DOCUMENT A/1928

21 June 2006

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The role of the European Gendarmerie Force

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Document A/1928

21 June 2006

The role of the European Gendarmerie Force

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Baroness Taylor of Bolton, Rapporteur (United Kingdom, Socialist Group)

and Ignacio Cosidó Gutiérrez, co-Rapporteur (Spain, Federated Group)

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The Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly has taken a decision regularly to monitor progress in regard to the European Gendarmerie Force and to maintain a watching brief on operations undertaken and deployment of units by the Force.

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RECOMMENDATION 784²

on the role of the European Gendarmerie Force

(i) Welcoming the increasing determination being shown by the European Council to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises where NATO as a whole is not engaged;

(ii) Aware of the acute need to establish close cooperation among all European police and gendarmerie services in view of the terrorist threat;

(iii) Drawing on the experience of the numerous peacekeeping operations in Europe in which the EU member states have participated since 1991;

(iv) Noting the essential role of police forces during certain phases of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations;

(v) Welcoming the member states' growing awareness of the need from the very outset of operations to deploy police forces to take part in the maintenance of public order in crisis zones;

(vi) Welcoming the creation by five WEU member states of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) to be made available as a priority to the EU;

(vii) Concerned at the lack of interest shown by the parliaments of the member states in the deployment of peacekeeping forces in the EU or NATO frameworks,

1. Take steps to ensure they are fully aware of the establishment and work of the European Gendarmerie force and its potential for positive work in crisis-management operations;
2. Ensure that gendarme deployments, like troop deployments, are subject to oversight by the parliaments of the member states and the WEU Assembly;
3. Consider the ways in which all member states can best contribute to police/gendarmerie operations forming part of peace or humanitarian missions so as to ensure their effectiveness at any operational stage and give thought to the means of enabling member states that do not have police forces with military status to cooperate with EGF operations where appropriate;
4. Establish closer coordination between the relevant European Union structures (the Military Staff (EUMS) and the Council Directorates General) and the headquarters of the European Gendarmerie Force;
5. Include the technological and equipment requirements of the EGF in the next European Security Research Programme;
6. Encourage studies and work on improving the transitional phase from military intervention to peacekeeping;
7. Consider the appropriateness of a system of rotation among "pre-identified" gendarmerie units from the EGF member countries so as to have two integrated gendarmerie units (IGUs) permanently on emergency standby for all police missions and in particular public order tasks, at the same level of readiness as the EU battlegroups;
8. Examine ways of improving EGF capabilities and self-protection standards for the most demanding police operations like substitution or strengthening missions in hostile environments;
9. Encourage any new gendarmerie force within the EU to take part in or cooperate with the European Gendarmerie Force;
10. Make sure that police/gendarmerie officers are involved from an early stage in the process of planning post combat and peacekeeping roles, ensuring there is adequate planning of the transition from coercive missions to stabilisation phases;
11. Develop a common system for command, control and communication for EGF operations and reinforce its logistics resources so as enhance operational capacity.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Baroness Taylor of Bolton (United Kingdom, Socialist Group), Rapporteur

and Mr Ignacio Cosidó Gutiérrez (Spain, Federated Group), co-Rapporteur

1. Since the Nice Treaty (December 2000), the European Union has developed a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in compliance with the European Council Declaration at Helsinki (December 1999): "The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises".
2. Moreover, given the current threat of terrorism there is an acute need for close coordination among all European police and gendarmerie services. This report tackles one aspect of that European cooperation: the pooling of police forces in a European framework with a view to their participation in peacekeeping operations.
3. Indeed, experience of conducting operations of this kind in Europe over the past 15 years has brought home the need to have police forces working alongside military forces and the role of police forces in civilian ESDP missions is now an extensive one.
4. Since the adoption of a Police Action Plan at the Gothenburg European Council in June 2001, a Chiefs of Police meeting (in October 2004) and a Police Capabilities Commitment Conference at ministerial level (in November 2001) have both contributed towards considerable progress in the concept of use of police forces in the framework of the ESDP.
5. This has prompted some EU member states possessing police forces with military status (gendarmerie) to set up a permanent headquarters, together with a pool of gendarmerie forces which can be drawn upon at very short notice: the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), or EUROGENDFOR.

1. WEU operation on the Danube

6. In 1992, the United Nations imposed a general embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to the former Yugoslavia. WEU and NATO were tasked with monitoring compliance in the Adriatic (Operations Sharp Fence and Maritime Guard). On 15 June 1993, they merged their operations into a joint air and naval campaign (Operation Sharp Guard). However, the embargo was circumvented by barges transporting weapons, munitions and spare parts from the Black Sea to Serbia and Croatia via the Danube. In order to put a stop to this, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 787 (16 November 1992) and 820 (17 April 1993) calling on the riparian states to take measures to ensure that all craft travelling on the Danube complied with the embargo. Western European Union was also asked to provide assistance, giving rise to its embargo-monitoring mission on the Danube.
7. Following an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers on 5 April 1993 in Luxembourg the WEU member states agreed to offer assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania for enforcing the UN sanctions on the Danube. In June, that offer was taken up by the three riparian states which decided together with WEU to launch a police and customs operation. At its height, that WEU operation involved some 250 people (customs officials, police officers and border-guards from France, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) divided between a coordination and support centre and three control areas (Mohacs in Hungary, Calafat in Romania and Ruse in Bulgaria). With their eight patrol boats and 48 vehicles the WEU staff conducted a total of 6 748 inspection and monitoring operations resulting in the discovery of 422 infringements. That operation was not only a practical example of cooperation with associate partner states within WEU, but also of coordination between WEU and the OSCE through the WEU Presidency delegation to the OSCE Sanctions Committee in Vienna. The Danube operation was terminated in September 1996 following the signing of the Dayton Accords and the lifting of the UN embargo.

2. Operation Alba

8. On 28 March 1997, at Italy's request and pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1101 authorising the creation of a Multinational Protection Force in Albania (MPFA). This marked the birth of Operation Alba, a short operation initially planned to last three months, but which was extended for a further 45 days by Resolution 1114, adopted on 19 June 1997. Its mandate was clear: "to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organisations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance". The EU would thus continue to provide humanitarian aid and support economic reforms in coordination with the Multinational Protection Force. The force was composed of contributions from 11 European countries³. Albania having directly appealed to the European Union for military intervention by WEU in order to restore "constitutional order", the mission could have been conducted in the framework of the Peterberg missions.
9. In conjunction with the efforts being made in Albania by the international community, the OSCE and EU in particular, the WEU Council decided, in May 1997, to send a Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) to Albania, with the initial task of providing advice and training instructors. It was composed of a head of mission and his deputy and four main advisers, one for each sector of activity: organisation, public order, border police and logistics. Each main adviser was assisted by a small team of police officers in charge of implementing the relevant tasks.
10. MAPE was the first mission to be directed by the WEU Council with the support of the Planning Cell. It started with a short-term programme divided into two main parts: advice and training. Some 3 000 police officers were trained at the Police Academy in Tirana and a second training centre in Durrës, as well as through field training programmes. The Albanian authorities also consulted MAPE for the restructuring of their police services and reorganisation of the interior ministry, for which the Planning Cell drew up a long-term programme concept. A key element of the MAPE mission was the provision of advice to the Ministry for Public Order on the restructuring of the Albanian police force. A new State Police Law drawn up with MAPE's support laid the foundations for building a democratic police force to international standards. On 2 February 1999, the WEU Council approved plans for extending MAPE's mandate until April 2000, increasing its geographic scope and its operational mobility and expanding its advice and training to other ministries, directorates and "low-risk" police districts, down to the level of operational units. The MAPE mission comprised some 140 staff members in mid-1999 and at its height was some 160-strong.
11. In autumn 1998, the European Union expressed its resolve to assist the Albanian authorities in order to restore law and order to the country. The Council called on WEU "to complete urgently its study on the feasibility of possible options for international police operations in Albania in order to assist the Albanian authorities to restore law and order in that country"⁴. On 9 March 1999 the Council decided that the EU should contribute to rebuilding a viable Albanian police force and called on WEU to implement a joint action. This European contribution involved the provision of advice and training to the Albanian police, including in particular direct assistance from a team of advisers to the Ministry for Public Order, as well as to other ministries, as required.
12. From April 1999 onwards, the WEU mission played an important role in the Kosovo refugee crisis by assisting the Albanian police with the reception, registering, supervision and support of refugees. MAPE remained in permanent contact with the Albanian Ministry for Public Order, assisted the Albanians with setting up their own joint crisis centre and remained available 24 hours around the clock to assist with the latter's decisions and operations. MAPE teams were deployed to Kukës near the border with Kosovo to provide assistance to the police authorities there and in Tirana and Durrës. The MAPE mission was finally terminated on 31 May 2001.

3. Operations in Kosovo

13. During the night of 23 to 24 March 1999, NATO launched what was to be a 78-day air campaign against Serbia. On 10 June, the Serb troops withdrew from Kosovo now occupied by the international peacekeeping force under UN mandate, KFOR.
14. Throughout the summer of 1999, the KFOR peacekeeping forces were faced with an atypical crisis in which crowd behaviour had become a key component. It was therefore necessary to adapt, particularly in the Mitrovica area under the responsibility of France, where unusual arrangements based on the complementary roles of army and gendarmerie forces were adopted.
15. The French Gendarmerie was called upon to set up within the French brigade a battalion tasked with preventing crimes and offences and maintaining public security and public order in Kosovo (but not law enforcement). It was composed of 125 people (10 officers and 115 non-commissioned officers). The gendarmes performed basic judicial police functions pending the establishment of effective administrative and judicial structures in the country. The Gendarmerie also had the task of providing the command headquarters with reports on the general economic and social situation in the region.
16. This gendarmerie detachment was responsible, in practice, for:

17. In parallel to KFOR the UN Security Council decided to establish under UN auspices an interim civilian administration in Kosovo under which its people could progressively enjoy "substantial autonomy". The United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has evolved into a system of protectorate since it was established in June 1999.
18. UNMIK has deployed a total of 3 110 UN civilian police officers in Kosovo, including many veterans with considerable experience of different cultural environments, as well as experienced and highly qualified officers recruited from the police forces of dozens of different countries.
19. KFOR's task in the initial period was to guarantee public security and public order, while that of UNMIK was to advise KFOR on civilian police matters and to establish contacts with the local communities.
20. Within the UNMIK civilian police force are special police units responsible for specific law and order tasks such as crowd control. They support the other UNMIK civilian police officers, who include border police.
21. In June 2005 the European Union envisaged deploying the European Gendarmerie Force to Kosovo as its first theatre of operations, with a view to eventually taking over from UNMIK.

4. EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

22. The EU Police Mission (EUMP) was launched on 1 January 2003 as a follow-on mission to the United Nations Police Task Force (IPTF)⁵, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1396 of 5 March 2002.
23. In contrast to the IPTF which had a staff of more than 1 600 civilian and military police officers from 46 countries operating throughout the territory of the Bosnian Entities⁶ down to the level of police stations, the EUMP was composed of 512 policemen and gendarmes from 15 EU member states and 18 other countries wishing to participate in the operation. The police element was supplemented by 52 international civilians and 308 local recruits, bringing its strength to 872 staff on 31 January 2003. In January 2006 it was composed of just over 500 police officers from more than 30 countries.
24. The EUPM, which has an annual budget of 38 million euros, has the job of reinforcing the local police (through its advisory, assistance, mentoring, inspection and monitoring activities). It does not perform any executive functions and therefore does not directly manage public security, which is the responsibility of the local police. Its mandate is envisaged to last three years. With a view to its strategic objective of enhancing the police services of Bosnia and Herzegovina its action is focused on four main areas:

25. This is in keeping with the EU's overall aim of strengthening the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina and establishing sustainable policing structures under Bosnian ownership. In order to conduct its monitoring, mentoring and inspection operations that form part of its broader rule-of-law mission, the EUPM has also set itself a number of operational objectives.
26. The EUPM has its chain of command in Sarajevo and 24 monitoring units co-located at medium and senior levels with the different police structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The head of mission/police commissioner is responsible for the operational command of the mission and the day-to-day management of operations. Although the Bosnian authorities have transferred the operational command to the EUPM head of mission, all the police officers remain fully under their command.
27. The EUPM is part of the EU's broader rule-of-law reform programme for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is why it is part of a single chain of command. The EU Special Representative (EUSR) reports to the EU Council through the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR). The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the mission. The head of mission running the day-to-day operations reports to the SG/HR through the EUSR and receives instructions from the SG/HR through the same channel.
28. The excellent cooperation between the UN and the EU is reflected in the smooth transition from the IPTF to the EU Police Mission, to which two factors contributed. The first was the appointment by the General Affairs Council (Foreign Ministers) of 11 March 2002 of the IPTF Commander as the person in charge of planning the EUPM and also, as of 1 January, as the head of mission. The second was the deployment in Sarajevo as of the end of May 2002 of a planning team of some twenty people. Preparations for the EUPM were speeded up, it is true, by the possibility that the UN mandate might not be renewed in July 2002. In addition, the EU member states were able to mobilise the resources to follow up their November 2001 capability commitments under the EU's capabilities plan.
29. Furthermore, on the basis of the force status agreement negotiated with the Bosnian authorities and adopted for the EU Police Mission, a framework document that can be used for future EU operations, in particular those involving the Europe Gendarmerie Force (EGF), can now be drawn up.

5. EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

30. In September 2003, the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) invited the European Union to play a greater role in maintaining law and order by deploying a police mission there. The operational phase of the resulting EUPOL Proxima mission started on 15 December 2003. This coincided with the end of the Concordia military operation launched in March 2003 at the request of President Trajkovski on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1371 as a follow-up to NATO's Allied Harmony operation (16 December 2002 to 31 March 2003). Proxima's main aim was to help establish a stable and secure environment in FYROM in order to enable the Government to implement the Ohrid framework agreement concluded in 2001 (and which entailed more widespread use of the Albanian language, decentralisation of power towards local governments and guaranteeing proportional representation of the ethnic Albanian population in state institutions, the police force in particular).
31. EUPOL Proxima worked in close cooperation with the FYROM authorities. It was launched on 15 December 2003 for a one-year period in order to supervise and advise the local police in their efforts to fight organised crime and to promote European peacekeeping standards.
32. Its main tasks were to:

33. Following the end of the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 14 December 2005, the European Union launched the EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in that country in the framework of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). EUPAT will work for six months to ensure the transition from EUPOL Proxima to a technical assistance programme funded from the programme for Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation of the Western Balkans (CARDS).
34. The EUPAT police experts will be responsible for monitoring and advising the FYROM police authorities on such matters as border policing, keeping public order and fighting corruption and organised crime. It will thus carry on the work started by EUPOL Proxima with a view to "the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing"⁷ in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

1. Gendarmes and police

35. Experience of the many police missions that have been conducted in European crisis areas in recent years has shown how important they are for restoring peace and normalising the situation in the regions concerned.
36. Furthermore, in the event of a crisis-management operation there are always numerous calls for practically simultaneous intervention by police and military forces. It is therefore extremely useful for the EU to have at its disposal a group of police with military status for rapid deployment in accordance with the 2010 Headline Goal.
37. Gendarmes, who are police officers with military status, can be rapidly deployed and are trained for all police missions. All the recent operations in Europe (FYROM, Bosnia, Kosovo etc.) have involved a combination of police and gendarmes, as those countries which have gendarmerie forces often prefer to use them for operations.

2. The concept of EU police missions

38. The development of police and gendarmerie capabilities for crisis-management operations began when the Feira Council decided in June 2000 that the EU should acquire the necessary machinery and doctrines to deal with that new aspect of crisis management.
39. Indeed, in order to meet the new security challenges, the EU decided to increase the numbers of police and gendarmerie available for civil crisis-management missions. The member states undertook, in particular, to provide larger numbers of police officers for such international police operations as they decided to contribute on a voluntary basis. In June 2000, the Feira European Council set the objective of creating a pool of 5 000 police officers available for and able to meet the specific requirements of international crisis-prevention and crisis-management missions. The EU police capabilities are to be deployable either in response to a request from an international organisation (UN, OSCE) or for an autonomous EU-led mission. To guarantee rapid deployment the member states pledged to take the necessary steps to be able to make available within 30 days 1 400 policemen or gendarmes capable of conducting operations as well as advisory, training, monitoring and management tasks.
40. The gendarmerie forces of the five EGF participating states are police with military status. The Gendarmerie, Carabinieri or Guardia Civil have the same functions on their national territory as civilian police officers and fall under the authority of their respective Interior Ministries. They are internal security forces.
41. The military police that exist in many countries are quite different in nature: generally they are responsible for enforcing discipline in the armed forces, guarding war prisoners and regulating the movements of armed forces vehicles.
42. In June 2002 the Gothenburg European Council adopted a Police Action Plan for the purpose of mobilising the 5 000 police officers and taking into account possible contributions from non-EU states. The EU launched its first police mission⁸ on 1 January 2003, when it sent 500 policemen to take over from the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
43. The EU Chiefs of Police, in a declaration⁹ adopted in October 2004, recalled the central role of police in international crisis-management operations and the ever-increasing importance of the contribution being made by the EU in this regard.
44. In particular, a number of areas that need to be addressed by the EU and member states were highlighted¹⁰:

3. The 2008 Civilian Headline Goal

45. When it adopted the European Security Strategy in December 2003 the European Council signalled its resolve to shoulder its share of responsibility for global security. To achieve its aim of building a safer and more united world it saw the need for enhanced civil crisis-management capabilities, which was why, in June 2004, it endorsed a "Civilian Headline Goal" for 2008, building on the experience acquired since 1999.
46. The 2008 Civilian Headline Goal sets out the EU's main tasks and objectives in the field of civilian crisis management. The EU's approach is global, drawing on all civil and military means available to the ESDP in order to respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis-management situations, from conflict prevention to peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation. The Civilian Headline Goal specifies that "in addition to the priority areas for EU civilian crisis management agreed at Feira (police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection), the EU must be able to conduct various types of monitoring missions as well as to provide support to Special Representatives of the European Union. It will, inter alia, contribute to activities such as security sector reform and support disarmament, demobilisation/reintegration processes". Furthermore, the EU must be able to conduct concurrent civilian missions at different levels of engagement, and indeed at the present time it is conducting seven civilian ESDP missions. As regards its rapid reaction capacity it must be able "to deploy civilian means simultaneously with military means at the outset of an operation". Finally, civilian crisis-management operations under the ESDP must be deployable autonomously, jointly or in close cooperation with military operations.
47. In order to comply with those objectives, a step-by-step approach comparable to the headline goal for military capabilities has been adopted for the development of civilian crisis-management capabilities in 2005: it entails the definition of planning assumptions on the basis of scenarios, the elaboration of capability requirements lists, the assessment of national contributions and the identification of capability shortfalls.
48. The Civilian Headline Goal process will be supervised by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) assisted by the committee in charge of the civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM).
49. During the process of developing its capabilities to achieve the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal the EU will consult other international organisations, in particular the United Nations and the OSCE, and take account of lessons learned from ongoing operations and exercises.

4. Role of police missions in the ESDP framework

50. The European Union's experience of police missions in recent years has highlighted the need for intervention during the various phases of a crisis-management operation, as follows:

51. Thus the role of a police mission evolves over time and the transition from one phase to the next is very delicate. Following the military intervention phase, the choice of civil-military authority in charge of the police/gendarmerie force during the peacekeeping phase is extremely important. The choice will be made on a case-by-case basis; close coordination with both types of authority is in any case indispensable for the use of police and gendarmerie forces where these exist side by side.

1. History and objectives

52. Following the experience of crisis management in the Balkans during the 1990s, which had brought home the need for an EU police force with military status, the five European states possessing national gendarmerie forces (France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) together set up the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), or EUROGENDFOR.
53. Its objectives are set out in a Declaration of Intent issued on 17 September 2004:

54. At their meeting on 22 November 2004 the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers "also welcomed the initiative by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain to establish a European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) and the contribution the EGF can make to the ESDP. These five countries have made this capacity with a military status available for the more demanding scenarios and for rapid deployment in order to guarantee public security and public order. Ministers also welcomed that this force will be first and foremost at the disposal of the EU and stressed the need to explore further the possibilities of close affiliation of EU Member States not participating in the EGF".
55. The four countries set up a high-level ministerial committee known as CIMIN for the purpose of taking decisions with regard to the organisation of the force.
56. Gendarmerie General Gérard Deanaz was appointed as the first EUROGENDFOR Commander following the CIMIN meeting of 21 January 2005.
57. EUROGENDFOR, which is inspired by the Euroforce model, set up a permanent dedicated headquarters at Vicenza (Italy) at the beginning of 2005. That headquarters drew up an operational concept which should be approved by the participating states in 2006.

2. Conditions for use and tasks

58. In compliance with the Declaration of Intent, the EGF will be composed essentially of the same forces as those declared by the participating states in the Helsinki Forces Catalogue and included in the civilian crisis-management capabilities defined at the Brussels Capabilities Conference of 19 November 2001. For that reason the EGF will be made available first and foremost to the European Union. When the force is deployed for EU-led missions, the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) will be responsible for its strategic direction and political control.
59. The EGF can also be made available to the UN, the OSCE, NATO and other international organisations or ad hoc coalitions.
60. However, given the EGF's current resources and the small size of its headquarters, its capacity will be limited to the simultaneous conduct of a major substitution mission and one "strengthening" mission, requiring a smaller number of personnel.
61.  It may intervene during various phases of a crisis:

62. In accordance with the mandate of each operation, the EGF will perform a broad spectrum of activities related to its own police capability, such as:

3. Structure and capabilities

63. The EGF has four component parts:

64. The EGF has an initial rapid reaction capability that is some 800-strong and deployable within 30 days. It must be able to deal with all aspects of a crisis-management operation, mainly for the purposes of a substitution mission. It is an integrated police tool, designed for the full range of related tasks: maintaining order and public security, judicial police operations, intelligence gathering and analysis. On 1 January 2006 the participating states undertook to be able to set up a force composed of up to 2 300 men.
65. In addition to the capabilities needed by any military crisis-management force (availability, responsiveness, survivability, flexibility, deployability, command and control, interoperability, logistic autonomy), this type of force requires a number of specific capabilities.
66. Among the capabilities required for substitution assignments are, inter alia:

67. In strengthening scenarios, the aim of the EGF is to consolidate weakened state institutions, with a particular focus on the police field of action. It will be composed primarily of specialised elements that can be provided in modular fashion in order to establish and maintain a secure framework in an uncertain environment. More specifically, the capabilities required for assignments aimed at strengthening the local police include, inter alia:

68. Even during strengthening missions, the risk of situations deteriorating and the possible need for robust capabilities must be taken into account.
69. Humanitarian scenarios are characterised by a breakdown of society with severe consequences for the population. The range of capabilities required includes, inter alia:

4. Permanent Headquarters

70. In stand-by conditions, the role of the Permanent HQ consists of planning, developing doctrine (e.g. the technical and tactical procedures for employment of the Force) and establishing and maintaining links with the different international organisations. Its role in an operational context will be to provide a rapid planning capacity. For this purpose it must be able to:

71. Furthermore, the EGF Permanent HQ will facilitate the deployment and initial conduct of subsequent operations by providing an initial core for the Force HQ on a temporary basis, until such time as the Force HQ is completely up and running. Advanced teams may be sent to the mission area to prepare and facilitate the deployment of the force. The same Permanent HQ will also coordinate the strategic transport of the EGF Units and equipment to the mission area and prepare pre-deployment training packages as well as, if necessary, induction training courses for the participating units.
72. Appropriate reporting mechanisms will be established, including a procedure for transmitting reports to CIMIN (interministerial committee of the EGF participating states) and the relevant international organisations. As the parent HQ in charge of mounting the operation, the Permanent HQ will retain a sufficient capability for its primary assignment.

5. EGF operations

73. International organisations wishing to call on the EGF's services must address their request to the participating state that is currently chairing the CIMIN as well as directly to the Force HQ in order to save time. In agreement with the relevant international organisation, the FGE Force HQ should be able to launch or participate in a preparatory fact-finding mission within less than five days.
74. Following that evaluation phase the decision to engage the EGF must be taken unanimously by CIMIN¹¹, following which a memorandum of understanding (MOU) will be drawn up between CIMIN and the organisation in question. A standard framework agreement will be prepared in advance for that purpose.
75. The EGF Permanent HQ will then play the principal role. It will be responsible for:

76. At political and strategic level there are a number of possibilities, depending on the coalition or international organisation in charge of the operation:

77. At operational level the FGE Permanent HQ will be responsible for the supervision, control and support of the operation:

78. At tactical level, the EGF Force Commander (EGF FCDR) will command operations in the theatre, within either a military or a civilian structure. In the latter case, if the EGF is conducting an autonomous police operation, its Commander will be answerable to the highest civilian authority in the theatre of operations.

79. Intelligence is critical for the planning and deployment of an operation. The delivery of timely, updated and realistic analyses of the situation in the area of interest will facilitate the decision-making process at all levels. Access to the relevant information, including classified data, will be paramount for enabling the EGF HQ properly to plan subsequent operations.
80. The countries participating in the EGF should make every effort to ensure that the EGF HQ has access to the relevant national sources of information, for these may have a significant impact on EGF operations.
81. Appropriate information gathering and analysis capabilities commensurate with the importance and the size of the mission need to be set up for EGF operations, paying particular attention to criminal intelligence in the areas of terrorism, organised crime and war crimes. Such information must be collected, stored and analysed in such a way as to allow proper follow-up and the conduct of a criminal investigation in compliance with the relevant legal framework and the rule of law.
82. The logistic support to be provided to the EGF should make use of existing logistic assets, procedures and agreements already being provided by the EU, NATO, the UN and OSCE.
83. However, since none of the existing logistic structures will fully satisfy the specific needs of the EGF as a police force with military status, it would be appropriate, in order to achieve economies of scale and optimise the use of strategic assets, to apply the concept of a lead nation to the different fields of specialisation.
84. Logistic support will be organised in accordance with the specific EGF deployment scenario:

85. In the area of communications and information systems (CIS), the following links will need to be established  as soon as the possibility of an EGF deployment arises:

86. Given that the national CIS equipment of the five participating countries is generally not fully interoperable and sometimes even incompatible, and that the tactical level would be the one most affected by interoperability problems, the EGF needs to be able to rely on a common tactical CIS, deployable in the area of operations. This system should possibly take advantage of the national CIS equipment being used internally by the deployed EGF units as well as of the local existing communications infrastructure.
87. Aware of the difficulties involved in achieving interoperability among the different systems used by participating countries, the CIMIN could entrust a willing nation with the task of playing the lead role in order to provide the EGF with the necessary tools and take appropriate measures as regards adaptability, modularity and consistent maintenance of equipment. The duration of the lead nation's mandate will be the subject of a prior agreement that can be renegotiated or renewed if necessary.

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 16 May 2006.

² Adopted by the Assembly on 21 June 2006 at the 4^th sitting.

³ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey.

⁴ Council decision of 22 September 1998 adopted on the basis of Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union on the study of the feasibility of international police operations to assist the Albanian authorities (98/547/CFSP).

⁵ The ITPF was set up under a UN mandate (Resolution 1035) pursuant to the Dayton Accords signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.

⁶ Bosniac-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska.

⁷ http://www.eu-pat.org/

⁸ The EU Police Mission.

⁹ Presidency report on the ESDP (EU Council Document 16062 , 13 December 2004), Annex II to the Annex.

¹⁰ Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference, 22/11/2004. http://europa.eu.int/

¹¹ CIMIN : Comité interministériel des états participant à la FGE (Interministerial Committee of EGF participant states).