equal and more respectful partnership. It has generated a more ongoing, frank and constructive dialogue with our partners.

The time has come, on the basis of that positive experience, to implement a more coherent, common, systematic and permanent European approach. Community instruments such as the Peace Facility must be supplemented by the tools provided by the member states in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. That set of tools for strategic planning and crisis management must be placed at the service of the African Union.

Allow me to say a few words, finally, on the future of the Peace Facility.

Everyone agrees in both Europe and Africa that this instrument has been a success. But that success comes at a price, for its resources may soon be depleted. I therefore think it would be useful to launch a debate among the EU member states on the possibilities for replenishing the funds for this important instrument.

I would like at the same time to stress that the Peace Facility will never be able to fund all the costs of any peacekeeping mission.

Ladies and gentlemen, enormous issues are at stake. Without security there can be no development. The peace and security architecture needed for Africa is exactly the same as the one on which the European Union is founded. It is based on common values that are deeply entrenched in peoples' hearts and minds, on a concept of continental cohesion that provides the ideal framework for managing and resolving crises, conflicts and wars.

For my part I will never cease my efforts to ensure that the African Union is given the means to meet its aims and carry out its missions.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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- Mr Herman **DE CROO** (Belgium), President of the House of Representatives, Belgium
- Mr Armand **DE DECKER** (Belgium), Minister for Development Cooperation (Former President of the Assembly)
- Mr Charles **GOERENS** (Luxembourg), Rapporteur for the Assembly (Former Minister for Defence and Development, Former President of the Assembly)
- Mr Stef **GORIS** (Belgium), President of the Assembly of WEU
- Mr François **ROELANTS DU VIVIER** (Belgium), Chairman of the Committee on External Relations and Defence of the Belgian Senate, representing the President of the Belgian Senate
- Mr Al Derderi Mohamed **AHMED** (Sudan), Member of the National Assembly
- Mr Arnauld **AKODJENOU**, Director of the Emergency and Security Services, UN High Commission for Refugees
- Major Gen. Henry **ANYIDOHO**, Head of the United Nations Assistance Cell in Addis Ababa, Chief of Staff of the African Union Darfur integrated Task Force
- Gen Emmanuel **BETH** (France), Head of the Planning and Operations Centre, Ministry of Defence (Operation Licorne – Côte d’Ivoire)
- Prof Sven **BISCOP** (Belgium), Senior Researcher, Royal Institute for International Relations
- Mr Alain **DELETROZ**, Vice-President (Europe), International Crisis Group
- Mr Christian **MANAHL**, Official with responsibility for Darfur, European Union Task Force “Africa”
- Mr Louis **MICHEL** (Belgium), European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid
- Dr Alexia **MIKHOS**, Crisis Management Policy Section, Operations Division, NATO
- Gen Jean-Marie **MOGOKO**, Peace and Security Advisor to the Head of State, Congo
- Mr Matadi **NENGA GAMANDA**, Vice-President of the National Assembly, Democratic Republic of Congo
- Gen Bruno **NEVEUX** (France), Head of the Joint Services Combat and Training Division (Operation Artemis – Democratic Republic of Congo)
- Gen. Jean-Paul **PERRUCHE**, Director of the EU Military Staff
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- Gen Koen **VERVAEKE**, Head, European Union Task Force “Africa”

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