Assembly of Western European Union
The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly

FIFTY-FIRST SESSION
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Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Charles Goerens, Rapporteur (Luxembourg, Liberal Group)

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[1] Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 8 November 2005.

RECOMMENDATION 768[1]

on peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach

The Assembly,

(i) Recalling the historical ties between African and European countries and Europe's continuing commitment to promoting peace, security and development on the African continent;

(ii) Considering that the recent increase in attempts by refugees, mainly of Sub-Saharan origin, to reach the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melila is symptomatic of ongoing and serious political, economic and human rights shortcomings in many Sub-Saharan countries, which pose a threat to the lives of many more people than the few who arrive at the EU's borders;

(iii) Recalling the importance of achieving the Millennium Development Goals, but noting the need for Africa as a continent to make more progress in this direction;

(iv) Noting also that although these objectives are ambitious they are also insufficient because even if the number of people living in extreme poverty was reduced by 50% between now and 2015, the remaining number would be unacceptably high;

(v) Welcoming the announcement of the member states of the European Union to raise the percentage of their Gross National Income (GNI) dedicated to development aid to 0.7% by 2015, which should lead to an additional 46 billion euros a year out of which 50% will be allocated to Africa;

(vi) Welcoming also the "*EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development*" adopted by the European Commission on 12 October 2005, which will contribute to an *EU Strategy for Africa* to be adopted by the EU Council in December, and taking the view that such a strategy should be adopted jointly with Africans, preferably following a comprehensive EU-AU summit or a meeting of the EU-AU Troika;

(vii) Stressing that the principles of *peace, security and good governance* which the Commission sets out in its document are fundamental if there is to be sustainable development on the African continent and if work on the Millennium Development Goals is to make real progress ;

(viii) Welcoming also the principles of *equality, partnership and ownership* which the Commission's document sets out for governing EU-African relations, thus reflecting the emergence of democratically elected political leaders and many new political figures who are contributing to negotiated settlements of conflicts and participating in transition governments working for peaceful conflict resolutions, and commending the recent reinforcement of the political pan-African institutions and the willingness of Africans to deal with the problems on their continent themselves;

(ix) Welcoming the contribution by the EU High Representative to the *EU Strategy for Africa*, in which he emphasises the link between security and development and argues that "*measures in the fields of trade, aid and debt relief will need to be supported by peace and security, and governance*";

(x) Welcoming also the initial conclusions drawn by EU Foreign Ministers on an *EU Strategy for Africa* at their meeting in Brussels on 21-22 November 2005, and stressing that these should be strengthened and improved by giving effect to the practical proposals made in this report;

(xi) Noting the ongoing trend in international relations whereby countries in Africa are being encouraged to shoulder more responsibility for conflict management on their continent;

(xii) Taking the view that European governments should not use this as an excuse for slackening their cooperation with African governments in order to resolve conflicts in Africa or for distancing themselves from their responsibility to protect populations in danger of extermination as a result of famine, disease or conflict;

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[1] Adopted by the Assembly on 6 December 2005 at the 7th sitting on the basis of the amended draft recommendation.

(xiii) Noting the reduction in the number of violent conflicts on the African continent since the 1999 peak and welcoming the historic peace agreements concluded for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Sudan (North-South conflict);

(xiv) Noting the cessation of hostilities in Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone but still concerned about the absence of lasting solutions to a number of conflicts in African countries, their negative regional impact and the continuing instability, in particular in the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Eastern region), Guinea, Somalia and Sudan (Darfur and North-East region), which make the presence of peacekeeping forces and/or international mediation necessary;

(xv) Welcoming recent efforts to improve African early warning mechanisms, and taking the view that the reason for unaccounted numbers of victims on the African continent in the past was not a lack of awareness but rather a lack of will to act and that the early warning mechanisms need to be properly linked to political decision-making bodies;

(xvi) Noting that developed countries' financial aid packages are geared more to long-term development or to short-term funding for humanitarian emergencies and that work on new systems to cater for periods leading up to a conflict (prevention phase) or those following conflicts (post-conflict phase) needs to be accelerated;

(xvii) Considering that the EU-funded Africa Peace Facility is a possible model for future EU funding of African-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations;

(xviii) Noting that the Africa Peace Facility is virtually depleted and that its funds have either been spent or are earmarked, and that this means that the EU could be incapable of providing funding for further AU proposals for mediation, observer or peacekeeping operations unless decisions on replenishment and the future funding of African-led peace support operations are taken as a matter of urgency;

(xix) Emphasising that the credibility of an *EU Strategy for Africa* depends on the EU member states making available adequate financial resources for the African continent, and noting that the African Union, for its part, is providing the political capital and human resources that are equally necessary for establishing peace and security in Africa;

(xx) Welcoming the progress that has been made in implementing the EU Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa;

(xxi) Considering that, in a number of cases, conflicts in Africa are influenced by outside economic and military interests;

(xxii) Considering that the unregulated flow of small arms and light weapons, which are produced and traded by countries inside and outside Africa, is contributing to instability in Africa and that wider support for enhanced international regulation is necessary;

(xxiii) Stressing that many countries emerge from conflicts only to relapse into violence soon afterwards and that it is necessary on the one hand to provide a wide range of post-conflict support including disarmament and demobilisation, which would be more productive than offering combatants financial incentives to hand in their weapons, and on the other to find sustainable solutions for the reintegration of former combatants into civil life in an improving economic environment;

(xxiv) Considering that a coherent European strategy for the African continent must include improved access for African exports to the European Union as well as support for a continued increase in intra-African regional trade;

(xxv) Stressing that HIV/AIDS poses a serious threat to African armed forces and seriously undermines the military capabilities of African countries;

African Union

(xxvi) Welcoming the establishment of the African Union and its decision-making bodies as a new institutional form of governance for the African continent, the evolution of doctrine from non-

interference to non-indifference and the inclusion in the AU's guiding principles of the responsibility to protect African citizens from war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;

(xxvii) Agreeing with the EU that the AU is the institutional framework within which it should establish an enhanced EU-Africa partnership, while underlining that the AU is not the EU's sole institutional partner in Africa;

(xxviii) Welcoming the readiness of Africa's own institutions, in particular the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities/Regions, to shoulder more of the burden for dealing with conflicts on the continent;

(xxix) Noting the African Union's capacity constraints, in particular with regard to logistic support and communications equipment, and the fact that it is heavily dependent on outside financial and technical support, as was highlighted by the recent shortcomings of the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS), and stressing that these need to be addressed as a matter of urgency;

(xxx) Welcoming the progress made in setting up the African Standby Force and its five regional components in the belief that the African Union must show strong leadership in coordinating progress at regional level, and noting the AU's stated intention to invite contributions from the EU and other donor countries to upcoming policy formulation workshops;

(xxxi) Taking note of the results of the third session of the Pan-African Parliament and convinced that pan-African interparliamentary cooperation has the potential to promote human rights observance and democracy across the African continent, allow for benchmarking with respect to good governance, transparency and accountability among member states, and contribute to peace and stability;

(xxxii) Noting that Morocco, which is not a member of the AU, must continue to be associated with EU policy towards Africa;

Darfur

(xxxiii) Concerned by the slow pace of progress in the Abuja peace talks on Darfur between the rebel groups and the central government;

(xxxiv) Concerned about the continuing serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and also about the atrocities being committed in Darfur against the civil population, and in particular against African communities, including internally displaced persons (IDP) now living in camps in Darfur which are being run by the international community;

(xxxv) Regretting the recent deterioration in humanitarian aid supplies to camps housing internally displaced persons (IDP), and deploring the fact that the Sudanese Government continues to hinder the work of humanitarian organisations;

(xxxvi) Noting that the mandate of the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS), which encompasses military observation and policing tasks including the protection of civilians under immediate threat, is at present not being implemented in such a way as to prevent attacks against the population of Darfur;

(xxxvii) Supporting the firm stance the European Union is taking vis-à-vis the Sudanese Government in insisting that it is the latter's responsibility to guarantee the safety of all its citizens and those working on their behalf, and taking the view that international pressure on the Government of Sudan must be stepped up;

(xxxviii) Welcoming the appointment of Pekka Haavisto (Finland) as EU Special Representative for Sudan and commending his efforts to arrive at a successful outcome of the Abuja peace talks on Darfur;

(xxxix) Aware of the existence of a list drawn up by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur containing the names of 51 individuals, including senior officials of the Sudanese Government, accused of violating international human rights law and humanitarian law and of perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan;

(xl) Welcoming the decision of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an investigation into the situation in Darfur, and expressing the hope that there will be an end to impunity in Sudan and that the ICC will shortly be serving indictments;

Côte d'Ivoire

(xli) Noting that the EU has not yet adopted a joint position on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire;

(xlii) Considering that intervention by France (Operation Licorne) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) have prevented a bloodbath in the country, in contrast to what has occurred in other African countries;

(xliii) Welcoming the permanent participation of the United Nations, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South Africa and France in efforts to resolve the conflict and find lasting solutions, and noting the need for all the international players to show firm resolve and adopt a united stance;

(xliv) Taking the view that notwithstanding the problems that have arisen with the application of a series of agreements − Linas-Marcoussis, Accra III and Pretoria − these nevertheless form the basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and for lasting stability in the region;

(xlv) Noting that the presidential election scheduled for 30 October 2005 had to be postponed;

(xlvi) Concerned by many human rights violations committed by the forces on both sides;

(xlvii) Noting the proposal by the AU Peace and Security Council, as endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, that President Laurent Gbagbo should remain as Head of State for a maximum period of twelve months and that a new Prime Minister should be appointed with the approval of all the signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis agreements;

Democratic Republic of Congo

(xlviii) Welcoming the positive impact of both the European Union Security Sector Reform (SSR) mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC-RD Congo) and the European Union Police mission (EUPOL Kinshasa) and noting that the country needs continuous support in its preparations for the electoral process;

(xlix) Commending the United Nations on the achievements of its mission (MONUC), which is currently the largest UN peace support operation;

(l) Aware of the problems involved in establishing a security climate in the Great Lakes region as a whole;

(li) Considering that the EU military operation Artemis in the Ituri region helped initiate the process of finding a lasting solution to the conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo;

(lii) Noting the efforts of the African Union in this region;

Sierra Leone

(liii) Welcoming the work the United Kingdom has done both in managing the conflict and organising post-conflict reconstruction;

(liv) Commending the United Nations on the successful conclusion of its mission (UNAMSIL) and on its decision to set up an UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone, which will continue to offer support so that the population of Sierra Leone can lead a more normal life;

(lv) Considering that the situation regarding the safety of women and children in the country is still unsatisfactory,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU NATIONS AS MEMBERS OF THE EU TO REQUEST THE EUROPEAN UNION TO:

1.   Accelerate the setting up in the EU of adequate and sustainable financial resources through the establishment of a *Euro-African Peace and Security Fund* in order to provide funding for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations undertaken by the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities/Regions, bearing in mind the following principles and objectives:

    (a) basing the Euro-African Peace and Security Fund on the successful example of the EU-funded Africa Peace Facility;

    (b) establishing solidarity on the one hand between the EU and AU member states and on the other between the EU and AU as organisations;

    (c) emphasising the leadership role of the AU for African-led peace support operations;

    (d) providing resources compatible with the AU's own complementary funding efforts such as the Peace Fund and other non-EU financial resources;

    (e) providing multi-annual funding and improving the predictability of funding for the African Union;

    (f) expanding the list of items eligible for funding;

    (g) including a specific joint EU-AU auditing and reporting mechanism;

    (h) earmarking funds for demobilisation, decommissioning and reintegration (DDR) projects;

    (i) separating funds to support African-led peacekeeping missions from the financing of other CFSP/ESDP operations;

    (j) involving the European Commission in the management of funds with a view to facilitating the coherence of EU policies towards Africa;

    (k) improving information rights for the European Parliament;

2.   Persuade the EU Council to increase, in the context of the *EU Strategy for Africa*, its offers of assistance to the African Union, in particular as regards enhancing continental and regional peacekeeping capabilities but also across the whole spectrum of the AU's activities, including its managerial, accounting and auditing capacities;

3.   Propose, in the context of the European Union, the funding of a joint EU-AU programme to provide treatment against HIV/AIDS for military and civilian personnel participating in AU-led peace-support operations;

4.   Propose, in the context of EU efforts to support African initiatives to improve the continent's peacekeeping capabilities, a study into the setting up of joint regional military bases which would host European and African military personnel, equipment and training facilities;

5.   Encourage the return of Diaspora citizens to countries in which conflicts are being settled so that they can participate in the post-conflict reconstruction process;

6.   Ensure that special attention is given in post-conflict-support to the specific needs of former boy and girl soldiers who face different challenges in reintegrating civil society;

7.   Continue to work on an efficient strategy against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the conflict regions of Africa, in particular by marking weapons and ammunition, and take action in the framework of the 2006 United Nations Review Conference following on from the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects;

8.   Expand and deepen in the EU Council the section on security cooperation in the *EU Strategy for Africa* before its adoption scheduled for the European Council meeting in December in Brussels and include in it the following requirements:

> *(a)* regular meetings between the EU Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council at ambassador level, particularly in view of the EUPSC's role in endorsing AU proposals for EU funding of peace support operations;
>
> *(b)* keeping the Regional Economic Communities/Regions informed about the implementation of the *EU Strategy for Africa*, including the creation of new instruments to promote the development of crisis management capabilities and fund peace support operations;

9. Strengthen the Pan-African Parliament with a view to helping it evolve into the parliamentary dimension of the African Union and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), including its African Peer Review Mechanism;

Darfur

10. Support proposals to strengthen the mandate of the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS) so that it is able to disarm the various armed groups operating in Darfur;

11. Propose support for the Sudanese Government of Unity's police forces, which are responsible for the security of the population in Darfur, and also for the humanitarian aid workers operating in the region and more particularly in and close to the camps for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP).

Côte d'Ivoire

12. Encourage and promote the application and development of the DDR programme (demobilisation, decommissioning and reintegration) in Côte d'Ivoire for both the governmental security and defence forces and the rebel *Forces Nouvelles*;

13. Support the efforts being made to implement the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra III and Pretoria agreements and insist that only a political solution will bring lasting peace and stability to the country and the region;

14. Adopt a very strict policy concerning the monitoring of the arms embargo on Côte d'Ivoire;

15. Encourage the authorities in Côte d'Ivoire to organise free and transparent elections as soon as possible;

Democratic Republic of Congo

16. Continue supporting voter registration and the distribution of voter cards with the aim of ensuring that conditions are such that all the country's citizens are able to vote in the planned referendum and the ensuing elections;

17. Promote the holding of free and transparent elections in the near future, including the provincial elections foreseen by the draft constitution, with the aim of improving local governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo;

18. Support the United Nations' efforts in the region, mainly through the intermediary of MONUC;

19. Support the African Union so that it can play a bigger role in restoring confidence among the countries of the region;

Sierra Leone

20. Encourage further political reform and remain committed to the country after the departure of UNAMSIL peacekeepers and the establishment of the non-military UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSL);

21. Promote and support initiatives designed to improve the situation of women and children;

22. Support the work of the special war crimes Court for Sierra Leone and its contribution to the establishment of rule of law, and provide it with the necessary financial resources.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Charles Goerens, Rapporteur (Luxembourg, Liberal Group)

I. Introduction

1.	Recent developments in Darfur (Sudan), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere on the African continent give cause for growing concern about the stability of the regions involved, the security of their populations and the humanitarian situation in general. This report draws on the results of the Assembly's conference on "Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach", which took place on 20-21 September 2005 at the Belgian Chamber of Representatives in Brussels and brought together national parliamentarians from European and African countries, representatives of governments and the military from both continents and international and non-governmental organisations. It led to a preliminary assessment of the security issues that need to be covered by the *EU Strategy for Africa* which is due to be adopted by the European Council in December 2005. A summary report of the conference proceedings is being issued separately. What is now quite clear is that demand for international peacekeeping is growing, as is public support for ending humanitarian disasters.

2.	The present report is also based on a series of interviews your Rapporteur had with, among others, representatives of the European Union (the Council Task Force Africa, the Commission and member states), NATO, the United Nations and the African Union, and on meetings the President of the Assembly had in New York at the International Peace Academy, the Council on Foreign Relations and with several European Permanent Representatives to the United Nations. It is a follow-up to a report on "The European Union and peacekeeping in Africa", which the Assembly adopted on 1 December 2004[2].

3.	Two approaches have emerged among European countries so far in dealing with crises in Africa. In a multinational context organisations such as the EU and NATO together with the African Union and the UN tend to offer African countries financial and technical assistance so that they themselves are in a position to manage the problems on their continent ("*African solutions to African problems*"). The other approach is direct foreign intervention either on a multinational basis (for instance the EU Operation Artemis in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo preceded and followed by a UN peacekeeping operation) or provided by an individual country (for instance France in Côte d'Ivoire or the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone) alongside a United Nations mission.

4.	Many conflicts have now been going on for a while and have become very complex. Any EU member state acting in an individual capacity is likely to be overwhelmed by the challenge of having to deal with conflict management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding on its own. While the African Union is very willing to deal with the problems on the continent, it has to contend with major shortcomings as regards the necessary political, financial and material resources.

5.	Even if a military intervention brings a crisis to a halt, post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction − grassroots reconciliation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of militia members, and security sector reform (SSR) − are extremely costly and the mechanisms for generating the necessary funds and means require further development.

6.	The *EU Strategy for Africa* should therefore be based on a "double solidarity" principle – solidarity between the EU and Africa on the one hand, and among EU member states, which should share risks, responsibilities and burdens, on the other. In future, if any EU member states attempting to resolve a crisis encounter difficulties, it should be inconceivable for the other EU nations to remain bystanders.

7.	The strategy should also include provision for substantial resources to fund peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. A *Euro-African Peace and Security Fund* should be set up along the lines of the Africa Peace Facility. It would be the basis for a strategic partnership encompassing the shared security interests of the European Union and Africa.

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[2] See Assembly Document 1880 adopted on 1 December 2004, "The European Union and peacekeeping in Africa" submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Stef Goris, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group).

II. Disillusion with traditional development instruments and changing attitudes towards military intervention: a renewed priority for peace and security in Africa

8.   Africa is the only continent to have grown poorer in recent decades and its already small share of world trade has further dwindled. The continent receives less than 1% of the world's direct foreign investment. Millions of children are deprived of education and have no access to health services. Millions of people die as a result of famine or disease. Pandemic diseases such as AIDS/HIV pose a serious threat to the future not only of the armed forces but of entire populations.

9.   Since 1946, Africa has seen no fewer than 73 armed conflicts. No other region of the world has suffered so much violent combat[3]. Countless people have died in these numerous conflicts, most of them civilians[4]. Of the 19 current armed conflicts in the world recorded by SIPRI[5], six are in Africa. Only one of them, the conflict in Darfur, has been going on for fewer than ten years. Since 1990, 19 conflicts have broken out on the continent in 17 different locations. However, over this same period, the number of ongoing conflicts has decreased from the 1999 peak when 11 armed conflicts were recorded.

10.   Most of the conflicts have arisen as a result of a struggle for government power and only one has been about disputed territory (Ethiopia/Eritrea). As SIPRI observes, neither governments nor rebel movements openly challenge existing borders and the contest has more to do with government leadership. In many cases, this implies a conflict over the distribution of a country's natural resources. The porosity of existing borders makes territorial wars less relevant as neighbouring countries meddling in conflicts have easy access to the natural resources of a combat zone close to their frontiers.

11.   Many of the conflicts in Africa have a regional dimension. There was a link between the conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda as there was between those in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. As small arms are quickly moved from one conflict to the other depending on the intensity of the fighting, there is always a possibility of hostilities flaring up even where ceasefires have been negotiated. Tackling the problem of disarmament and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, thus cutting "conflict resources", are crucial elements of any long-term security strategy for Africa.

12.   Despite this bleak picture, there have also been encouraging signs of improvement with regard to the democratisation of the continent: never before have so many elections been held in African countries and the peaceful transition of power from one political party to another following an election which meets international standards has now become a reality in Africa.

13.   The most encouraging development has been the emerging willingness of the African Union and other regional organisations to deal with the conflicts on the continent themselves (*African ownership*). In parallel, there has been an important change of attitude towards crisis management. When the African Union was established, it introduced the concept of "*non-indifference*" which contrasted with the inhibitive principle of "*non-interference*" for which its predecessor, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), was known. Since then, building the capacity of African countries and regional organisations to prevent and manage conflicts has quickly become the focal point of global investment in the continent's stability.

14.   At the same time, there has been a gradual shift in the perception of Africa's problems from aspects such as development and humanitarian aid towards factors such as threats and risks – these being prejudicial to the security of Western countries. Moreover, the continent has gained in geostrategic importance because of Africa's growing role as an oil supplier.

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[3] For comprehensive information on past and current conflicts in Africa see "The Uppsala Conflict Data Program", www.pcr.uu.se

[4] Since 1994 more than nine million Africans have died as a result of conflicts. See G8 Factsheet: Peace and Security in Africa Today. www.g8.gov.uk

[5] SIPRI Yearbook 2005, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm 2005, pp. 122-133.

15.   The main instruments of Europe's Africa policy – development aid and trade incentives – have yet to produce satisfactory results. Many governments are convinced that a conflict-ridden continent is unable to absorb more money and that more progress has to be made on improving governance and combating corruption and trafficking. At the abovementioned Assembly conference African speakers pointed to the need for better control over African countries' financial resources and invited European countries to step up the pressure on African governments to combat corruption. "This is not neo-colonialism but a direct help to protect the future of our people"[6].

16.   A certain degree of disillusion with traditional development instruments has found its way into the minds of decision-makers. Europe's political leaders are looking for new ways of helping the continent to make progress and are giving priority to the motto *"no development without security"* in dealing with current and future conflicts.

17.   In this new context military options are no longer taboo. On the contrary, under certain conditions (small-scale operations, low-intensity combat, the presence of a humanitarian objective, media attention) they hold out the prospect of achieving quick results owing to the immediate impact of military action. Moreover, the European Union's efforts to consolidate its action as a global player and the further development of European crisis-management capabilities, which feature among the main objectives of the European Security Strategy, are a premium.

18.   The European Union's interest in peacekeeping in Africa is relatively recent, partly because only a few of its member states have a colonial past. For those that do, it is a very important issue because if the situation in a country's former colony deteriorates, this has immediate political implications on the domestic front. It used to be a commonly held belief that interest in Africa among the other EU member states was limited and in particular that enlargement had in any event turned their attention towards the new countries. But awareness of Africa's strategic importance for Europe is now growing as is the perception that security, too, is global. Africa is part of the interdependent world in which the EU wants to be a force for good.

19.   The European Security Strategy is not very clear on the vital security interests Europe shares with Africa. The text mentions Sub-Saharan Africa among the regions posing global challenges and threats, vaguely indicates the value of the African Union as a potential source of stability, and speaks of the "history, geography and cultural ties" that create links with "our partners in Africa"[7]. But it does not explicitly outline a strategic concept for a security partnership with Africa. However, since the adoption of the European Security Strategy a doctrinal evolution has taken place. On 26 January 2004, the European Council adopted the *EU Common Position on the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts in Africa*[8] which was followed on 16 November 2004 by the *Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa*[9]. At the half-yearly meeting of the WEU Assembly's Committees with the Ambassadors of the WEU Permanent Council and the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC), the British Ambassador, Julian King, representing the WEU/EU joint Presidency, announced that the European Council was expected to adopt an *EU Strategy for Africa* in December 2005. A so-called non-paper on such a strategy had been published previously by the Luxembourg Presidency on 11 April 2005[10].

20.   On 12 October 2005, the European Commission published its Communication to the EU Council on an *"EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development"*[11]. It contains a chapter on fostering peace and security which states that "peace and security are the first essential prerequisites for sustainable development". The Commission proposes to address the structural causes of conflict including "poverty, degradation, exploitation and unequal distribution and access to land and natural resources, weak governance, human rights abuses and

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[6] Matadi Nenga Gamanda, Vice-President of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

[7] "A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy", as published by the European Union Institute for Security Studies, pp. 6, 8, 11, 15, 21.

[8] 2004/85/CFSP dated 26 January 2004, OJ L21/25 dated 28 January 2004.

[9] 10538/4/04 Rev 4

[10] http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/ 04/11ue-afrique

[11] COM(2005) 489 final, 12 October 2005.

gender inequality" in order to support African-led peace support operations, in particular by strengthening and replenishing the Africa Peace Facility, and to focus on disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and reinsertion. The Commission also underlines the importance of post-conflict support and proposes the strengthening of its existing transition strategies. Initial comments on the Commission's proposals underline that the new strategy must also be "led by Africans and properly reflect African priorities"[12]. The informal meeting of EU development cooperation ministers in Leeds (UK) in October this year revealed that a number of EU member states, and in particular those which have a strong national development policy, are wary of what they see as too much involvement on the part of the Commission[13].

21.   The EU has undertaken its first ESDP missions in Africa (the military operation *Artemis* in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo in support of the United Nations, the current operations *EUPOL* (EU Police Mission in Kinshasa) and *EUSEC* (on Security Sector Reform) also in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and EU support for the African Union mission in Darfur/Sudan). Two EU member states, France and the United Kingdom, have intervened to protect their citizens in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone respectively. This report will take a closer look at these operations.

22.   In parallel with the growing awareness in the EU of the need for a strategy for Africa that gives priority to the continent's security problems, many efforts have been made to develop new concepts for Africa and, in a wider perspective, to advance international law with regard to the management of conflicts and crises, and to identify weaknesses in the way peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are run and reflect on how to improve their effectiveness. These include, among others, the so-called Brahimi-Report[14], the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change[15] at the initiative of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty supported by the government of Canada[16]. Also, the United Nations Security Council recently adopted a declaration on "strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council's role in conflict prevention, particularly in Africa"[17] and in a further resolution expressed "its determination to take appropriate steps towards the further development of cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organisations in maintaining international peace and security"[18].

23.   In one of the most recent initiatives putting the focus on Africa, the United Kingdom Government established "The Commission for Africa", composed of 17 members (9 of whom are from Africa) and chaired by Prime Minster Tony Blair, and asked it to come up with proposals in time for the G8 summit in Gleneagles (6-8 July 2005). The report published by the Commission in March 2005 entitled "Our common interest"[19] notes that developed countries have, so far, preferred reaction to prevention and that, consequently, reactive military or humanitarian measures have became necessary. However, while such measures can control an emergency situation, they will not resolve it. The report also criticises developed countries' trade policy and claims that their participation in the trade of small arms and light weapons is contributing to Africa's instability. The Commission recommends investment, in particular in African national and regional capacity to manage conflicts, mediation and peacebuilding so that existing conflicts can be resolved and future ones averted. The Commission believes that without such investment the demand for reactive measures, such as military intervention, can only increase. One of its most striking recommendations is that the African Union

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[12] Damien Helly and Claire Hickson in "The EU's Africa Strategy: from words to action", in European Security Review, Number 27, October 2005, www.isis-europe.org
[13] Bulletin Quotidien Europe 9056, 26 October 2005.
[14] Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, United Nations General Assembly document A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
[15] Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "A more secure world: our shared responsibility", United Nations document A 59/565, 2 December 2004.
[16] The responsibility to protect, report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, published by the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001.
[17] Resolution 1625 (2005), 14 September 2005.
[18] Resolution 1631 (2005), 17 October 2005.
[19] Report of the Commission for Africa, www.commissionforafrica.org

(AU) should be given *"unearmarked"* funds and that the focus should be on AU capacity building across the whole spectrum of its activities, and not only on security policy and peacekeeping[20].

III. From non-intervention to non-indifference to the responsibility to protect – the evolution of doctrine and the consequences for the maintenance of international peace and security

24.   In recent times the debate on whether countries have a right or even an obligation to intervene has become animated. Other questions asked are: under whose authority should troops intervene and how and when should a mission be executed?

25.   The principles set out in the report "The responsibility to protect" published in December 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), co-chaired by the former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, and an Algerian senior diplomat and Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, Mohamed Sahnoun, form a good basis and ~~could~~ serve as a starting point. The responsibility to protect means that countries can justify military intervention not only as an act of self-defence but as an obligation in order to protect peoples other than their own: "Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect"[21].

26.   Recent negotiations on the reform of the United Nations in the framework of the World Summit 2005 which took place on 14-16 September 2005 in New York revealed the deep-rooted opposition many countries have to any idea of the "right of intervention". There are two principal objections: first, countries fear that it would undermine state sovereignty, and second, they are worried that it could put them in a position in which they would have no room for manoeuvre and could be forced to intervene in order to be credible, which, of course, is the essence of an obligation.

27.   It was therefore not possible for the World Summit "outcome document" to use wording that would have put countries under an *obligation* to respond to genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It was only possible to agree that countries "are prepared to take collective action through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII … on a case-by-case basis"[22]. Nevertheless, there is a striking difference between the policy concept of "non-interference", which was characteristic of the cold-war period, that of "non-indifference", and more recently the trend towards the responsibility to protect.

28.   However, opinions differ as to what weight this new concept will carry in political circles, even among representatives of the executive. While Armand De Decker, the Belgian Minister for Development Cooperation and former President of the Assembly, told participants at the Assembly's conference on peacekeeping in Africa that the adoption of the principle 'responsibility to protect' constituted a remarkable step forward in international law which would make it legitimate to take action in the event of genocide and other crimes against humanity, European Union High Representative Javier Solana regretted during the question and answer session following his annual speech at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris[23] that the principle had not been accepted by every member of the United Nations, that some very prominent members were fundamentally opposed to it and that some even saw it as a form of neo-colonialism. Only time will tell whether the international community will be able to avoid another Rwanda, Bosnia or Kosovo. In any case, the evolution of doctrine in recent years makes intervention more likely, and countries need to be prepared to take action in the event of another disaster.

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[20] Myles Whitstead, former UK Ambassador in Ethiopia and member of the Commission for Africa at the Parliamentary Seminar on Africa, 19-22 October 2005, British Museum, London.

[21] The responsibility to protect, report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, published by the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001, p. XI. A summary of the report by Chairman Gareth Evans was published in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81 No. 6, November/December 2002, pp. 99-110.

[22] 2005 World Summit Outcome document, adopted by the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly 14-16 September 2005, paragraphs 138-140; http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html

[23] 26 September 2005, www.iss-eu.org

29.   It is worth noting at this point that the African Union has accepted as one of the ruling principles for the work of the Peace and Security Council, its main decision-making body, that the African Union has the right "to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity"[24].

30.   At the 2005 World Summit it was also agreed to establish a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission[25] with important tasks for post-conflict support to countries settling conflicts. However, the Commission has yet to be created and many questions remain about its composition, its relations with other UN bodies and its financial resources.

31.   In the chapter on *development*, the World Summit Outcome document contains a section devoted to "meeting the special needs of Africa"[26] in which African regional and sub-regional organisations are encouraged to "prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts with the assistance of the United Nations" and support is promised. A decision by the World Summit to "develop and implement a 10-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union" is to be found in the chapter on *peace and collective security*.

IV. Africa's emerging security architecture

32.   Recent developments in Africa have seen the emergence of democratically elected national political leaders and the creation or reactivation of regional and continental institutions and organisations. Following your Rapporteur's visit to the African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa on 18-19 October 2005, a major part of the present report concerns the African Union (AU). A good deal of progress on doctrine, military capabilities and regional coherence has been made by the Regional Economic Communities (RECs/Regions), which are operating alongside the AU and are an essential part of Africa's emerging security architecture. ECOWAS, ECCAS and IGAG have already undertaken peacekeeping operations or played an important role in brokering peace agreements. Also, as the section concerning the African Standby Force will show, the RECs/Regions have provided the AU with the drive necessary for promoting and advancing the creation of a continental rapid reaction force.

33.   Following its extraordinary session in Sirte in 1999, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) decided to establish the *African Union*. The Lomé Summit of July 2000 adopted the "Constitutive Act of the African Union". At the first summit at heads of state level in Durban (July 2002), the AU agreed to create the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as "a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts" and as a "collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa"[27]. AU member states elect the 15 countries represented in the PSC, which can meet at ambassador, foreign minister or summit level. The Durban Summit also decided that support for the PSC would be provided by the African Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a continental early warning system, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund.

34.   To date, only the PSC and the African Commission have reached operational level and the Special Fund is slowly being built up. The PSC, which is supported by a small administration, has held over 40 meetings and has quickly asserted itself as the leading voice on the African continent, responding quickly whenever the situation demands. Its recent declaration condemning the unconstitutional succession of power in Togo[28] was heeded by the Togolese authorities. The Chairman of the Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré (former President of Mali), and the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Said Djinnit (Algeria), are internationally respected dignitaries. However,

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[24] Article 4 j, Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 9 July 2002, www.au2002.gov.za

[25] 2005 World Summit Outcome document, adopted by the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly 14-16 September 2005, paragraphs 97-105; ; http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html

[26] *Idem,* World Summit Outcome document, paragraph 68.

[27] Article 2 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union; 9 July 2002, www.au2002.gov.za.

[28] Declaration of the Peace and Security Council on the situation in Togo, 24th meeting, 7 February 2005.

this focus on two individuals who are well known in the EU and other donor countries in the West, places a heavy communications burden on their shoulders. Their European and international counterparts tend to contact them first, thus bypassing the able staff at AU Headquarters who are being left somewhat on the sidelines.

35.　The members of the Panel of the Wise are expected to be appointed in early 2006. The idea behind the panel is that it will enable discreet diplomatic initiatives to take place. But it is precisely this aspect that is criticised by many who are sceptical about "envoy mediation". AU officials defend the panel as they believe there is a need for a flexible diplomatic instrument of this sort, especially in the early stages of conflict prevention.

36.　Early warning systems already exist in several RECs/Regions and work on the establishment of a continent-wide system is progressing. AU officials recognise that the essence of such a system is not merely that is provides early warning, but rather that it allows for early action. Discussions are under way concerning the indicators that would trigger the involvement of the PSC.

37.　The African Standby Force (ASF), with up to 25 000 personnel, is designed to be a continental military intervention force capable of rapid reaction. It will have five sub-regional components (regional brigades) which are expected to reach initial operational capability in 2006 and full operability in 2010. A meeting between the AU, the RECs/Regions, G8 countries and other AU partners took place on 17-18 October 2005 to prepare five ASF policy formulation workshops intended to define the force's Doctrine, Command, Control and Information Systems (C^3IS), Logistics, Training and Evaluation and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). At the meeting a lead support partner from the donor countries' group was found for every workshop and five RECs/Regions were nominated for the purpose of hosting the workshops. The five RECs/Regions involved are the South African Development Community (SADC) (Doctrine), supported by the EU; Egypt (and possibly other member states of the Arab Maghreb Union) (C^3IS) supported by the United States; Eastern Brigade (Logistics), supported by the United Kingdom; the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) (Training and Evaluation), supported by France and Canada; and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) (SOP), also supported by the EU.

38.　It was also agreed that the AU would have a key leadership role in ensuring coherence, harmonisation and uniformity in the regional structures of the ASF. This will not be easy to achieve. The different components have made varying progress in the past and it was clear from the preparatory meeting in which your Rapporteur took part that there was some suspicion between individual RECs/Regions and the AU regarding the latter's leadership role. It also emerged during the preparatory meeting that the fact that some countries are members of two RECs/Regions may be a potential source of conflict. There was a debate among AU members about issues of confidentiality and the involvement of donor countries in the policy formulation workshops. In the end, the donor countries, including the EU, were invited to make a contribution in the ensuing preparations for setting up the ASF. It will be important for the future of the ASF to make sure that AU member countries perceive the ASF as their own tool which is worth investing in.

39.　The Special Fund or *Peace Fund* as it is sometimes referred to, is the AU's sole autonomous source of funding. However, at the present time it consists only of a 6% contribution taken out of the annual AU budget (currently running at about 63 million US dollars, minus an estimated 12 million in annual unpaid membership dues) and direct contributions by donors.

40.　The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was inaugurated in September 2004 in Addis Ababa. Its headquarters is temporarily in Johannesburg, South Africa, while its permanent seat will be in Pretoria. The PAP's first and current President is Gertrude Mongela, a member of the national Assembly of Tanzania. Four vice-presidents represent central, western, northern and southern Africa. The PAP is a consultative body, although it is envisaged that it will eventually pass legislation for the entire continent[29]. Its objectives are to promote human rights and democracy and encourage good governance, transparency and accountability in African governments. It can also provide a forum to

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[29] Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament, Article 2, www.panafricanparliament.org

facilitate cooperation with the African Peer Review Mechanism, promote the free movement of people and goods within the continent and initiate debates on issues concerning the whole of Africa such as external debt, poverty, and HIV/AIDS[30]. The G8 Gleneagles Summit declaration (6-8 July 2005) contains a number of measures supporting African parliaments and in particular the Pan-African Parliament.

41. The PAP is a very young institution which has yet to find its role. Its initial work has met with some criticism,[31] which underscores the need for support for this under-used body that occupies a potentially crucial place in the institutional architecture of the African Union and for the continent's governance. It could also evolve into the parliamentary forum of the AU's initiative for economic cooperation and good governance (the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)) and its peer review mechanism.

V. Financial resources for peacekeeping and peacebuilding

42. The African Union's lack of generic funding is the biggest single contradiction to its stated ambitions, the expectations that are projected on it and the principle of African ownership. What are the options for providing the AU with more predictable funding that allows for more African participation and autonomous decision-making?

1. The EU-funded Africa Peace Facility

43. The Africa Peace Facility (APF), with funds of 250 million euros, is an EU initiative in response to a request from the African Union for funding for African-led peacekeeping operations on the African continent. It draws on the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) which was made available under the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the EU and 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific States (the ACP countries). In all 13.5 billion euros have been allocated to the 9th EDF. In addition, the unexpended balances from previous EDFs total 9.9 billion euros. One of the hallmarks of the EDF is that it does not form part of the general EU budget: it is financed by the EU member states; the European Commission is responsible for its financial execution; a specific committee (the EDF Committee composed of representatives of the member states) oversees its management; it is subject to exceptional financial rules.

44. At its summit in Maputo (Mozambique) in July 2003, the African Union requested the EU to provide financial assistance to help it implement its emerging crisis management policy. It also suggested setting up a "Peace Support Operation Facility for the African Union" to fund peacekeeping operations conducted under the AU's authority and proposed that the facility should be "sustainable and replenished whenever necessary"[32]. Nine months later, in March 2004, the EU Council adopted a proposal by the European Commission to create a 250 million euro Peace Facility to promote African peacekeeping in Africa[33]. The Africa Peace Facility was set up to run until 2007. It is a one-off funding allocation. Further decisions have to be taken on whether it should be resourced on a sustainable basis and, if so, how this should be done.

45. In what could be described as "virtual solidarity" between the EU and Africa, funds that were originally allocated to individual African countries (Cotonou country 'B' envelopes) under the EDF long-term development scheme have been reduced by 1.5% for each country. The resulting savings account for 126.4 million euros on the "African side" of the APF. The "European side" adds a further

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[30] www.southafrica.info, Africa's parliament opens, 19 March 2004 and Africa's parliament at home in SA, 17 September 2004.

[31] See for example Jakkie Cilliers and Prince Mashele, "The Pan-African Parliament. A plenary of Parliamentarians", in *African Security Review* 13(4), 2004. and Prince Mashele, "The 3rd Pan-African Parliament Session. Utility or Futility?, in *African Security Review* 14(2) 2005.

[32] Decision on the establishment by the European Union of a peace support operation facility for the African Union; Decisions of the Assembly of the AU, Second Ordinary Session, 10-12 July 2003, Maputo, Mozambique, Document Assembly/AU/dec.21 (II), www.african-union.org/

[33] Poul Nielson, European Commissioner for Development Aid and Humanitarian Affairs, in EC Press Release IP/04/434, 31 March 2004.

123.6 million euros from other, unallocated EDF funds. There is real solidarity among the Sub-Saharan African countries because all of them, including those with no conflicts, participate in the funding of the APF.

46.   To highlight African ownership of the AFP, it has often been said that it would be "led, operated and staffed by Africans"[34]. However, in reality EU member states retain final control over it. To make use of the APF the African Union submits a request to the European Commission. After evaluating its eligibility the Commission transmits the request to the member states' representatives in the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) inviting them to endorse it. The PSC can ask the EU Military Committee and other Council bodies to comment on a given request, particularly if other forms of ESDP technical assistance are being provided in parallel. The Regional Economic Communities can also draw on the AFP but must first submit requests to the AU for approval.

47.   In the words of Ambassador Said Djinnit, AU Commissioner for Peace, the APF is today the "backbone" of the funding for AU operations[35]. Unlike the system of donor conferences, where the time it takes for a contribution to be paid upfront following its announcement is unpredictable, there is a certain degree of predictability as regards APF funding. But AU officials also made clear that the APF drawing process is slow, that the money arrives in small amounts only and that they are constantly preoccupied with keeping the cash flow of the organisation going by juggling between the APF and individual donor contributions, most of which, however, take the form of materiel and equipment rather than additional cash. They suggested that future funding of AU operations should be much more predictable and allow for greater AU autonomy. It was also clear that the AU lacks the capacity for complying with the reporting and auditing procedures required by both the EU and individual donor countries.

48.   Critics have pointed out that the APF diverts money initially intended as official development aid for security issues and that, in future, EU financial planning must ensure that there is enough money for both conflict management and development aid[36]. Others believe that APF money is taking the place of the defence budgets of recipient countries. However, the APF does not finance *European* peacekeeping efforts, nor does it finance the procurement of military equipment; it supports UN-mandated peacekeeping activities conducted by *Africans*, thus contributing to the promotion of stability, which is a precondition for development. As far as the initial 250 million euros are concerned, these funds are part of unabsorbed development money and represent only about 1% of the total amount of available EDF appropriations. The argument put forward is that this money has not yet been used because there is too much instability on the African continent, so using it for peacekeeping is justifiable.

49.   So far, the APF has mainly been used to finance soldiers' per diem allowances, transport and logistical support for the African Union mission (AMIS) in Darfur (Sudan) (about 89.2 million euros out of 92 million euros committed)[37]. Another 70 million euros have been requested by the African Union for the extension of AMIS. 35 million euros have been earmarked for capacity-building measures supporting the AU and sub-regional organisations, out of which 6 million euros have been committed and 2 million spent. In Central Africa 11.38 million euros have been allocated to a mission conducted by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; 15 million euros have been earmarked for an AU observer mission to Somalia and another 15 million euros are reserved for an AU disarmament mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 3 million euros have been committed to evaluation and auditing.

50.   By October 2005, all but 8 million euros of the APF funds had been spent or were earmarked. The APF is an undeniable success but it has quickly become depleted and the issue of its replenishment is unresolved. The future of a special instrument such as the APF will depend on the outcome of the European Commission's evaluation of the facility with the initial results expected by

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[34] European Commission Memo 05/313, 12 September 2005, page 6.
[35] Meeting with the Rapporteur in Addis Ababa, 19 October 2005.
[36] Heike Schneider, "The Africa Peace Facility", in BOND Networker, August 2004, www.bond.co.uk
[37] EU Council Secretariat fact sheet AMIS II/02, October 2005.

the end of November 2005. A further determining factor is the overall situation regarding the EU budget for the period 2007-2013, which currently looks rather grim.

51.　Replying to a question[38] on if, when and how the APF should be replenished and for what purpose any additional funds should be used, the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, has said that the special nature of the APF renders its replenishment difficult to achieve and that a consensus will have to be found among all EU and ACP countries.

52.　A long-term financial strategy for the support of African-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions should consider developing instruments *independent* of funds intended for official development aid. The link between security and development is obvious and therefore the capacity of African countries to absorb official development aid should quickly improve once there is more stability. Such a positive development will limit the period during which it can be argued that the transfer of official development aid to security-related activities is legitimate. Another factor is that it would appear to be impossible to identify permanently non-absorbable development aid resources. Hence, in the long run, funds used in the APF are indeed lost to development projects. However, if the stated objectives of EU member states for increased development aid are met, additional money would be available and this could alleviate concerns about shifting funds from development to security issues.

53.　Peacekeeping operations, especially if they include peacemaking, need military equipment such as ammunition and weapons. Combat training for soldiers is also essential. If special funds such as the APF cannot be used to finance such expenditure due to the fact that they are tied up with development aid, the money or items of equipment need to come either directly from the EU member states, or to be provided by non-EU members or other international institutions[39]. An independent financial facility would allow the necessary military equipment to be provided without the problem entailed by using "civil" development funds for "military" expenditure. However, critics say that if common EU funding were also to cover military equipment, there might be a risk of EU and non-EU bilateral donors reducing their funding efforts in that sector.

54.　The EU member states are currently discussing four options for funding the APF in the future. They would have different consequences as regards the quality of African autonomy and the existence of an African financial contribution, the role of the European Commission and the European Parliament, and prospects of greater flexibility and predictability. All options give the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) a central role in endorsing proposals to draw funds from the APF. It is therefore important to strengthen ties between the AU and the EU-PSC.

55.　Under Option 1 the APF would be replenished from the current 9th EDF. This option would require the agreement of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers to extend the current decision on using EDF funds for the APF. Unless member states agree on additional reform proposals, the current procedures will continue to apply.

56.　Under Option 2 the APF would be funded through the CFSP budget in line with the new 2007-2013 financial perspective. The European Commission's role would be reduced − if not excluded − and there would no longer be any African contribution, which some see as a clear contradiction of the APF ownership principle[40]. But the European Parliament would be able to oversee the use of APF funds as part of its competence in respect of the CFSP budget. In order to maintain a minimum of African ownership for EU funding of AU-led peace support operations, it would be preferable to keep the APF as a separate item inside the general CFSP budget.

57.　Option 3 would entail the creation of a new multi-annual intergovernmental fund which would be managed either under current APF procedures or by the ATHENA mechanism used for EU-led

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[38] Question and answer session following the EU High Representative's annual address to the European Union Institute for Security Studies, 26 September 2005, www.eu-iss.org
[39] Rory Keane, "The EU's Africa Peace Facility uncovered: Better late than never?", in European Security Review, No. 24, 24 October 2004, www.isis-europe.org
[40] Damien Helly and Claire Hickson in "The EU's Africa Strategy: from words to action", in European Security Review, Number 27, October 2005, www.isis-europe.org

military operations. Again, there would be no African financial contribution and African participation in managing the fund would need to be clarified. Such a fund would be likely to be under the full control of the EU member states, with no role for the European Commission.

58.   Option 4 suggests that the part of the funding under the current APF scheme that goes to AU *capacity building* could be financed using resources that are the sole responsibility of the European Commission. Under this option it would not be possible to fund AU peacekeeping or indeed any military activity, including Darfur-type monitoring by non-armed military observers. Oversight by the European Parliament would be limited to only a small proportion of EU funding for AU activities. Currently, only 14% (35 million euros) of the 250 million euros in the APF are committed to capacity-building, and less than 1% (2 million euros) has actually been spent.

59.   The European Commission proposes in its "*EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development*" that the Africa Peace Facility should be strengthened and replenished. In its view, "the development-related objectives of the Facility have been successfully converted into practical action". Louis Michel, the Commissioner for Development, explained at the Assembly's conference on Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa that giving the African Union access to the APF confers upon it a central role in African-led peace support operations, raises its credibility and clearly shows the importance the EU attaches to the AU having a leadership role. In his view funds channelled through the APF would keep the Commission involved in the way peace support funds are used. It is obvious that such involvement would also allow the Commission to ensure a certain degree of coherence between the different Community and CFSP/ESDP activities.

2. The G8 Gleneagles commitments

60.   The G8 Gleneagles Summit declaration (6-8 July 2005) devotes a whole chapter to Africa. The participants (including four EU member states − France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom − as well as the European Commission) commit themselves to "train and, where appropriate equip, some 75 000 troops by 2010 to take part in peace support operations worldwide, with a sustained focus on Africa", to provide support, "including flexible funding, for African peace support operations" and to "give greater … resources to reconstruction and reconciliation in post-conflict countries"[41]. While Annex II to the declaration contains a list of the commitments by individual G8 countries to raise funds for Africa, it does not go into any detail as to the additional amounts available for peace support operations. Furthermore, many of the commitments are a repetition of previous announcements.

3. The proposal by the Commission for Africa regarding "unearmarked" funds

61.   The Commission for Africa recommends in a report[42] that international donors should finance at least 50% of the African Union's own instrument for funding peace support operations, the Peace Fund, through what it calls "*unearmarked*" contributions. It considers it important for international donors to focus on support for the purpose of establishing systems for the proper administration and accounting of funds, but it proposes that the funds themselves should be managed by Africans according to their own priorities. The Commission explains that at the moment the AU and RECs/Regions have to ask for fresh funds from international donors each time they need to finance operations. This fund-raising process is extremely time-consuming and puts pressure on their scarce human resources. In the Commission's view it also means that African crisis management resources depend to a large extent on the donor countries' interests, which do not necessarily match Africa's own priorities. It is fair to say that most countries providing funding for the African Union would not want to do so without a certain level of control over their use and of the results achieved.

4. The financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations

62.   The UN's peacekeeping budget approved for the period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 amounts to US$ 3.55 billion[43]. This does not include the cost of the mandated increase in strength of MONUC

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[41] G8 Gleneagles Summit declaration (6-8 July 2005), paragraphs 8 and 11
[42] "Our common interest", Report of the Commission for Africa, page 169, www.commissionforafrica.org.
[43] The source for all figures on United Nations peacekeeping operations is a background note of September 2005 www.un.org; see also www.europa-eu-un.org

(UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) and UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan), which could increase the total budget for peacekeeping operations to US$ 5 billion. All the member states are obliged to pay their share of the cost of peacekeeping operations under a complex formula which they themselves have drawn up. Notwithstanding that obligation, in September 2005 the member states had accumulated US$ 2.2 billion in arrears under this particular item.

63. The system of funding UN peacekeeping operations is one of reimbursement. It is a very cumbersome arrangement because it is based on the assumption that a member state informs the UN of the number of troops it has deployed and the rate of reimbursement as regards military equipment. The UN then has to verify that the figures it has been given are accurate. Basic financial questions concerning peacekeeping are discussed by the General Assembly under an agenda item entitled "administrative and budgetary aspects of funding UN peacekeeping operations". At each session this item is assigned for consideration to the Fifth Committee, one of the General Assembly's six Grand Committees.

64. The EU member states are the foremost sponsors of the UN funding system. Taken as a whole the 25 EU members contribute about 38% of the UN's ordinary budget and over 40% of the budget for its peacekeeping operations. They account for almost 50% of the contributions of all the UN member states to the organisation's funds and programmes.

VI. *Regulating the flow of small arms and light weapons*

65. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) have become a highly destabilising factor in international relations and particularly in Africa. It is estimated that they are responsible for the death of 500 000 people every year (300 000 victims in armed conflicts and 200 000 in other circumstances)[44]. Furthermore, it is more often than not those who are most vulnerable, i.e. women, children and the poor, who are worst hit [45]. It should also be noted that small weapons are used as a threat in many attacks on women. Trafficking in SALW, which is often part of a wider network of illicit activities, such as diamond trafficking in the case of Sierra Leone, with the involvement of mercenaries, slows down and even prevents peacekeeping operations.

66. At the Assembly's conference on "Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach", held in Brussels on 20 and 21 September 2005, many speakers, and particularly those representing African delegations, referred to the problem of SALW. This issue has also been addressed in many EU and UN texts and, at the initiative of the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in the final declaration of this year's G8 Summit in Gleneagles[46], even though a draft treaty on the subject which was proposed by the UK Government was rejected during preparatory meetings. There is a great deal of ambiguity among the G8 countries because most of them produce SALW even if they do not as a rule export them directly to conflict zones. It often happens that weapons which have been exported legally subsequently become the object of illegal trade on the black market. There is a need for stricter controls over transfers following the initial export of such weapons.

67. In geopolitical terms SALW play a fundamental role both for producer and customer states. For a producer state the sale of SALW may tie in with its diplomatic strategy or with agreements with certain countries and may therefore help to forge links with them. It is important to remember that the lifetime of SALW is often much longer than that of alliances. It is not just countries in the northern hemisphere which are producing firearms. African countries such as South Africa, Uganda or Zimbabwe are also manufacturing SALW and this helps develop outlets on the black market which

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[44] http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/salw.html
[45] Amnesty International report "The Impact of Guns on Women's Lives".
[46] G8 Gleneagles Summit declaration: Africa: a historic opportunity: "We will enhance our support for the development of Africa's capacity to resolve conflicts and keep the peace, consistent with our national laws, by: […] improving the effectiveness of transfer controls over small arms and light weapons, including at *inter alia* the review conference of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons in 2006, and taking effective action in Africa to collect and destroy illicit small arms. Development of international standards in arms transfers, including a common understanding of governments' responsibilities, would be an important step towards tackling the undesirable proliferation of conventional arms."

increase all types of trafficking[47]. It is for this reason that international consensus on controls is essential.

68.   In order to keep tabs on the movements of firearms from the time they leave their country of manufacture to the time they arrive at their destination, it is proposed that they be systematically marked and that any unmarked SALW found in circulation should be destroyed[48]. The aim of marking firearms is to make it easier to trace them and follow their movements from production through the lines of supply to distribution. If marking is to be effective, it will be necessary not only to find a way of ensuring that all producer countries comply with the requirement, but also to make provision downstream for sanctions against any countries found to have engaged in illicit activity. Munitions should also be marked. In conflict zones it is commonplace to find larges volumes of ammunition but rarely to find weapons.

69.   The relevant proposals submitted by the European Commission for an *"EU strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to accelerate Africa's development"* should be fleshed out by the EU Council so as to promote the setting-up of an effective system of control over arms in general and SALW in particular with the involvement of countries from both the northern and southern hemispheres.

VII. *Recent peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in Africa*

70.   Your Rapporteur's selection in this report of the four countries in which peacekeeping operations are under way is based first and foremost on the fact that the situation in these countries was discussed at the Assembly's conference on "Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa : a practical approach". The importance of analysing Operation Artemis, which took place in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, lies in the fact that for the first time a military operation was conducted by the European Union as a whole, and not by an individual member state, as is the case in Côte d'Ivoire (France) and Sierra Leone (United Kingdom), acting in conjunction with the United Nations. Sudan is an example of an African-led operation that is supported by a number of international players, including the European Union. The four case studies therefore differ not only as regards the entity leading the peacekeeping operation, but also in size, complexity and financing. This makes for an interesting comparison. The United Nations continues to be the main promoter of peace and security in Africa. There are currently eight UN peacekeeping operations in Africa involving the deployment of over 51 00 military and police personnel.

1. *Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*

History of the conflict and activities of the United Nations and the African Union

71.   Civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo began in an attempt to remove the dictatorial regime of Mobutu, who was ousted by Laurent Kabila. By the end of 1999, the conflict had evolved into a complex struggle involving several Congolese factions and a number of other − mostly, but not all − neighbouring countries. On 30 November 1999, the United Nations Security Council established MONUC (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) by virtue of Resolution 1279. On 24 February 2000, the Security Council (Resolution 1291) mandated MONUC to monitor the implementation of the 1999 Lusaka ceasefire agreement, verify the disengagement of foreign forces, monitor human rights violations, and facilitate the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Following serious violations of the ceasefire and attacks on both the members of the ceasefire

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[47]   UNODC working paper on "Effective measures to combat transnational organised crime" (A/CONF.203/4(2005)): the easy availability of firearms in some regions and countries, in particular those in conflict, suggest that the problem has reached significant proportions. The continued production of new weapons − there are some 1 249 companies in more than 90 countries − […] ensure that stockpiles of older (and now cheaper) weaponry become available, often on the illicit market. Such factors underscore the importance of ensuring that concerted attempts are made to effectively counter trafficking in firearms."

[48] United Nations General Assembly (A/60/88 (2005)) Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.

commission and MONUC staff, Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) authorised the deployment of an "Interim Emergency Multinational Force" which led to the EU undertaking Operation Artemis with a view to strengthening the authority of the international community and enabling MONUC, which was having a hard time, to reinforce its capacities. MONUC's mandate was substantially strengthened on 28 July 2003, when Security Council Resolution 1493 authorised it to have recourse to the use of force to carry out its tasks. On 1 October 2004, the Security Council again revised its mandate (Resolution 1565). MONUC was authorised to deploy troops to key areas of instability and was requested to cooperate more with ONUB, the United Nations Operation in neighbouring Burundi. The objective was to monitor and prevent the movement of combatants and arms across borders, protect civilians and UN staff and facilities, facilitate the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of militia forces, rebel fighters and child soldiers, and help to ensure that the election process was successful.

72.   While there has been a big improvement as regards voter registration, there are still many areas where it is at present impossible to prepare for elections owing to the precarious security situation and the recent renewed surge of violence. At a meeting the President of the WEU Assembly had on 9 September 2005 in New York (in the margins of the Second World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments) with Olivier Kamitatu, President of the DRC National Assembly, the latter said that only 9 out of 28 million voter cards had been delivered and that distribution was very limited in certain regions[49]. He also talked about difficulties in establishing a fruitful relationship of cohabitation with the DRC's neighbouring countries and asked whether the EU would be ready to deploy forces in order to support efforts to deal with the presence of foreign armed groups in the east of the country. These are the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR/Interahamwe) in South Kivu and armed groups associated with the Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC) in Ituri. Also, there are armed groups called Mayi-Mayi operating in the Katanga region. According to the 19th report of the UN Secretary-General on MONUC, most Mayi-Mayi commanders have so far refused to join reintegration programmes.

73.   As a result of the operations of these armed groups, civilians continue to be attacked and clashes with the FARDC (Congolese Armed Forces) are commonplace although joint or parallel operations by government and MONUC forces have succeeded in stopping the FDLR from moving around freely. Concerned at the prospect of an intervention by Rwanda against the FDLR operating from the DRC, which could throw the whole region back into turmoil, the African Union recently decided to set up a reconnaissance mission that will go to the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (these countries have also pledged forces to the reconnaissance team) to evaluate the need for further action in the region. AU officials regretted that MONUC was not making more progress on disarmament.

74.   Following the promulgation of the Transitional Constitution in April 2003, national elections were scheduled to be held in 2005[50]. The Transitional Constitution also makes provision for a President of the Republic and four Vice-Presidents representing the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC,) the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), the civilian opposition and a presidential party. It has led to the creation of a parliament (a National Assembly and a Senate), a transitional government and five institutions "for the promotion of democracy": a National Human Rights Commission, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a Media Council, an Ethics and Corruption Commission and an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) with responsibility for organising elections.

75.   However, the international liaison group supporting the transition in the DRC (composed of accredited ambassadors to the DRC and chaired by the US Ambassador, William Swing) has observed that a number of obstacles are holding up the transition process: an absence of the legislation necessary for holding elections, the inexistence of any territorial administration or integrated police force, and delays in the process of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of militia groups.

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[49] See the 19th report of the Secretary-General on MONUC for more details about progress in voter registration; document S/2005/603, 26 September 2005.
[50] These elections were scheduled to take place on the anniversary of the country's independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960.

76.   Even though the peace agreement makes provision for exceptional circumstances in which the government has the possibility of postponing elections for six months beyond the deadline of 30 June 2005, the major opposition party − the Union for Democracy and Social Progress − has accused it of putting off the elections in order to stay in power[51]. The government, for its part, claims it needs time to generate interest among voters who are spread over the huge area of Congolese territory and who are more interested in peace than in elections.

77.   The postponement of elections in the DRC has given rise to further instability. If commitments are honoured, a referendum on the future constitution should be held in November 2005 followed by general, presidential and regional elections by May 2006. Notwithstanding the peace agreement and the Transitional Constitution, the transition government is still weak and has no administrative control over the country as a whole. After five years of civil war, this patchwork coalition of former enemies is being undermined from within owing to mutual distrust and by dissatisfaction among the armed forces, which have still to be integrated. In addition, it has to contend with rebellions by armed groups which are not party to the peace agreement.

Operation Artemis

78.   Although it has now been two years since Operation Artemis took place, it is worth reviewing the mission as it was a *pioneering* mission for ESDP (being the EU's first autonomous operation, its first rapid reaction mission, the first operation outside Europe, the first operation under the so-called framework-nation concept and the first example of EU-UN cooperation with a "bridging" character). It highlighted existing shortfalls and thus initiated the establishment of the EU battlegroup concept and allowed a number of conclusions to be drawn. Curiously, while most commentators consider Operation Artemis to have been a success, it is probably true to say, in view of the substantial cost to EU member states and the requirement of compliance with the principle of "African ownership", that there would have to be very specific circumstances before any similar mission was undertaken again. Artemis was, indeed, an exception[52].

79.   Operation Artemis was carried out from June to September 2003 in the north-eastern *Ituri* region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and more specifically in the town of *Bunia*.[53] The region, which is rich in natural resources, had been the scene of violent hostilities. A longstanding conflict had been under way between different ethnic groups (farmers and herders) and the region was occupied by Ugandan forces who took far longer to withdraw than had been foreseen by the Luanda accord of September 2002. In April and May 2003, violence around Bunia escalated and included instances of mutilation and cannibalism. Also, the Headquarters of MONUC, the United Nations mission in the DRC, was attacked, and, in a separate incident, two UN observers were killed.

80.   The operation was officially launched on 12 June 2003 following a request from the UN[54] but it was made possible from the political point of view by the EU's readiness, in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, to use an opportunity to improve its visibility as a credible force in international affairs. France was particularly keen on this and volunteered to become the "framework nation". It was the French authorities which persuaded the other member states to agree to a potential EU-led military operation in Africa.

81.   The "framework" or "lead nation" concept had been developed in 1997 by WEU Ministers to "better prepare WEU to take on operational responsibilities". It was designed "to enable a European headquarters to be established, using existing national or multinational assets, within timeframes

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[51] *The Economist*, 9 September 2005.

[52] According to General Jean-Paul Perruche, Director of the EU Military Staff at the Assembly conference on "Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach", Brussels, 20 September 2005

[53] For more information on Operation Artemis see the report on "The European Union and peacekeeping in Africa", submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Stef Goris (Belgium, Liberal Group), Assembly Document 1880, 1 December 2004, pp.16-20, and Fernanda Faria, "La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – le rôle de l'Union européenne", EU Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 55, pp 47-61.

[54] UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) authorised the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia.

compatible with the operational requirements, especially in situations of extreme urgency"[55]. In the case of Artemis, the framework nation concept was successfully implemented for an EU operation. France, a member state with the appropriate capabilities, was given the task of conducting the operation and was asked to involve other countries depending on the contributions they wished to make. A French national headquarters was multi-nationalised, with other contributing nations sending liaison officers to Paris. Because the French military were able to start internal planning well before the official launch of the operation and base it on adaptable contingency plans, the time-lag between the initial request for an" Interim Emergency Multinational Force" made by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the beginning of May 2003 and the deployment of the intervention force was very short (the first deployments, intended to prepare the airport in Bunia, took place on 6 June 2003 even before the official launch of the operation).

82.   Artemis was first and foremost a success for the EU and France in proving the effectiveness not only of the lead nation concept, but also of the EU's decision-making mechanisms and its ability to muster a force at short notice, deploy and sustain it, and ultimately hand over to a follow-up UN force after restoring law and order where chaos had prevailed. This particular aspect was crucial given that the UN was facing the looming threat of another Srebrenica-type tragedy when ill-equipped Blue Berets operating under an insufficient MONUC mandate proved incapable of preventing violence from being inflicted on the local population before their very eyes. Swift intervention by the EU meant that the UN did not suffer another loss of credibility. It also provided the UN Security Council with an opportunity to rectify some of the shortcomings of MONUC's mandate[56]. However, as critics pointed out, the operation had only a limited effect on the long-term stabilisation of the conflict region where warring militias are still presenting MONUC with a challenge even today. Although a designated area around Bunia was at one point declared "weapon free", the EU forces did not systematically disarm the various militia groups, guerrilla forces and child soldiers but merely deterred them from operating in a 10-km zone around Bunia[57]. But the decision to limit the tasks of the operation was a political one and the deployed troops cannot be held responsible. To date, the international community has not yet fully solved the problem of how to disarm the various militia groups in the Ituri region. Nevertheless, Artemis was clearly a helpful contribution in the search to bring about lasting stabilisation in the country.

83.   From the outset Operation Artemis was intended to be very short, reflecting the EU member states' unwillingness to deploy their troops for a long-term engagement. Indeed, the troops could have been "re-hatted" in order to continue to operate, only this time under the new MONUC mandate. Even as the first soldiers arrived in Bunia, the schedule for their departure and the handing over of the operation to a UN follow-up mission had already begun.

84.   Artemis was also a show case for the EU to demonstrate that its member states can successfully mount an operation without making use of NATO planning and logistic assets. While the operation certainly was *independent* in that NATO did not make capabilities available to the EU, it was not entirely *autonomous* as the EU had to charter commercial Antonov-124 planes to transport equipment to Entebbe (Uganda) from where it was airlifted to Bunia. A total of 44 Antonov flights were necessary. The Antonovs could have been replaced by planes from the EU member states' fleet of Hercules C-130s and C-160s. But because those aircraft have less transport capacity, strategic air lift and the setting-up of the operation would have taken more time and hence threatened the success of an intervention whose very essence was speed.

85.   The advantages of the framework nation concept (a strong and well-trained core force with a clear chain of command and well established procedures including access to intelligence) at the same time expose its limits, for the framework nation bears a heavy burden. In the case of Artemis, France delivered the initial forces and the bulk of the total force. It also provided the operational headquarters

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[55] WEU Council of Ministers, Paris Declaration, 13 May 1997.
[56] UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (28 July 2003) authorised increasing the military strength of MONUC from 700 to 10 800 personnel and the "use of all necessary means to fulfil its mandate".
[57] Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, "Operation *Artemis*: The Shape of Things to Come?" in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 508-525.

and the mission intelligence. France therefore bore a major share of the costs of the mission, accepting the principle of "costs lie where they fall". This means that the "sending member state" has to finance the participation of its troops. The Artemis Forces Commander, General Bruno Neveux (France), explained at the Assembly conference on peacekeeping in Africa that the current distribution of common and national costs would discourage potential framework nations from taking on that role. However, it has to be said that only a few of the 25 EU member states have the wherewithal to be a framework nation. For other member states which cannot or are unwilling to become a framework nation to share the burden of a mission, it would be necessary to raise the level of costs that are considered to be common costs or to use a common fund to help finance an Artemis-type operation.

EUPOL and EUSEC

86.   On 20 October 2003, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo requested the European Union to help establish the Congolese Integrated Police Unit (IPU). On 15 December, the EU's Political and Security Committee agreed that the EU should support the IPU and on 17 May 2004 the Council decided[58] that the Union should provide support for the process of consolidating internal security in the DRC, this being necessary to restore peace and promote development. To this end the EU would help to set up the IPU in Kinshasa. In December the Council adopted a Joint Action establishing an EU police mission, EUPOL Kinshasa[59], for that purpose. After being partially pre-positioned in the DRC from 3 February 2005, the mission was launched officially on 12 April. An inaugural ceremony was held on 30 April during a visit to the country by Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP.

87.   The police mission is planned to last one year and has a budget of about 4.3 million euros. Some 30 personnel, led by the Portuguese Police Chief Commissioner Adilio Custodio, are helping to set up the Congolese IPU, which will have the task of protecting state institutions and strengthening the country's security systems. The mission is operating in close cooperation with MONUC. It is the first civil crisis management mission in Africa to be conducted under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) although in the preliminary stages the EU was involved in a project for training and equipping the IPU which was initially funded by the European Development Fund.[60]

88.   In response to an official request from the DRC Government, the EU also decided[61] to set up an advisory and assistance mission for DRC security reform (EUSEC – R.D. CONGO). It was launched by the Council on 8 June 2005 and is expected to last one year. The mission will provide advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law. General Pierre Joana of France has been appointed head of mission.

2. Sudan

89.   Sudan is home to a number of conflicts. They have been characterised by systematic violence inflicted on the local population by government-supported militias and by vast numbers of internally displaced people. One of the underlying causes of the conflicts is the − at times artificially initiated or exaggerated − exploitation of longstanding ethnic and religious differences. A further factor, particularly in the case of the greater region of Darfur, is the phenomenon of creeping desertification which reduces water supplies, shrinks arable land and gives rise to disputes between sedentary farmers and semi-nomadic herders. But the main cause of conflict in Sudan is the struggle for the control and distribution of the country's rich oil resources and for participation in the country's government[62].

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[58] Council Joint Action 2004/494/CFSP of 17 May 2004.
[59] Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004.
[60] Address by Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, on the occasion of the inaugural ceremony opening the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa, DRC, on 30 April 2005; http://ue.eu.int/Solana.
[61] Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005.
[62] Ulrike Koltermann, "Kreuz des Südens. Das Jahr der Wende für den Sudan – Neubeginn oder Chaos?", in *International Politik*, August 2005, pp 104-109.

90.   *Southern Sudan* has been the scene of a lengthy north-south civil war involving the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the central government. According to most analysts, it started in 1983 when the central government withdrew the regional rights of autonomy which the south had acquired following an earlier rebellion. The conflict coincided with a canal project draining water from the southern wetlands and with the Islamic central government's attempt to introduce Sharia law into a region dominated by Christianity and animistic practices. According to estimates it has claimed up to two million lives and turned a further four million into internally displaced persons. Recently, other rebel movements have emerged contesting the SPLM/A's claim to represent the entire region. After more than ten years of negotiations, on 9 January 2005 the government and the SPLM/A as the principal rebel movement concluded a peace agreement in Nairobi brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and supported by the US government and a number of European countries. Based on the Machakos Protocol of July 2002[63], it provides for the sharing of oil revenues on the basis of 50% for each side, the non-application of Islamic religious law, and self-determination in southern Sudan.

91.   The conflict inspired local political leaders in the western region of *Dafur* to start claiming a share of Sudan's natural resources for their neglected, remote and poor region at a time when it became clear to them that the north-south conflict would eventually be settled. However, Darfur was never represented in the IGAD negotiations and its leaders were worried that they would be left with nothing. In February 2003, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – two rebel groups composed mainly of three "African" tribes, *Fur*, *Zaghawa* and *Masalit* from the region of Darfur − started attacking government positions. The central government was taken by surprise and responded by arming a local Arab militia (the *Janjaweed* − literally "devils on horseback" although in reality they travel round in jeeps), sending in the air force to bomb and burn villages whose inhabitants fled or were killed, and sparking longstanding inter-ethnic rivalry between farmers and herders. This provided the central government with an opportunity to put the blame for what was in fact its repression on "ethnic" rivalry. Its initial strategy seemed to be "to punish the rebels' presumed base of support – civilians – so as to prevent future rebel recruitment"[64]. But the atrocities inflicted on the African population of Dafur became much more serious and systematic. Today, about 200 000 people are presumed dead and 1.9 million live in camps run by the international community.

92.   After the New York Times columnist Nicholas D. Kristof called this "the century's first genocide", the US Congress and the US Administration, including President George Bush, pressured by a wide range of activist groups, used the term *genocide* to describe the situation in Darfur. They invoked the Genocide Convention of 1948 and called on the UN Security Council to take action. It was believed this could help trigger a rapid international response and prevent Darfur from turning into another Rwanda. Representatives from the EU and its member states and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan were much more reticent about using the term or simply avoided it. Neither was it used by the UN Security Council. The reason for this is that under the 1948 Convention it is only the United Nations that is obliged to take action in the case of genocide. Individual member countries are under no such obligation. It is believed that Kofi Annan wanted to avoid an embarrassing situation: had he declared a genocide, he would have put himself and the Security Council under an obligation to act when it was likely that the member states would not provide the means necessary for taking action[65]. In the case of Darfur there was therefore no bold international response and questions still remain about the specific threshold for intervention. The US use of the term *genocide* failed to send out a strong signal as to the acceptability of a concept which places the international community under an obligation to act when faced with the spectacle of destructive violence directed at a specific ethnic group. Proving premeditation to commit genocide is never easy, but for many the results of the central government's policy in Darfur speak for themselves.

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[63] See the United States Institute for Peace website for the text of the protocol, www.usip.org
[64] Scott Strauss, "Darfur and the Genocide Debate", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 127-133.
[65] Gérard Prunier, Press conference on the situation in Darfur, Paris, Centre d'Accueil de la Presse Etrangère, Maison de Radio France, 13 October 2005.

93.   It is not only in the present-day case of Sudan and Darfur that the issue of being "African" or "Arab" is highly sensitive[66]. In the past, some African tribes tried to pass themselves off as Arabs in order to enjoy better relations with the central government. Some observers believe that in the case of Darfur, which was an independent Sultanate before joining Sudan as late as 1916, the local population (mostly herders and farmers) is treated with contempt, regardless of its African or Arab status, by the majority of the population living in Khartoum (where many people are traders with strong aspirations towards Egypt and have a "Nile-Valley conscience"). Many Darfurians were integrated into the Sudanese Army and fought against the south. This could explain why it was difficult for the central government to use the army to combat the Darfur rebels, given that some of its troops would have had to confront their own people. However, the arming of local criminals and certain Arab tribes, most of whom come not from Darfur but from the north and are not party to traditional local arrangements between herders and farmers on grazing rights, was a choice made under these circumstances.

94.   With the great majority of the African population living in camps in Darfur or neighbouring Chad, the remaining Arab herders are increasingly moving into the abandoned areas. The rebel movement perceives this as a specific central government policy. Unfortunately, the AU forces have no mandate to prevent the Arab herders from moving. Consequently, they are regarded as de facto allies of the central government. This could explain the recent killings and abductions by rebel groups of AU forces, including civilian support staff, as well as attacks on supply trucks paid for by the international community. The international community (by feeding and maintaining the African population in camps) and the AU forces (by paving the way for Arab herders to take land from African farmers) are unintentionally playing into the hands of Khartoum. If the rebels attack Arab herders, then a *real* civil war between the local populations could break out, with unforeseeable consequences for the international aid workers. The Abuja peace talks on Darfur would most likely break down. A civil war would also present the AU forces with a huge challenge and might even drag the EU and NATO into the conflict, which already involves neighbouring Chad and which would take on an even bigger regional dimension.

95.   For as long as there is no peace agreement for Darfur, the implementation of the peace agreement between the North and the South will be hampered. It is up to the new government of Sudan, composed on the basis of the criteria set out in the peace agreement, to endeavour to find a lasting solution for Darfur and prevent the disintegration of the country, which would have untold consequences for a number of neighbouring countries.

96.   A third conflict might continue to develop in Sudan's north-east border region with Eritrea, where local rebel movements of the Beja people have recently engaged central government forces in heavy fighting. There too, the claim for a fair share of Sudan's oil revenues generates support for the rebel movement.

AMIS (African Mission in Sudan)

97.   AMIS was established following the mediation of the government of Chad in talks aimed at concluding a "Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement" (HCFA) and because neither the Sudanese government nor the UN Security Council supported a UN intervention in Darfur. The agreement was eventually signed in N'djamena on 8 April 2004. It provided for the establishment of a "Ceasefire Commission" (CFC) to monitor ceasefire violations and identify the position of the opposing groups, a Joint Commission (JC) to host political negotiations and the deployment of Observers. To set up the CFC, the AU provided 60 unarmed military observers, supported by a 300-strong protection force composed of Rwandan and Nigerian soldiers. However, this proved to be inadequate and on 28 May 2005, the African Union authorised the deployment of the "African Mission in Sudan" (AMIS) to Darfur to monitor and implement the agreement. This was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council on 30 July 2005 in Resolution 1556.

98.   Violence continued and the AU Peace and Security Council authorised an increased force (AMIS II) made up of 2341 military personnel, including 542 military observers, 815 civilian police

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[66] The following paragraphs draw on Gérard Prunier's press conference at the Maison de Radio France on 13 October 2005.

and 26 international CFC members. It widened the force's mandate to assist in confidence building and contribute to a secure environment in Darfur[67]. Dr Salim Ahmed Salim (former Secretary-General of the OAU) was appointed as special representative of the Chairman of the African Commission and the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) was created in Addis Ababa where it serves as the mission headquarters. A forward headquarters is based in El Fasher/Darfur. Sector headquarters have been established for the eight sectors covering the entire Darfur region. When the ceasefire violations continued, the AU again increased the strength of the observer mission (AMIS II extended, 28 April 2005) to up to 6171 military staff and 1560 civilian and police staff.

99.   This rapid increase in strength gave rise to problems in bringing the forces to the designated sectors in Darfur. The AU mission was soon seriously hampered by logistical limitations (for instance problems with the supply of food acceptable to soldiers of different African origin or the limited capacity of the dispatch centre in El Fasher), adverse weather conditions and lack of equipment[68]. As a consequence, deployment came to a temporary halt and the North Atlantic Council extended its airlift support to the AU to allow for deferred deployment[69]. In a remarkable statement revealing the gravity of the situation, the EU declared it had insisted very strongly in talks with the government in Khartoum that Sudan must "take the necessary steps to facilitate the deployment of equipment necessary to enhance the effectiveness of AMIS"[70].

100.   Currently 5546 troops are deployed in eight sectors, with 40 stationed in Abeche (Chad) and 1188 officers of the 1560-strong police force on duty. Military forces are being provided by Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Gambia and Kenya (military police). 28 helicopters donated by Canada and the Netherlands are available. With the very limited infrastructure in Darfur, they are often the only means of transport. Recently, fuel shortages have reduced transport capacity. The Sudanese government is blocking the release of 105 armoured personnel vehicles (APC) donated by Canada. These vehicles are crucial for the extension of the observer patrols to cover the whole area of each sector.

101.   The killings of several AU soldiers and civilian support staff (from PAE) on 8 October 2005 highlight the severe deterioration of the situation in Darfur since the deployment of AU forces began in April 2004. Attacks on military observers and members of the protection forces, including abductions, have increased since August 2005. General banditry and crime are also on the increase and the delivery of humanitarian aid has deteriorated. Some of the attacks have been perpetrated by splinter groups of rebel movements not represented at the Abuja talks, and AU officials believe that many of the attacks are intended to show the relative strength of a given faction. Such shows of force are to the detriment of the local population and incite acts of revenge. The stage is set for a further bout of intense violence in Darfur.

102.   The Darfur mission is clearly at a crossroads and decisions will have to be made on its future strength and role. AU officials believe that without a revision of its mandate allowing troops to disarm the various forces and armed groups, AMIS will not be able to prevent the security situation in Darfur from deteriorating further. Better communication equipment and improved logistical structures are also on the AU's wish list. For the EU and NATO, both of which have been supporting AMIS[71], this could mean that the AU will soon come up with further requests for financial and logistical assistance. Neither can a scenario be excluded in which either the EU or NATO will be faced with a request to deploy an Artemis-type operation to stabilise a specific sector in Darfur where the security situation is particularly tense. While the EU has set up a special Task Force Africa in the Council Secretariat, which is monitoring developments constantly, supported by the staff based at Addis Ababa, Khartoum

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[67] Seth Appiah-Mensah, "AU's Critical Assignment in Darfur", in African Security Review, Volume 14, No. 2 2005, pp.7-21.
[68] Nicholas Fiorenza reporting on the Assembly Conference on Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa in Brussels in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 October 2005.
[69] *Atlantic News*, 22 September 2005.
[70] Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Darfur, Brussels 11 October 2005, No. 13176/05 (Press 262), italics by author.
[71] For EU support to AMIS see EU Council Secretariat fact sheet AMIS II/02, October 2005. For NATO's assistance to the African Union for Darfur see http://www.nato.int/issues/darfur/index.html

and El Fasher, NATO currently lacks the structures required for sustained analysis and policy development in support of the AU and its Darfur mission.

3. Côte d'Ivoire

103.   The instability in Côte d'Ivoire started in 1993 following the death of its charismatic President Felix Houphouët-Boigny, which sparked of a series of events culminating in the coup d'état led by General Robert Gueï in 1999 and the adoption in 2000 by referendum of a new constitution in which was enshrined the principle of "ivoirity". This principle discriminated between ethnic Ivorians and those of "doubtful origin", in particular as regards the eligibility conditions for the presidential elections. Thanks to the pressure brought to bear by his supporters and part of the armed forces, Laurent Gbagbo won the 2000 elections, notwithstanding a high abstention rate, beating his rivals the self-proclaimed president General Gueï and Alassane Ouattara, who was disqualified on the grounds of his "doubtful Ivorian nationality". Protests were violently crushed. On 19 September 2002 a failed coup d'état against President Gbagbo marked the start of a rebellion by part of the army which took control of the entire northern part of the country. The south and Abidjan remained under loyalist control, in spite of violent unrest in the capital during which General Gueï was killed. It was at this time that the security forces burned down dwellings in the shanty towns[72].

104.   On 22 September, French military reinforcements[73] from the 43rd infantry battalion were sent in to protect foreign nationals. They consisted of 511 soldiers stationed at Port Bouët, near Abidjan. The French intervention took the name of Operation Licorne[74]. On 4 February 2003, the United Nations authorised the deployment of French and ECOWAS[75] forces for a renewable period of six months. By 7 February, the number of troops engaged in Operation Licorne stood at 4000[76]. Their mandate was later extended[77] and subsequently replaced by UN Security Council Resolution 1518.

105.   The negotiations between the different political forces led, on 23 January 2003, to the drawing-up of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement, making provision in particular for the establishment of a government of national reconciliation, the organisation of credible and transparent national elections, a restructuring of the security forces, the disarmament of armed groups and the settlement of underlying disputes, in particular on eligibility criteria. That agreement, like the Accra II and III[78] and Pretoria[79] agreements, was never applied, in spite of the setting-up of the MINUCI mission[80] to facilitate its implementation. Each party blamed the other for these failures. MINUCI was later replaced by UNOCI (Security Council Resolution 1528 of 24 February 2004) signalling a change from a political to a peacekeeping mission. The elections scheduled for the end of October 2005 have been postponed, with President Gbagho refusing to negotiate and Guillaume Soro, the leader of the "*Forces Nouvelles",* calling for him to step down on the date initially scheduled for the elections. Alpha Oumar Konaré, Chairman of the African Union Commission, supported extending Mr Gbagbo's mandate so as not to leave an institutional vacuum which might result in another coup d'état[81]. The AU succeeded in obtaining support for its position when, on 21 October, the United Nations Security Council endorsed[82] the decision of the AU's Peace and Security Council that President Gbagbo should remain in power beyond 30 October and that a Prime Minister acceptable to all parties should be appointed.

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[72] "Côte d'Ivoire: The worst may be yet to come"; Crisis Group Africa report No. 90, 24 March 2005, p. 2.

[73] The French pre-positioned forces came from the Gabon, Senegal, Djibouti and Chad.

74 French National Assembly, 18 January 2005: report submitted on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Committee on draft resolution 1968, proposing the creation of a commission of inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the French Government's intervention in the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire since 19 September 2002.

75 Resolution 1464(2003) of the UN Security Council.

76 "Côte d'Ivoire: chronologie et repères historiques"; www.defense.gouv.fr

77 Resolution 1498(2003).

78 30 July 2004.

79 6 April 2005.

80 UN Security Council Resolution 1479, 13 May 2003.

[81] Press conference at the Centre d'Accueil de la Presse étrangère, Paris: "L'Union africaine aujourd'hui"; 26 October 2005.

[82] Resolution 1633 (2005).

106.   The military situation is being held in check by the UNOCI forces which have been monitoring the ceasefire since February 2004[83] with the support of the French troops engaged in Operation Licorne, who are acting as a buffer force in the "confidence zone" between the belligerent parties. Nevertheless, serious human rights violations have been reported on both sides and those responsible have never been brought to account for their acts in either a national or international court[84]. Moreover, the French buffer force is itself a target for action by the belligerent parties. France responded to incidents involving both rebel and loyalist forces with firm reprisals, including the destruction of the Ivorian air force in November 2004. Following the further deterioration of the situation in November 2004, with the belligerent parties rearming, the UN Security Council voted[85] in favour of an embargo on the sale of weapons to Côte d'Ivoire and on the imposition of sanctions on anyone hampering the peace process.

4. Sierra Leone

107.   The conflict in Sierra Leone lasted from March 1991 to 2002. It began when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked government forces, initially by making incursions from Liberia. In 1997, a splinter group from Sierra Leone's own army overthrew the government. Until 1998 there was a succession of coups d'état, ceasefires and further offensives. Power was restored to the legitimate government in February 1998 with the assistance of ECOMOG (Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)).

108.   The UN Security Council's involvement started when it imposed an oil and arms embargo on 7 October 1997 (Resolution 1132). In June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL supervised the disarming of the parties to the conflict and helped with the restructuring of the country's security forces. The observers investigated reports of atrocities committed against civilians[86].

109.   The conflict culminated in January 1999 when RUF forces, in an alliance with former members of the Sierra Leone army, took Freetown, the scene of wide-scale atrocities. The rebels were gradually pushed back by ECOMOG forces. Both the rebel and ECOMOG forces committed human rights abuses. On 7 July all the parties to the conflict signed a peace agreement in Lomé. Under its provisions hostilities were to end, a government of national unity was to be formed and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was given a mandate to draw up an impartial report on the causes of the conflict and the events that unfolded.

110.   However, in 2000 the situation deteriorated when the RUF attacked UN peacekeepers and destroyed disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration camps. UK forces were deployed to Freetown to evacuate British citizens and support the UN mission, mainly by securing Freetown's airport and providing over the horizon forces, thus giving the UN greater credibility[87]. In August, 11 British soldiers were captured by a group of former members of the Sierra Leone Army (the so-called West Side Boys). A rescue operation resulted in the death of one of the captured soldiers. On 10 November, the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed the Abuja agreement on disarmament, freedom of movement for the UN (including in the diamond mining areas) and a return to the peace process.

111.   One of the main issues which fuelled the conflict in Sierra Leone was control over the big diamond mines in the east of the country[88]. Illegal diamond trading has played a substantial part in funding arms and drugs. Another aspect was the widespread use of child soldiers in paramilitary

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[83] UN Security Council Resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004, making provision for the deployment of 6 240 blue helmet troops.

[84] According to an Amnesty International report entitled "Côte d'Ivoire un avenir lourd de menaces".

[85] UN Security Council Resolution 1572, 15 November 2004.

[86] UNOMSIL was created by virtue of UN Security Council Resolution 1181; its powers were extended under Resolutions 1220, 1231, 1245 and 1260.

[87] www.fco.gov.uk

[88] Greg Campbell, "Blood Diamonds", *Westview Press* 2004.

militias[89]. In regional terms the conflict was interlinked with the crises in Guinea and, above all, Liberia. The interests of many countries in the region were affected, a fact the international community did not take sufficiently into account during its intervention.

112.   UNOMSIL was eventually replaced by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) on 22 October 1999. UNAMSIL was a much more ambitious mission with redefined objectives. It initially consisted of 6000 military personnel including 260 observers whose task was to help the parties to enforce the Lomé peace agreement. The UN Security Council expanded the mission's military component at regular intervals and increased its powers. On 30 March 2001 it decided to bring the number of military personnel up to 17 500[90]. In parallel the UN, in agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone, set up the Special Court for Sierra Leone[91] in Freetown. The Court's task is to rule on serious human rights violations.

113.   UNAMSIL helped the Government of Sierra Leone to restore security in the country, focusing in particular on the police, the army and local government authorities. A great deal of work is being done as regards training and improving logistics and communications. There is not enough regular funding for a real operational capability to be established. Were it forthcoming, it would improve the morale of troops whose loyalty is somewhat fickle.

114.   The programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration has been carried out effectively, but a special effort is needed to reintegrate children, in association with Liberia and humanitarian NGOs. The state is now in a position to resume gradual control over diamond mining activities, with exports increasing all the time. The human rights situation has improved progressively as a result of an awareness campaign among citizens and the police force. The justice system, which had to be reformed as an urgent priority, is still understaffed. Discriminatory laws as regards women's rights still exist despite improvements in the justice system[92].

115.   The Truth and Reconciliation Commission submitted its final report at the end of 2004. It comprised over 8000 accounts by witnesses and comprehensive studies of all aspects of the conflict, concentrating in particular on human rights violations and the situation of children. The Special Court for Sierra Leone is cooperating with the Commission with a view to easing tensions and plays a crucial role in establishing where the main responsibility lies for crimes committed during the conflict[93].

116.   The fact that the general situation and the political climate in Sierra Leone are now stable has helped to consolidate peace in the country and paved the way for major progress to be made on the objectives set by UNAMSIL. The UN is to replace UNAMSIL, whose current strength is already down to 2360 soldiers, on 1 January 2006 by a UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSL, Security Council Resolution 1620 of 31 August 2005). UNIOSL should build on achievements to date and strengthen political and economic governance, working in close cooperation with the Government of Sierra Leone.

117.   Among the many areas in which assistance is required, the following take priority: building the capacities of public institutions; strengthening the legal system and the independence of the judiciary; enhancing good governance; protecting human rights and children's rights; ensuring freedom of the press. Furthermore, UNIOSL will need to provide the National Electoral Commission with the support it needs to conduct free, fair and credible elections in 2007[94].

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[89] Witness to truth: report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, volume 3B.

[90] UNAMSIL was created by virtue of UN Security Council Resolution 1270; its powers were extended *inter alia* under Resolutions 1299 and 1346.

[91] Agreement signed on 16 January 2002.

[92] 23rd report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMSIL, 9 September 2004.

[93] www.sc-sl.org 11 persons have been indicted for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity; on 27 September 2005, 9 were awaiting trial (*Le Monde diplomatique*, October 2005, "Sierra Leone, de la justice à la réconciliation".

[94] 25th report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMSIL, addendum of 28 July 2005.

VIII. *Lessons learned from peacekeeping and peace support operations*

118.   A number of studies have been published on the lessons learned from peace support operations, including documents that focus particularly on peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa[95]. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has a *Best Practices Unit* (Peacekeeping Best Practices Section) and a whole section of its website is devoted to lessons to be drawn from past peacekeeping operations. All this, together with other UN and external documents[96], provides a wealth of material for analysis. In addition, the EU's Political and Security Committee held an informal meeting in September 2005 on the conclusions to be drawn from recent operations in support of the African Union and on the way ahead for ESDP on the African continent.

119.   Leaving aside the crucial question of financing, which was addressed in Chapter V of this report, most studies focus on political issues and examine a series of aspects such as the nature of mandates for operations and the role of neighbouring countries, donor countries and the international community in general. They also look at military issues including training, logistics, troop deployment, supplies, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration measures and the need for civilian police. Other questions addressed concern human rights, elections, public information, management, civil affairs, and civilian personnel. Some more specific studies look at the structures and procedures inside the United Nations, coordination between different UN bodies in a country where an operation is being carried out and UN cooperation with regional organisations.

The increased complexity of peace support missions and regional links between conflicts

120.   There is a general trend towards increasingly complex operations. The classic peacekeeping mission in which a neutral military force monitors the application of an *existing* ceasefire agreement between warring parties is being replaced by operations set up to *produce* such a ceasefire and create the conditions for negotiations to start. Where a conflict situation develops favourably, operations are increasingly based on comprehensive mandates which require a wide range of tasks to be undertaken, including assistance with the implementation of electoral processes. Mandates are also being drawn up with a growing awareness of the regional links between conflicts. It might be necessary in the future to further develop cooperation between peace support missions in neighbouring countries, especially as far as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes are concerned.

Strengthening the role of the African Union

121.   One of the most important tasks ahead is the need to confirm the leadership role of the African Union, increase its authority on the continent and improve coordination between regional players, neighbouring countries and African lead nations. From the point of view of the Regional Economic Communities/Regions and certain African lead nations there is still somewhat of a deficit as regards the credibility of the African Union's authority. They are concerned about the slow pace at which the AU progresses and occasionally perceive its involvement as adding a further layer to the decision-making process. There is often a fear on the part of the RECs/Regions that they may lose control over the outcome of the process and that benefits for the region will not be guaranteed. Furthermore, the AU, which is a very young organisation, has on a number of occasions in the past had to be urged to make progress by the RECs/Regions and lead nations, which have been working on certain integration projects for quite some time. Also, the fact that some African countries belong to two RECs/Regions and the sometimes contradictory stance of individual countries (for instance Rwanda, which is an important troop provider helping the AU to stabilise the situation in Dafur while at the same time contributing to the instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo) are further problems that need to be addressed by the African Union in order to improve coherence.

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[95] For example: Cyrus Samii, International Peace Academy, "Peace Operations in Africa: Capacity, Operations and Implications. Report from the 34th annual Vienna Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Seminar (30 June to 3 July 2004); Emeric Rogier "Rethinking Conflict Resolution in Africa. Lessons from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Sudan", Clingendael, July 2004; Stephan Klingebiel, "Africa's new peace and security architecture", in *African Security Review* 14(2), 2005.

[96] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/

Cross-cutting approaches

122.   There is a growing awareness of the need to take a cross-cutting approach when tackling Africa's security problems, by integrating foreign, security and development policy instruments. Such an integrated approach poses specific challenges for policy-makers in Western governments as well as in NGOs, where mindsets reflecting different foreign, security and development policy cultures tend not to be the same. Efforts to change mentalities should continue. The cooperation between the relevant United Kingdom government foreign affairs, international development and defence departments in the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool[97] is a good example of what can be done in this respect.

Improving disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes

123.   It is common knowledge that countries emerging from a conflict may relapse into violence if there is no coordinated effort to promote disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. While the shorter-term aspects of disarmament and demobilisation, i.e. converting combatants into ex-combatants and the collection of weapons and ammunition, are generally well-established programmes, the reintegration part (return to civil life) continues to pose a big challenge, especially where child soldiers are involved. Substantial long-term funding is needed to provide the necessary schooling and vocational training which enable ex-combatants to return to a normal life in society and address the special needs of children.[98] Improvements also need to be made in many of the camps in which ex-combatants are kept during the reintegration programmes. In many cases these camps tend to resemble prisons rather than the sheltered accommodation which is the first step towards a more normal life. The acronym "DDR" is sometimes expanded to include a wider range of reintegration objectives such as rehabilitation (DDRR) in the case of Liberia, where many atrocities have been perpetrated, or repatriation and reinstallation (DDRRR) in the case of the Democratic Republic of Republic, thus reflecting the specific problems that need to be addressed in post-conflict management.

The need for coherent civil-military strategies

124.   Peace-support operations need to tackle the vicious circle of war, violence, the militarisation of society, displacement, disease, poverty and illegal trafficking in weapons, which is often made possible as a result of illegal trafficking in natural resources. As military means alone have proven insufficient to accomplish such a complex objective, an appropriate combination of military and civil instruments is now being used. However, many of the civil positions in United Nations missions remain vacant because of a lack of suitable candidates. A medium-term training policy could help alleviate these shortcomings.

The importance of civil policing

125.   The importance of having a civil police force is becoming increasingly obvious. There is no doubt that a population which does not trust the local police force, as is the case in Darfur, and which feels the need to protect itself will almost inevitably turn to violence. It is for this reason that programmes designed to rebuild and support state authorities, make local police aware of human rights issues and train and equip them are being built into international intervention missions. Such programmes also include support for amending and modernising constitutions.

Civil capabilities

126.   Current support programmes for the African Union tend to focus on military capabilities. However, there is also a need for an equal commitment to building civil capabilities, especially if African structures are to be entrusted with the management of post-conflict situations. Among other things this entails the provision of sufficient post-conflict peacebuilding funding and the necessary technical and human assistance.

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[97] African Conflict Prevention Pool, Information Document, UK Department for International Development, September 2004.
[98] Not every child fighting in African wars has had the luck of Lucien Badjoko who successfully took part in a demobilisation programme in Kinshasa and who has written a book about his experience ("J'étais enfant soldat" (avec Katia Clarens), Plon 2005).

Force enablers to strengthen military efficiency and interoperability

127.   At present none of the ten leading countries providing troops for UN peace support operations (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Jordan, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa and Uruguay) is a NATO or EU member state. The first NATO/EU country is Poland, which ranks 20th on the list. This has consequences for the higher end capabilities of UN forces. Most of the forces provided cover light weapon and infantry needs sufficiently but lack communication and logistics specialists, experts in airfield and air transport management, water and electricity management, medical supplies and intelligence. The African Union too suffers from a lack of so-called *force enablers* who provide crucial logistical and managerial support. Current training programmes[99] are endeavouring to address these shortfalls. At the Assembly's conference on "Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach", Armand De Decker, the Belgian Minister for Development Cooperation, called for the establishment, in Central Africa of a major joint African Union/European Union base, thus making it possible to pursue further and more intensively the process of training African and European forces in the field.

Rapid reaction and over the horizon forces

128.   The African Union, together with the Regional Economic Communities/Regions, is in the process of setting up the African Standby Force, composed of regional rapid reaction force components which will be available at short notice. Following their intervention other forces could take over a mission. The African Standby Force could also act as a deterrent, dissuading warring parties from resorting to violence. In addition, it will be a reserve force for ongoing operations and will quickly be able to provide backup for a deployed force that comes under attack (over the horizon capacity). However, in view of the current lack of AU capabilities, over the horizon forces may also need to be provided by European countries.

Languages

129.   Operations in Africa have sometimes been rendered more difficult because deployed troops have little or no knowledge of the language used locally. One example of this is the deployment of English-speaking troops from Asian countries in the Democratic Republic of Congo where the main language is French. Although this would seem to be an obvious problem, it continues to be an issue as it limits the ability of peacekeepers to engage with the local population and restricts the forces' intelligence capability.

Ongoing political and military preparations by the EU to respond to crises immediately

130.   Despite the AU's efforts to take on more responsibility for crisis management on the continent, the EU needs to be prepared to respond to a given crisis when neither the AU nor the United Nations is willing or able to do so. Such an intervention would probably be an Artemis-type operation. Because only a few EU member states have the capability to be a *lead nation*, the further development of the battlegroup concept is crucial so that the smaller member states can also take part in such operations. In the longer run the EU needs to address its current self-imposed restriction whereby it has no plans for long-term or large-scale troop deployments in Africa.

Code of conduct for deployed personnel

131.   Proper conduct on the part of deployed personnel is crucial for the success of any peace support operation as failure to comply with established rules immediately calls the legitimacy of a mission into question. In the past the UN, ECOWAS and other organisations have had to live with the adverse consequences of misconduct by individual members of personnel participating in their missions. The UN Secretary-General has now imposed a strict zero tolerance policy and the EU is currently working on a code of conduct. In so far as it is possible, harmonising the principles governing the code of conduct of various international players would appear to be an essential requirement.

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[99] For an overview see for example Cyrus Samii, International Peace Academy, "Peace Operations in Africa: Capacity, Operations and Implications. Report from the 34th annual Vienna Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Seminar (30 June to 3 July 2004), table 3.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: a practical approach

The Assembly,

(i)　　Recalling the historical ties between African and European countries and Europe's continuing commitment to promoting peace, security and development on the African continent;

(ii)　　Considering that the recent increase in attempts by refugees, mainly of Sub-Saharan origin, to reach the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melila is symptomatic of ongoing and serious political, economic and human rights shortcomings in many Sub-Saharan countries, which pose a threat to the lives of many more people than the few who arrive at the EU's borders;

(iii)　　Recalling the importance of achieving the Millennium Development Goals, but noting the need for Africa as a continent to make more progress in this direction;

(iv)　　Noting also that although these objectives are ambitious they are also insufficient because even if the number of people living in extreme poverty was reduced by 50% between now and 2015, the remaining number would be unacceptably high;

(v)　　Welcoming the announcement of the member states of the European Union to raise the percentage of their Gross National Income (GNI) dedicated to development aid to 0.7% by 2015, which should lead to an additional 46 billion euros a year out of which 50% will be allocated to Africa;

(vi)　　Welcoming also the "*EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development*" adopted by the European Commission on 12 October 2005, which will contribute to an *EU Strategy for Africa* to be adopted by the EU Council in December, and taking the view that such a strategy should be adopted jointly with Africans, preferably following a comprehensive EU-AU summit or a meeting of the EU-AU Troika;

(vii)　　Stressing that the principles of *peace, security and good governance* which the Commission sets out in its document are fundamental if there is to be sustainable development on the African continent and if work on the Millennium Development Goals is to make real progress ;

(viii)　　Welcoming also the principles of *equality, partnership and ownership* which the Commission's document sets out for governing EU-African relations, thus reflecting the emergence of democratically elected political leaders and many new political figures who are contributing to negotiated settlements of conflicts and participating in transition governments working for peaceful conflict resolutions, and commending the recent reinforcement of the political pan-African institutions and the willingness of Africans to deal with the problems on their continent themselves;

(ix)　　Noting the ongoing trend in international relations whereby countries in Africa are being encouraged to shoulder more responsibility for conflict management on their continent;

(x)　　Taking the view that European governments should not use this as an excuse for slackening their cooperation with African governments in order to resolve conflicts in Africa or for distancing themselves from their responsibility to protect populations in danger of extermination as a result of famine, disease or conflict;

(xi)　　Noting the reduction in the number of violent conflicts on the African continent since the 1999 peak and welcoming the historic peace agreements concluded for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Sudan (North-South conflict);

(xii)　　Noting the cessation of hostilities in Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone but still concerned about the absence of lasting solutions to a number of conflicts in African countries, their negative regional impact and the continuing instability, in particular in the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Eastern region), Guinea, Somalia and Sudan (Darfur and North-East region), which make the presence of peacekeeping forces and/or international mediation necessary;

(xiii) Welcoming recent efforts to improve African early warning mechanisms, and taking the view that the reason for unaccounted numbers of victims on the African continent in the past was not a lack of awareness but rather a lack of will to act and that the early warning mechanisms need to be properly linked to political decision-making bodies;

(xiv) Noting that developed countries' financial aid packages are geared more to long-term development or to short-term funding for humanitarian emergencies and that work on new systems to cater for periods leading up to a conflict (prevention phase) or those following conflicts (post-conflict phase) needs to be accelerated;

(xv) Considering that the EU-funded Africa Peace Facility is a possible model for future EU funding of African-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations;

(xvi) Noting that the Africa Peace Facility is virtually depleted and that its funds have either been spent or are earmarked, and that this means that the EU could be incapable of providing funding for further AU proposals for mediation, observer or peacekeeping operations unless decisions on replenishment and the future funding of African-led peace support operations are taken as a matter of urgency;

(xvii) Emphasising that the credibility of an *EU Strategy for Africa* depends on the EU member states making available adequate financial resources for the African continent, and noting that the African Union, for its part, is providing the political capital and human resources that are equally necessary for establishing peace and security in Africa;

(xviii) Welcoming the progress that has been made in implementing the EU Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa;

(xix) Considering that, in a number of cases, conflicts in Africa are influenced by outside economic and military interests;

(xx) Considering that the unregulated flow of small arms and light weapons, which are produced and traded by countries inside and outside Africa, is contributing to instability in Africa and that wider support for enhanced international regulation is necessary;

(xxi) Stressing that many countries emerge from conflicts only to relapse into violence soon afterwards and that it is necessary on the one hand to provide a wide range of post-conflict support including disarmament and demobilisation, which would be more productive than offering combatants financial incentives to hand in their weapons, and on the other to find sustainable solutions for the reintegration of former combatants into civil life in an improving economic environment;

(xxii) Considering that a coherent European strategy for the African continent must include improved access for African exports to the European Union as well as support for a continued increase in intra-African regional trade;

(xxiii) Stressing that HIV/AIDS poses a serious threat to African armed forces and seriously undermines the military capabilities of African countries;

African Union

(xxiv) Welcoming the establishment of the African Union and its decision-making bodies as a new institutional form of governance for the African continent, the evolution of doctrine from non-interference to non-indifference and the inclusion in the AU's guiding principles of the responsibility to protect African citizens from war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;

(xxv) Agreeing with the EU that the AU is the institutional framework within which it should establish an enhanced EU-Africa partnership, while underlining that the AU is not the EU's sole institutional partner in Africa;

(xxvi) Welcoming the readiness of Africa's own institutions, in particular the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities/Regions, to shoulder more of the burden for dealing with conflicts on the continent;

(xxvii) Noting the African Union's capacity constraints, in particular with regard to logistic support and communications equipment, and the fact that it is heavily dependent on outside financial and technical support, as was highlighted by the recent shortcomings of the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS), and stressing that these need to be addressed as a matter of urgency;

(xxviii) Welcoming the progress made in setting up the African Standby Force and its five regional components in the belief that the African Union must show strong leadership in coordinating progress at regional level, and noting the AU's stated intention to invite contributions from the EU and other donor countries to upcoming policy formulation workshops;

(xxix) Taking note of the results of the third session of the Pan-African Parliament and convinced that pan-African interparliamentary cooperation has the potential to promote human rights observance and democracy across the African continent, allow for benchmarking with respect to good governance, transparency and accountability among member states, and contribute to peace and stability;

(xxx) Noting that Morocco, which is not a member of the AU, must continue to be associated with EU policy towards Africa;

Darfur

(xxxi) Concerned by the slow pace of progress in the Abuja peace talks on Darfur between the rebel groups and the central government;

(xxxii) Concerned about the continuing serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and also about the atrocities being committed in Darfur against the civil population, and in particular against African communities, including internally displaced persons (IDP) now living in camps in Darfur which are being run by the international community;

(xxxiii) Regretting the recent deterioration in humanitarian aid supplies to camps housing internally displaced persons (IDP), and deploring the fact that the Sudanese Government continues to hinder the work of humanitarian organisations;

(xxxiv) Noting that the mandate of the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS), which encompasses military observation and policing tasks including the protection of civilians under immediate threat, is at present not being implemented in such a way as to prevent attacks against the population of Darfur;

(xxxv) Supporting the firm stance the European Union is taking vis-à-vis the Sudanese Government in insisting that it is the latter's responsibility to guarantee the safety of all its citizens and those working on their behalf, and taking the view that international pressure on the Government of Sudan must be stepped up;

(xxxvi) Welcoming the appointment of Pekka Haavisto (Finland) as EU Special Representative for Sudan and commending his efforts to arrive at a successful outcome of the Abuja peace talks on Darfur;

(xxxvii) Aware of the existence of a list drawn up by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur containing the names of 51 individuals, including senior officials of the Sudanese Government, accused of violating international human rights law and humanitarian law and of perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan;

(xxxviii) Welcoming the decision of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an investigation into the situation in Darfur, and expressing the hope that there will be an end to impunity in Sudan and that the ICC will shortly be serving indictments;

Côte d'Ivoire

(xxxix) Noting that the EU has not yet adopted a joint position on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire;

(xl) Considering that intervention by France (Operation Licorne) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) have prevented a bloodbath in the country, in contrast to what has occurred in other African countries;

(xli) Welcoming the permanent participation of the United Nations, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South Africa and France in efforts to resolve the conflict and find lasting solutions, and noting the need for all the international players to show firm resolve and adopt a united stance;

(xlii) Taking the view that notwithstanding the problems that have arisen with the application of a series of agreements − Linas-Marcoussis, Accra III and Pretoria − these nevertheless form the basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and for lasting stability in the region;

(xliii) Noting that the presidential election scheduled for 30 October 2005 had to be postponed;

(xliv) Concerned by many human rights violations committed by the forces on both sides;

(xlv) Noting the proposal by the AU Peace and Security Council, as endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, that President Laurent Gbagbo should remain as Head of State for a maximum period of twelve months and that a new Prime Minister should be appointed with the approval of all the signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis agreements;

Democratic Republic of Congo

(xlvi) Welcoming the positive impact of both the European Union Security Sector Reform (SSR) mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC-RD Congo) and the European Union Police mission (EUPOL Kinshasa) and noting that the country needs continuous support in its preparations for the electoral process;

(xlvii) Commending the United Nations on the achievements of its mission (MONUC), which is currently the largest UN peace support operation;

(xlviii) Aware of the problems involved in establishing a security climate in the Great Lakes region as a whole;

(xlix) Considering that the EU military operation Artemis in the Ituri region helped initiate the process of finding a lasting solution to the conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo;

(l) Noting the efforts of the African Union in this region;

Sierra Leone

(li) Welcoming the work the United Kingdom has done both in managing the conflict and organising post-conflict reconstruction;

(lii) Commending the United Nations on the successful conclusion of its mission (UNAMSIL) and on its decision to set up an UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone, which will continue to offer support so that the population of Sierra Leone can lead a more normal life;

(liii) Considering that the situation regarding the safety of women and children in the country is still unsatisfactory,

> RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU NATIONS AS MEMBERS OF THE EU TO REQUEST THE EUROPEAN UNION TO:

1. Accelerate the setting up in the EU of adequate and sustainable financial resources through the establishment of a *Euro-African Peace and Security Fund* in order to provide funding for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations undertaken by the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities/Regions, bearing in mind the following principles and objectives:

> *(a)* basing the Euro-African Peace and Security Fund on the successful example of the EU-funded Africa Peace Facility;

> *(b)* establishing solidarity on the one hand between the EU and AU member states and on the other between the EU and AU as organisations;

> *(c)* emphasising the leadership role of the AU for African-led peace support operations;

    (d) providing resources compatible with the AU's own complementary funding efforts such as the Peace Fund and other non-EU financial resources;

    (e) providing multi-annual funding and improving the predictability of funding for the African Union;

    (f) expanding the list of items eligible for funding;

    (g) including a specific joint EU-AU auditing and reporting mechanism;

    (h) earmarking funds for demobilisation, decommissioning and reintegration (DDR) projects;

    (i) separating funds to support African-led peacekeeping missions from the financing of other CFSP/ESDP operations;

    (j) involving the European Commission in the management of funds with a view to facilitating the coherence of EU policies towards Africa;

    (k) improving information rights for the European Parliament;

2.   Persuade the EU Council to increase, in the context of the *EU Strategy for Africa*, its offers of assistance to the African Union, in particular as regards enhancing continental and regional peacekeeping capabilities but also across the whole spectrum of the AU's activities, including its managerial, accounting and auditing capacities;

3.   Propose, in the context of the European Union, the funding of a joint EU-AU programme to provide treatment against HIV/AIDS for military and civilian personnel participating in AU-led peace-support operations;

4.   Propose, in the context of EU efforts to support African initiatives to improve the continent's peacekeeping capabilities, a study into the setting up of joint regional military bases which would host European and African military personnel, equipment and training facilities;

5.   Encourage the return of Diaspora citizens to countries in which conflicts are being settled so that they can participate in the post-conflict reconstruction process;

6.   Ensure that special attention is given in post-conflict-support to the specific needs of former boy and girl soldiers who face different challenges in reintegrating civil society;

7.   Continue to work on an efficient strategy against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the conflict regions of Africa, in particular by marking weapons and ammunition, and take action in the framework of the 2006 United Nations Review Conference following on from the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects;

8.   Expand and deepen in the EU Council the section on security cooperation in the *EU Strategy for Africa* before its adoption scheduled for the European Council meeting in December in Brussels and include in it the following requirements:

    (a) regular meetings between the EU Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council at ambassador level, particularly in view of the EUPSC's role in endorsing AU proposals for EU funding of peace support operations;

    (b) keeping the Regional Economic Communities/Regions informed about the implementation of the *EU Strategy for Africa*, including the creation of new instruments to promote the development of crisis management capabilities and fund peace support operations;

9.   Strengthen the Pan-African Parliament with a view to helping it evolve into the parliamentary dimension of the African Union and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), including its African Peer Review Mechanism;

Darfur

10.   Support proposals to strengthen the mandate of the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS) so that it is able to disarm the various armed groups operating in Darfur;

11.   Propose support for the Sudanese Government of Unity's police forces, which are responsible for the security of the population in Darfur, and also for the humanitarian aid workers operating in the region and more particularly in and close to the camps for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP).

Côte d'Ivoire

12.   Encourage and promote the application and development of the DDR programme (demobilisation, decommissioning and reintegration) in Côte d'Ivoire for both the governmental security and defence forces and the rebel *Forces Nouvelles*;

13.   Support the efforts being made to implement the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra III and Pretoria agreements and insist that only a political solution will bring lasting peace and stability to the country and the region;

14.   Adopt a very strict policy concerning the monitoring of the arms embargo on Côte d'Ivoire;

15.   Encourage the authorities in Côte d'Ivoire to organise free and transparent elections as soon as possible;

Democratic Republic of Congo

16.   Continue supporting voter registration and the distribution of voter cards with the aim of ensuring that conditions are such that all the country's citizens are able to vote in the planned referendum and the ensuing elections;

17.   Promote the holding of free and transparent elections in the near future, including the provincial elections foreseen by the draft constitution, with the aim of improving local governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo;

18.   Support the United Nations' efforts in the region, mainly through the intermediary of MONUC;

19.   Support the African Union so that it can play a bigger role in restoring confidence among the countries of the region;

Sierra Leone

20.   Encourage further political reform and remain committed to the country after the departure of UNAMSIL peacekeepers and the establishment of the non-military UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSL);

21.   Promote and support initiatives designed to improve the situation of women and children;

22.   Support the work of the special war crimes Court for Sierra Leone and its contribution to the establishment of rule of law, and provide it with the necessary financial resources.

AMENDMENTS 1-2[100]

tabled by Charles Goerens,
Rapporteur (Luxembourg, Liberal Group)

1. Add the following new recital after recital *(viii)* of the preamble to the draft recommendation:

"Welcoming the contribution by the EU High Representative to the *EU Strategy for Africa,* in which he emphasises the link between security and development and argues that '*measures in the fields of trade, aid and debt relief will need to be supported by peace and security, and governance';"*

2. Add the following new recital before recital *(ix)* of the preamble to the draft recommendation:

"Welcoming also the initial conclusions drawn by EU Foreign Ministers on an *EU Strategy for Africa* at their meeting in Brussels on 21-22 November 2005, and stressing that these should be strengthened and improved by giving effect to the practical proposals made in this report;"

Signed: Goerens

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[100] See 7th sitting, 6 December 2005 (Amendments adopted).