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The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly**

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FIFTY-FIRST SESSION

Replies of the Council to
Recommendations 759-766

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
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**REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL
TO RECOMMENDATIONS 759-766¹**

RECOMMENDATION 759²

***on the implementation of the European Security Strategy –
reply to the annual report of the Council³***

The Assembly,

- (i) Confirming its support for the main objectives set out in the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003;
- (ii) Recalling in that connection its Recommendations 733, 736, 748, 749 and 757;
- (iii) Emphasising that bringing about the international order founded on the effective multilateralism advocated in the European Security Strategy, respect for international law and an acceptance of the primacy of the United Nations Charter and the UN Security Council depends on there being agreement in principle about those objectives with other national and multinational players on the international stage, in particular the United States;
- (iv) Noting with satisfaction that there is wide convergence between the ideas set out in the report “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” submitted by the UN Secretary-General to the UN General Assembly on 21 March 2005, and the objectives of the European Security Strategy;
- (v) Noting, conversely, persistent major differences between the European and United States approaches to the establishment of an international order of peace, freedom and justice, the role of the United Nations, the means of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery and the fight against international terrorism;
- (vi) Convinced of the need regularly to update the evaluation of the threats and pay more attention to the growing risk of renewed outbreaks of militant nationalism in certain countries in the world;
- (vii) Noting the rapid emergence of new world powers, such as China, with ideas on democracy, individual and collective freedoms and human rights that are still out of alignment with the norms the western world supports;
- (viii) Considering the uncertainties created by the very different and often contradictory tendencies observed in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and their repercussions for the policy of Russia, with which the European Union intends to establish a strategic partnership;
- (ix) Recalling the importance of implementing the European Union’s strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and perplexed to note the inability of the plenary session of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), held in Seoul, in October 2004, to reach agreement regarding the integration of seven new European Union member states into the regime;
- (x) Noting the current uncertainty over the outcome of the negotiations under way between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, on behalf of the European Union, and Iran, on the latter country’s nuclear programme and the questions this raises about the consequences of the possible failure of such negotiations;

¹ Recommendations communicated to the Council on 8 July 2005.

² Adopted by the Assembly on 13 June 2005 at the 1st sitting.

³ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled on behalf of the Political Committee by Gerd Höfer, Rapporteur (Germany, Socialist Group), Document 1896.

- (xi) Recalling continuing major divergences between the European and United States approach as to the maintenance of international peace and global security;
- (xii) Noting with interest, in that connection, the UN Secretary-General's proposal that the UN Security Council adopt a resolution setting out the principles governing the use of force and stating the intention to abide by those principles in deciding whether or not to authorise or proscribe such use of force and that, broadly speaking, that resolution would reaffirm the provisions of the Charter concerning the use of force and specifically Article 51 of the same;
- (xiii) Recalling that the European Security Strategy fails to spell out exactly what it means by "preventive engagement" and is silent about the means of self-defence in the event of diplomacy, non-proliferation and conflict prevention coming to naught;
- (xiv) Convinced that the UN Secretary-General's proposal to reach agreement on a generally recognised definition of terrorism is a good basis for beginning an international dialogue on the matter which it would be appropriate to widen to take in the need to narrow the gap between Europeans and Americans in regard to ways of fighting terrorism;
- (xv) Stressing the importance it attaches to strengthening practical cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations and its sub-regional organisations over crisis management, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa;
- (xvi) Emphasising the utmost importance of removing all the obstacles that currently stand in the way of a substantial dialogue between the European Union and NATO, which does not exclude any member state or any subject of reciprocal interest, in order to lay the foundation for productive cooperation between the two organisations;
- (xvii) Supporting all efforts to restore pride of place to NATO as the forum for discussion between the Atlantic and European allies of major transatlantic security issues;
- (xviii) Recalling that European Union commitment to crisis management, particularly in regional conflict, in accordance with the broad outlines of the European Security Strategy requires faster progress in implementing the 2010 Headline Goal and the 2008 civilian Headline Goal;
- (xix) Convinced that ratification of the provisions of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on strengthening ESDP decision-making and operational instruments should significantly facilitate the European Union's ability to implement future actions whereby it can more readily take on its share of the responsibility for international security;
- (xx) Considering that the more member states' troops are involved in multinational units in the context of the battlegroups or multinational HQs the more the different national laws governing their rights and obligations raise problems, possibly leading to conflicts of laws and tensions within the units in question;
- (xxi) Noting that the European Security Strategy is not supported by a European collective defence commitment on the part of all the European Union member states and stressing in consequence the importance of the mutual assistance obligation subscribed to by the signatory powers of the modified Brussels Treaty, inasmuch as those obligations have not been taken up by the European Union;
- (xxii) Noting with concern that since the transfer of the exercise of WEU's crisis-management functions to the European Union, it has become increasingly difficult for the national parliaments to be informed collectively about the activities the Union has inherited from WEU and in particular about those carried out in implementation of the European Security Strategy, which nevertheless require parliamentary and electoral support in the member states;
- (xxiii) Deploring all the more that the Council did not transmit the second part of its fiftieth annual report to the Assembly on time;
- (xxiv) Thanking the current Luxembourg EU Presidency, however, for having readily provided the Assembly's Committees with comprehensive information in regard to ESDP development, at their joint meetings with the EU Political and Security Committee in Brussels on 9 March 2005;

(xxv) Considering the reply of the Council to Recommendation 749,

I. RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU NATIONS AS MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO TO:

1. Intensify their efforts to secure the diplomatic means and operational military capabilities on the basis of the 2010 Headline Goal and the 2008 civilian Headline Goal that are required to make the European Union a credible force for global security and peace, and adequately resource those capabilities;
2. Bring the work of activating the Civil-Military Planning Cell, the Situation Centre and the European Defence Agency to rapid completion;
3. Pursue the political endeavour of achieving universal compliance with the treaties, agreements and arrangements for verification of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and ensure that all the new European Union member states are in a position to accede to the Missile Technology Control Regime at the latter's next plenary Assembly session, scheduled to take place in Spain in autumn 2005;
4. Draw up a road map so as to persuade other major world powers to support the main ideas and objectives set out in the European Security Strategy;
5. Take the initiative in drawing up a concept for coercive measures, including military measures, to be taken in combating proliferation when political means have failed, and for a defence against WMD and their means of delivery;
6. Play an active part in drawing up European Union priorities with a view to the 60th UN General Assembly session in September 2005 and reaching agreement on common positions with regard to the UN Secretary-General's proposals for:
 - (a) the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution setting out the principles governing the use of force in the event of threats endangering peace;
 - (b) the development of a generally recognised definition of terrorism and the conclusion of a global convention on terrorism;
 - (c) the establishment of an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission within the United Nations;
7. Strengthen practical civil and military cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations by applying the principles set out in the European Security Strategy;
8. Take steps towards opening a Euro-American dialogue to achieve a closer convergence of views, particularly in regard to the establishment of an international order based on effective multilateralism, the rule of law and the role of the United Nations and the Security Council and the conditions under which recourse may be had to force;
9. Support the efforts of the NATO Secretary-General to create the conditions for a constructive political dialogue between the European Union and NATO at foreign minister level, to include all the member states of both organisations and dealing with all topics of mutual interest;
10. Insist that the European Union define clearly the purpose and content of the strategic partnerships envisaged with a number of international powers, between which dissension and conflicts of interest exist, to ensure that each such partnership is consistent with the values and objectives promoted in the European Security Strategy and represents no danger to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance;
11. Point out within the European Union the importance of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, of which ten EU member states are signatories and which is currently the only European defence commitment and, by the same token, the sole European guarantee underpinning the European Security Strategy;

12. Take steps to improve national parliaments' collective information and input into the European Union decision-making process in regard to ESDP matters, and to widen the public understanding and support necessary for the objectives set out in the European Security Strategy;
13. Promote the development of a European legal status for troops engaged in European multinational units and/or multinational HQs;

II. RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

14. Transmit its annual report to the Assembly sufficiently early to allow its Committees to examine and formulate their replies, and continue to include in it all information concerning the activities of member states under the ESDP and in NATO in areas covered by the modified Brussels Treaty;
15. Maintain the modified Brussels Treaty and Article V of the same for as long as the European Union has no equivalent provisions to draw on that could replace the Treaty, and invite all EU and NATO member states to accede to it under terms to be agreed with them pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty;
16. Inform the Assembly of any steps taken to consider the future of the modified Brussels Treaty, without waiting until it has drawn its own conclusions from such consideration.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL⁴
to Recommendation 759

The Council thanks the Assembly for its timely recommendations and wishes to confirm that the modified Brussels Treaty (mBT) will remain in force without being amended until the High Contracting Parties collectively decide otherwise.

If and when the Council decides to address the issue of the future of the mBT, the Assembly will be informed of the outcome of the Council's deliberations.

As regards an invitation to all EU and NATO Member States to accede to the mBT under terms to be agreed with them pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty, the Council confirms that it does not intend to take any initiative in this respect. It refers the Honourable Parliamentarians to the terms of its replies to Written Question 384 and Recommendation 745.

⁴ Reply communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 8 November 2005.

RECOMMENDATION 760⁵

on security cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbours⁶

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the importance that the EU attaches to promoting close cooperative relations with its eastern neighbours;
- (ii) Noting in particular the need to create the conditions for stronger cooperation on specific security issues;
- (iii) Stressing that the fight against corruption and mafia activities (drug trafficking, illegal immigration, trafficking in women, illegal adoption and criminal mercenaries) is a priority for the EU's eastern neighbours;
- (iv) Noting that many regional conflicts on the EU's borders are deliberately being fuelled by the mafia and their political connections;
- (v) Stressing the geostrategic and economic importance of Ukraine for the European Union and welcoming the positive political developments which have taken place in Ukraine following the December 2004 presidential elections;
- (vi) Aware of the extent of the economic and social reforms that need to be carried out in Ukraine and of the political issues at stake in the parliamentary elections of March 2006 and convinced that the reform process needs specific aid from the European Union that will have a practical effect on the social and democratic situation of the Ukrainian people;
- (vii) Noting with satisfaction the political resolve expressed by the new Ukrainian authorities to develop closer relations with the EU and NATO;
- (viii) Welcoming the signature of the EU/Ukraine Action Plan on 21 February 2005 and the additional measures adopted with a view to strengthening it;
- (ix) Concerned about the existence of as yet unresolved border conflicts between Ukraine and Russia and between Ukraine and Romania;
- (x) Considering the results of the recent parliamentary elections in Moldova and welcoming the political will of the Moldovan authorities to develop closer relations with the EU;
- (xi) Concerned about the conflict in Transdniestria which has been going on for more than twelve years and supporting the Moldovan authorities in their desire to broaden the format of the negotiations that are being conducted in order to resolve the conflict;
- (xii) Taking the view that Russia should make a supplementary effort to contribute to the settlement of the status of Transdniestria;
- (xiii) Welcoming the appointment in March 2005 of an EU Special Representative for Moldova and the desire expressed by the EU to contribute to a settlement of the conflict in Transdniestria;
- (xiv) Expressing the hope that the new Ukrainian authorities will cooperate actively in the efforts to resolve the conflict in Transdniestria, in particular by stepping up controls along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border;
- (xv) Concerned about the persistent unwillingness of the Belarus authorities to create the necessary conditions for democratic progress in that country;
- (xvi) Aware that the development of the EU's relations with Belarus will depend on the progress the authorities in that country make towards democratisation;

⁵ Adopted by the Assembly on 14 June 2005 at the 3rd sitting.

⁶ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled on behalf of the Political Committee by Jean-Pierre Masseret, Rapporteur (France, Socialist Group) and Abdülkadir Ateş, co-Rapporteur (Turkey, Socialist Group), Document 1895.

- (xvii) Considering the special relationship between Russia and Belarus, in particular in the area of defence;
- (xviii) Stressing the need to deepen the strategic partnership between Russia and the European Union and welcoming the outcome of the 15th EU-Russia Summit of 10 May 2005 in Moscow, especially the agreement on a package of roadmaps for the creation of four common EU-Russia areas (the economy, security/freedom/justice, external security, research/education/culture);
- (xix) Considering it indispensable to ensure quick and efficient implementation of the agreements concluded between the EU and Russia, in particular in the area of security;
- (xx) Considering that differences in the assessment of democratic standards are also a potential source of dispute;
- (xxi) Aware that those EU member states which are Russia's immediate neighbours, in particular Finland, Poland and the Baltic States, are particularly keen to see the development of a constructive common policy with regard to Russia;
- (xxii) Stressing the importance of the mutual economic interests of Russia, the EU member states and the EU's eastern neighbours while recognising that they may have divergent security interests;
- (xxiii) Recalling Assembly Recommendation 697 adopted unanimously on 4 December 2001, which urged the Council to "request the EU to further intensify dialogue and cooperation with Russia on political and security issues and in particular on developments in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine where both have a common interest in security, stability and economic development";
- (xxiv) Recalling also Assembly Recommendation 715 adopted unanimously on 3 December 2002, which urged the Council to "pursue its efforts to assist Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in the process of political democratisation and the liberalisation of trade relations" and to "continue actively to strengthen the strategic partnership with Russia",

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL REQUEST THE WEU COUNTRIES TO INVITE THE EU TO:

1. Take immediate steps to open up CFSP activities more broadly to Ukraine;
2. Strengthen dialogue with Ukraine with a view to evaluating its prospects of closer links with the EU;
3. Provide more support to the democratic movement in Belarus;
4. Offer Moldova the prospect of integration in the stabilisation and association process for south-eastern Europe;
5. Secure an undertaking from the parties involved in negotiations on the conflict in Transnistria to become more closely involved alongside the EU, in a broader negotiating framework, with a view to finding a definitive solution to the conflict;
6. Increase cooperation between the member states of the EU and its neighbours in the fight against organised crime, in particular by strengthening border controls and cross-border cooperation;
7. Engage in dialogue with Russia on the conditions for and principles of democracy as a key component of security.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL⁷
to Recommendation 760

The Council thanks the Assembly for its topical recommendations and wishes to confirm that WEU member countries share the Parliamentarians' views on the importance and relevance for European security of the stability as well as of the political, social and economic development of the Eastern neighbours of the European Union, including Russia. Issues of concern are addressed by WEU Member States in the framework of the developing Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.

As regards the ESDP dimension, two recent *acquis* warrant a mention: negotiations with a view to concluding agreements establishing a framework for participation in EU crisis management operations were completed in the case of Ukraine; and in the framework of the strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, a joint Road Map for the Common Space on External Security was agreed on 10 May 2005. This Road Map contains provisions designed to increase EU-Russia dialogue and cooperation in the crisis management area within the agreed framework in order to face regional and global challenges more effectively.

⁷ Reply communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 8 November 2005.

RECOMMENDATION 761⁸***on the European Technology Acquisition Programme (ETAP) –
reply to the annual report of the Council⁹***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the work done over many years by European nations in WEU, NATO and the EU towards building a European defence industrial and technological base (EDITB);
- (ii) Emphasising that such instances of variable geometry cooperation seek to rationalise European defence industrial and technology work by making it more coherent and defining priorities for research, technology and development (RT&D);
- (iii) Noting Europe's shortcomings in defence RT&D investment, and when it comes to certain leading-edge technologies and systems and systems integration, particularly in relation to the new information and communications technologies;
- (iv) Considering that weighty economic reasons such as maintaining a skilled workforce, preserving and developing national DITBs and the need to remain competitive, particularly in export markets, play a major part in the decisions that are taken on defence RT&D;
- (v) Noting that transatlantic cooperation/competition in R&T is also a major factor in the catching-up required to strike the long-sought "better balance" in transatlantic security and defence relations;
- (vi) Judging that ETAP is the result of the implementation of undertakings under the LoI/Framework Agreement concerning measures to facilitate the restructuring and functioning of the European defence industry;
- (vii) Recalling that the LoI/Framework Agreement covers only the major European producers/investors in defence R&T and equipment and that the rules defined within it necessarily govern any reform or reshaping of the EDITB, which is, moreover, also one of the tasks of the European Defence Agency;
- (viii) Considering that ETAP can play an important part in encouraging European cooperation in the field of defence R&T and that its effect is beneficial to both industry and government procurement agencies required to work in a more European environment;
- (ix) Emphasising that ETAP is made up of the six principal European nations in the fields of civil and defence aeronautics in the process of equipping themselves, in terms of piloted future air combat systems, with aircraft whose working life will extend beyond 2020 – Typhoon/Eurofighter, Rafale and Gripen – and that such platforms could benefit from the innovations designed and developed through ETAP, which would contribute to making them more interoperable;
- (x) Recalling that two vitally important factors in ETAP's success are transparency and joint development of technologies and systems, always a highly complicated matter in the European context;
- (xi) Noting that Europe's increasing number of external military commitments concerned with combating international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terror, and with dealing with crises falling within the remit of the Petersberg tasks, particularly in Africa, have not given rise to increases in defence spending of the same order as in the United States;
- (xii) Recalling that the European Defence Agency includes a Security and Defence R&T Directorate;

⁸ Adopted by the Assembly on 14 June 2005 at the 3rd sitting.

⁹ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee by Edward O'Hara, Rapporteur (United Kingdom, Socialist Group), Document 1901.

(xiii) Noting that the European Defence Agency is not the only authority dealing with security and defence R&T and equipment but that the European Commission too has been involved in this area for almost a decade, particularly in regard to defence industry restructuring and reorganisation of the sector, notwithstanding the legal restrictions imposed by Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC);

(xiv) Considering that in this area the European Commission's European Security Research Programme (ESRP), for which the Preparatory Action for the period 2004-2006 is currently under way, covers dual-use technologies and concept development which are also central to ETAP;

(xv) Taking the view furthermore that when it comes to defence equipment and R&T, there is no getting away from the transatlantic dimension and that European countries involved in this area want to be dealt with as genuine partners (and suppliers) and not merely, as previously, as potential subcontractors dependent on American products and technology;

(xvi) Stressing that the project for the future combat aircraft, the "F-35 Joint Strike Fighter" (JSF), is a good illustration of Europe's dilemma over transatlantic cooperation and also directly affects the future of ETAP and the EDITB;

(xvii) Considering that European countries which have committed themselves to that programme, are tied in for decades to come to a US project which makes no industrial or technological contribution to the EDITB;

(xviii) Regretting that the Neuron project (a demonstrator of the validity of the UCAV – Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle – concept) could not be developed as part of ETAP,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THOSE WEU COUNTRIES TAKING PART IN ETAP TO:

1. Inject new life into the European Technology Acquisition Programme by identifying areas of cooperation for the years ahead and setting a realistic timetable for achieving the programme's objectives;
2. Ensure that the technological priorities identified under ETAP are translated into study and development programmes for firms in the participating states so as to maintain the public-private partnership that forms the core of the project;
3. Ensure that ETAP is used to identify, among future needs for air combat systems, those which the United States has already developed, including joint projects like the Joint Strike Fighter, so as to avoid costly and futile duplication;
4. Ensure that any impetus given to European defence R&T and to strengthening the EDITB does not become part of an attempt to build "Fortress Europe" in that sphere, without however ruling out recourse to European preference in equipment and technology choices, so as to maintain Europe's autonomy and strengthen the EDITB;
5. Ensure that European countries' efforts to retain national capabilities they regard as strategic acquire a European dimension embodied in the EU in the European Defence Agency;
6. Do their utmost to achieve balanced transatlantic cooperation, which could give a significant boost to European defence industry restructuring;
7. Ensure that ETAP is gradually extended to other countries which have expertise and "niche" specialisms in aerospace technology.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹⁰
to Recommendation 761

The Council thanks the Assembly for its useful and interesting recommendations. It wishes to assure the honourable Parliamentarians that WEU's member countries are well aware of the strategic, political and technological priorities and requirements on which the European Technology Acquisition Programme and the European Defence Agency should base their respective programmes of action in order to ensure a successful outcome for their ongoing endeavours in the framework of the relevant mechanisms of the European Union.

¹⁰ Reply communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 8 November 2005.

RECOMMENDATION 762¹¹

on network-centric operations: European capabilities¹²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the evolution of European defence is closely linked to development and enhancement of the national capabilities of the European states that are WEU, NATO and EU members;
- (ii) Stressing the reforms and efforts to adapt undertaken by those states since the end of the cold war so as to be in a position to respond to the new security and defence challenges in Europe and worldwide;
- (iii) Noting the progress achieved in the area of the EU's European Security and Defence Policy since the decisions taken by the European Council in Cologne and Helsinki in 1999, and welcoming in particular:
- the setting up of structures for political and military decision-making and for the conduct of operations;
 - the achievement of the 1999 Headline Goal and the fact that a start has been made on the implementation of the Headline Goal 2010;
 - the launch and revision of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP);
 - the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA);
 - the formation of battlegroups;
 - the European Union operations in Africa (Artemis) in 2003 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Althea) in 2004;
- (iv) Noting the reforms undertaken by NATO since 1990 the better to respond to post-cold war crises and conflicts and strengthen transatlantic ties;
- (v) Concerned by the growing gulf between the military doctrines and defence-related technologies of Europe and the United States;
- (vi) Stressing the need for European forces to maintain and increase their level of interoperability with US forces, necessary for NATO or coalition operations;
- (vii) Emphasising the important role, in this context, of new information and communications technology (ICT) as applied to defence;
- (viii) Considering that the concept of network-centric operations arising out of this development presents the defence capabilities of European nations with both an opportunity and a major challenge, at national level as in multinational institutional frameworks or in coalitions of the willing;
- (ix) Taking the view that setting up national network-centric capabilities is a first essential step in that development process and in the transformation of the armed forces;
- (x) Considering that European nations must work together on developing and implementing a common concept to increase their interoperability and the effectiveness of action taken under the ESDP or in NATO;
- (xi) Considering that any European network-centric capability must be based from the outset on a process of identifying operational need and on the current state of play in European countries of RT&D (research, technology and development) in the relevant field;

¹¹ Adopted by the Assembly on 14 June 2005 at the 3rd sitting.

¹² Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled on behalf of the Defence Committee by Klaus Werner Jonas, Rapporteur (Germany, Socialist Group), Document 1899.

- (xii) Highlighting the significant contribution, past and present, made by WEAG (the Western European Armaments Group) and WEAO (the Western European Armaments Organisation) to the success of that process;
- (xiii) Expecting the European Defence Agency, having inherited WEAG *acquis*, to be in a position to give more active encouragement to work on network-centric concepts in relation to operational command and control (C2) procedures and on associated communications and UAV technology;
- (xiv) Taking the view that the gap, in terms of technology, doctrine and above all assets, between European and American forces is not conducive to the transposition of the US model to Europe;
- (xv) Stressing the need to maintain a sufficient degree of European autonomy in network-centric capabilities to avoid increasing Europe's dependence on US concepts and technology, while at the same time seeking to reinforce the degree of transatlantic interoperability in that sphere;
- (xvi) Considering that a substantial financial investment must be made in developing the technologies essential to the provision of national and European C4ISTAR¹³ capabilities;
- (xvii) Considering that resources must also be allocated proportionately to recruitment, training and to retaining within the armed forces the staff who operate, make use of and depend on those systems in the theatre of operations;
- (xviii) Taking the view that the development of network-centric capabilities in Europe also depends on the general level of education, research and technological development in European societies, an area that falls within the field of action and responsibility of national parliaments,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU MEMBER STATES AS MEMBERS OF THE EU TO:

1. Maintain and as far as possible increase defence RT&D investment, in particular in C4ISTAR technology;
2. Deepen the regular exchange of information and experience, bilaterally, in NATO and in the EU, and also through WEAO, on the state of play and technological development in regard to national projects on network-centric capabilities;
3. Cooperate with a view to developing and implementing concepts for shared or interoperable network-centric operations and capabilities, so as to maintain operational cohesion and coherency in multinational or coalition-based operations;
4. Seek, as a matter of priority, European solutions, technologies and products, so as to strengthen the defence industrial and technology base, both national and European, without which there will not be European autonomy in this sphere;
5. Cooperate with the United States at bilateral and multilateral levels in regard to network-centric capabilities and operations, so as to benefit from its experience and technology with a view to maintaining and strengthening transatlantic ties;
6. Seek, within the framework of transatlantic cooperation, to maintain a balance between the need for interoperability and the political requirement of strategic and operational autonomy that is the hallmark of the ESDP;
7. Engage more actively in the Alliance framework and in the EU, in particular through ECAP and EDA project groups, with the armed forces transformation process, leading to a shared European vision of the goals to be attained and the stages to be completed towards them;
8. Make the European Defence Agency (EDA) the framework for the definition of European network-centric technology required for ESDP missions and for interoperability with NATO, and provide the Agency with adequate funds to launch R&T programmes in that area;

¹³ Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.

9. Support armed forces transformation with adequate spending at both national and multilateral level, paying particular attention to human resource management;
10. Keep the Assembly better informed about WEAO R&T work on C4ISTAR capabilities and activities undertaken by the EDA in conjunction with the Research Cell or based on work done by the latter.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹⁴

to Recommendation 762

The Council thanks the Assembly for its timely recommendations, which broadly correspond to the objectives jointly pursued by the WEU Member States through the current activities of the competent bodies in the European Union.

¹⁴ Reply communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 8 November 2005.

RECOMMENDATION 763¹⁵

on the fight against international terrorism: defence aspects¹⁶

The Assembly,

- (i) Condemning all forms of terrorism, particularly acts of terrorism against civilian populations;
- (ii) Expressing solidarity with the Spanish people, victims of the attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, and with all those in the world who suffer the consequences of terrorism;
- (iii) Recognising that recourse to terrorism has highly complex causes which must be tackled using many means and noting that this recommendation refers only to the defence aspects;
- (iv) Recognising that the best political response to terrorism is the unwavering upholding of human rights, the rule of law and democratic norms;
- (v) Recognising that the primary responsibility for the prevention and management of the consequences of terrorist acts lies with national homeland security structures;
- (vi) Recognising also the central role of intelligence in the fight against terrorism and of cooperation among European states in this field;
- (vii) Considering that the armed forces make an important contribution to the fight against terrorism in external situations and that their actions complement those of national security forces in internal situations;
- (viii) Acknowledging the expertise and knowledge gained by individual WEU nations in their own fight against terrorist groups within their borders over the years and endorsing their call for greater cooperation;
- (ix) Recognising NATO's efforts to adapt its policies and force structures in the fight against terrorism;
- (x) Recalling the 2003 European Security Strategy, which defines the new face of terrorism and lays down the foundations upon which Europe should build its security and defence strategy;
- (xi) Recalling that the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council stated on 17 November 2003 that it intended to re-examine and redefine the Petersberg tasks under a new Headline Goal 2010;
- (xii) Noting that Article III-309 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe specifies that the EU may use civilian and military means to contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories;
- (xiii) Recognising the importance of the EU's 2004 Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism and its aims and priorities for the future;
- (xiv) Noting the establishment of EU battlegroups which can be made available for external operations in the fight against terrorism;
- (xv) Noting the creation of a European Security Research Programme (ESRP) and its importance in moving a step closer towards harmonising different technologies which can be used to prevent terrorist acts and manage their consequences;
- (xvi) Noting the establishment of a Preparatory Action to enhance cooperation among EU member states and ensure that the ESRP operates efficiently;
- (xvii) Highlighting the significant progress made to date in the fight against terrorism in terms of preventing the financing of terrorist groups, law-enforcement cooperation, border and transport security, relations with third countries and security cooperation,

¹⁵ Adopted by the Assembly on 14 June 2005 at the 3rd sitting.

¹⁶ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled on behalf of the Defence Committee by Ignacio Cosidó Gutiérrez, Rapporteur (Spain, Federated Group), Document 1900.

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU MEMBER STATES AS MEMBERS OF THE EU AND NATO TO:

1. Continue their work with a view to building a more secure European Neighbourhood through greater cooperation with third states, the Middle East and North African countries;
2. Enhance cooperation between European states in the military sphere, and take steps to adapt their military forces so that they can respond more effectively to the new threats within and outside the homeland;
3. Ensure that the timetable set for the EU battlegroups is kept to and that they are operational by the end of 2006;
4. Maintain efforts to ensure that the NATO Response Force is fully operational as soon as possible, and facilitate its decision-making mechanisms with a view to obtaining a higher level of efficiency;
5. Increase awareness of the importance of intelligence cooperation among European states and move towards strengthening the intelligence community across three fronts: reinforcement of domestic intelligence services, better integration of the information gathered by the various agencies, and more cooperation over intelligence within the European Union framework;
6. Strengthen and adapt Europe's security forces so that they can respond to the new threats and are better prepared to cooperate with the military and intelligence communities;
7. Ensure that Europe's capabilities are further strengthened and developed, particularly as regards technologies which enhance the performance of the armed forces and the intelligence and security services;
8. Move towards a more proactive, and not merely reactive, defence strategy on terrorism, without this signifying a justification for preventive military action;
9. Continue to maximise the effectiveness of a European security network against terrorism by developing existing structures such as the Schengen Information System and Eurojust.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹⁷
to Recommendation 763

The Council welcomes the Assembly's recommendations on the defence aspects of the fight against international terrorism to which recent events, particularly in London, lend an acute urgency. In the face of these hideous attacks against civilians, WEU Member States are determined to expand and deepen their cooperation.

On 23 May 2005 the Council of the EU endorsed the first report on implementation of the Conceptual Framework on the ESDP dimension of the fight against terrorism. This report is a living document which will be regularly updated. It takes stock of progress made in implementing action points and makes concrete recommendations to be put into effect as soon as possible. The Conceptual Framework covers a vast spectrum of capability and operational sectors, including management of the consequences of a terrorist attack. The most innovative initiatives agreed include interoperability between military and civilian assets, including civil protection assets, and the extension to all natural and man-made disasters of military assets and capabilities relevant to the protection of civilian populations against terrorist attacks, including nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical (NRBC). Work is underway on the proposal to create an NRBC Centre of Competence.

Consistency between ESDP activities and other instruments is essential and must be promoted to ensure a comprehensive response by the European Union to the multidimensional terrorist threat. The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and Presidency provide the interface between all the Committees and working parties concerned. The European Commission will also be involved, within its areas of competence.

On 7 March 2005, on the basis of a mandate in the Conceptual Framework, the EU Institute for Security Studies organised a seminar on the contribution of the ESDP to the fight against terrorism. Areas for further study were identified. The seminar also provided an opportunity for a more thorough dialogue with the United States in this respect.

¹⁷ Reply communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 16 November 2005.

RECOMMENDATION 764¹⁸***on ESDP developments and the Headline Goal 2010 – reply to the annual report of the Council¹⁹***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling the resolve of the member states expressed at Helsinki “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises”;
- (ii) Noting with satisfaction the determination shown by the EU member states in the European Security Strategy together to be capable of dealing with the new threats: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organised crime;
- (iii) Welcoming the EU’s efforts to constantly improve upon its crisis-management procedures and structures (PSC, EUMC, EUMS etc.) and to acquire the capabilities needed for fulfilling its tasks;
- (iv) Noting that the so-called extended Petersberg tasks that the EU set for itself in the Constitutional Treaty cover all aspects of crisis management: conflict prevention, crisis management proper and post-crisis missions;
- (v) Regretting that Article I-41 (7) of the Constitutional Treaty on mutual defence contains no binding commitment for the member states;
- (vi) Welcoming the setting-up, through that treaty, of “permanent structured cooperation” among member states wishing to acquire effective crisis-management capabilities for the EU by improving their autonomy and responsiveness;
- (vii) Noting with satisfaction that the Headline Goal 2010 will give the EU the capability to react very swiftly to an emerging crisis;
- (viii) Recalling, however, that the EU does not have a permanent multinational operational headquarters which would enable it to respond within the timeframe specified by the Headline Goal 2010, namely, a decision within five days and deployment within ten days;
- (ix) Welcoming the development of the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff which will make it possible to link up the different aspects involved in the management of a crisis and to rapidly set up an operations centre for that type of mission;
- (x) Noting with satisfaction the desire of the large majority of member states to participate in the creation of battlegroups, but aware of the difficulties involved in having well-trained multinational battlegroups available within less than ten days;
- (xi) Noting the dispersal of efforts in the defence equipment sector within the EU and welcoming the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA);
- (xii) Noting the efforts being made by the member states within the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) to remedy identified shortfalls in the area of military capabilities with a view to carrying out EU missions, but conscious of the difficulties they are encountering;
- (xiii) Noting the developments in the area of the Global Approach on Deployability;
- (xiv) Regretting the lack of an industrial armaments policy within the EU;
- (xv) Welcoming the EU’s efforts to acquire a civilian crisis-management capability in the different areas of civil intervention and the start of the process for implementing the 2008 civilian Headline Goal;

¹⁸ Adopted by the Assembly on 15 June 2005 at the 4th sitting.

¹⁹ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled on behalf of the Defence Committee by Konstantinos Vrettos, Rapporteur (Greece, Socialist Group), Document 1898.

(xvi) Welcoming the developments in EU training in the field of the ESDP, which will enhance a European security culture;

(xvii) Recalling the emphasis that has been placed within the EU on the fight against terrorism and that is reflected in the EU plan of action to combat terrorism and the use of the ESDP to that end;

(xviii) Noting with satisfaction the EU's cooperation during recent crises with NATO (Berlin plus arrangements), the UN (joint declaration) and the African Union,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU MEMBER STATES AS MEMBERS OF THE EU TO:

1. Maintain their mutual defence obligation as it stands within the modified Brussels Treaty for as long as the EU member states have not entered into any commitment of that kind by means of a future amendment to the Constitutional Treaty;
2. Urge the EU Military Committee to draw up a proper military strategic concept with a view to translating into military capabilities the political resolve to manage crises that is expressed in the European Security Strategy and in the Headline Goal 2010;
3. Mobilise their efforts within the EU to introduce a minimum procedure for qualified majority voting in the ESDP decision-making processes in order to avert the danger of decisions being blocked by the unanimity requirement;
4. Encourage the development of the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff and provide the means to establish a proper operations centre;
5. Concert their efforts with a view to putting in place a genuine permanent multinational operations headquarters to be used in connection with "permanent structured cooperation" within the EU;
6. Incorporate in the ESDP a proper intelligence policy based on European satellite capabilities and the Torrejón Satellite Centre, which will have been made more operational;
7. Take forward the implementation of the EU battlegroups concept in order to achieve full operational capability in 2007 as identified in the Headline Goal 2010, and set up specific battlegroup training and exercises;
8. Take forward the Global Approach on Deployability and the creation of a permanent EU Movement Coordination Cell within the EUMS;
9. Participate actively in the new phase of the ECAP (European Capability Action Plan) and make available the financial resources that are essential for developing the equipment programmes being envisaged to remedy the identified capability shortfalls;
10. Continue work in the area of EU training in the field of the ESDP and especially in relation to the European Security and Defence College;
11. Foster the development of the European Defence Agency by providing it with the necessary personnel and funding as soon as possible and by introducing the possibility of qualified majority voting into the decision-making process.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL²⁰
to Recommendation 764

The Council thanks the Assembly for its recommendations and wishes to make the following comments:

1. The modified Brussels Treaty remains in force.
2. The WEU member countries are resolved to lend their full support to the implementation of the European Security Strategy with all its implications, notably in terms of successful development of an active, more capable and more coherent ESDP, cooperating with key partners, in particular the United Nations and NATO.
3. Implementation of the Civilian/Military Cell and the Operations Centre is being actively pursued. An establishment team, which began its work on 23 May 2005, carried out the preparations for setting up the Cell.
4. In the context of implementation of the 2010 Headline Goal, the Council of the EU has approved a Requirements Catalogue incorporating the results of the technical work done to date. The Catalogue will serve as the basis for future work and contains considerations regarding strategic planning hypotheses, the five illustrative scenarios and an initial list of the capabilities required to meet the aims set out in the 2010 Headline Goal.
5. Work continues on the global approach on deployability. The aim is to improve the ability of the EU to deploy forces, by primarily focusing on more effective use of all available means of transport coordination.

The EU Presidency has presented a non-paper on the maritime dimension of the 2010 Headline Goal including a proposed road map.

6. Evaluation of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) has been completed, and the role of the Headline Goal Task Force (HTF) evaluated in this context. The Council of the EU approved the ECAP evaluation report drawn up by the EU Military Committee and the European Defence Agency (EDA). The refocusing of the Project Groups is an important element in remedying the shortfalls remaining in the area of military capabilities in relation to the Helsinki Headline Goal. An updated Capability Improvement Chart has been drawn up, to keep the public and media informed.
7. A Battlegroups Coordination Conference was held on 11 May 2005. It noted that the commitments made by the Member States of the EU will enable the objective set for the initial period of operational capability for 2005 and 2006 to be met, i.e. to have one Battlegroup permanently available.
8. Since the beginning of 2005, the European Defence Agency has been fully engaged in implementing its work programme. The Agency has moved into its own premises and has started work on four flagship projects in its four areas of operation: C3 (command, control and communications) in the area of capabilities; combat armoured vehicles in the armaments area; the European defence equipment market, in liaison with the European Commission, for the industry and the market area; and drones for the research and technology area. The EU Council has welcomed the action plan on the creation of a European defence equipment market adopted by the Steering Board of the Agency, which has also approved a transition plan with a view to the gradual transfer of the research and technology responsibilities of the Western European Armaments Organisation and of its Research Cell (with contracts) in the first quarter of 2006. The development of working relationships has been initiated with the Letter of Intent (LoI), the Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR), NATO, the defence industry and academic institutions. The Agency's first contract, on technical assistance for the EU, was concluded with NATO's NC3A Agency.

²⁰ Reply communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 23 November 2005.

9. The concept of training in the field of ESDP has been successfully implemented. Courses were organised in the EU Training Programme in ESDP for the years 2005 to 2007. The arrangements for the functioning of the European Security and Defence College have been defined.

RECOMMENDATION 765²¹
on developments in the Broader Middle East²²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the Middle East and North Africa is a vast region, the majority of which is Arab-Muslim, in which a number of conflicts are unresolved and where stability and security are under threat, while noting that it is also has the most extensive energy sources in the world;
- (ii) Noting that in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa almost 40% of the population is under the age of 16 and does not have access to a proper education; that power remains in the hands of an unelected elite which also controls the economy; that the countries in question are suffering from a lack of democracy and transparency, economic stagnation, poverty, unemployment, inequality and injustice all of which are conducive to terrorism;
- (iii) Noting that recent developments have resulted in a change of mindset and the increased attraction of extremist groups which exploit religion and manipulate thinking while having recourse to terrorism to pursue their goals;
- (iv) Aware that since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in particular, the Western world has come to understand that far greater efforts need to be made at all levels to improve communication and cooperation with the Arab and Muslim world and to promote political, economic and social reform in the regions concerned;
- (v) Noting, however, that the governments of most of the countries concerned now seem to have realised that reforms are necessary in order to meet the needs of their citizens and respond to changes in society with a view to ensuring peace and stability in the region, but that the reform process which has started is highly inadequate;
- (vi) Stressing that in recent years and as part of its Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the European Union has embarked on comprehensive programmes and concluded specific agreements with countries of the Middle East and North Africa to help them guarantee peace, stability and prosperity for their peoples;
- (vii) Noting that the action plans which the EU is drawing up with Middle Eastern countries as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy contain a set of conditions that must be met by the country concerned in order to make further progress, but also aware that in the past the EU has not always been strict enough with partners which have not met certain conditions;
- (viii) Aware that the EU member states are sceptical about the likelihood of all-encompassing plans leading to the establishment of a new order in the Middle East and North Africa, and that they prefer cooperation agreements and complementary activities on a bilateral and multilateral level, tailored to the needs and capabilities of each partner or group of partners;
- (ix) Taking account of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI) launched by the United States at the G-8 Summit in June 2004 with the aim of promoting economic, political and social liberalisation in a large number of Muslim countries;
- (x) Considering that the G-8 initiative supports the regional reforms proposed by independent intellectuals, civil society and governments and that they are superimposed on EU initiatives or are complementary to them, while aware that achieving these reforms in the Middle East will require an overall long-term and sustained commitment;
- (xi) Considering that if the West wishes to pursue a strategy of far-reaching reforms to help promote democratic change in the Broader Middle East and North Africa, the way to go about achieving that objective is to engage in dialogue, partnership and cooperation;

²¹ Adopted by the Assembly on 15 June 2005 at the 5th sitting.

²² Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled on behalf of the Political Committee by Josette Durrieu, Rapporteur (France, Socialist Group), Document 1894.

- (xii) Considering that the West must in the first instance step up its efforts to help resolve the region's major geopolitical conflicts and crises – in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the problem of instability in Iraq and Lebanon, the nuclear threat from Iran, the isolation of Syria and the precarious situation in Afghanistan – and that in order to create a secure and stable environment it is necessary to establish a system of mutual protection and cooperative security;
- (xiii) Aware that if the European Union and the United States are serious about implementing their policies for the purpose of stimulating reform in the Broader Middle East and North Africa, they will have to strike a balance between their relations with authoritarian regimes in the region on the one hand and opposition reform movements on the other hand;
- (xiv) Considering that “freedom”, as propagated by new Western initiatives and especially the United States initiative, includes not only civil and political liberties and therefore freedom from oppression, but also individual freedom and thus deliverance from anything that constitutes human subjugation and is incompatible with human dignity such as poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance, torture, the death sentence and a lack of work;
- (xv) Considering that in the Arab world such freedom is threatened by undemocratic regimes which may sometimes find support in tribal culture and in ancestral or religious traditions;
- (xvi) Considering that, with all the respect due to Islam, certain interpretations of Koranic law cannot be the lasting pretext for the oppression of women and non-respect of their individual and social freedom, and that the deprivation of recognised rights of the individual and citizen, and of sexual equality in particular, is contrary to the democratic process;
- (xvii) Considering that in their efforts to engage in dialogue and partnership with a view to appropriate and acceptable reforms in the Broader Middle East and North Africa, both the United States and the European Union must take into account the place of Islam as a religion, a political force and a social force, and recognise that there is no inherent contradiction between Islam and democracy;
- (xviii) Considering that in a democratic State religious beliefs and traditions may be a source of legislation provided they are not incompatible with the measures that are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
- (xix) Disagreeing with the categorical statement by some regimes in the region according to which democratisation will bring radical Islamists to power, but considering that in an environment where freedom of speech, association and assembly are heavily restricted, Islamist movements enjoy the important advantage of being the only groups able to organise and express themselves in mosques and other religious institutions;
- (xx) Taking note of the progress made in Iraq where the forthcoming adoption of a Constitution will pave the way for the establishment of a democratically elected parliament to which the government will be accountable;
- (xxi) Welcoming the fact that free elections will shortly be held in Lebanon following the withdrawal of the Syrians, which should be complete;
- (xxii) Considering it essential in the interests of future peace and stability in Iraq for the transitional government, with the help of the United States and the international community, to restore law and order, re-establish security and control terrorism;
- (xxiii) Expressing the hope that the Iraqi economy will pick up and that the Constitution that is to be drawn up will give the country the most appropriate institutional framework and will accord every respect to ethnic and religious groups on the territory of Iraq;
- (xxiv) Considering that the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now an absolute priority and that it cannot be the result of a unilateral action on the part of Israel but that it must be achieved by a renewed initiative from the Quartet on the basis of the roadmap;

- (xxv) Considering that the United States, the European Union and the Arab League states which have already taken initiatives (the Saudi Arabia Plan – Beirut 2002) together have the capacity to achieve common objectives for the region, which should rest on three pillars, namely, security, stability and prosperity;
- (xxvi) Considering that in the immediate term the mutual ceasefire agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh must be complied with and violence kept under control; that terrorist acts against the civil population must cease; that Israel is committed to withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and certain settlements in the West Bank; that Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank should be opened to allow access to cultivated land and water sources; that prisoners must be freed when terrorist acts have ceased; and that the Palestinian Authority must continue to prove that it will not tolerate terrorist acts;
- (xxvii) Considering that the Gaza Strip should be linked to the West Bank by a secure passage and that the administrative reorganisation of this area and its economic activity will not be viable unless access to the sea is assured and the port and airport in Gaza are free and operational;
- (xxviii) Considering that peace between Israel and Palestine in this region will not be possible without a specific, comprehensive and lasting settlement that builds on all the various earlier commitments, namely: Israel's right of existence, the creation of a viable Palestinian State in one area lying within the 1967 confines and with East Jerusalem as its capital; the end of illegal settlements and the gradual dismantling of those settlements and the separation walls in the West Bank; the principle of the right of return for the refugees or financial compensation;
- (xxix) Considering that the international community should take the initiative to organise an international conference in order to plan for phase 2 (the transition phase involving the creation of a Palestinian State with provisional borders) and then phase 3 (leading to a final agreement putting an end to the conflict) of the roadmap;
- (xxx) Considering that lasting peace and stability in the region and the world as a whole depend on a solution to the existence of weapons of mass destruction, and in particular of Israel's nuclear weapons, and mindful of the disturbing possibility that Iran might possess such weapons in the near future;
- (xxxi) Considering that it will never be possible to draw up rules to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction if a policy of double standards is applied, and that it is preferable to continue with negotiations to persuade Iran to put a stop once and for all to its uranium enrichment activities and to other nuclear activities liable to lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons;
- (xxxii) Considering that under these circumstances and in the interest of a lasting peace in the region, it is necessary to envisage the full denuclearisation of the area by decreeing that the Middle East is a zone free of weapons of mass destruction;
- (xxxiii) Considering that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is unfair and should be revised so as to put an end to a selective approach and to varying degrees of stringency according to the country concerned, and that a new definition of nuclear proliferation is necessary to draw a distinction between civil and military nuclear programmes, the various technologies, fissile material, and legal and illegal traffic;
- (xxxiv) Considering the danger inherent in strikes against nuclear sites in Iran if the negotiations being conducted by France, Germany and the United Kingdom were to fail, unless the UN Security Council were to find a solution to this problem;
- (xxxv) Considering that it is in the interests of peace in the region not to isolate Syria, a "country on the axis of evil", which is being threatened by the United States;
- (xxxvi) Considering finally that the fight against corruption, organised crime, fundamentalism and terrorism is part of the same combat to ensure stability in the region, and that the disarmament of radical Islamic movements and their integration in the political process should be an objective of immediate priority,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE EUROPEAN UNION:

As regards the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East

1. To pursue dialogue, cooperation and the development of economic and trade relations in partnership and complementarity with the United States and the specific initiatives undertaken by the G-8 in the Arab-Muslim region in order to prevent a clash between civilisations;
2. To continue its specific financial transfers whose aim is to improve the situation of the populations; to accompany economic and social progress and to develop education, especially for girls;
3. To promote social and economic reforms and to initiate the process of democratisation of the states and regimes in the region;
4. To participate in the full emancipation of women and the repeal of the laws which subjugate them, especially in certain countries;
5. To improve control over the use of donated funds and to assess regularly the results of the programmes undertaken, which should lead to more security, stability and prosperity;

As regards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

6. To take a fresh initiative within the Quartet and possibly to extend it to Egypt and Jordan;
7. To decide to hold an international conference in order to move on to phases 2 and 3 of the roadmap and arrive at a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the conflict;
8. To ensure that the organisations and states concerned implement the agreement that is concluded and decide in particular to denuclearise the region and guarantee its security, perhaps by establishing an international force there;

As regards the other threats in the Middle East

9. To actively pursue negotiations with Iran with a view to halting the development of nuclear facilities which may have a military application;
10. To work for a revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is no longer fair and requires a new definition of proliferation and a distinction to be drawn between civil and military nuclear programmes;
11. To prevent Syria from being isolated as this will do nothing to promote either peace or stability in the region;
12. To take steps to achieve the disarmament of radical Islamic groups and their integration in the political process.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL²³
to Recommendation 765

The Council thanks the Assembly for its interesting recommendations regarding a web of political initiatives aimed at creating or further developing the conditions for peace, stability, and social and economic development in the Mediterranean basin as well as in the Middle East.

The Council wishes to draw Parliamentarians' attention to recent initiatives taken in this respect. On 11 April 2005, a EuroMed Senior Officials meeting was held on ESDP. It confirmed the interest of the Mediterranean partners of the European Union in the way ESDP is being developed and in its achievements. The meeting was an opportunity for a first exchange of views on a concrete proposal by the European Union to strengthen its cooperation with the Mediterranean countries in security and defence matters. More visibility will be given to this cooperation through the implementation of an annual action plan. For its part, the European Union Institute for Security Studies devoted a seminar on 10 May 2005 to the prospects for dialogue on security and defence matters under the Barcelona process, the conclusions of which highlighted a number of possibilities for practical cooperation.

The European Union has manifested its willingness to support the Palestinian Authority in developing a modern, efficient and responsible police force, providing support for operational priorities and long-term reform. To that end, an EU Coordinating support office for the Palestinian Police (EU COPPS) has been set up within the framework of the office of the European Union Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process.

²³ Reply communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 8 November 2005.

RECOMMENDATION 766²⁴***on arms control and non-proliferation: verification by satellite²⁵***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that it was only as of 1980, at the time of the Iran-Iraq war, that proliferation once again became a major international issue, when the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), chemical weapons in this instance, gave new impetus to the fight against proliferation;
- (ii) Recalling that Iraq – which, in addition to building up an arsenal of chemical weapons had engaged in a ballistic missile programme based on Scud missiles – was the central factor in those anti-proliferation efforts, and stressing that it had also shown the limitations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by launching a particularly advanced nuclear programme;
- (iii) Recalling also that the A.Q. Khan network – named after the Pakistani scientist considered to be the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb – although officially dismantled by the Pakistani authorities under pressure from the United States, would seem to be a veritable international grouping of proliferating states;
- (iv) Stressing that North Korea continues to be one of the most worrying cases as regards ballistic and nuclear proliferation;
- (v) Noting furthermore that the Iran crisis continues to unfold and that participation – with the EU Council’s approval – by three European states (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) in the negotiations on nuclear weapons proliferation has proved to be symbolic of Europe’s growing involvement in arms control and non-proliferation issues;
- (vi) Noting that, as a consequence, arms control and non-proliferation have become key objectives of the European Union which, in order to fulfil its ambition of becoming a major global force, has drawn up a Security Strategy and a Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction;
- (vii) Taking the view that the European Union must for that purpose acquire means of verification in order to ensure compliance with the treaties, as well as in the interests of its own security;
- (viii) Noting that satellite means are perfectly legal, since they do not violate the airspace of the country being observed, and that their ever-greater precision and growing numbers in orbit allow satellite images of acceptable quality to be produced of any spot in the world in reasonable timeframes;
- (ix) Taking the view that the major developments these past few years in the field of European space activities – such as the Galileo programme, the increasingly close ties between the EU and the European Space Agency (ESA) and the EU White Paper on space setting out an action plan for implementing a European space policy – illustrate the EU’s efforts to become a key player in this area;
- (x) Stressing that although Europe, through ESA, has been present in the space sector for some considerable time, European cooperation in this area has been confined to scientific research, while observation for military purposes has been a matter for individual member states, France in particular, which so far is the only country – in cooperation with Belgium, Italy, Spain and soon Greece – to have developed military observation satellites (Helios);
- (xi) Noting that the next generation of European observation satellites will be produced on a purely national basis, even though cooperation among states has been strengthened to allow those systems to function in a complementary fashion;

²⁴ Adopted by the Assembly on 15 June 2005 at the 5th sitting.

²⁵ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee by Jean-Guy Branger, Rapporteur (France, Federated Group), Document 1902.

- (xii) Welcoming in that respect Germany's SAR-Lupe and TerraSAR programmes as well as the Franco-Italian cooperation initiative based on France's Pleiades programme and Italy's Cosmo-SkyMed programme;
- (xiii) Recalling furthermore the five types of threat identified by the European Security Strategy: terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- (xiv) Noting that the European Defence Agency (EDA) was set up in response to the need to pool capabilities and that the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was launched in order to identify capability shortfalls and propose short- and medium-term solutions to remedy them;
- (xv) Noting furthermore that the creation within the ECAP framework of a Space Group tasked with improving capabilities in the short term, developing them in the medium and long term and drawing up an operational concept and doctrine is of particular strategic interest for Europe;
- (xvi) Considering that the inclusion of space-based assets in the ESDP guarantees a degree of strategic independence by providing continuous access to information;
- (xvii) Stressing that satellite images are a crucial tool for the prevention of WMD proliferation and the verification of international treaties and that their interpretation is now the responsibility of the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC);
- (xviii) Recalling that the EUSC provides support for Petersberg missions, general security, maritime and environmental surveillance missions and activities in the area of treaty monitoring, arms control and non-proliferation;
- (xix) Noting, however, that although the EUSC provides information that is of undeniable strategic relevance, it does not for the moment offer a tactical intelligence capability, and that therefore, despite now being an integral part of the ESDP and involved throughout the decision-making process, its action will remain limited for as long as the European Union does not possess its own satellite capabilities;
- (xx) Considering that from this perspective the ESA-Commission joint GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) initiative will strengthen the EUSC's image acquisition capacities and could therefore be the first step towards the creation one day of a European intelligence agency;
- (xxi) Stressing that the aim of the GMES initiative is to group together all European earth observation activities;
- (xxii) Considering that the Commission's interest in using the GMES system in support of the CFSP makes it necessary to clarify the respective roles of the Council and Commission in this area in order to avoid the duplication and tension that currently exists between the EUSC, which is answerable to the Council, and the Joint Research Centre (JRC), which is answerable to the Commission;
- (xxiii) Considering that the Common Operational Requirements (known by their French acronym BOC) are the forerunners for a new European space cooperation architecture, possibly with a variable geometry;
- (xxiv) Recalling furthermore the decision of the WEU Ministerial Council in 1995 to conduct a study in order to evaluate the possibilities for the participation, at the time, of WEU in a multilateral space observation programme,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU MEMBER STATES AS MEMBERS OF THE EU TO:

1. Take up once again the idea put forward by the WEU Ministerial Council in 1995 and take the necessary steps for launching a genuine European military space observation programme;
2. Ensure that the European Union, through the European Defence Agency, groups together all those efforts by taking account of the need to:

- establish a European standard for the construction of observation satellites by encouraging European or intergovernmental initiatives such as GMES and the Common Operating Requirements (BOC);
 - give the EU Satellite Centre the necessary means to implement the ESDP by:
 - (a) giving it access to both the commercial and non-commercial images of the EU member states;
 - (b) allowing it to participate in the programming of European observation satellites;
 - (c) enabling it in the future to acquire a tactical capability to support Petersberg missions;
3. Allocate sufficient funds to the framing of a genuine European space policy, in order to avoid being dependent in this sensitive area on governments or companies outside the Union;
 4. Offer European companies outlets for technological innovation in the space sector;
 5. Strengthen ties between the EU and ESA with a view to establishing a link between the EDA and the ESA Security Office;
 6. Make use of permanent structured cooperation in the space field on the model of the Common Operating Requirements (BOC) or of ESA's optional programmes;
 7. Give preference to the capacities of the Kourou Space Centre in Guiana for launching European satellites.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL²⁶
to Recommendation 766

The Council thanks the Assembly for its timely and innovative recommendations.

As underlined in its reply to Recommendation 755, the European Union now benefits from a sound basis for further work on the role of space applications in the ESDP framework. The initial road map will allow the effective implementation of the various stages identified so far. Inter-pillar exchanges of information have taken place to ensure that security and defence aspects are taken into account in the development of the European space programme. Cooperative links between the European Space Agency (ESA), the European Defence Agency (EDA), and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) will provide further impetus to achieve effective synergies where required.

²⁶ Reply communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 8 November 2005.

