TEXTS ADOPTED

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Texts adopted (June 2001)

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Texts adopted
(June 2001)

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RECOMMENDATION 684¹

(i) Recalling that the Council continues to have an obligation under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty to make an annual report to the WEU Assembly and reiterating that this report should cover all the relevant treaty areas and reach the Assembly early enough to be examined by its committees, thereby supporting the Assembly's function as a broad forum for discussion of security and defence matters, and therefore deeply regretting that the second part of the 46^th annual report of the Council did not reach the Assembly on time;

(ii) Welcoming the progress the European Union has made in order to become a credible, autonomous actor in crisis-management matters;

(iii) Regretting, however, that the Treaty of Nice was unable to complete the project whose purpose is to provide the European Union with a fully-fledged defence dimension;

(iv) Deploring that, as a consequence, responsibility for crisis management and collective defence now formally lies with different European organisations with different memberships and that different treaties form the basis for these tasks;

(v) Noting that under the present wording of Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy, WEU is no longer an integral part of the development of the European Union;

(vi) Deeply concerned about the consequences this will have for defining how WEU's remaining functions are to fit into the European framework in the future, these being:

(vii) Welcoming the EU's determination to be capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks;

(viii) Aware, however, that it may well be a long time before member states make all the improvements as regards munitions, weapons, force protection, medical services, intelligence, command and control and air and sea lift that are necessary if they are to be able to act autonomously even in peacemaking operations;

(ix) Recognising the complexity inherent in the EU's policy of moving towards the development of a common European defence, which is mentioned as a possible objective in the Treaty on European Union, while maintaining it as a fundamental commitment in the modified Brussels Treaty;

(x) Considering that European armaments cooperation, which will continue to take place in WEAG - one of the residual functions of WEU - will be more important than ever now that the EU has decided to develop an autonomous European military capability because, if implemented properly, it will lead to the harmonisation of armaments and equipment and will make defence budgets, which are not likely to increase, more cost-effective;

(xi) Repeating that it is of great importance to keep both WEU's associate members and partners closely involved in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy;

(xii) Convinced that there is still a fundamental interest in increasing the number of signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty, including Article V thereof, even if the European Union continues to pursue the objective of achieving a common defence as enshrined in the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties,

1. Concentrate its efforts on armaments cooperation in WEAG and WEAO in order to help the member states find ways of offsetting the qualitative shortfalls and deficiencies, in terms of collective capabilities, that were recently identified in the Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, taking into account the proposal to create a European Armaments Agency;
2. Place stronger emphasis in its deliberations on supporting the Assembly's function as a broad forum for discussion of security and defence matters by providing it in good time and as appropriate with all the information it needs to carry out this function;
3. Play an active role in the custodianship of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and endeavour to increase the number of signatories in order to ensure that common defence remains a central issue for conceptual thinking in a European framework, in total harmony with the responsibilities of the Atlantic Alliance;
4. Draw up for that purpose a number of options which could help to overcome the difficulties that persist as regards including a mutual assistance clause in the Treaty on European Union;
5. Ask the Council of the European Union to take the necessary steps to enable it to undertake peace-enforcement missions in the near future.

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RESOLUTION 105²

(i) Recalling its Lisbon Initiative on the parliamentary dimension of Europe's security and defence institutions;

(ii) Considering that the Treaty of Nice places emphasis on defining the future role of national parliaments in the new European institutional architecture;

(iii) Aware of the current debate concerning interparliamentary bodies capable both of scrutinising government policy at national and European level and of providing for reciprocal information exchange and encouraging development of a common political will,

1. To spare no effort to stimulate debate on the future of parliamentary scrutiny over European and foreign policy, security and a common defence;
2. To make a point of ensuring that parliamentarians are aware of the need to maintain democratic dialogue with governments in order to be able to grapple with the new reality of problems on a global scale and the political choices arising in consequence;
3. To ensure the widest possible participation of their number in similar initiatives launched by other national and international parliamentary assemblies, in particular the WEU Assembly;
4. To organise seminars on the future of European security and defence institutions both in parliamentary circles and in collaboration with academic and research institutes working in the fields of international policy, security and defence;
5. To maximise the response of the general public by circulating information as widely as possible and throwing open their discussions to cultural fora and the media, especially in regard to the future of institutions whose task it is to manage humanitarian operations and maintain international security.

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OPINION 38³

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RECOMMENDATION 685⁴

(i) Convinced that the prerequisite for securing peace and freedom for WEU nations and for Europe as a whole is the further consolidation of democracy and the rule of law;

(ii) Noting with satisfaction that the values defended by WEU as a whole and its Parliamentary Assembly in particular are becoming increasingly broadly and deeply shared by all peoples and states on the continent of Europe;

(iii) Concerned about as yet unresolved ethnic, religious and nationalist conflicts, not only in Europe itself but also in other regions of the world, both close to Europe and further afield;

(iv) Disturbed by conflicts born out of poverty, disease, the competition for resources, greed and the thirst for power;

(v) Aware of the threat posed by an increase in the activities of organised international criminal groups benefiting from modern technology and more open borders;

(vi) Concerned about the potential dangers inherent in the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and in particular the risk of them being used by states of concern;

(vii) Concerned also about the uncontrolled proliferation and circulation of small and light arms, to a large extent in connection with organised crime and terrorism;

(viii) Noting therefore with satisfaction that the process of integration and cooperation in Europe has sustained its momentum, which will enhance security;

(ix) Convinced of the fundamental importance of the decisions taken by the WEU full member states to transfer WEU's crisis-management functions to the EU, to develop the EU's military capability and to link it with the EU's civilian and economic resources;

(x) Noting that the mutual defence clause of the modified Brussels Treaty and armaments cooperation issues have not been transferred to the EU, and regretting that, furthermore, no satisfactory solution has been found, either at governmental or parliamentary level, for cooperation between the EU and the WEU associate members and associate partners;

(xi) Stressing therefore that it is indispensable for WEU as a whole, and its Assembly in particular in its capacity as the interim European Security and Defence Assembly, to continue to make the contribution to common security which arises out of its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty, while involving to the greatest possible extent the governments and parliaments of all interested states of Europe;

(xii) Convinced that in taking over WEU's crisis-management functions, the European Union's stated resolve of becoming a credible and independent actor in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) must be underpinned by a common security concept forming the practical basis for political and military decision-making and action;

(xiii) Convinced that one of the fundamental tasks of such a common security concept must be to redefine security in a broad sense, with a view to defending the values of a democratic society based on the rule of law and the interests of its citizens, leading to a wider European system of comprehensive, cooperative and undivided security;

(xiv) Convinced, furthermore, that the future role and function of collective defence in such a broad security system need to be redefined;

(xv) Recalling that the November 1995 concept on European security interests drawn up by the then 27 WEU full members, observers, associate members and associate partners has in some respects become outdated, since:

(xvi) Aware of the difficulties of reconciling what in some cases are widely divergent assessments by European countries of the new risks and threats, which explains the absence of a common European position, for example on the United States' missile defence programme;

(xvii) Noting that however important that programme may be for guaranteeing world peace and security in Europe, Russia has drawn up counter-proposals, talks are currently under way between the United States and Russia and the United States has said it will consult its European allies;

(xviii) Concerned nevertheless that the European allies may find themselves presented with a bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia which could lead to a new security framework that may not take fully into account the interests and convictions of all the allies;

(xix) Convinced in that respect of the need to define forthwith who is to act and speak for Europe in that area, and for the European countries to agree on which forum and in which configuration they wish to adopt a common position on this issue;

(xx) Recalling that any real or imagined threats or any new defence projects as well as any initiative aimed at revising the doctrine of deterrence fall directly within the purview of Articles V and VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty for which the WEU Council remains fully responsible;

(xxi) Underlining that the necessary revision of the common European security concept must be the result of an inclusive approach fully involving the WEU associate members, observers and associate partners as well as other candidate countries for EU and NATO accession, and taking into account the interests of all other European countries;

(xxii) Convinced therefore that it is WEU's duty as an enlarged forum for strategic reflection to forge ahead with the necessary revision of the 1995 common security concept in dialogue with all interested European states,

1. Draw up, with the participation of all associate member, observer and associate partner countries, and with appropriate involvement of all other European states, a common European security concept called for by the emergence of a broader perception of security, and including the following elements:

2. Start a process of revision of those parts of WEU's 1987 The Hague Platform and 1995 common security concept which concern the accepted doctrine at that time of a credible and effective strategy for deterrence and defence;
3. Follow closely the US missile defence project, since it could offer an opportunity to contribute to the creation of a broad network of security agreements which will lead to further nuclear arms reductions and promote disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation;
4. Ensure that the European allies are consulted on any new security arrangement between the United States and Russia;
5. Continue, as in the past, to keep the Assembly informed of all activities conducted by NATO with a view to the military implementation of Article V obligations on the basis of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, in particular in the area of missile defence;
6. Convey this recommendation and report to the members of the European Council, Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Commission and NATO Council, as well as to the OSCE member countries.

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ORDER 114⁵

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RECOMMENDATION 686⁶

(i) Noting that the European Union member states are determined "to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises";

(ii) Noting with satisfaction that many non-EU countries, and in particular the WEU associate members and associate partners, are resolved to play an active part in the EU's crisis-management capability;

(iii) Stressing the importance of the decisions taken by the Nice European Council on the operational aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy with a view to forming an autonomous rapid reaction force through the deployment of 60 000 troops within two months, in accordance with the Helsinki headline goal;

(iv) Welcoming the progress made in work to develop relations between the EU and NATO;

(v) Welcoming also the efforts the European Union member states have made to place at the EU's disposal the forces necessary for achieving the Helsinki headline goal;

(vi) Taking note of the commitments given by non-EU European members of NATO and EU applicant countries to contribute to the establishment of the European Union's rapid reaction capabilities,

1. Ensure that, in accordance with their status, the 28 WEU member, associate member, associate partner and observer states are involved in the best possible way in EU-led crisis-management operations at both the governmental and parliamentary levels;
2. Urge the EU governments to:

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RECOMMENDATION 687⁷

(i) Noting the increasingly multinational nature of civilian and military crisis-management activities this past decade, particularly in south-eastern Europe;

(ii) Considering the resolve of all European Union member states to give the EU a civil-military crisis-management capability enabling it to intervene "where NATO as a whole is not engaged";

(iii) Noting the decisions taken by the Nice European Council on the practical implementation of that capability;

(iv) Considering that the new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) must be a catalyst for more effective civil-military crisis management in which participation is extended to include all European countries wishing to contribute to that effort;

(v) Welcoming the desire of those WEU nations which are not members of the EU to make a practical contribution to the military capabilities that are to be put in place in the framework of the Helsinki headline goal;

(vi) Aware of the proposals for institutional arrangements that have been put forward by the EU with a view to organising cooperation between the EU and non-EU states in the field of civil and military crisis management;

(vii) Noting the resolve of the EU to cooperate with NATO in a spirit of transparency;

(viii) Stressing the need to take account of the legitimate interests of the non-EU European NATO member countries, as well as those of the United States and Canada, in the decision-making process within the new politico-military bodies of the EU;

(ix) Emphasising the need for interoperability among the forces engaged in multinational crisis management;

(x) Bearing in mind the fundamental characteristics of availability, mobility and deployability required of the forces used for peace-support missions;

(xi) Welcoming the effectiveness of the NATO Partnership for Peace programme for developing interoperability and meeting those requirements;

(xii) Aware that the new EU crisis-management policy must include the complete range of capabilities for conducting the military operations defined in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration;

(xiii) Recalling the work done by WEU in conjunction with NATO in order to draw up consultation procedures involving the observers, associate members and associate partners,

1. Encourage those WEU states which are also members of the EU to strive to ensure that the new EU politico-military crisis-management structures remain open to participation by other WEU nations which are not members of the EU, in order to take into account factors of geography, historic interests and practical experience;
2. Call on those WEU states which are also members of the EU and NATO to ensure that the interests of the NATO members within WEU, as well as those of the United States and Canada, are taken into account by the decision-making process within the EU politico-military structures, while preserving the degree of autonomy they deem necessary;
3. Call on those WEU states which are also members of the EU to promote within the EU political and military exercises involving the associate members and associate partners of WEU;
4. Promote the organisation of EU-NATO joint exercises, extending participation to include countries which are part of the Partnership for Peace;
5. Call on those WEU states which are also members of the EU to keep the Council regularly informed about the activities of the EU politico-military bodies, in particular as regards the participation of the associate members and associate partners;
6. Keep the Assembly informed of developments in that field;
7. Preserve the participation and dialogue among the 28 nations within WEU as regards those issues of European security and defence that fall within its remit under the modified Brussels Treaty.

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RESOLUTION 106⁸

(i) Recalling Resolution 104 adopted by the Assembly on 7 December 2000 on sub-regional organisations in central and southern Europe and their parliamentary dimension;

(ii) Highlighting the major current expansion in sub-regional cooperation in northern Europe and the results obtained by the interparliamentary assemblies which have been active there;

(iii) Firmly believing that the system of joint activities adopted by the sub-regional assemblies of northern Europe has promoted understanding among the countries concerned as well as the harmonious development of solutions in keeping with the requirements of modern-day society;

(iv) Convinced of the importance of the role parliamentary diplomacy can play in creating an awareness among national parliaments of the usefulness of interparliamentary meetings for settling common problems,

INVITES MEMBER COUNTRY NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

1. To deepen interparliamentary cooperation on matters of common interest;

2. To encourage existing organisations and assemblies to pay an active part;

3. To request all governments concerned to engage in mutual information drives and cooperation efforts with a view to working together more effectively for economic development and consolidation of peace and national security in the regions concerned;

4. To encourage national parliaments to mount a campaign to inform and educate the public more widely about sub-regional cooperation issues;

5. To support the creation of parliamentary cooperation networks, to include national parliamentary, sub-regional and international assemblies;

6. To encourage representatives of national assemblies to attend the meetings of sub-regional organisations;

7. To take part in meetings directed towards promoting exchanges between parliamentarians from the countries of those regions of Europe involved in joint projects;

8. To make available the necessary resources for regular, effective exchange between national and sub-regional parliamentary assemblies;

9. To foster exchanges between parliamentary committees and contacts between parliamentarians on social, economic and cultural matters and issues relating to immigration, security, women, health, employment, the environment, human rights, etc.;

10. To promote exchanges between their committees for foreign and European affairs, defence, cooperation and the economy, and between the latter and their counterparts in international assemblies, and in particular with the Assembly of WEU, so as to contribute to solving problems relating to security, peacekeeping, defence and economic development;

11. To renew the discussion on the proposal for setting up an International Parliamentary Centre on Sub-regional Cooperation, approved in the Nantes Declaration, with a view to providing a permanent structure, within the framework of an existing European national or international parliamentary assembly, for collecting data on sub-regional parliamentary assemblies and disseminating information on the programmes and projects conducted at sub-regional level.

RECOMMENDATION 688⁹

on conventional arms control - the CFE Treaty
and its implications for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

The Assembly,

(i) Stressing the important contribution made by the CFE Treaty to peace and security in Europe;

(ii) Aware of the geopolitical and strategic changes that have taken place in Europe since its entry into force;

(iii) Considering the need to preserve and develop the CFE Treaty acquis whilst taking account of such changes;

(iv) Desirous that the ratification procedure for the adapted CFE Treaty be brought to completion as soon as possible;

(v) Stressing the importance of opening up the adapted CFE Treaty to new signatories in order to strengthen security in Europe and in particular in the Baltic Sea area and south-eastern Europe;

(vi) Aware of the persistence of problems linked to the application and interpretation of the Treaty provisions;

(vii) Stressing the sustained commitment on the part of the Atlantic Alliance in applying the Treaty and its constructive role in searching for solutions acceptable to all States Parties, to the problems encountered in implementing the Treaty;

(viii) Considering it essential for the Russian Federation to comply with all commitments it has undertaken within the Treaty framework, in particular as regards force levels in the Caucasus, and to withdraw the armed forces it has stationed in the territories of Georgia and Moldova within the agreed timeframe;

(ix) Stressing the need to pursue the process of controlling conventional arms in Europe, combined with confidence-building measures covering air and naval equipment in accordance with arrangements to be defined between the States concerned;

(x) Expressing the wish that European machinery to control trafficking in light and small-calibre weapons used in conflicts in Europe should be established as soon as possible, with the involvement of WEU, the OSCE, NATO and the EU,

1. Encourage WEU states not parties to the CFE Treaty to accede to the adapted CFE Treaty as soon as it comes into force;
2. Encourage exchange of information and cooperation between WEU countries on matters concerning control over conventional armaments, light and small-calibre weapons and confidence-building measures with reference to air and naval forces;
3. Systematically place on the agenda of its future meetings the question of armaments control in Europe and how this should evolve;
4. Encourage those WEU states which are also members of the OSCE, NATO and the EU to put forward proposals for joint action in this area;
5. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of its activities as regards armaments control and of the activities of those WEU states which are parties to the Open Skies Treaty.

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RECOMMENDATION 689¹⁰

(i) Aware that a Europe which defines itself as a "community with a shared destiny" should be sufficiently powerful as regards its security and defence to play an international role in keeping with the size of its population and with its economic and cultural weight, alongside Russia and the United States in particular;

(ii) Welcoming the current historic period of European reunification and the major progress achieved in the construction of Europe, particularly in the field of security and defence;

(iii) Emphasising the political and economic progress resulting from the process of European integration and the need to guarantee the political stability of Europe as a whole;

(iv) Recalling that the associate partner countries are all candidates for accession to the EU and NATO and that it is in the interests of all European countries to increase their participation in European armaments cooperation;

(v) Reiterating that an important acquis of WEU is its precursor role in the creation of a European security and defence community involving 28 European countries;

(vi) Aware, therefore, of the justification for adopting an "inclusive approach" in the field of armaments cooperation, as well as in other areas, with a view to successfully building not only defence Europe, but Europe as a whole;

(vii) Noting the growing number of multinational peacekeeping operations involving participation by all European countries and the importance of military interoperability;

(viii) Recognising the diversity of efforts and capabilities among European countries in the field of armaments and the need to define a minimum budget share that each European state should spend on basic research and on the development and production of defence equipment;

(ix) Considering that armaments Europe is being built by bringing about a convergence of demand among the different states, which should lead to economies of scale in the production of defence equipment, and by consolidating supply, through industrial restructuring;

(x) Noting that an indispensable prerequisite for rationalising demand among the largest possible number of European countries is to harmonise the requirements of their armed forces;

(xi) Recalling the decisions taken at Erfurt with a view to establishing a European Armaments Partnership in the framework of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG);

(xii) Desirous of increasing the possibilities for the participation of the associate partner countries as full members in armaments cooperation activities within the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO);

(xiii) Regretting, moreover, that most European armaments structures are still not open to the associate partner countries;

(xiv) Desirous of greater and more rapid integration of all European countries in all European armaments cooperation structures;

(xv) Regretting that the second part of the 46th annual report of the Council to the Assembly did not arrive early enough for the Technological and Aerospace Committee to study the parts concerning armaments cooperation,

1. Submit future annual reports to the Assembly early enough for its committees to have time to study them;
2. Devote a larger part of its future annual reports to the activities of WEAG and the WEAO Research Cell;
3. More firmly assert the political will of the WEU nations to strengthen WEAG and WEAO armaments cooperation activities with a view to developing a European armaments policy;
4. Promote an "inclusive" approach to European armaments cooperation activities, encouraging the broadest possible participation by all European countries - particularly EU and NATO candidate countries - with a view to building a Europe that has been defined as a "community with a shared destiny";
5. Reaffirm the principle of continuity in the political consultations at the highest level within WEAG and schedule the dates for the next WEAG Ministerial in autumn 2001;
6. Encourage the Defence Ministers and National Armaments Directors of the 19 WEAG member states to enlarge the European Armaments Partnership and to invite forthwith their counterparts from the associate partner countries to participate in their meetings;
7. Inform the Assembly about the plan for strengthening the European Armaments Partnership;
8. Invite the WEAG Defence Ministers to study the possibility of proposing to the associate partners that they join WEAG as full members;
9. Invite the WEU associate partner countries to clearly express, through an official exchange of letters between their Defence Ministers and the WEAG Presidency, their desire to participate in armaments cooperation activities within WEAG and WEAO;
10. Invite the WEAG Defence Ministers to propose that the associate partner countries immediately sign the SOCRATE Memorandum of Understanding which would enable them, without yet being full members of WEAG, to participate in WEAG's R&T activities;
11. Call on the WEAG Defence Ministers to make it possible for the associate partner countries to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on the Mutual Use of Government Test Facilities;
12. Invite the WEAG Defence Ministers to propose that the associate partner countries sign, as soon as possible, the EUROPA Memorandum of Understanding which could in the near future provide the umbrella structure for all R&T activities managed by the WEAO Research Cell;
13. Invite the WEAG Defence Ministers, for the purpose of cooperative R&T projects, to make provision for a flexible cost-sharing system allowing the associate partner countries to participate in such projects according to their possibilities;
14. Encourage the WEU associate partners to participate extensively and actively in the activities of the Eurolongterm and Eurocom groups, as well as those of the Western European Logistics Group (WELG), and to invite those associate partners which so wish to join those groups as full members;
15. Take the necessary measures to ensure that full use is made within the EU of the acquis constituted by the WEAG and WEAO armaments cooperation activities and the work of Eurolongterm, Eurocom and WELG;
16. Endeavour to harmonise the WEAG and WEU Presidencies;
17. Invite the WEAG countries which are also NATO members to ensure that there is better coordination of armaments cooperation activities open to the associate partners at European level, within WEAG, and at transatlantic level, within NATO;
18. Encourage the members of OCCAR, as a first step, to make full use of the arrangements allowing the participation of other WEU nations that are not members of OCCAR in specific programmes on a case-by-case basis, and in the longer term to fully open up OCCAR to other European countries, including the associate partners;
19. Urge the countries party to the Letter of Intent (LoI) to extend forthwith the LoI process to include those other WEU countries which are prepared to adopt the principles already defined in that framework and have expressed the wish to contribute actively to the ongoing negotiations;
20. Encourage the EU member countries to conduct a further, more exhaustive study of the defence industrial capabilities of all EU candidate countries;
21. Encourage the EU member states to invite forthwith the EU candidates to participate, on the basis of a status which remains to be defined, in the work of the EU's POLARM and COARM Groups;
22. Encourage the EU member states to develop, in the framework of the successive EU technological research and development programmes, dual-use research projects and to promote the participation of the EU candidate countries in such projects;
23. Invite the WEAG countries to allow the associate partner states to participate, as of now, in the WEAG Group of National Experts on the European Armaments Agency (EAA) and to steer the work of that group in such a way as to promote maximum participation by the associate partners in the activities of the future EAA;
24. Promote the participation of the associate partner countries in those cooperative defence equipment production programmes conducive to shaping the future structure of the European defence industry and which will be useful for strengthening the credibility of the European Security and Defence Policy;
25. Urge the WEAG member states to organise a programmes commitment conference, with a view to remedying the shortfalls the European Union identified in the framework of the Forces Headline Goal following the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000, and in that context make arrangements for more intensive consultations with the associate partner countries.

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RECOMMENDATION 690¹¹

(i) Recalling that the issue of anti-missile defence falls within Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty for which the Council of WEU retains full responsibility;

(ii) Recalling the reply of the Council to Assembly Resolution 103 on the United States National Missile Defence programme whereby the Council, whilst agreeing with the Assembly on the importance of this subject, informed the Assembly that it was not, nor foreseen to be, on the agenda of any of its forthcoming meetings;

(iii) Judging unacceptable an identical reply from the Council to Recommendation 680 on transatlantic cooperation on anti-missile defence, supplemented by a statement confirming the lesser importance of the subject given that the results of the WEU Marseilles ministerial meeting drew the consequences of ESDP developments for WEU and its future structure, as from 1 July 2001 at the latest;

(iv) Taking account of the speech made by President Bush on 1 May 2001 explaining the American position on missile defence;

(v) Considering the proposal made by the Russian Defence Minister, Mr Sergeyev, to NATO on the subject of a pan-European non-strategic anti-missile defence system which could serve as a framework for global cooperation between the Alliance and Russia and also between Russia and Europeans;

(vi) Noting that the proposal seeks to marry technical and military cooperation with a form of political association, thus making it deserving of particular attention by both NATO and WEU;

(vii) Considering that the classic trade-off between offensive deterrence and mutual vulnerability among responsible nuclear powers has been seriously modified and that the emergence of new nuclear players and the proliferation of ballistic missile systems that goes with it raises new difficulties that are in the first instance military and then political;

(viii) Deeming that in the United States such proliferation has gone hand in hand with a complete rethink of defence doctrines in that the concept of shared vulnerability has given way to one of global protection;

(ix) Noting that the coexistence of these two factors suggests that the present state of affairs as regards deterrence may in essence be defined as transitory and that we are heading towards a mixed arrangement combining offensive and defensive systems;

(x) Noting that Europe has not yet gone far enough in making the full doctrinal adjustment required to take these new circumstances on board;

(xi) Taking the view that Europe perceives its security being maintained by the presence of nuclear arsenals as a potential recourse against any nuclear or chemical strike and through the perpetuation of disarmament and control agreements, especially the ABM Treaty;

(xii) Considering that Europe should be aware of the need to work towards increased protection from ballistic threats, without restricting itself to ad hoc anti-missile capabilities, explicitly directed against air-breathing launchers, very short-range missiles or antiquated Scud family ballistic systems;

(xiii) Stressing that the launch of such programmes is a major political decision that implies an assessment of the threat and above all public identification of potential enemies, a process that has been avoided to date as most European governments are unwilling to name their adversaries and take preventive measures;

(xiv) Noting that the partial reform of the ABM Treaty has meant giving greater latitude to tactical anti-missile weapons deployments and to the alleviation of constraints on the development of strategic anti-missile weapons;

(xv) Noting furthermore that the majority of ATBM systems based on the coordinated operation of a series of mobile launchers/interceptors, radar surveillance and launch control units and associated C3I¹² network, and that optimisation of the performance of such systems requires early warning and trajectography satellites, together with communications and data management systems;

(xvi) Highlighting the importance of this last question as regards early warning satellites, if one considers that transatlantic cooperation, especially within NATO, has up until now excluded Europe from the field of military space-based detection;

(xvii) Bearing in mind that Mr Sergeyev's proposal to NATO envisages in detail the possibility of cooperating in the satellite field, referring to the creation of a joint space centre initially to identify and track ballistic missiles and ultimately to intercept non-strategic missiles;

(xviii) Considering that the essentially political nature of the Russian Defence Minister's proposal suggests that Russia is legitimately laying claim to a major role in developing the continent's security policy;

(xix) Emphasising the fact that the proposal tacitly acknowledges this and stresses the need for a definition and joint assessment of ballistic threats, possible areas of intervention for the Euro-ABM and the development of a European non-strategic anti-missile concept;

(xx) Recalling the fundamental importance of compliance with the different control and non-proliferation regimes;

(xxi) Stressing, finally, that non-militarisation of space should continue to be a paramount aim of all nations;

(xxii) Recalling that the lack of a European position in regard to US and Russian plans could lead to a situation where the United States and Russia reached a bilateral agreement and Europe was faced with a fait accompli,

1. Develop in the broad forum of strategic reflection involving the 28 countries a common position on European anti-missile defence, based on a joint assessment and definition of ballistic threats and on the development of a European non-strategic anti-missile concept that harmonises the American anti-missile programme, the Russian proposal on a Euro-ABM and European interests in that area, and that it submit that position to the Alliance;
2. Use the WEAG framework to evaluate the impact of an anti-missile defence on European industry, taking into account:

3. Inform the Assembly, on the basis of Articles IV and V of the modified Brussels Treaty, of any NATO activities in relation to:

4. Urge, through a joint approach by all WEU member countries in NATO to both the United States and Russia, that no arrangement in this connection discussed between them on a bilateral basis which affects currently accepted strategic doctrine will be concluded without consultation and the involvement of those European allies that so wish.

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ORDER 115¹³

(i) Underlining the crucial importance of Russia in the debate on anti-missile defence,

(ii) Recalling the regular dialogue the Assembly has established with the Russian State Duma in security matters,

To take the necessary steps in order to establish a Joint Working Group of the Assembly with the Russian State Duma to institutionalise a regular dialogue on the anti-missile defence of Europe and others security issues of common interest.

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RECOMMENDATION 691¹⁴

(i) Considering that the European space sector today has technical expertise, a large scientific community and an efficient space industry but that there is no common political will to make the most of these assets;

(ii) Stressing that it is imperative for Europe to have a space component and to consolidate its status as a world power by acquiring an autonomous capability in this area;

(iii) Noting that the European space endeavour is based on a series of different choices and national programmes rather than on any European policy as such;

(iv) Recalling the huge amount of productive work done over many years by the European Space Agency and also by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre more recently;

(v) Recalling also WEU's endeavours in the form of studies on the development of a European space-based observation system;

(vi) Commending the WEU Satellite Centre on the sterling work it has done not only in terms of its operational efficiency but also as regards the constant improvements it has made in its techniques and procedures notwithstanding budget constraints;

(vii) Considering that the European Union's resolve to deploy a rapid reaction force able to carry out Petersberg missions under the command of a joint Military Staff requires, among other things, a thorough overhaul of Europe's intelligence assets;

(viii) Recalling that in this new framework the WEU Satellite Centre, which is to be transferred to the European Union on 1 January 2002, will have to carry out new tasks;

(ix) Stressing that the Centre's current status as a service provider is compatible with the future missions it may be assigned and that it would be eminently sensible for it also to acquire communications, navigation, real-time data transmission and, in the longer term, early warning and electronic surveillance capabilities;

(x) Considering nonetheless that it is imperative for the Centre to maintain the dual nature of its missions and preserve its capacity to provide services for the civilian sector;

(xi) Welcoming the document on a European strategy for space drawn up jointly by the European Commission and the European Space Agency;

(xii) Noting with satisfaction that ESA intends to share the EU's growing interest in a Common European Security and Defence Policy;

(xiii) Observing that, with the sole exception of Helios I, European military satellite programmes have so far been confined to the national framework;

(xiv) Recalling the studies carried out by the WEU Space Group on the development of a European space-based observation system and the possibility of WEU's participation in such a system at a multilateral European level;

(xv) Welcoming the decision of the EU Council of transport ministers to go ahead with the Galileo navigation satellite programme,

1. Request the WEU member and observer countries, in their capacity as EU member states, to ensure that the European Union acts as coordinator for Europe's space activities (in terms of observation, communications, navigation and early warning satellite systems) including the military component, taking into account the following factors:

2. Further request the WEU member and observer countries, in their capacity as EU member states, to ensure that once the Satellite Centre has been transferred to the European Union, it is given a status enabling it to adjust its work to the requirements of the Common European Security and Defence Policy by pursuing the following objectives:

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RECOMMENDATION 692¹⁵

(i) Considering the many ties binding Europe indissolubly with the Middle East, which is both the cradle of European civilisation and the main source of its energy supply, as well as an important trading partner;

(ii) Considering, therefore, that Europe has a vital interest in the peace, stability and prosperity of all the states and peoples of the Middle East region;

(iii) Aware, however, that the Middle East is riddled with tension, simmering disputes and violent conflict between opposing parties;

(iv) Taking the view that settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a determining factor for security throughout the entire region, while its continuance is having a negative impact both on respect for human rights and on the economic and social development so essential to all the countries concerned;

(v) Aware that one of the main reasons for the present stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the almost total lack of confidence, on the part of Palestinians, who believe that the Oslo peace process will never be implemented, and Israelis, convinced they will forever have to live under the threat of Arab violence and terrorism;

(vi) Noting that the present stand-off between Israel and the Palestinians is giving rise to mounting tension between the two peoples and strangling the economy of the Palestinian-controlled territories, where two-thirds of the 3 million inhabitants now live below the poverty line and where the unemployment rate has reached 60% in Gaza and 40% on the West Bank since the start of the Al-Aqsa intifada;

(vii) Considering that the Palestinian Authority has an obligation to control armed anti-Israeli violence in the territories under its jurisdiction, but aware that growing disillusion among Palestinians with both the implementation of the Oslo peace process and the policies of its own political leadership are making it difficult for the Palestinian Authority to secure effective control over radical elements in its own population;

(viii) Noting that many Palestinians are disgusted with the blatant corruption and unaccountable disappearance of public money that is taking place in the areas under Palestinian rule, which only the Palestinian Authority can put a stop to;

(ix) Recalling that, on 9 April 2001, the EU Presidency called upon Israel to abandon plans to expand existing settlements and build new ones, adding that such settlements affect the physiognomy and demographic composition of the occupied territories and that all settlement activities are illegal and represent a major obstacle to peace;

(x) Convinced that the present spiral of violence must be halted and that no solution is possible other than a negotiated statute, based on international law, and in particular on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the land for peace principle, as was agreed earlier;

(xi) Welcoming the Jordanian-Egyptian peace plan which calls for a series of confidence-building measures, including the renewal of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation and the lifting of the siege in the West Bank and Gaza, thus paving the way for political negotiations;

(xii) Afraid that through the emphasis it places on military power and superiority, the Israeli Government under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is raising the stakes in the Arab-Israeli confrontation thus conjuring up the spectre of wider regional conflict;

(xiii) Aware that Syria will try to avoid any direct military confrontation with Israel's far superior armed forces but that it supports violent operations on the part of Hezbollah guerrillas as a reminder to Israel that it will not have peace until it withdraws from Syria's Golan Heights;

(xiv) Regretting the fact that despite some hopeful signs following the accession of President Bashar al-Assad last year, the Syrian Government is still resisting political reform, and that economic reform is far too slow and insufficiently thoroughgoing to bring about a revival in the country's economy, which has stagnated for over 20 years;

(xv) Aware that the EU is negotiating a Euro-Mediterranean agreement with Syria in order to integrate it into the association agreements concluded with other Mediterranean countries and help the country reform its economy and administrative structures, but nonetheless regretting that insufficient progress is being made in these negotiations because of Syria's mistrust of Europe's intentions;

(xvi) Aware that since the withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon in May 2000, Lebanese tolerance of Syria's presence in Lebanon, and its control over the country, is waning due to the disruption caused to its economy and labour market by an unimpeded flow of cheap Syrian imports and the influx of some 250 000 Syrian workers - coupled with pervasive corruption and the activities of Hezbollah, both of which Syria is being held responsible for and which are preventing much-needed foreign investors taking a stake in the Lebanese economy;

(xvii) Aware, on the other hand, that, for the time being, the Syrian presence has put a lid on the earlier sectarian schisms that plunged Lebanon into a devastating fifteen-year civil war;

(xviii) Noting that one source of persistent instability in the Middle East is the distinct lack of unity among Arab nations, recently demonstrated once again at the Arab League summit in Amman on 27-28 March 2001;

(xix) Aware that any durable and comprehensive future peace agreement must include a solution to take account of the Israeli settlements in occupied territories, the possible return of refugees and the future status of Jerusalem;

(xx) Considering that the building and expansion of settlements while the Oslo peace process has been going on has in large measure undermined Palestinian confidence in that process, and that a total and immediate freeze of all settlement activity is therefore a necessary and vital confidence-building measure to get peace negotiations restarted;

(xxi) Aware that Israel will not be prepared to give up all its settlements in the occupied territories but taking the view that the present settlements and system of access roads prevent the establishment of a viable social-economic framework for a future Palestinian state;

(xxii) Considering, therefore, that there should be a thorough re-evaluation of the viability of the existing settlements, the result of which would provide the basis for negotiations on rationalising the current patchwork of settlements and access roads, leading to some being annexed by Israel and others dismantled, with financial and other support provided for relocation of their inhabitants;

(xxiii) Noting that a less ideological and more realistic approach to the refugee problem might lead to the conclusion that many refugees - some of whom are second or even third generation - having succeeded in building a new life elsewhere, would prefer not to return to their home country, while those who do would probably prefer to live in the Palestinian territories;

(xxiv) Considering, therefore, that refugees should in principle return to the territory of the future Palestinian state and that their return should be accompanied by a large-scale programme for their social integration in their new surroundings and for economic development of a region which, up until now, has suffered chronic poverty and economic decay;

(xxv) Noting that the historic importance of Jerusalem as the holy place of three religions, as such lends it an ecumenical vocation that entitles it to a special status under international mandate, a factor not necessarily an obstacle to West Jerusalem being the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem that of a future Palestinian state;

(xxvi) Convinced that the European Union, on the basis of its specific approach, should play a more active political role in the Middle East peace process, in accordance with its own foreign policy guidelines and as befits the urgency of the situation,

1. To develop a more coherent common policy for the Middle East, with a view to actively helping the countries of the region to establish a climate where democracy, peace, stability, security, respect for human rights and economic and social development can all flourish;
2. To become more actively involved in re-establishing the Middle East peace process, as the key to furthering peaceful economic and social development of the entire region, and use every endeavour to establish a climate of mutual trust between Israel and its neighbours as a basis for renewed peace negotiations;
3. To make a serious effort, together with all the parties involved, to pave the way towards creative and acceptable solutions to the problem of the settlements, the possible return of refugees and the future status of Jerusalem, including developing a programme of economic and financial support to the implementation of a peace agreement.

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¹ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 18 June 2001 (second sitting).

² Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 18 June 2001 (second sitting).

³ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 19 June 2001 (third sitting).

⁴ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 19 June 2001 (third sitting).

⁵ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 19 June 2001 (third sitting).

⁶ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 19 June 2001 (fourth sitting).

⁷ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 19 June 2001 (fourth sitting).

⁸ Adopted by the Assembly on 19 June 2001 (fourth sitting), on the basis of the amended draft resolution.

⁹ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 20 June 2001 (fifth sitting).

¹⁰ Adopted by the Assembly on 20 June 2001 (fifth sitting), on the basis of the amended draft recommendation.

¹¹ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 20 June 2001 (sixth sitting).

¹² Command, control, communication and intelligence.

¹³ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 20 June 2001 (sixth sitting).

¹⁴ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 20 June 2001 (sixth sitting).

¹⁵ Adopted without amendment by the Assembly on 20 June 2001 (sixth sitting).