TEXTS ADOPTED

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Texts adopted (December 2001)

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Texts adopted
(December 2001)

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ORDER 116¹

(i) Welcoming the initiatives the Netherlands and Belgian Parliaments have taken to encourage the parliaments of the EU member states, the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament to draw up joint proposals for submission to the EU governments with a view to solving the problem of the democratic deficit within the ESDP which has arisen as a result of transferring responsibility for the exercise of Petersberg missions from WEU to the European Union;

(ii) Welcoming more particularly the resolution on parliamentary scrutiny of the European Security and Defence Policy, adopted on 28 June 2001 by the Belgian Senate and Chamber of Representatives;

(iii) Recalling that at the parliamentary conference held in Brussels on 2-3 July 2001 no consensus was reached on the text of a declaration to be conveyed to the Laeken European Council;

(iv) Considering that the President of the Belgian Senate has drawn up a new proposal for a declaration on the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP for the follow-on conference to be held in Brussels on 6-7 November 2001;

(v) Reiterating the position the President of the Assembly set out at the Brussels conference on 2-3 July 2001, which is that the Assembly can approve any solution that observes the following principles:

(vi) Convinced that it would not be possible for proper parliamentary scrutiny of the ESDP to be exercised under COSAC-type arrangements or in meetings confined to the chairmen of the relevant committees in the national parliaments and the European Parliament;

(vii) Considering that the new Belgian proposal for a declaration on the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP defers to an unspecified date the settlement of a number of important questions such as the assembly's composition and secretariat and the association of delegations of non-EU countries;

(viii) Noting that the new Belgian proposal does not lay down a requirement for a specific legal basis for the new assembly;

(ix) Aware of the difficulties involved in setting up a new assembly for an interim period and settling outstanding questions by virtue of what is no more than an informal arrangement, without making provision for a sufficiently sound legal or financial basis;

(x) Convinced nonetheless that agreement on the text of the new Belgian proposal will have the distinct merit of enabling all the parliamentary institutions concerned to exert political pressure on the EU Council, this being essential to ensure that it tackles the problem of the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP in earnest;

(xi) Stressing the importance of the presence of representatives of the WEU Assembly in the bodies that are to prepare the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, particularly when they discuss matters affecting the role of the national parliaments in the European architecture,

To convey to the Belgian Parliament a message which should contain the following points:

"I.

1. The WEU Assembly, while approving the objective behind the Belgian initiative, considers that the creation of a new assembly as proposed requires a legal basis and must therefore be the subject of a provision in the Treaty on European Union or an additional protocol to that Treaty, or of another legal instrument sanctioned by the European Union.
2. However, it does not consider it realistic to envisage establishing a legal basis using one of these options between now and the next Intergovernmental Conference in 2004.
3. It also considers it unrealistic to give effect to the fundamental principles of such an assembly, as set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the operative text in the Belgian proposal, by means of what is no more than an informal arrangement between the parliamentary institutions concerned, particularly in view of the fact that there are still important issues to be settled concerning the composition and secretariat of the proposed assembly, and the association of non-EU countries.
4. In this respect it wishes to restate its position whereby future parliamentary oversight of the ESDP must not fall below the standard attained in the WEU Assembly.
5. It would therefore prefer to request that the new Belgian proposal be put on the agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference.

II.

1. The Assembly proposes that, over the interim period, parliamentary supervision of the ESDP should be organised on the basis of synergy between the parliamentary institutions that already exist, that is to say the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament.
2. This would require the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament to set up the machinery for cooperation, in particular by holding regular joint meetings at which the competent European Union authorities would report on the ESDP.
3. Acting in the framework of their respective competences, the two parliamentary bodies would base their work on such reports, without any amendment of the existing treaties.
4. Subject to those conditions, the Brussels Conference on 6 and 7 November 2001 should conclude with a declaration calling on the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly to draw up cooperative arrangements for that purpose and inviting the governments concerned to report to them jointly."

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RECOMMENDATION 693²

(i) Aware that a settlement of the inter-ethnic conflict in FYROM is essential for the development of that country and for the stability of the region;

(ii) Stressing the importance of preventive diplomatic action by the European Union, United States and NATO;

(iii) Noting that notwithstanding the signing of the 13 August 2001 framework agreement, the situation in FYROM remains unstable and unpredictable;

(iv) Welcoming the NATO decision to maintain a military presence in order to strengthen local security and ensure the protection of the OSCE and EU observers in the exercise of their duties;

(v) Noting with satisfaction the action taken by UNMIK and KFOR to secure the border between Kosovo and Macedonia and to prevent a spread of the conflict;

(vi) Welcoming the progress made by the Albanian police thanks to the WEU Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) training mission in Albania, which ended in May 2001;

(vii) Concerned at the lack of sufficient numbers of European troops for forming peacekeeping forces where required, for example in the case of Operation Essential Harvest,

1. Invite the governments of the WEU countries, in particular those which are members of the EU or NATO:

2. Put the monitoring of the situation of FYROM on the agenda of the Council in order to be ready to call on the European Union to take on the political control of a military presence where "NATO as a whole" is no longer in charge.

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RECOMMENDATION 694³

(i) Unequivocally condemning the acts of terrorism perpetrated in the United States on 11 September 2001 that killed thousands of innocent citizens of more than sixty nations, in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania;

(ii) Expressing its solidarity and determination to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States in eliminating and rooting out, once and for all, both national and international terrorism in all its forms and bringing to justice all those who perpetrated and master-minded the 11 September attacks;

(iii) Drawing attention to the fundamental challenge this new and as yet imponderable international dimension to terrorism presents for Europe's security and consequently welcoming the action plan to tackle that challenge agreed by the European Council at its extraordinary meeting on 21 September 2001;

(iv) Recalling that terrorist attacks such as those committed in the United States are international crimes, and demanding a coordinated international response involving inter alia cooperation between judicial, police and intelligence services, inclusive of any measures that may be required to prevent future funding of terrorist activity in any shape or form,;

(v) Underlining, however, the absolute need also to take appropriate measures against states ruled by regimes which aid and abet terrorists, in particular by establishing and protecting training camps for planning and carrying out terrorist activities;

(vi) Recalling in this context the evidence provided by the United States according to which the 11 September terrorist attacks were planned and carried out by Al-Qa'ida, an organisation directed by Osama bin Laden, based in Afghanistan and protected by the Taliban regime;

(vii) Recalling that UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which describe the acts committed on 11 September 2001 as a threat to international peace and security and recognise the right of individual or collective self-defence established under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, constitute the basis of the retaliatory military strikes by the United States which began on 7 October 2001 against the military capabilities of the Taliban regime and the Al-Qa'ida terrorist training camps;

(viii) Emphasising that this military action is not indicative of a clash of civilisations or religions and stressing therefore the urgent need to form a global coalition to combat the sources of hatred and fanaticism, such as injustice, poverty and the lack of democracy and human rights, that lead individuals and groups into terrorism or to lend their support to or sympathise with terrorists;

(ix) Considering that the use of biological and chemical substances threatening human life, and first and foremost that of civilians, constitutes a new type of terrorist action and is even stronger justification for the legitimate action taken in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001

(x) Recalling NATO's decision of 2 October 2001, pursuant to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, to consider the 11 September terrorist attacks as an armed attack on a member state that is to be treated as an attack against all allies;

(xi) Convinced that this decision by NATO will have a fundamental impact on the character of the Alliance and the scope of its activities including those guaranteeing Europe's defence, the consequences of which remain to be seen;

(xii) Noting that the military operation which began on 7 October 2001 is not led by NATO but by the United States of America with the involvement of a coalition of the willing including a number of European allied nations;

(xiii) Underlining its continuing attachment to the principle of the indivisibility of transatlantic security, in particular in the face of the mounting risk of future acts of terrorism which might affect Europe and WEU nations in particular;

(xiv) Recalling that one of the fundamental objectives of the European defence commitment based on the modified Brussels Treaty and reaffirmed continually since the creation of WEU has been the establishment of an as yet indissoluble link between European and transatlantic defence and security through ever stronger cooperation with NATO and solidarity with the Atlantic Alliance;

(xv) Profoundly alarmed therefore that the WEU Council has not issued any public statement reaffirming its solidarity with the Alliance and supporting the decisions taken by NATO, and that the European Council also failed to express such solidarity in its conclusions of 21 September;

(xvi) Alarmed too at the absence of any reaction on the part of the WEU Council to NATO's decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, notwithstanding the fact that:

(xvii) Seriously doubting therefore whether the modified Brussels Treaty and Article V thereof will continue to be of relevance in the event of a threat to the security of one or more WEU member countries;

(xviii) Convinced that the events of 11 September 2001 have blurred the dividing lines between "internal" and "external" security and that the approaches used to date in responding to security threats are largely obsolete;

(xix) Recalling in this context Assembly Recommendation 685 on revising the European security concept - responding to new risks;

(xx) Concerned that the possibility of the European Union relying on NATO assets for missions conducted in the ESDP framework might be affected by the United States increasingly needing to use them for military operations against international terrorism;

(xxi) Stressing the urgent need to examine to what extent the full range of "Petersberg" missions should be redefined to include appropriate countermeasures against international terrorism and, as necessary, accordingly to adapt the headline goal and the civilian aspects of crisis management, having particular regard to any financial implications,

1. Proceed without delay with an assessment of the risk of WEU nations in future becoming the target of acts of terrorism similar to those perpetrated in the United States on 11 September, paying particular attention to the threat of terrorism involving nuclear, biological or chemical attack, and inform the Assembly of its conclusions;
2. Take the necessary action to reassure the citizens of WEU member countries, as well as the Assembly, that their security is still based on both the modified Brussels Treaty and the Washington Treaty and that there is no difference of interpretation as to what is understood by an "armed attack" under either treaty;
3. Make full use of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty to request information from the appropriate NATO military authorities as to what practical consequences may result from bringing terrorism countermeasures within the remit of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and how this may affect NATO's commitment to guarantee the security of WEU member countries;
4. Take rapid action on Assembly Recommendation 685 on revising the European security concept - responding to new risks;
5. Request the European Union (a) to take the necessary steps to ensure that its remit for "Petersberg" missions is extended to include measures to counter international terrorism and to develop appropriate capabilities and resources to that end, (b) to revise the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the light of the new threats posed by international terrorism using biological and chemical weapons in particular, while at the same time reaffirming the continuing validity of the transatlantic alliance and taking due note of Russia's position, and (c) to inform the Assembly of action taken by the EU in this respect;
6. Ensure that all associate member and associate partner countries become fully involved in any activity the European Union undertakes to combat international terrorism;
7. Urge all WEU nations to implement the measures set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1373 without delay;
8. Place the capacities of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón at the disposal of the international coalition against terrorism as a European contribution to the operations in Afghanistan.

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RECOMMENDATION 695

(i) Recalling the shock and surprise of the United States and the international community as a whole when they recognised the new dimension international terrorism had taken on with the acts perpetrated against the United States on 11 September 2001;

(ii) Recalling that neither the European Union nor the Atlantic Alliance has a military strategy for fighting international terrorism notwithstanding the fact that it is referred to as a major security risk in the Strategic Concept which the Alliance adopted in April 1999;

(iii) Noting that the military campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has been waged by an international coalition of the willing under the leadership of the United States but without the involvement of NATO despite the fact that the Atlantic Alliance invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty;

(iv) Noting also that efforts to restore peace in Afghanistan on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1378 of 14 November 2001 are being undertaken by individual countries without recourse to the relevant joint structures in NATO or the European Union;

(v) Considering that the European Union intends to concentrate efforts in the fight against terrorism on political dialogue and on adopting common measures in the areas of justice and home affairs, the economy and finance;

(vi) Mindful that the European Union has yet to engage in an in-depth discussion of the repercussions the terrorist attacks perpetrated on 11 September might have for its European Security and Defence Policy;

(vii) Welcoming the progress the EU has made both in setting up the necessary ESDP decision-making structures and ensuring that they are operational, and in taking steps to achieve the headline goal by 2003;

(viii) Concerned, however, that the addition by the European Council of a number of important goals regarding the civilian aspects of crisis management raises questions as to the priorities the European Union will set to achieve the proper crisis-management capability, which was the main reason for transferring the relevant WEU functions to the EU;

(ix) Deploring the fact that even when it is declared operational, the European Union will not be in a position to replace WEU as regards its ability to manage the military aspects of a crisis because (a) the Treaty of Nice has not entered into force and (b) NATO will be unable to provide the EU with assured access to its assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis-management operations until a satisfactory solution to the problem of the participation of non-EU allied countries in the ESDP has been found;

(x) Considering that questions concerning the financing of EU crisis-management activities remain to be solved and stressing that they are too important to fall victim to inter-institutional power struggles between the EU Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament;

(xi) Welcoming the efforts the Belgian Presidency has made to give the ESDP fresh impetus by including in its programme of work a plan to draw up a White Paper on European security and defence and by encouraging public opinion and parliamentary assemblies to become more involved in the debate on the ESDP;

(xii) Stressing that any conceptual paper on the ESDP must take into account the impact the new dimension of international terrorism has on the collective defence commitment of the signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty and the Washington Treaty;

(xiii) Welcoming the Council's reaffirmation in the first part of its 47^th annual report that the modified Brussels Treaty remains in force, and underlining that the Treaty provisions cover the full range of those EU activities which are now referred to under the heading of "ESDP" and include measures against international terrorism;

(xiv) Recalling that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and ESDP matters are interlinked and that until the ESDP has a proper parliamentary dimension within the European Union, the WEU Assembly remains the only European treaty-based parliamentary body composed of national parliamentarians which is entitled to an explanation of agreed European positions and intergovernmental analysis;

(xv) Recalling also that the Assembly is the only appropriate forum to which governments can report on the implementation of the EU's arrangements for cooperation and consultation under the ESDP in the 15+6 and 15+15 formats;

(xvi) Stressing the importance of continued participation by the representatives of WEU associate members, associate partners and observers in the work of both the Council and the Assembly so that in the WEU framework they have a specialised forum for dialogue between governments and parliaments, which other organisations do not provide;

(xvii) Welcoming in this context the fact that associate members and associate partners will continue to have the possibility of contributing to the annual report of the Council;

(xviii) Insisting on its right to report on all security and defence matters, including those coming under the ESDP, covered by the modified Brussels Treaty,

1. Implement paragraph 3 of Assembly Recommendation 694 which contains a request for information from NATO as to what practical consequences may result from bringing terrorism countermeasures within the remit of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and how this may affect NATO's commitment to guarantee the security of WEU member countries;
2. Support the Belgian initiative of drawing up a White Paper on European security by submitting, in close coordination with NATO, a WEU contribution on the repercussions of countering the threat that international terrorism poses for collective defence, and inform the Assembly about the report on the impact of the 11 September events which the WEU Secretary-General and High Representative for the CFSP is to submit to the European Council;
3. Ensure that clear priority is given in the European Union to implementing the military aspects of crisis management under the ESDP and that the funding of military operations is not compromised by inter-institutional quarrels between the EU Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament over their co-decision rights regarding the funding of civilian crisis-management missions;
4. Ensure that the EU makes full use of WEU's experience in exercise policy and of the comprehensive work done in the framework of the WEU Civil-Military Cooperation Concept (CIMIC);
5. Take an initiative within the European Union to improve the arrangements for the participation of non-EU allied countries in the ESDP on the basis of WEU's experience, with a view to creating an associate status for the countries concerned;
6. Continue to include in its annual report to the Assembly the full range of European security and defence activities covered by the modified Brussels Treaty even where these are carried out by other organisations in which WEU countries take part;
7. Provide comprehensive replies to Assembly recommendations on all matters covered by the modified Brussels Treaty, which include the ESDP;
8. Ensure that WEU continues to operate as a specialised forum for extensive dialogue between the representatives of 28 governments and parliaments and that it develops its activities, paying particular attention to matters concerning the associate member and associate partner countries.

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RECOMMENDATION 696

(i) Recalling Order 116 on the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP and the motion adopted at the follow-on Conference on the Parliamentary Dimension of the ESDP, held in Brussels on 6-7 November 2001;

(ii) Considering the proposals it has made in Resolution 107 on this matter with a view to ensuring a parliamentary dimension and supervision of the ESDP during the transitional period between now and the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference,

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RESOLUTION 107

(i) Welcoming the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the creation of structures allowing the European Union to implement a policy of conflict prevention and civil and military crisis management, in particular by carrying out Petersberg-type missions;

(ii) Considering nonetheless that at European level there is a democratic deficit within the ESDP which must be remedied by means of legal instruments to be negotiated and finalised at the next revision of the Treaty on European Union;

(iii) Recalling the lessons learned from the seminar on the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP held on 14 May 2001 at the Dutch Parliament in The Hague and organised on the initiative of the Netherlands section of the European Movement, and welcoming the adoption by both Chambers of the Belgian Parliament on 28 June 2001 of a resolution on parliamentary scrutiny of the European Security and Defence Policy

(iv) Thanking the Federal Parliament of Belgium for having convened a Conference on the European Security and Defence Policy and its related parliamentary scrutiny in Brussels on 2-3 July 2001, and a follow-up Conference, also in Brussels, on 6-7 November;

(v) Aware that the ESDP, in particular the defence budgets and operational military decisions, will remain within the competence of the national governments and parliaments; aware also that the latter share this competence in the field of conflict prevention and civil aspects of crisis management with the European Commission and the European Parliament;

(vi) Recalling that the constitutions of the Member States of the European Union confer upon their parliaments the task of exercising democratic scrutiny over their national security and defence policies, even where these are implemented within the framework of the ESDP;

(vii) Aware that each national parliament has difficulty in obtaining a European overview of the EU's security and defence policy, while the ESDP must be discussed as a matter of priority at European level, given that the basic principles underlying the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy reduce the possibility of conducting in future purely national conflict-prevention and crisis-management policies on which agreement has not been reached in advance at European level;

(viii) Aware of the competences of the European Parliament with regard to the CFSP, which are based on Article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union and on its budgetary co-decision powers based on the interinstitutional agreement on the financing of the CFSP, which was concluded following the Treaty of Amsterdam;

(ix) Recalling nonetheless that the Council of the European Union is not under any contractual obligation to the European Parliament either as far as the ESDP is concerned or as regards replying to its recommendations or resolutions, and that the representatives of the national parliaments who have competence in this area do not have access to the information which the EU Presidency and the High Representative for the CFSP regularly provide to the European Parliament;

(x) Stressing that a common European approach by the national parliaments is essential, providing them with the possibility of being consulted collectively on all aspects of the ESDP with a view to reflecting on such matters and comparing national defence budgets and requirements on a European scale;

(xi) Recalling that the modified Brussels Treaty continues to have full force and that it covers all the activities which are now being carried out in the European Union under the "European Security and Defence Policy";

(xii) Recalling on the one hand that questions concerning the ESDP cannot be separated from collective defence matters and on the other that the WEU Assembly will continue to monitor Article V (on collective defence) and armaments cooperation, which remain essential aspects of European security and defence, thus remaining a permanent and indispensable player in any discussion concerning the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP;

(xiii) Insisting in consequence on the fact that it is absolutely essential that the WEU Assembly continue to receive the funding necessary to discharge its responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty;

(xiv) Reminding the European Council that the WEU Assembly constitutes an essential partner for helping to ensure that the governments' message on the ESDP reaches the electorates in all the countries concerned;

(xv) Considering that it is essential to continue to associate the non-EU European NATO countries and the EU candidate countries with the European Security and Defence Policy, thus preserving one of WEU's principal acquis, and to draw the consequences for the parliamentary dimension of the activities carried out in the cooperation and consultation structures created in the 15+6 and 15+15 formats;

(xvi) Insisting once again that future parliamentary oversight of the ESDP must not fall below the standard attained in the WEU Assembly and that as a consequence COSAC-type arrangements or meetings confined to the chairmen of the foreign affairs and defence committees of the national parliaments would not constitute a proper parliamentary dimension of the ESDP;

(xvii) Recalling that uncertainty surrounds the possible date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice and that questions related to the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP can be settled only in the framework of the Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for 2004;

(xviii) Recalling also that at the Laeken Summit the European Council is to take a decision on establishing a Convention to prepare the next Intergovernmental Conference and that it will adopt a declaration setting out initiatives to redefine the role of national parliaments in the European architecture;

(xix) Desiring, in order to ensure a parliamentary dimension and supervision of the ESDP throughout the transitional period which will last until the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference and possibly beyond then until the entry into force of a new treaty, that a pragmatic solution based on the treaties in force be found by establishing synergy between the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament;

(xx) Recalling in this context Assembly Order 116 on the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP,

1. To state, in its Laeken Declaration, its determination to take steps in the framework of the next Intergovernmental Conference to remedy the democratic deficit within the ESDP by drawing up arrangements enabling the national parliaments to participate collectively and together with the European Parliament in the dialogue with the European Union executive; such arrangements should draw on the experience and the acquis of the WEU Assembly and allow it to continue as a body for parliamentary and interparliamentary oversight and supervision in a form adapted to the new circumstances;
2. To agree on appropriate arrangements for the WEU Assembly to be regularly informed during the transitional period about the European Union's activities under the ESDP;
3. To that end to urge the European Parliament to establish cooperation with the WEU Assembly during the transitional period on the basis of Assembly Order 116, in particular with a view to organising joint meetings at which the relevant European Union authorities would regularly report on the ESDP, and which the chairmen of the foreign affairs and defence committees of the national parliaments could attend;
4. To decide that two observers from the WEU Assembly should be able to take part in the work of the Convention when it draws up proposals on the role of national parliaments in the European architecture and on the delimitation of competences between the European Union and the Member States.

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RECOMMENDATION 697

(i) Noting that under President Putin, the Russian government has actively embarked upon a vast programme of bringing a whole series of laws and practices into line with international standards and that international financial institutions and other organisations see this as a positive step, but at the same time recognising that despite this undeniable progress much remains to be done;

(ii) Considering that following the tragic events of 11 September 2001, Russia has taken a number of foreign policy initiatives which offer the Euro-Atlantic community a historic chance to base its relations with that country on a completely new footing;

(iii) Noting that Russia, while still considering the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to be an important factor for stability in the world, has shown its readiness to adapt the Treaty in order to allow the United States to implement a test programme deemed essential for developing a Missile Defence (MD);

(iv) Aware that Russia is endeavouring to obtain agreement on major mutual reductions in US and Russian arsenals that would bring the number of nuclear warheads down to fewer than the 3 500 stipulated in the START 2 Agreement, which has not yet entered into force, while the United States also appears ready to make substantial reductions in its nuclear arsenal;

(v) Aware that Russia is keen to gain recognition for its position as a bulwark against the spread of extremist Islamic movements into Europe;

(vi) Welcoming Russia's recent decision to abandon the Lourdes signals intelligence base in Cuba and to give up its lease of the Cam Ranh Bay naval base in Vietnam as important signs of its determination to put the cold war behind it once and for all and build a new relationship with the United States;

(vii) Considering that the energy partnership envisaged between the EU and Russia could make an important contribution to the EU's policy of diversifying its energy supplies while providing Russia with opportunities to improve the exploitation of its energy resources;

(viii) Aware of Russia's objective of having a more visible role in European security arrangements which may go beyond NATO's geographic and treaty-based responsibilities;

(ix) Considering that Europe and the United States will need to put forward imaginative proposals in response to Russia's bold new approach to international relations;

(x) Considering that both the West and Russia will together have to make determined cooperative efforts to establish reliable and reassuring security arrangements for the Caucasus and Central Asia;

(xi) Confirming the key role of a stable and independent Ukraine as a European partner for maintaining stability and security in the eastern part of Europe and of its importance for the peace and security of Europe as a whole;

(xii) Noting, however, that the task NATO and the EU face of forging closer relations with Ukraine is being seriously hampered by the lack of progress in Ukraine on embracing essential values such as pluralist democracy, respect for the rule of law, free and open markets and press and political freedom;

(xiii) Considering that it is a major task for the EU, together with the Council of Europe and the OSCE, to provide advice and training for Ukraine in order to help it develop a civil society, adopt effective laws and apply them properly;

(xiv) Aware that Ukraine, despite its geographic location, with easy access to the Black Sea and borders with a number of Central European countries, remains very dependent on Russian markets for its economic development and that, at present, over 80% of its energy needs are met by Russia, inevitably making it prone to Russian political influence;

(xv) Aware that a unified Russian-Belarussian state may never become a reality, but that for a number of practical reasons the 1999 Treaty on Creating the Union is likely to result in close cooperation between the two countries, in particular in the fields of finance and the economy, industry, defence and foreign policy;

(xvi) Observing that the policy in recent years of isolating Belarus has not proved effective;

(xvii) Considering that the September 2001 presidential elections, although fundamentally flawed, provided an opportunity for the emergence of political and social forces genuinely attached to democratic values and principles;

(xviii) Considering that Belarus is bound to become a border state of the EU in the near future and that from Russia's point of view it is also the most important transit country to western Europe, these being compelling reasons for the EU to intensify its relations with Belarus;

(xix) Noting that both Belarus and Ukraine, due to their economic and energy dependency, may inevitably need, for a time, to draw closer to Russia before eventually, with the help of the present more imaginative and courageous Russian leadership, finding their rightful place in the larger framework of Euro-Atlantic organisations;

(xx) Considering that in view of Russia's stated objectives of strengthening its dialogue and cooperation with the EU on political and security issues, further developing the Russia-EU energy partnership and establishing a Common European Economic Space, both Belarus and Ukraine will have no choice other than to adopt a similar policy;

(xxi) Welcoming the renewed and intensified cooperation in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in which both partners are committed to building a more solid partnership in the interests of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;

(xxii) Firmly in favour of the resolve being shown by both NATO and Russia to change the climate of their relationship and further extend their cooperation following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington;

(xxiii) Dissatisfied with the Council's frivolous reply to paragraph 2 of Recommendation 677 and of the opinion that, in the light of foreign policy initiatives taken by President Putin after 11 September 2001, there is every reason to develop a serious dialogue with Russia to discuss policy and armaments cooperation which are issues of particular common interest and mutual value,

1. Together with the national armaments directors and WEAG, examine the scope for comparing Western European and Russian requirements for the next generation of defence equipment and opportunities for technological and industrial cooperation between Western Europe and Russia in development and production of new defence equipment, bearing in mind that the state of relations between Western Europe and Russia at the present juncture offers unprecedented chances for intensifying mutual dialogue and cooperation;
2. Request the EU to further intensify dialogue and cooperation with Russia on political and security issues and in particular on:

3. Ask that Russia be more proactive in insisting on autonomous solutions for the separatist situations in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

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RECOMMENDATION 698

(i) that the Council has conveyed to the Assembly the budgets of the ministerial organs for the financial year 2001, with the exception of the budget for refurbishing the building in the rue de la Régence (WEU's former headquarters);

(ii) that the approved operating budgets concern the Secretariat-General (1st and 2nd halves of 2001), the Military Staff (1st half), the Institute for Security Studies and the Satellite Centre (2001 financial year), Eurocom and WEAG/WEAO, the National Experts Group (NEG), the Transatlantic Forum, the JES 2001 exercise and the Social Plan;

(iii) that the approved budgets also cover pensions for retired staff and leaving allowances paid by the ministerial organs (Secretariat-General, Institute for Security Studies, Satellite Centre and the former Paris Ministerial Organs (PMO, former WEU agencies in Paris));

(iv) that the total of all the budgets of the ministerial organs for 2001 as approved to date amounts to 35.5 million euros, an increase of 20.8% compared to 2000, i.e. 6.1 million euros;

(v) that this increase does not cover the future cost of refurbishing the rue de la Régence building;

(vi) that the WEU staff working in Paris (i.e. from 1 January 2002, principally in the Assembly Secretariat) are still affiliated to the French social security system pending a response from the French authorities to a request for individuals to be able to opt out of the system, as approved by the Council and submitted by the Secretary-General of WEU to the relevant authorities for agreement (similarly to the procedure followed by other Coordinated Organisations such as the OECD or the Council of Europe),

1. Inform the Assembly of the decisions taken concerning the rue de la Régence building and of their budgetary implications;
2. Inform the Assembly of steps taken to ensure continuity in and equitable arrangements for the funding of the complementary health insurance scheme for staff still in service on 1 January 2002 and for retired staff;
3. Inform the Assembly of the decisions taken to ensure continuity in the management of the Paris building and relations with the host country;
4. Urge the French authorities to respond swiftly and positively to the request for individual members of the Assembly Secretariat to be able to opt out of the French social security system.

RECOMMENDATION 699

on the draft Opinion of the Council on the draft budget of the Assembly for 2002

(i) Noting with concern and surprise the latest information it has received about the state of discussions on the draft Opinion of the Council on the Assembly's draft budget for 2002, given that when it was first examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee of the WEU Council on 7 November 2001 six states out of the nine represented declared that they could agree to the budget as submitted;

(ii) Noting the effort the European Union countries are making to maintain zero nominal growth for the budgets of the Institute for Security Studies and the Satellite Centre;

(iii) Observing that the information provided indicates zero nominal growth for the operating budget, which implies that merely renewing the 2001 budget would mean that the Assembly would be obliged to bear the cost of salary increases for the staff in its Secretariat and of the foreseeable rate of inflation;

(iv) Observing that according to the same information the Assembly could be called upon to double the contribution it pays towards the upkeep of the Paris building within that budget envelope;

(v) Observing that, from within the same budget, the Assembly might also have to find a contribution equivalent to two-thirds of the salaries of the staff responsible for the upkeep of the building, whereas up to 2001 the cost of those staff has always been covered in the Institute's budget;

(vi) Observing that decisions on major items of increased expenditure fall within the competence of the governments (salary increases, cost-sharing formulae for expenditure on the building, etc.);

(vii) Observing that all these costs could together account for a reduction of as much as 10% of the Assembly's budget;

(viii) Observing that all these costs could together account for a reduction of as much as 28% of the Assembly's budget excluding the permanent staff;

(ix) Noting that this being the case, the draft budget for 2002 envisaged by the Council will have major negative repercussions for the political work of the Assembly;

(x) Noting with surprise that the result would contradict statements made by the Council, its members and successive presidencies which have indicated, in particular since the ministerial meeting in Marseilles, that the Assembly is to continue its indispensable work of exercising parliamentary oversight in the debate on European security and defence;

(xi) Aware of the contradiction with the efforts the member governments are making in their own countries to ease budgetary constraints upon the measures necessary to tackle the current terrorist threats,

1. Review with the utmost urgency its draft Opinion on the draft budget submitted by the Assembly for 2002 in the light of the following considerations and facts:

2. Agree to the above recommendations at the latest at the meeting of the WEU Council's Budget and Organisation Committee scheduled for 14 December 2001;
3. Give immediate consideration to accepting contributions from WEU's associate members with regard to the Assembly's budget.

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RECOMMENDATION 700

(i) Noting the need for Europe to have strategic lift capability to project peace support forces, as recent crises on Europe's periphery have served to demonstrate;

(ii) Noting Europe's resolve to have real capability for intervening in international crises, which, in line with the European Union headline goal adopted in Helsinki, should allow deployment of 60 000 troops over a period of 60 days;

(iii) Convinced that a strong airlift capability is essential in order to be in a position to intervene rapidly in an area to prevent an emerging crisis becoming a fully-blown one;

(iv) Aware that the weight and quantity of ground troop equipment require major sealift capability;

(v) Noting with concern foreseeable difficulties in transporting equipment due to a lack of port facilities in areas of potential crisis;

(vi) Noting with some anxiety the absence from European strategic airlift fleets of outsize airlifters, apart from the United Kingdom's four C17 Globemasters;

(vii) Perturbed by the obsolescence of a large part of the European medium-size fleet (Transalls and similar);

(viii) Welcoming the European Agreement on the development of the A400M programme but disappointed at the apparent lack of an absolutely firm commitment in the form of signed contracts for the aircraft;

(ix) Recalling that outsize military airlift is to be found not only in the United States but also in Russia and Ukraine;

(x) Aware of the small number of military transport ships and the large number of RoRo (Roll-on/Roll-off) ships required in order to project a 60 000-strong force over 60 days;

(xi) Disturbed by the weakness of European merchant navies owing to flags of convenience;

(xii) Aware that, should a crisis occur, few RoRo ships are available on the world charter market,

1. Request WEU countries to:

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RECOMMENDATION 701

(i) Stressing the important contribution made by the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention to international peace and security;

(ii) Aware of the technical developments that have taken place in the fields of chemistry and biology, especially biotechnology and genetic engineering, which could have offensive military applications;

(iii) Concerned at the possibilities for evading the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention that may result from such developments;

(iv) Highlighting the threat to international peace and security from persistent proliferation of toxic chemical and biological agents and the technologies from which they are produced;

(v) Emphasising the need to bring together the chemical, biological and biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries in the endeavour to control chemical and biological weapons, while respecting their legitimate commercial interests, in particular by affording due protection to patents and processes;

(vi) Concerned at the fact that among states that have not yet signed the Chemical Weapons Convention are countries, in particular Middle Eastern and Asian countries, which have research and development capabilities in this area;

(vii) Uneasy over the delays incurred in relation to the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, particularly those in the possession of the Russian Federation, and calling on the Russian Government to honour its commitments in this sphere, by complying with the time-limits provided for under the Chemical Weapons Convention;

(viii) Aware of the financial and practical difficulties that the achievement of that task presents and appealing for financial aid and the necessary technical assistance to be given, in a bilateral or multilateral framework, for the destruction of such chemical weapons stockpiles as soon as possible;

(ix) Desirous for the means available to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for overseeing compliance with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and for setting up effective assistance machinery - in particular in the face of the threat of a terrorist attack involving the use of chemical weapons - to be increased;

(x) Concerned about possible environmental damage from old chemical weapons dumped at sea, especially in the Baltic Sea area;

(xi) Noting with concern that the Biological Weapons Convention still does not provide for an effective system of control and verification of its application;

(xii) Calling on all signatory states to comply with their commitments in this field and not to deflect research into vaccines and forms of protection against toxic biological agents from its legitimate aim by developing organisms which, in modified or strengthened form, are resistant to current defences;

(xiii) Uneasy at the threat posed by the possible use of toxic biological agents in the context of terrorist action;

(xiv) Calling on the signatory states of the Biological Weapons Convention to pursue their efforts to negotiate the setting up of effective control and verification machinery, responsibility for which could be assigned to an international organisation similar to the OPCW;

(xv) Calling on the member states of the Australia Group to enhance cooperation between them for the control of toxic biological agents and, in the face of the increased threat of biological terrorism, give thought to setting up permanent structures for information exchange and assistance,

1. Place on its agenda follow-up of chemical and biological weapons issues and the risks arising from the emergence of a terrorist threat involving the use of biological and chemical weapons, and also identification of the measures necessary to protect civilian populations more effectively against these risks;
2. Demand that WEU nations that still hold chemical weapons stocks destroy them, according to the provisions and time scales provided for in the Chemical Weapons Convention, and call upon other nations to do the same;
3. Encourage information exchange and cooperation among the WEU and other European countries in connection with the disposal of old and abandoned chemical weapons with a view to preventing environmental damage;
4. Encourage information exchange, cooperation and the setting up of assistance machinery among WEU countries in connection with chemical and biological weapons control issues and the threat that the use of toxic, chemical and biological agents presents in terrorist attacks;
5. Encourage WEU nations sitting on international committees and groups responsible for the oversight and strengthening of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention to propose joint actions in this field, and, as far as possible, in cooperation with other allies and partners, particularly the United States, Canada and the Russian Federation;
6. Ask WEU nations to continue to pursue through diplomatic channels the matter of strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention and setting up effective control and verification machinery;
7. Ask WEU nations that are members of the Australia Group to enhance cooperation between them for the control of biological agents and, in the face of the increased threat of biological terrorism, give thought to setting up permanent structures for information exchange and assistance;
8. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of any steps it takes in regard to chemical and biological weapons control and monitoring the threat of terrorist use of toxic chemical and biological agents.

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RECOMMENDATION 702

(i) Welcoming the political will on the part of European countries to plug gaps identified in the framework of the European Union headline goal so as to be able to carry out the range of Petersberg missions;

(ii) Acknowledging, in the light of the experience of the Kosovo crisis, European nations' need for even higher performance interoperable military equipment for European crisis-management operations;

(iii) Noting with satisfaction that the countries of the European Union have decided rapidly to develop capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport;

(iv) Sincerely hoping that the difficulties Germany and Italy are experiencing in regard to their participating in the A400M military transport aircraft programme will be resolved without delay so that the production contract can be signed before the end of the year;

(v) Welcoming the fact that at the Capability Improvement Conference held on 19 November 2001, EU countries made additional contributions to rectify several shortcomings;

(vi) Recalling that European nations must bring their effort to bear in particular on intelligence capabilities, forces projection, command, control and communications systems and on the means of power projection and forces' protection;

(vii) Unanimously endorsing the recent agreement between EU member states for a "European Capability Action Plan", mainly designed to rectify the remaining deficiencies, and noting that such plan rightly emphasises the importance of broad public support and that its transparency must be such as to ensure that the public in the member states have a clear vision of the existing shortcomings and the efforts to be made to achieve the objectives set;

(viii) Welcoming the fact that on 23 November 2001, the Spanish Government officially decided to take part in the Helios 2 optical satellite programme;

(ix) Considering how vitally important it is to European countries as a whole for Europe to have a credible Common Foreign and Security Policy and, consequently, the capability to carry out crisis-management operations jointly;

(x) Stressing the importance of European countries as a whole - not just the present fifteen EU member countries, but also the six non-EU European members of NATO and the nine EU applicant states - being involved in European crisis management;

(xi) Stressing how essential it is to have a competitive defence industrial and technological base;

(xii) Welcoming the fact that the Council undertook in its reply to Assembly Recommendation 689 to ensure that, as far as the tasking and substance of the work of WEAG and WEAO were concerned, the annual report would continue to reflect their activities;

(xiii) Taking the view that the reasons given in the first part of the forty-seventh annual report of the Council justifying the Council's decision to place the Western European Logistics Group (WELG), Eurocom and Eurolongterm "in a state of dormancy" are most unconvincing and that these groups are more useful now than ever,

1. Reactivate the Western European Logistics Group (WELG) within WEU so as to strengthen cooperation on rationalising and standardising logistic support capabilities to the armed forces;
2. Reactivate the Eurocom Group with a view to promoting interoperability amongst land forces tactical communications systems;
3. Give the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), which operates within the WEU framework, a more important role in harmonising the operational needs of European nations;
4. Reactivate the Eurolongterm Group to encourage cooperation in long-term military planning, in order to lay the foundation for firmer cooperation over defence equipment;
5. Coordinate and harmonise as far as possible the policies and defence equipment procurement methods of European nations;
6. Envisage a study in this connection, covering European nations as a whole, in order to compare operational needs, evaluate national procurement policies and submit recommendations to European governments on the most promising forms of cooperation to set in train;
7. Take the necessary steps, in line with the expectations of the industry, to facilitate the creation of a European defence equipment market, in the interest of states that need a highly efficient, competitive industry to ensure their operational effectiveness and strategic autonomy,
8. Urge WEU governments and in particular those of the WEAG and WEAO member nations to:

9. Urge the governments of European Union member states to:

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RECOMMENDATION 703

(i) Recalling that the implications of antimissile defence for European industry come under the responsibility of the Council, as the custodian of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, and fall within the purview of WEAG, which remains part of WEU, and that these issues cannot therefore be left exclusively to the Atlantic Alliance or the European Union;

(ii) Noting with satisfaction the new position of the United States Administration in favour of a discussion with its friends and allies on the deployment of an antimissile system whose title, moreover, it has changed from "National Missile Defense" to simply "Missile Defense";

(iii) Considering that Europe perceives its security as continuing to be guaranteed mainly by agreements on disarmament and armaments control, in particular the ABM Treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems;

(iv) Taking the view that any revision or abrogation of that Treaty can only come about as the result of a consensus between the United States and Russia, as signatory states;

(v) Welcoming in this connection the meeting of minds between the United States and Russia during recent talks between the Presidents of both countries;

(vi) Considering that it would be desirable for China to be involved in any future agreement and with that perspective in mind for that country and Europe to draw closer together on antimissile defence;

(vii) Recalling that the non-military use of space must continue to be an essential aim for all countries;

(viii) Stressing the need for Europe to acquire a European missile defence capability that is compatible with the ABM Treaty, for the protection of its forces during operations;

(ix) Recalling the proposals Russia has made to NATO for, on the one hand, a non-strategic pan-European missile defence system (Euro-ABM) and on the other hand, cooperation in the field of satellites;

(x) Noting, furthermore, that Japan is also developing a theatre missile defence system with a naval component similar to the American Navy Theater Wide system;

(xi) Taking into account also the NATO feasibility study on a theatre missile defence system, currently in the invitation-to-tender phase;

(xii) Taking into account the discussions that have started at industrial level between Israel and the United States on possible cooperation in the field of BPI (boost phase interception of missiles);

(xiii) Noting that, notwithstanding the considerable political as well as technical differences between the American and European analyses of antimissile defence, there are nevertheless areas of agreement, in particular in the field of terminal defences and early warning satellites;

(xiv) Recalling in that connection, among other examples of transatlantic industrial cooperation, the MEADS programme being conducted as a cooperative venture by Italy, Germany and the United States, as well as the industrial partnership involving EADS, Lockheed Martin and Boeing for a study of the NATO tactical antiballistic missile system;

(xv) Emphasising that current antimissile defence studies involving Europeans focus on theatre missile defence and in most cases are being conducted in cooperation with the United States;

(xvi) Welcoming the major rationalisation and restructuring effort made by the European defence industry over the last decade, enabling it to face the future in circumstances similar to those of its American competitors;

(xvii) Considering that the development of a European defence industry, particularly in the field of antimissile defence, is both the consequence of the setting-up of a European defence and a prerequisite for it, and that the prospects for the industry's future development are, to a large extent, interlinked with it;

(xviii) Considering, finally, that the implications for European industry of possible participation in a missile defence system can only be evaluated once the United States and Russia have decided on the systems they wish to develop and propose to the European states,

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RECOMMENDATION 704

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that recent developments in other parts of the world, including the dramatic and unprecedented terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing fight against international terrorism, should not affect the European Union's strategic priority of establishing and supporting peace, stability and prosperity in south-eastern Europe;

(ii) Welcoming EU efforts to support and cooperate with the countries of that region, with a view, ultimately, to their integration into the political and economic mainstream of Europe;

(iii) Welcoming the fact that both Bulgaria and Romania have made progress in their efforts to meet the economic accession criteria and already meet the relevant political criteria for accession to the European Union;

(iv) Supporting the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in encouraging and strengthening cooperation between the countries of south-eastern Europe and in streamlining ongoing efforts to support their integration in the political, economic and security structures of Europe;

(v) Noting with satisfaction the admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Stability Pact, in October 2000, as an important step towards its integration in European structures;

(vi) Welcoming the results of the second Regional Conference for South-East Europe, held in October 2001 in Bucharest, where donors pledged the sum of 2.4 billion euros for key infrastructure projects;

(vii) Supporting the EU's policy of offering Stability and Association Agreements to south-eastern European countries and hoping that, following the footsteps of Macedonia and Croatia which signed such agreements in April and October 2001 respectively, the remaining countries - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - will make all possible efforts to qualify for this type of agreement in the near future;

(viii) Concerned that the continuing uncertainty over future relations between Montenegro and Serbia, which in practice function as separate states in most fields, is preventing efficient economic reform, acting as a deterrent to foreign investment and standing in the way of accession to key European and Atlantic structures;

(ix) Considering that Serbia must do everything in its power to implement the May 2001 Presevo peace accord, envisaging inter alia an amnesty for all Albanian rebel fighters, greater investment in the local economy and proportional representation for Albanians in the local government and police services in order to prevent further insurgency in the region;

(x) Calling upon Serbia to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and make sure that all its state institutions comply with the implementation of this cooperative policy;

(xi) Considering that at both government and political party level Serbia's political authorities should cease to support the armed forces and those politicians in Republika Srpska seeking to hinder the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the exercise and expansion of its authority over its Entities;

(xii) Aware that in Serbia internal rivalries within the ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition are currently impeding the economic, social and judicial reforms required by foreign and international donors and which Serbia itself needs;

(xiii) Worried that more than six years after the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement, extremist nationalists still attract widespread popular support in Bosnia and Herzegovina, enabling them to a large extent to frustrate efforts towards state building, notwithstanding the victory in the November 2000 elections of the non-nationalist Alliance for Change at both central government and Federation level;

(xiv) Concerned in particular that the extremist nationalist Serb Democratic Party (SDS), which became a de facto coalition partner in the Republika Srpska Government after its victory in the November 2000 legislative elections, is preventing the adoption of essential laws to reform the economy, obstructing the privatisation of profitable government-controlled companies currently being run improperly and resisting effective cooperation between Republika Srpska and the ICTY, while at state level too, together with its allies, it has consistently sought to block legislation considered of vital importance to the country's functioning;

(xv) Considering it somewhat anomalous that the new government of Serbia was forced to extradite ex-President Milosevic to the ICTY in The Hague a few months after his fall from power, under pain of not being able to obtain funds for the reconstruction of Serbia from essential donors, while Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, indicted war criminals, who are still at large and under protection within Republika Srpska, more than six years after their forced withdrawal from power, and the same foreign donors continue to bail out this virtually bankrupt Entity where nationalist forces are still apparently in control;

(xvi) Noting that the other nationalist parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action have elected or re-elected hardliners to positions of leadership, who are now using their power to pursue policies of ethnic hatred and exploitation of the Entities resources, for their own political purposes;

(xvii) Aware that progress has been made in the return of refugees and displaced persons to their former homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that many related problems still remain to be solved such as the appropriate application of property law and prevention of the continuing, all too frequent ethnic violence against returnees;

(xviii) Considering that under the abovementioned circumstances there can be no doubt that the maintenance of a SFOR presence remains crucial to the continuance of a safe and secure environment conducive to the further implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement;

(xix) Welcoming the positive trend towards greater political stability in Albania, as confirmed by the June/July 2001 general elections, but regretting that Sali Berisha and his Democratic Party are persisting in their strategy of boycotting the legislative process;

(xx) Calling upon Albania's Democratic Party to accept its defeat in the 2001 legislative elections and participate fully in the democratic process, as this is essential for Albania's integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures;

(xxi) Welcoming the adoption by the national parliament of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia⁴, of the constitutional amendments as set out in the Ohrid Agreement, and calling upon all political parties in the country to concentrate on making a genuine cooperative effort to implement the amended Constitution;

(xxii) Considering that the continuing activities of armed ethnic Albanian extremists are undermining the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement;

(xxiii) Calling upon the Macedonian Government to show the greatest possible restraint in the use of violence in sensitive areas of the country;

(xxiv) Recognising that the 17 November Assembly elections in Kosovo were a significant step towards building a democratic society based on human rights and the rule of law;

(xxv) Concerned, however, that efforts within the new structures for provisional self-government may be directed towards establishing an independent Kosovo, while neglecting other issues which are far more important to the citizens of Kosovo, such as the development of a viable economy, the fight against crime and corruption, the return of refugees and displaced persons, good relations with neighbouring countries and the improvement of the healthcare and educational systems,

Invite the governments of the WEU countries, in particular those which are members of the EU or NATO:

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RECOMMENDATION 705

(i) Welcoming the courageous decision by Macedonian parliamentarians from the different communities, who have adopted the amendments to the Constitution, thereby initiating a peaceful process of political, social and cultural reform beneficial both to the constituent peoples of FYROM, to the territorial integrity of this country and to the stability of the region;

(ii) Recalling Recommendation 693 adopted by the Standing Committee on 18 October 2001, calling on the Council to:

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RESOLUTION 108

(i) Noting the increased frequency with which national military contingents are deployed abroad in the context of international missions;

(ii) Noting that often the most important information is broadcast in the media and the fact that the pressure of public opinion makes itself felt directly rather than through political intermediaries means that parliaments are being sidelined;

(iii) Recalling that the European Union has taken over responsibility for the Petersberg missions without the Community institutions having developed suitable plans for democratic scrutiny;

(iv) Recalling that national defence, including management of the armed forces, falls within each European country's national area of responsibility;

(v) Aware of the debate going on in several parliamentary assemblies on the search for a procedure, compatible with the principle of the separation of powers, that will allow parliaments to formulate political guidelines for government decisions regarding the deployment of armed forces abroad,

1. To reflect on the fact that the democratic scrutiny they are supposed to exercise over government decisions on the use of armed forces for international missions is not being adequately provided;
2. To compare the current initiatives and debates going on in several parliaments in Europe and the legislative and procedural solutions being put forward;
3. As necessary, to draft legislation or statutory amendments that make it possible to institute regular procedures for consulting and informing Parliament that cannot be circumvented by the executive under pressure of political events;
4. Support initiatives of international assemblies calculated to strengthen the dissemination of information among parliamentarians from a number of countries and a comparison of ideas, in order to create a common basis for democratic scrutiny attuned to the new reality of the European Security and Defence Policy.

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¹ Adopted by the Standing Committee on 18 October 2001.

² Adopted by the Standing Committee on 18 October 2001.

³ Adopted by the Standing Committee on 18 October 2001.

⁴ Turkey recognises the Federal Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name.