DOCUMENT A/1919

7 December 2005

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The European Union in the Balkans:Althea and other operations

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Document A/1919

7 December 2005

The European Union in the Balkans:
Althea and other operations

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by João Mota Amaral, Rapporteur (Portugal, Federated Group)

^{____________________}

¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 9 November 2005.

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RECOMMENDATION 773¹

on the European Union in the Balkans: Althea and other operations

(i) Recognising the important role of the European Union in stabilising Bosnia and Herzegovina and integrating that country into the Euro-Atlantic community of democratic nations;

(ii) Welcoming the European Council Decision of 12 July 2004 to launch Operation Althea whose main objectives are:

(iii) Welcoming good cooperation between EU and NATO forces under the terms set out in the Berlin plus agreements which facilitated mission transfer from NATO's SFOR to EUFOR (now in charge of Operation Althea);

(iv) Concerned about the significant number of institutional, political and economic questions that remain to be resolved in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(v) Underlining the important role of the UN/EU High Representative, Lord Ashdown, in helping to take forward the political process in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(vi) Taking into account Althea's success in the first 11 months of its operation, particularly in harvesting a significant amount of weapons, aiding the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the capture of indicted war criminals and contributing to the fight against organised crime and corruption;

(vii) Welcoming effective cooperation between the Althea mission and the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM);

(viii) Welcoming the agreement reached on police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the forthcoming Stability and Association Agreement with the EU;

(ix) Considering that political and economic progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina is primarily the responsibility of the democratic bodies in and the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they cannot rely solely on EU initiatives such as Operation Althea,

1. Continue their support for Althea, providing it with the necessary human and material assets to accomplish its mandate;
2. Support EU and NATO initiatives to cooperate with the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in reforming the security and defence sectors in that country;
3. Support EU police and European gendarmerie capabilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
4. Step up efforts to include Bosnia and Herzegovina in the NATO Partnership for Peace programme;
5. Increase political and economic assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkan region with a view to their integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic community of democratic nations;
6. Take account of the lessons learned from Operation Althea to further develop EU operational capabilities and cooperation on crisis management between the EU and NATO;
7. Intensify cooperation between Operation Althea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in order to secure the arrest of war criminals on the run.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by João Mota Amaral, Rapporteur (Portugal, Federated Group)

1. The decision to create a European Union peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) stems from a series of earlier decisions which culminated in Operation Althea. Following the end of hostilities and the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) on 14 December 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, NATO was given a mandate to implement the military aspects of this agreement. This began with the Implementation Force (IFOR) which subsequently evolved into SFOR (Operation Joint Guard/Operation Joint Forge) a year later under UN Security Council Resolution 1088 (12 December 1996). The decision to wind up SFOR was announced at the NATO Istanbul Summit on 28 June 2004. At the same time it was announced that the EU was being readied to supply a new mission to BiH. The successful work done by SFOR in the country provided a model and the basis for what was later to become the Althea mission.
2. In ancient Greek mythology Althea is known as the goddess of healing and it is a fitting name to give to an operation whose primary aim is to assist in the healing process in BiH and among its ethnic populations. The initial signs of a move towards an EU operation in the Balkans − and specifically BiH − were given at the EU Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 where it was announced that "the future of the Western Balkans, of which Bosnia and Herzegovina is both a central and significant part, lies within the European Union"².
3. The creation of an EU military operation in BiH to take over from NATO forces was given the green light by the United Nations in Security Council Resolution 1551³, adopted unanimously on 9 July 2004. The resolution welcomed the EU's intention to launch a mission in BiH. Subsequently, the European Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004⁴ approved a military operation in BiH in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
4. Following the decision outlined above, the EU decided to launch the military operation in BiH on 2 December 2004, a date which was also established as the date of the transfer of authority from NATO to the EU. It was also decided to deploy a robust force (EUFOR) of the same size as SFOR (7 000 troops). It was to have a Chapter VII⁵ mission to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton/ Paris Agreement.
5. Althea is an operation that falls under the Berlin plus agreements⁶ which provide for operational cooperation between the EU and NATO. Althea took over from NATO's IFOR and its successor SFOR operations and cooperation arrangements between the two organisations ensured a smooth and seamless transition, thus avoiding duplication and building on an existing base of knowledge and expertise.
6. The primary objectives of Operation Althea are:

7. On a wider scale, ranging from short-term to long-term objectives, the EU announced that the military operation in BiH should achieve the following:

8. It should be noted that one of the key supporting tasks of the EU-led force will be to provide support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and relevant authorities, including the detention of Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs).
9. Operation Althea follows in the footsteps not only of NATO's SFOR operation, which it succeeds, but also of a number of initiatives and missions in the Balkans during the 1990s under the auspices of WEU⁹. These missions were not only vital to the organisation's development of its operational structures but also paved the way for future missions in the Balkans and led to the acquisition of an invaluable level of knowledge and expertise.

10. Operation Althea is supported by approximately 7 000 troops. To date, 33 member nations are contributing troops of which 22 are EU member states and 11 are non-EU Troop Contributing Nations¹⁰.
11. BiH is currently divided into three military areas each with a Multinational Task Force:

12. In addition, an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) is based in Sarajevo with about 500 personnel. Its operations cover the entire country. A remaining 1 000 theatre troops are based in a number of locations in BiH and provide services to all the abovementioned units.
13. To date, EUFOR troops have been active in three major operations in the country:

14. In his second quarterly report¹² to the United Nations and to the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy described the activities being carried out under Operation Althea, together with a number of developments. The report includes the following chapters:

15. Regarding the SAP, considerable progress has been made on a number of the 16 priorities¹³ outlined by the European Commission Feasibility Study. Another important point is that cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) continues to be a key condition.
16. As far as EUFOR's activities are concerned, the quarterly report focuses on a number of topics, including patrols, to demonstrate EUFOR's presence in sensitive and remote areas. This task includes liaison and observation activities as well as collecting illegal weapons, as demonstrated by Operation Free Entrance. More specifically, the liaison activities are mainly conducted with a view to increasing cooperation and support with local police and other agencies such as the State Border Service (SBS) and the Indirect Taxation Authority. Cooperation with the EU Special Representative in BiH (EUSR), the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and the European Commission Delegation is also important. Among additional activities the IPU is increasingly assisting the SBS and helping it prevent the unlawful entry into the country of people and goods, which leads to illegal smuggling and a growth in criminal activities.
17. Since its inception the EUFOR's combined efforts have led to a synergised operation between military, police and the economic lines of operation. Furthermore, troop visibility across the country has contributed to the objectives of both the EUPM and the OHR Mission Implementation Plan in increasing public awareness. The quarterly report also states that EUFOR has also forged close working relations with national and international agencies. High-level meetings have been held between EUFOR, EUPM the EU Customs and Financial Assistance Office (CAFAO) and OHR Personnel and with security-related organisations (such as the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the SBS). These meetings have primarily focused on crime issues as well as the conduct of future military operations.
18. As EUFOR took over from NATO forces, it is carrying out the same missions and activities. In fact it can be said that since EUFOR is the same size, has the same structure and deploys the same assets on the ground, it is virtually identical to SFOR.
19. The latest quarterly report released on 4 October 2005 and covering the period 1 June to 15 September 2005 states that the political and military situation has remained stable. Also worthy of note are the following¹⁴:

20. The EUPM, the EU's first crisis-management operation under the European Security and Defence Policy, was launched on 1 January 2003¹⁵ with a three-year mandate. It follows on from the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF). Although the EUPM does not have an executive mandate or perform operational duties, its principal aim is to achieve progress in the establishment of sustainable multi-ethnic policing arrangements.¹⁶ Policing proper is the responsibility of the BiH authorities and is carried out in accordance with European and international practices. In addition, the EUPM has been planned in such a way as to work alongside the BiH police force. It monitors and advises on all aspects of policing activities the most important of which include:

21. The EUPM's mission objectives fall into four distinct categories, each with its own set of criteria:¹⁷

22. EUPM personnel are currently operational in a number of locations in BiH including the Ministry of Security (MoS), the airport, SBS headquarters/field offices/training school, the Ministry of the Interior, police stations and police academies. Their presence in the country's "central nervous system" ensures not only the full cooperation of the local authorities but also a level of monitoring, inspections and advice which will undoubtedly have a profound influence on the country's future administration. Furthermore, the EUPM's increasing cooperation with the Althea mission ensures that the EU's role in BiH will continue after the EUPM mandate comes to an end.
23. To date, all the EU member states have contributed personnel to the EUPM (either police officers or international civilians). In addition, the following countries have also provided personnel: Bulgaria, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Romania, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine¹⁸.

24. The EU has always striven to improve its relations with its neighbours. The Balkan region is no exception. As a multi-ethnic and multicultural region which has experienced vast political and economic upheaval over a relatively short period of time, several of its nations are today struggling to keep up with the fast pace of developments in the West and with the expectations of its neighbours. this has given rise to disparity, which in turn leads to instability on the EU's borders. This instability can engender a number of negative factors such as organised crime and, more importantly, regional tensions which lead to terrorism and nationalist sentiment − a growing problem in a period characterised by a fragile security environment.
25. The EU's longstanding commitment to the Balkans over the years has gone through a number of stages, all designed to bring stability to the region. The Union's, as well as the international community's main objectives for the Balkans, were first stated in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe¹⁹:

0. these objectives were subsequently reaffirmed, in particular during the June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council where the governments placed emphasis on their will to aid the region's progress towards EU accession and to enhance all aid policies²⁰.
26. To date the EU has focused primarily on financial aid and a military/peacekeeping presence as well as on bilateral efforts through its two cornerstone policies for the region: the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and the CARDS Assistance Programme to the Western Balkans 2002-2006²¹, both designed to encourage and support domestic reform processes. The EU is by far the largest donor to the Balkans: between 1991 and 2002 it provided over 6.1 billion euros through its numerous aid programmes.
27. This commitment is not seen merely as a temporary solution. With the recent completion of the enlargement process and with Romania and Bulgaria well on the way to joining the Union, the EU's commitment and obligation to the Balkans is now a reality for the long term. Through the SAP and CARDS the EU is in fact giving the Balkan countries the chance, by means of aid, trade preferences, technical advice and contractual relations, not only to realise their own hopes of peace, stability and prosperity but also to be integrated eventually in the EU's structures. Some states (Albania, BiH, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have been enjoying duty-free and unlimited access to EU markets since December 2000. The next step for many of these countries, particularly those that have made significant political and economic progress is a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Croatia and FYROM have already signed such agreements). These "tailor-made" contractual relationships target each state individually and aim to further the progress already made.
28. Regarding BiH in particular, EU policy is dominated by two major concerns; consolidating peace and stability in the country (thus achieving reconciliation among the three ethnic communities) and making BiH ready for future EU accession. A number of steps have been taken to achieve these goals:

29. Although BiH is reported to have made great progress in the recent past, it still does not fulfil EU expectations and has failed to fully comply with the list of conditionality - containing the 16 priorities outlined in the EC Feasibility Study - in order for EU accession talks to start. On these grounds, admission to accession talks was refused on 19 May 2005.²³
30. Much of the responsibility for the country's progress lies with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) at present led by Lord Paddy Ashdown. The OHR was created within the Dayton Peace Agreement framework. It is currently the chief civilian peace implementation institution in BiH; it oversees the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement and coordinates the activities of civilian organisations and agencies operating in the field. The OHR works on behalf of the international community engaged in the Bosnian peace-process. The High Representative's mandate, as set out in Annex 10 to the Dayton Peace Agreement, designates him as the "final authority in theatre"²⁴ regarding the interpretation of the agreement on civilian aspects. He is nominated by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and this nomination is approved by the UN Security Council. The decision-making powers of the OHR were extended during a PIC meeting in Bonn on 9-10 December 1997. Now known as the "Bonn Powers" they authorise active involvement - not mere supervision - in order to resolve difficulties. In particular, Chapter XI part 2 of the PIC Bonn Conclusions states²⁵:

31. However, the presence and the powers of the OHR are often seen as a double-edged sword for BiH and progress in the country. On the one hand, the Office has pushed for the implementation of crucial reforms and its efforts have led to the arrest of war criminals. On the other, however, its lack of democratic legitimacy has been strongly criticised by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe²⁶, which has stated that its role must be redefined. In addition, the OHR's strong presence and involvement has to some extent hindered the political and democratic development of BiH.
32. Another factor posing problems for the country's political and economic development is the high degree of decentralisation in its political system. At the present time two regional governments co-exist, each with an equal number of ministries. In addition, BiH still has no democratically approved constitution and therefore relies on the one defined by the Dayton Peace Accords. Addressing such problems is crucial as they are not only preventing BiH from developing further and moving closer to Western standards but are also preventing the country from establishing its own character and gaining international recognition.

33. Although a considerable amount of work and progress has been done in the Balkans in recent years with the active aid of the international community, it should be stressed that the situation is far from what can be described as "normal". There are still very real pockets of tension and full inter-ethnic reconciliation is likely to remain problematic for a long time to come. The transfer of responsibility from SFOR to EUFOR and the greater active involvement by the European Union (both as a force and a political and economic power) in the region can be viewed as a positive step in the direction of handing more responsibility to the forces of Balkan and neighbouring countries, with the ultimate goal being the entry of the Balkan countries into the EU.
34. To outline briefly the current problems in the region surrounding BiH: there is still a great deal of concern about ethnic tensions in Kosovo - a recent illustration of this was the rioting in 2004 when clashes between ethnic Serbs and Albanians left 19 dead. There are also tensions between ethnic Albanians and Macedonian nationalists in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Additionally, FYROM is involved in a dispute with Greece over its name: "Macedonia" which Greece fears implies territorial ambitions towards the northern Greek region of Macedonia. Relations between Slovenia and Croatia over common border issues are also uneasy and there is a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the union between Serbia and Montenegro, regarded as politically unstable. This is a problem which will need to be addressed, probably through a referendum. Lastly, high levels of corruption and the prevalence and predominance of organised crime remains a common feature of concern in all the countries of the region.
35. It is upon these problems that the international community, and particularly the EU, should bring their political and economic influence to bear. Bringing peace and stability to the region is currently the primary objective and this cannot be achieved without a "stability" force on the ground.
36. The ongoing success of the Althea mission and its efficiency in running its operations and tasks has provided a number of valuable lessons, the most obvious being that the EU can successfully deploy and manage forces away from its territory - Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo being another prime example. Althea also exemplifies effective cooperation between the EU and NATO and the EU's ability to field a major force that can take over missions and provide continuity. It shows the EU's willingness to evolve and begin to respond to the serious challenges of our time on a different level, one that not only involves a diplomatic presence at the negotiations table but also, and perhaps more to the point, a stronger military presence.
37. A central and still ever present question, however, is how long military operations will be needed, and whether EUFOR and Althea's role is now to be viewed as temporary or permanent. Althea is a mission that aims to create a stable environment. Its forces and personnel cooperate on both military and political levels with local and international forces and with structures in the country to assist BiH evolve from a volatile and fragile state to a fully independent one. However, the foreign forces and the idea of their permanence have often been criticised for creating an environment within which local forces are not given the chance to develop and evolve. If these fears are borne out, the mission those forces set out to achieve is in fact being hindered by their very presence. Possible solutions could be (a) gradually to engage in a level of cooperation with local forces that allows more power and responsibility to be handed over to the latter, always provided of course that this is within their capabilities, and (b) to begin envisaging a long-term programme culminating in a gradual withdrawal from BiH.
38. Along those lines, it has recently been reported that Operation Althea may be scaled down by 300-400 personnel by the end of 2006²⁷, reflecting progress made in the country. On 20 October 2005, the European Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, recommended the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement following a decision on police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Specifically, a law passed in the Bosnian Parliament was approved by the parliaments of both Bosnia and Herzegovina's federal bodies: the Republika Srpska Parliament and the Federal Parliament.

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APPENDIX I

EUFOR troop strength and chain of command²⁸

In theatre troops of EU nations		In theatre troops of non-EU nations
AUSTRIA	202	ALBANIA	71
BELGIUM	58	ARGENTINA	2
CZECH REPUBLIC	89	BULGARIA	36
ESTONIA	2	CANADA	85
FINLAND	183	CHILE	20
FRANCE	402	MOROCCO	133
GERMANY	1180	NORWAY	17
GREECE	181	NEW ZEALAND	14
HUNGARY	122	ROMANIA	110
IRELAND	52	SWITZERLAND	25
ITALY	1004	TURKEY	345
LATVIA	3
LITHUANIA	1
LUXEMBURG	1
THE NETHERLANDS	430
POLAND	226
PORTUGAL	231
SLOVAKIA	4
SLOVENIA	153
SPAIN	467
SWEDEN	80
UNITED KINGDOM	727
EU troops subtotal	5798	Non-EU troops subtotal	858
Total number of troops serving in EUFOR: 6 656

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APPENDIX II

Action taken by the European Union in former Yugoslavia: 1990-2001

1. Established in July 1991 under the aegis of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), had a threefold mandate consisting of mediation, observation and reporting. Until 1998, Mission HQ was in Zagreb, Croatia. In the early stages of the conflict, the ECMM's work concentrated on Slovenia and Croatia: its 138 international observers were the eyes and ears of the European Union in the Balkans. Their first achievement was the signing of the Brioni Accords bringing peace to Slovenia.
2. With the spread of the Yugoslav conflict, teams were deployed in Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania. On 22 December 2000, the EU Council adopted a Common Decision transforming the ECMM into the EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission). The EUMM's prime objective is to assist (through its tasks of information gathering and analysis) the effective formulation of European policy in the Western Balkans. The mission is directly answerable to the Secretary-General of the Council/CFSP High Representative. There are still 120 international observers and 75 local staff working in the field and the HQ is now in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. With the intensification of the fighting in Yugoslavia, the Italian WEU Presidency took steps to extend Europe's sphere of action to the Adriatic. Operation Sharp Vigilance was launched with the support of the WEU member states on 16 July 1992 in order to put a stop to violation of the United Nations embargo in the Adriatic. Under UN Security Council Resolution 787, WEU forces were empowered to stop and inspect ships. The surveillance operation in the Adriatic was at that point renamed Sharp Fence. Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 820 enforcement of the sanctions imposed by the international community took the form, as from 15 June 1993, of an air and maritime operation, Sharp Guard, mounted jointly by WEU and NATO. This unified force, under the command of the Italian Admiral Carlo Alberto Vandini, consisted of troops from a number of different countries (Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States). WEU deployed four maritime remote detection aircraft and six patrol boats and issued some 74 000 challenges in under four years.

4. Following a proposal from France, WEU decided in 1993 to monitor the embargo on the Danube in order to assist Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania achieve better surveillance of that area. On 20 May 1993, memorandums of understanding and cooperation for undertaking the task jointly were signed with the three riparian states. This police and customs support operation, which began on 18 June 1993, mobilised some 300 international staff and 11 river patrol boats. Over 400 cases of non compliance were recorded.
5. Both operations were suspended on 24 September 1996 after signature of the Dayton Agreement and the lifting of the embargo by the United Nations Security Council.

6. Mostar, a divided and destroyed city in the heart of Bosnia and Herzegovina, bore the brunt of the interethnic violence that typified the Yugoslav crisis. The European Union, without means or authority to act, asked WEU to provide a police contingent to train local police units to support the EU Administrator in Mostar, Hans Koschnick, and rehabilitate police structures. The police operation began on 23 July 1994 and had as its main objective cooperation over policing between the Croat and Muslim communities. It was coordinated by the WEU Planning Cell.
7. The mission was strengthened by the WEU Council's decision in 1995 to authorise observer members to take part. Contributions by Austria, Finland and Sweden meant that up to 182 officers could be mobilised.
8. Transfer of power to the local authorities took place on 15 October 1996.

9. As part of economic and financial reforms in Albania, early in 1997 the state authorities put an end to the pyramid investment schemes that had facilitated money laundering. The measure fanned the flames of discontent among an already severely impoverished people within a faltering economy. Rioting escalated beyond the control of the government and President Berisha. At Italy's request, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1101 authorising deployment of an armed force to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance over a three-month period. Italy took command of this Multinational Protection Force (MPF) whose objectives were to create a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance, to control Adriatic ports and to stabilise the internal situation.
10. Operation Alba, a "coalition of the willing", was launched in April 1997 with the agreement of the Albanian authorities. Organised outside WEU and NATO structures, the mission involved 7 000 staff from 11 different countries²⁹, under the command of Admiral Guido Venturini. Operation Alba came to an end on 11 August 1997, upon the resignation of President Berisha (on 13 July 1997) and the election of his opponent, Mr Mejdani.
11. While this operation was the first all-European crisis-management operation, it nevertheless appeared to signify failure on the part of the existing European institutions³⁰.

12. The WEU Council, taking account of the lessons learned through the police mission to Mostar, decided, on 2 May 1997, to set up an advisory police mission under WEU auspices in order to stabilise the country. On 24 June, a memorandum of understanding on the division of civil responsibilities between MAPE and the Albanian authorities was signed in Tirana. Apart from its advisory and logistical and police support tasks to the local forces, MAPE undertook a situation evaluation and reported back to the Council.
13. MAPE was very well received by the local authorities and population and in July 1999, following a request from the European Union on the basis of Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union³¹ further plans were drawn up for an enhanced MAPE mission. This consisted of 150 officers from 23 countries³² working with 60 or so Albanian instructors. Over 3 000 police officers were trained at the Tirana and Durres centres (border police, rapid reaction forces or criminal investigation officers). From April 1999, the WEU mission played an important part in the refugee crisis in Kosovo providing support to the Albanian police with refugee reception, registration, supervision and follow-up tasks.
14. Originally envisaged as lasting a year, the MAPE mission was finally terminated on 31 May 2001.

15. At the request of the EU on the basis of Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union, WEU implemented a joint action in the field of mine clearance. Within the framework of the WEU Demining Assistance Mission to Croatia (WEUDAM), which began operations on 10 May 1999, WEU provided advice, technical expertise and training support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC).
16. Sweden acted as lead nation for this nine-strong mission funded by the EU. The number of observers (subsequently reduced to four) meant demining could be carried out with maximum efficiency and the million or so mines littering the area detected. The WEUDAM mission terminated on 30 November 2001.

17. In response to a request from the European Union based on Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union, in November 1998 the WEU Satellite Centre embarked on a mission of "general security surveillance" of the Kosovo region. The initial focus of the mission was to gather information for the EU as well as for the NATO and OSCE missions
18. Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo has been under UNMIK provisional administration since 1999. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo works with the EU and the OSCE to guarantee the territorial integrity of this province of the former Yugoslav Republic. After 78 days of conflict from March to June 1999, NATO deployed forces on the ground in support of the efforts of the international community in Kosovo.

19. Established by decision of the EU Council on 11 March 2002³³ the European Union Police Mission helps train Bosnian police forces. It was approved under UN Security Council Resolution 1396. Its current mandate runs from January 2003 to December 2005.
20. The EUPM is intended to establish sustainable and effective policing arrangements in compliance with the objectives laid down in the Dayton Agreement. The force should in due course operate under Bosnian command. The mission comprises 887 people (489 of them international police officers) and has been led, since 1 March 2004, by Irish Assistant Commissioner Kevin Carty. The mission consists of seven main programmes: crime police, criminal justice, police administration, internal affairs, public order, a State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and a border control service.

21. In early 2001, clashes increasingly took place between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonian authorities and armed Albanian groups. In order to avoid further conflict developing in the Balkans, the EU and NATO exerted pressure on the government to negotiate with the Albanian side and, through the introduction of general legislation, bring an end to problems concerning the Albanian minority in the country. The Ohrid Framework Agreement of 13 August 2001 thus envisaged constitutional amendments and legislative reform to improve the status of the Albanian community, while maintaining the country's territorial integrity. The multi-ethnic character of Macedonian society was explicitly recognised.
22. NATO conducted three successive operations to support the stabilisation process in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony. On 17 January 2003, President Boris Trajkovski officially invited the EU to take over command of the last of these. Following Council authorisation of a joint action³⁴, the first exclusively European military operation, known as Concordia, was launched. Here, the Berlin plus arrangements were applied for the first time. Political control and strategic direction of Concordia were provided by the Political and Security Committee. The 400-strong mission was given a six-month mandate and subsequently extended beyond 29 July 2003 to 15 December 2003.
23. When operation Concordia came to an end, the European Union, launched a police operation, Proxima, at the request of the Macedonian authorities. Its remit was to advise the local police force and consolidate public order. Some 170 people from 19 different countries took part in this mission, headquartered in Skopje.

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APPENDIX III

A brief history of the Yugoslav Crisis

1. The disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation began in 1980 with the death of its founding father and President, Josip Broz Tito. At that point, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six Federal Republics possessing a considerable amount of autonomy (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia, the latter including the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina). Six nationalities were also constitutionally recognised (Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians).
2. The country experienced two major and decisive developments during the 1980s: a severe economic crisis, and a growing ethno-nationalism to the detriment of the ideal of the Yugoslav multicultural nation. The rise of nationalism was inevitably encouraged by the economic situation which created a growing regional disparity favouring Croatia and Slovenia.
3. The republics started undertaking changes to their constitutions not provided for in the Yugoslav State's Constitution. Croatia and Slovenia, on one hand, sought to achieve greater political and economic autonomy, aiming to approach the West, whereas Serbia pursued pan-Serbian nationalist goals, starting with the abolition of autonomy in the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.
4. The year 1990 saw the first democratic multiparty elections in Yugoslavia, which brought nationalist leaders clearly to the fore in all of the republics. The same year, Slovenia and Croatia proposed the transformation of Yugoslavia into a loose confederation and announced their determination to become independent should the proposal not be accepted. The Serbian refusal on 15 May 1991 to elect the Croat, Stipe Mesic as head of the Yugoslav Federation, according to the prevailing system of rotation, led to referendums in Croatia and Slovenia on independence, which was widely approved despite the Serbian boycott. On 25 June 1991, these two republics proclaimed their independence.
5. In view of developments in Croatia and Slovenia, and especially after international recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence in January 1992, Macedonia and BiH (Montenegro was the only republic to side with Serbia) faced two options: to follow Croatia's and Slovenia's example and declare independence, or remain in what was left of Yugoslavia and allow Serb domination. This latter option was inconceivable to the non-Serb part of the population and its political leaders. A third prospect for BiH was division of the province between Serbia and Croatia.
6. The situation for BiH was unique, for it was the only Republic whose population was made up of three ethnic communities: Bosnian Muslims (43%), Serbs (31%) and Croats (17%). The populations of the other republics were more homogenous, even though they were all also home to ethnic minorities. Macedonia, on the contrary, had no significant Serb minority and was therefore not in such a volatile position.
7. Initially, the Croats favoured the constitution of a federation of autonomous regions divided along ethnic lines, whereas the Muslims wanted to maintain the republic's integrity as a multi-ethnic country in order to ensure its viability as an economic region. The Serbs, whom both of these options would have put in a minority position, preferred either to stay with BiH as a whole in what was left of Yugoslavia or to have all predominantly Serb areas join the Republic of Serbia.
8. The republic had started breaking apart as early as 1991 with the proclamation of several Serb autonomous regions. On 15 October of the same year, when Croat and Muslim parliamentarians voted for independence, the Serbs refused to participate. In response, they organised a referendum the following month in which most of the Bosnian Serbs voted for independence for the autonomous Serb regions. Both declarations of independence remained irrelevant as they lacked international recognition which Croats and Muslims for their part persistently sought to achieve. In order to comply with EC conditions, a referendum was held in February 1992 on the independence of BiH, which Croats and Muslims approved, but which the Serbian population boycotted on the grounds that independence was non-negotiable. Under Radovan Karadzic's leadership, the Serb parliamentarians left the government and founded a counter-parliament in Sarajevo.
9. Negotiations under EC mediation about the constitutional order of the future Bosnia and Herzegovina commenced in March 1992, with the aim of preserving the republic's territorial integrity. The negotiations however failed, whilst tensions grew among the different militia. On 27 March 1992, the Serbs proclaimed their own constitution and merger with Serbia and Montenegro into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and on 6 April 1992 the international community finally recognised BiH as an independent state. The Yugoslav army, in alliance with the Serbs, started their offensives against Muslim and Croat forces two days later.
10. It was not until 1995, following the dramatic events that took place in Srebrenica, that the French and British governments realised that the intervention force under a UN mandate was powerless to restore peace. Together they deployed a rapid reaction force, which launched a ground attack against the Serbs in Bosnia who were laying siege to Sarajevo. In the end the Serb leader, Milosevic, agreed to engage in serious negotiations with the West. These led to the end of the war in November 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. The initial coalition between Croats and Muslims soon dissolved as the Croats sought to enlarge their national territories in line with the Serbs. Their aim was also to reshape the region according to ethnic distribution of the population and thus improve their bargaining power in case of peace negotiations, after the idea of maintaining the country's integrity became more and more unrealistic. The coalition was finally restored in March 1994 with the decision to create a Croat-Muslim Federation. Military superiority was nonetheless with the Serbs, who were supported by the former Yugoslav army and had all its military equipment at their disposal.
11. The international community started different diplomatic and later military activities in an attempt to halt the war. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission which had already started in February 1992 was continuously extended until the end of the war. Furthermore, a grounding order over BiH was given and economic and military embargoes were imposed equally on all parties.
12. In January 1993 the Vance and Owen plan was presented with a view to a future constitution for BiH, which still harboured the idea of "cantonising" the country while maintaining its integrity. However, this was rejected by the Serbs in August of the same year. The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, which included partition as an option, followed.
13. That June, the UN sent 1 100 Blue Helmets to control Sarajevo airport and facilitate humanitarian aid. Their numbers were increased several times and their missions extended. Eventually, on 28 February 1994, the first NATO combat mission began.

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APPENDIX IV

WEU missions in the Balkans

1. The development, since the beginning of the 1990s, of WEU's operational structures is also linked with the initiatives taken in 1987-1988 and 1990-91 to organise WEU military operations outside Europe. The crisis in former Yugoslavia, the embargo-enforcement operations against that country and the planning of a possible peacekeeping mission there were also instrumental in WEU reflections on the need to have its own permanent and efficient operational structures.

2. Meeting in Vianden, Luxembourg on 27 June 1991, the Council of WEU expressed "deep concern at the current turn of events in Yugoslavia". It was consequently decided to create an ad hoc group composed of representatives of foreign affairs and defence ministries to examine possibilities for supporting the action of the observers that the European Community wished to send to the spot, and for protecting the convoys of humanitarian aid.
3. Four options for WEU Intervention were subsequently proposed by the Council's ad hoc group:

4. On 23 September 1991, the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly asked the Council to call upon the United Nations to set up an intervention force to enforce a ceasefire in Yugoslavia, whilst on 18 November 1991, the Council of Ministers, which had been unable to reach agreement on one of the options proposed by the ad hoc group meeting in Bonn, declared that WEU member countries were prepared to participate in operations aimed at creating humanitarian corridors. Shortly afterwards in, December 1991, Recommendation 512 was adopted by the WEU Assembly on "Operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis".
5. The WEU Operation Sharp Vigilance was launched on 16 July 1992 following the decision by the WEU Ministers: 1. "to implement the monitoring at sea operations (...). Surveillance. (...) Such surveillance will be carried out in international waters, in the Ontario Channel and on other points off the Yugoslav coast (...). These WEU operations will be open to the participation of other allies and coordinated in cooperation with NATO. (...)" In 1993 the WEU commenced its embargo-monitoring operation on the Danube and shortly later it was agreed between the WEU and NATO Councils to create a joint operations concept for the monitoring of the maritime embargo.
6. In October 1993 a "Mostar" working group was created to examine the personnel and financial requirements for sending a WEU police unit to Mostar. The police operation officially began on 23 July 1994, with its main task to advise the EU Administrator in Mostar as well as recruit and train local police forces.

7. Following the growing tension in Albania in the first half of 1997, the Standing Committee of the WEU Assembly adopted a recommendation on the Albania crisis and urged the Council to prepare for WEU humanitarian action, peacekeeping and peace-making operations, as well as the evacuation of European nationals. Following the experience gained through the police mission in Mostar; a multinational advisory police element (MAPE) was established under WEU authority, its mandate on 13 May 1997 outlined its primary objectives:

8. MAPE's mandate was extended twice to April 1998, these extensions were accompanied by a long-term programme in which all 28 WEU members states were entitled to participate. The main elements of the programme were:

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¹ Adopted by the Assembly on 7 December 2005 at the 9^th sitting.

² Thessaloniki European Council Summit. http://europa.eu.int

³ UN Security Council Resolution 1551 states: "10. Welcomes the decision of NATO to conclude its current SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of 2004. Further welcomes the EU's intention to launch an EU mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, including a military component, from December 2004". http://www.un.org/

⁴ European Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP states: "(1) The European Council has announced the readiness of the European Union for an ESDP mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), including a military component."

⁵ Chapter VII of the UN Charter regarding "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". http://www.un.org/

⁶ For more details on operational cooperation between the EU and NATO, see also the Defence Committee's report: "Cooperation in the operational area between the EU and NATO - reply to the annual report of the Council", submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Jean-Pierre Kucheida, Rapporteur (France, Socialist Group). Assembly Document 1918.

⁷ EUFOR/Althea website. http://www.euforbih.org

⁸ EUFOR Althea website. http://www.euforbih.org

⁹ See Appendix IV

¹⁰ EUFOR/Althea website. http://www.euforbih.org

¹¹ Arms collected: 208 small arms, 1055 hand grenades, 193 rifle grenades, 8 anti-personnel mines, 76 502 rounds of ammunition, 79 anti-tank rockets and 119 kg of TNT. Source: EUFOR/Althea website.

http://www.euforbih.org

¹² The second Operation Althea - Quarterly Report to the United Nations covers the period 1 March 2005 - 31 May 2005. http://europa.eu.int

¹³ The 16 priorities for BiH as outlined by the EC Feasibility Study are: comply with existing conditionality and international obligations; more effective governance; more effective public administration; European integration; effective legal provisions on human rights protection; effective judiciary; tackling crime, particularly organised crime; asylum and migration; customs and tax reform; budget legislations; budget practice; reliable statistics; comprehensive and consistent trade policy; integrated energy market; developing of BiH single economic space; public broadcasting. http://europa.eu.int.

¹⁴ The third Operation Althea - Quarterly Report to the United Nations covers the period 1 June 2005 - 15 September 2005. http://europa.eu.int

¹⁵ Following the EU Council Joint Action of 11 March 2002 which establishes the EUPM. http://europa.eu.int and http://www.eupm.org. EUPM was also welcomed by the UN in its Security Council Resolution 1362 on 5 March 2002. http://www.un.org

¹⁶ Mission statement: "The European Union Police Mission, supported by the European Commission's institution building programmes, will, as part of a broader Rule of Law approach, aim, in line with the general objectives of Annex 11 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), to establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) ownership in accordance with best European and International practice, thereby raising current BiH police standards." http://www.eupm.org

¹⁷ The EUPM objectives. http://www.eupm.org

¹⁸ For a detailed list please visit http://www.eupm.org

¹⁹ The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was signed in Cologne on 10 June 1999 by the EU, the EC, the Balkan countries, the United Nations, US, Canada, the Russian Federation, Japan, Turkey and the following major European and international Organisations: UNO, UNHCR, NATO, OECD, IMF, IBRD, WEU, EIB, EBRD and also the Royaumont Process, BSEC, CEI, SEECP, SECI. http://www.stabilitypact.org/

²⁰ The EU's relations with South Eastern Europe. http://europa.eu.int

²¹ The EU's relations with South Eastern Europe: The CARDS Assistance Programme to the Western Balkans 2002-2006 identifies four areas of support: integrated border management will be supported to help to tackle cross-border crime, to facilitate trade across borders and to stabilise the border regions themselves; institutional capacity building will help raise awareness of EU policy and laws that the region should increasingly be moving towards; support to democratic stabilisation will help to cement advances on democracy and boost the involvement of civil society in the region's development; support will be provided to help plan the integration of the region's transport, energy and environmental infrastructure into the wider European networks. http://europa.eu.int

²² EU relations with BiH. http://europa.eu.int

²³ EU relations with BiH. http://europa.eu.int

²⁴ See Annex 10 of the General Framework Agreement, available at: http://www.ohr.int

²⁵ The PIC Bonn Conclusions 10 December 1997. http://www.ohr.int

²⁶ Resolution 1384 (2004) states: "12. The Assembly calls on: (...) ii. The international community to: (...) b. envisage a more coherent and specific strategy for transferring responsibilities and gradually withdrawing the OHR. 13. The scope of the OHR is such that, to all intents and purposes, it constitutes the supreme institution vested with power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this connection, the Assembly considers it irreconcilable with democratic principles that the High Representative should be able to take enforceable decisions without being accountable for them or obliged to justify their validity and without there being a legal recourse. The Assembly asks the Venice Commission to determine how far this practice complies with the Council of Europe's basic principles, and in particular with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." http://assembly.coe.int

²⁷ Atlantic News No. 3718, 20 October 2005.

²⁸ EUFOR/Althea website. http://www.euforbih.org

²⁹ Countries taking part in Operation Alba: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey.

³⁰ See Admiral Venturini's address on the occasion of the ceremonies to mark the 50^th Anniversary of the Brussels Treaty.

³¹ Under former Article J.4.2 TEU (Treaty of Maastricht) the Union "requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications".

³² States participating in MAPE in Albania were: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom

³³ Council Joint Action 2002/201/CFSP

³⁴ Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP adopted on 27 January 2003.