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**ESDP developments and the Headline Goal 2010 –
reply to the annual report of the Council**

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Konstantinos Vrettos, Rapporteur (Greece, Socialist Group)

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*ESDP developments and the Headline Goal 2010 –
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RECOMMENDATION 764¹***on ESDP developments and the Headline Goal 2010 – reply to the annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling the resolve of the member states expressed at Helsinki “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises”;
- (ii) Noting with satisfaction the determination shown by the EU member states in the European Security Strategy together to be capable of dealing with the new threats: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organised crime;
- (iii) Welcoming the EU’s efforts to constantly improve upon its crisis-management procedures and structures (PSC, EUMC, EUMS etc.) and to acquire the capabilities needed for fulfilling its tasks;
- (iv) Noting that the so-called extended Petersberg tasks that the EU set for itself in the Constitutional Treaty cover all aspects of crisis management: conflict prevention, crisis management proper and post-crisis missions;
- (v) Regretting that Article I-41 (7) of the Constitutional Treaty on mutual defence contains no binding commitment for the member states;
- (vi) Welcoming the setting-up, through that treaty, of “permanent structured cooperation” among member states wishing to acquire effective crisis-management capabilities for the EU by improving their autonomy and responsiveness;
- (vii) Noting with satisfaction that the Headline Goal 2010 will give the EU the capability to react very swiftly to an emerging crisis;
- (viii) Recalling, however, that the EU does not have a permanent multinational operational headquarters which would enable it to respond within the timeframe specified by the Headline Goal 2010, namely, a decision within five days and deployment within ten days;
- (ix) Welcoming the development of the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff which will make it possible to link up the different aspects involved in the management of a crisis and to rapidly set up an operations centre for that type of mission;
- (x) Noting with satisfaction the desire of the large majority of member states to participate in the creation of battlegroups, but aware of the difficulties involved in having well-trained multinational battlegroups available within less than ten days;
- (xi) Noting the dispersal of efforts in the defence equipment sector within the EU and welcoming the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA);
- (xii) Noting the efforts being made by the member states within the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) to remedy identified shortfalls in the area of military capabilities with a view to carrying out EU missions, but conscious of the difficulties they are encountering;
- (xiii) Noting the developments in the area of the Global Approach on Deployability;
- (xiv) Regretting the lack of an industrial armaments policy within the EU;
- (xv) Welcoming the EU’s efforts to acquire a civilian crisis-management capability in the different areas of civil intervention and the start of the process for implementing the 2008 civilian Headline Goal;
- (xvi) Welcoming the developments in EU training in the field of the ESDP, which will enhance a European security culture;

¹ Adopted by the Assembly on 15 June 2005 at the 4th sitting.

(xvii) Recalling the emphasis that has been placed within the EU on the fight against terrorism and that is reflected in the EU plan of action to combat terrorism and the use of the ESDP to that end;

(xviii) Noting with satisfaction the EU's cooperation during recent crises with NATO (Berlin plus arrangements), the UN (joint declaration) and the African Union,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU MEMBER STATES AS MEMBERS OF THE EU TO:

1. Maintain their mutual defence obligation as it stands within the modified Brussels Treaty for as long as the EU member states have not entered into any commitment of that kind by means of a future amendment to the Constitutional Treaty;
2. Urge the EU Military Committee to draw up a proper military strategic concept with a view to translating into military capabilities the political resolve to manage crises that is expressed in the European Security Strategy and in the Headline Goal 2010;
3. Mobilise their efforts within the EU to introduce a minimum procedure for qualified majority voting in the ESDP decision-making processes in order to avert the danger of decisions being blocked by the unanimity requirement;
4. Encourage the development of the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff and provide the means to establish a proper operations centre;
5. Concert their efforts with a view to putting in place a genuine permanent multinational operations headquarters to be used in connection with "permanent structured cooperation" within the EU;
6. Incorporate in the ESDP a proper intelligence policy based on European satellite capabilities and the Torrejón Satellite Centre, which will have been made more operational;
7. Take forward the implementation of the EU battlegroups concept in order to achieve full operational capability in 2007 as identified in the Headline Goal 2010, and set up specific battlegroup training and exercises;
8. Take forward the Global Approach on Deployability and the creation of a permanent EU Movement Coordination Cell within the EUMS;
9. Participate actively in the new phase of the ECAP (European Capability Action Plan) and make available the financial resources that are essential for developing the equipment programmes being envisaged to remedy the identified capability shortfalls;
10. Continue work in the area of EU training in the field of the ESDP and especially in relation to the European Security and Defence College;
11. Foster the development of the European Defence Agency by providing it with the necessary personnel and funding as soon as possible and by introducing the possibility of qualified majority voting into the decision-making process.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Konstantinos Vrettos, Rapporteur (Greece, Socialist Group)

I. *The strategic objective*

1. *A secure Europe in a better world*

1. The document “A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy”, drawn up by Javier Solana and adopted by the Brussels European Council in December 2003, sets out a security and defence strategy which should enable Europe to shoulder its share of responsibility, as a global player, for international security.
2. During the cold war period Europe relied on the United States, which through NATO played an essential role in European security. With the geostrategic upheaval of the 1990s new threats emerged: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. It was Europe’s awareness of those new threats that prompted the decision to define a European security and defence strategy.
3. The European Union has set itself three strategic objectives in order to guarantee its security and promote its values. The first is entitled “addressing the threats”, which calls for a committed effort to combat terrorism and the financing of terrorism in particular, the proliferation of WMD and the failure of states. The second is “building security in our neighbourhood”, which expresses Europe’s commitment to good governance in the EU’s neighbours to the east and on the borders of the Mediterranean. The third is “an international order based on effective multilateralism”, the aim of which is to develop a stronger international society, well-functioning international organisations (the United Nations, WTO, NATO, the IFI²) and regional institutions (the OSCE, the Council of Europe, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, the African Union) and a rule-based international order.
4. To achieve those aims the EU must first of all more actively pursue its strategic objectives – this concerns the full range of its crisis-management and conflict-prevention tools – while more strongly supporting the United Nations. It must therefore develop both its military and civil capabilities. The creation of the European Defence Agency is a practical example. Then Europe must become stronger by adopting a more coherent approach to crises. Finally, cooperation with its partners – the United States, Russia and Canada among others, but also with other countries, in particular Japan, China, and India – must become a priority.
5. In conclusion, to quote the European Security Strategy, “this is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world”³.

2. *Autonomy and responsiveness*

6. The first Gulf war and the dismemberment of former Yugoslavia in 1991 brought home to the EU member states the need to give the CFSP a defence dimension – the ESDP, which was mentioned for the first time in the Maastricht Treaty adopted at the EU summit of December 1991. However, it was only after the fundamental change of circumstances that occurred at the Saint-Malo Franco-British summit in December 1998 when the United Kingdom withdrew its opposition to the acquisition by the EU of an autonomous military capability, that any real progress could be made in this area: “the Union must be given (...) a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities *pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar* or national or multinational European means *outside the NATO framework*)”.

² International Financial Institutions.

³ Conclusion of the document “A European Security Strategy”.

7. The Saint-Malo compromise paved the way for the EU's subsequent progress at the Cologne summit in June 1999 and the Helsinki summit in December 1999, when the European Council underlined "its determination to develop an *autonomous* capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations *in response* to international crises (...)".

8. Through this declaration, which formed the basis for the ESDP, the EU member states defined their common strategic objective in the area of military capabilities: *autonomy* and *responsiveness*.

II. Evaluation of the Constitutional Treaty: progress and limitations

1. Missions

9. The June 1992 Petersberg Declaration was a key factor in the resolve to develop Western European Union (WEU) as the defence component of the European Union and a means for strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO). It set out the tasks of WEU, the so-called Petersberg missions, which had been drawn up in response to the threats identified at the beginning of the 1990s. It envisaged three types of mission: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The operations conducted in the Balkans are a good example.

10. In order to deal with international threats and challenges the EU member states have reached agreement on a series of measures with a view to coordinating their efforts in the field of security and defence (ESDP). The incipient ESDP was focused on the Petersberg tasks, which already features in Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union.

11. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks prompted a new awareness in both the United States and Europe of their vulnerability with regard to the threat of international terrorism. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and technological progress in the field of armaments pose further challenges for European security. Europe is therefore trying to develop a global approach to its security that takes into account the unpredictable nature of acts of terrorism and of cross-border organised crime. Finally, following conflicts like that which tore apart Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a need to participate in the reconstruction process.

12. In order to deal with the new emerging threats, a decision was taken in particular to broaden the range of the Petersberg tasks to include new missions and to make it possible to have recourse to military means in such cases as: conflict prevention, joint actions for disarmament, military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilisation and support at the request of the authorities of a third country in the fight against terrorism.

13. Developments in the ESDP enabled the EU to conduct its first crisis-management missions as early as 2003: two police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and two stabilisation/peacekeeping operations using military means, Operation Concordia in FYROM and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

14. It is important to note that even these extended Petersberg tasks concern missions on which there is a consensus among all the member states. They do not include mutual or collective defence.

2. Mutual defence

15. The notion of "mutual" or "collective" defence within the Union was deemed by many Convention members during the preparatory work on the EU Constitution to be a necessary mark of genuine solidarity among the member states.

16. The initial wording proposed by the Convention was very close to that of the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty: "Until such time as the European Council has acted in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, closer cooperation shall be established, in the Union framework, as regards mutual defence. Under this cooperation, if one of the Member States participating in such cooperation is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, *the other participating States shall give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other*, in accordance with Article 51 of the

United Nations Charter. In the execution of closer cooperation on mutual defence, the participating Member States shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”.⁴

17. However, Article I.41 (7) of the final version of the Constitutional Treaty reads as follows:

“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, *the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power*, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. *This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.*”

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation”⁵.

18. The changes that appear in the final version as compared with the initial proposal are quite significant. Hubert Haenel, a French Senator and a member of the Convention, produced a very relevant analysis: “In fact, the text no longer suggests a form of cooperation between some member states but rather a clause that extends to all of them. At the same time, logically enough since it is intended to apply universally, the clause is far less strongly worded. It states for instance that, in the event of aggression against a member state, the other states “shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance” instead of “shall give it aid and assistance”. Military means are no longer explicitly mentioned. Furthermore, a sentence has been added to the effect that the clause in question will not prejudice “the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states”. In the eyes of a number of member states, the Union is not and must not be a military alliance; given that the clause is applicable to all member states, it must no longer contain a binding element. Thus the “mutual defence” clause now becomes more like an exhortation in principle and as such can no longer be regarded as a replacement for WEU’s mutual defence clause”.

19. Your Rapporteur shares that view and therefore does not wish the modified Brussels Treaty and Article V thereof to be abolished.

3. Permanent structured cooperation

20. The Convention introduced into the draft Constitutional Treaty the notion that more organised cooperation among certain member states would make for more efficient military crisis management. Indeed, it became clear from the Convention that there is no unanimous agreement on the objectives of the EU in the area of security and defence, but that member states can be divided into three groups, according to the type of mission that they are prepared to carry out. The first group consists of those countries prepared only to participate in some of the least demanding Petersberg missions involving humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping missions. The 2003 and 2010 headline goals reflect that level of ambition and capabilities. The second group is in favour of permanent structured cooperation and consists of those states ready and able to become involved in all missions, including the “most demanding”⁶. The countries in the third group are prepared to sign up to a mutual defence commitment amongst themselves; however, the closer cooperation proposed by the Convention in this area was not taken on board by the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).

21. Article I-41 (6) of the Constitutional Treaty stipulates that “those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework”. The arrangements for such cooperation are set out in Article III-312 of the Treaty and in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation appended to it.

⁴ Article 40 (7) of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (EU document CONV 850/03, 18 July 2003).

⁵ Article I-41 (7) of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Official Journal C310, 16 December 2004).

⁶ In particular for the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (see “A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy”).

22. Permanent structured cooperation should bring together certain member states seeking to develop effective crisis-management capabilities to make available to the EU, which implies having the necessary capacity for that purpose and hence the readiness to enter into commitments with a view to improving the key factors of *autonomy* and *responsiveness*.

23. In practice the Protocol stipulates that the “permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article I-41(6) of the Constitution shall be open to any Member State which undertakes, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, to:

(a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), and

(b) have the capacity to supply by 2007 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battlegroup, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article III-309, within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days”⁷.

24. The text of the Constitutional Treaty, even as supplemented by the Protocol, leaves the door open to a broad interpretation of the concept of permanent structured cooperation and its mode of implementation.

25. That vagueness is clearly a deliberate political choice: in order to avoid creating an overly restricted club of partners, the door must be left open for countries with limited defence capabilities but willing to participate. However, that freedom of interpretation paves the way for broader cooperation involving almost all EU member states, with the danger that this will completely change the nature of the system intended to enable progress to be made on the ESDP.

26. The texts remain deliberately silent on:

- the precise definition of the criteria that need to be complied with in order to be eligible for permanent structured cooperation and the body authorised to approve that definition;
- the levels to be achieved for each of those criteria in order to ensure that the resulting permanent structured cooperation has the desired effectiveness, particularly in operational terms, while not excluding too many of the member countries that wish to become involved.

27. In practice, it is clear from the keenness shown recently by almost all 25 member states to be involved in the activities of the European Defence Agency and the multinational battlegroups that this will be a difficult exercise, which explains the absence of precise criteria and ratios for participation in permanent structured cooperation.

28. In any event it will be vital to translate the concept of permanent structured cooperation into action by specifying the modalities and most importantly of all, defining the criteria for eligibility.

29. It would seem, in the absence of specific provisions in the relevant texts, that it will be up to the interested countries themselves to define those qualitative and quantitative criteria and to get them approved by the Council.

III. Military capabilities: recent achievements and future prospects

1. Headline Goal 2010

30. It was at its Nice summit in December 2000 that the EU set up the necessary permanent diplomatic/political and military structures for implementing the European Security and Defence

⁷ “Extended Petersberg missions”.

Policy (ESDP). These were the Political and Security Committee (PSC), EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS).

31. The PSC stands at the centre of the ESDP institutional structures. Its task is to propose political objectives and recommend strategic options to the Council. In normal times it monitors the international situation and gives instructions to the Military Committee and the Committee in charge of the civilian aspects of crisis management and receives their opinions and recommendations. In times of crisis, it provides the political control and strategic direction of any operations that may be decided.

32. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staffs of the member states represented on a permanent basis by their Military Delegates in Brussels. It has a two-fold function: to submit advice and recommendations to the PSC on all military matters and direct all military action conducted in the EU framework. One of the things it does during a crisis is to present the PSC with the military strategic options and give its own military advice.

33. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) acts in practice as the headquarters of the Military Committee. In an emerging crisis it is responsible for giving an early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning.

34. It was also during the Nice summit that the member states further elaborated on the aims to be achieved by 2003 agreed at the Helsinki European Council and known as the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003. This meant “being able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces up to corps level (60 000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements”⁸.

35. The work-up phase of the ESDP from 1999 to 2003 was used to put in place the necessary organisation and procedures for attaining the 2003 Headline Goal. But the strategic environment of the past few years has brought home the weak point of those arrangements, namely a lack of responsiveness. This is the reason why the member states have set themselves the *Headline Goal 2010*:

“The ability for the EU to deploy force packages *at high readiness* as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases, is a key element of the 2010 Headline Goal. These minimum force packages must be militarily effective, credible and coherent and should be broadly based on the battlegroups concept. This constitutes a specific form of rapid response, and includes a combined arms battalion-sized force package with Combat Support and Combat Service Support. Rapid reaction calls for rapid decision making and planning as well as rapid deployment of forces. On *decision making*, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council. On the *deployment of forces*, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission on the ground, *no later than 10 days* after the EU decision to launch the operation. Relevant air and naval capabilities would be included. The need for reserve forces should be taken into account. These high readiness joint packages (battlegroups) may require tailoring for a specific operation by the Operation Commander. They will have to be backed up by responsive crisis management procedures as well as adequate command and control structures available to the Union. Procedures to assess and certify these high readiness joint packages will require to be developed. The development of EU Rapid Response elements including battlegroups, will strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to possible UN requests”⁹.

36. That ambitious objective for 2010 supplements the 2003 Headline Goal which remains relevant, although it is less demanding. The practical consequences in terms of the institutions and forces needed to attain that objective are analysed below.

⁸ Presidency report on the ESDP, Annexes I to III, Nice European Council (December 2000).

⁹ Presidency report on the ESDP, 15 June 2004, Annex I, paragraph 4.

2. Planning and command of operations

37. The chain of command for an EU-led operation is composed of three levels of headquarters (HQ)¹⁰:

- Operation Headquarters: HQ at strategic level, normally responsible for operational planning;
- Force Headquarters: Joint HQ normally deployed in the joint operations area;
- Component Headquarters: Land/Air/Naval HQ normally deployed in the joint operations area.

38. EU-led military crisis management operations are conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities or autonomously.

39. In the first instance, in the framework of the “Berlin plus” arrangements, NATO “guarantees” the availability of its planning capabilities to the EU and gives it the possibility of using various other capabilities (headquarters, communications, etc.) to be decided on a case-by-case basis. This agreement, which does not have the force of a treaty, is set out in an exchange of letters (17 March 2003) between the two organisations. It is a political agreement which is not legally binding.

40. For autonomous operations, the EU can also have recourse to a military chain of command built with HQs from those contributed by member states to the EU Force Catalogue. In these cases, in the event of a crisis the member states designate a country that will provide the nucleus for an Operation Headquarters. The EU member states currently contributing Operation Headquarters that can be made multinational are the United Kingdom (Northwood) and France (Mont Valérien), but three other EU member states will shortly also acquire the requisite structures: Germany (Potsdam), Greece (Larissa) and Italy (Rome). In relation to autonomous operations the “framework nation” concept could also be applied.

41. As explained above, the Headline Goal 2010 calls for a high level of responsiveness on the part of both headquarters and forces: five days for decision-making, ten days for deployment. Hence the EU must have at its disposal a multinational operational headquarters capable of planning and then conducting such a rapid deployment. The framework nation concept as applied to Operation Artemis in the Congo can therefore only be used if – as was the case in this instance – one nation provides total leadership, having prepared the operation in advance.

42. If not all member states are in agreement, then the permanent multinational operation headquarters can provide the nucleus for a “permanent structured cooperation” project as envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty.

43. Such a headquarters must be capable of taking command at very short notice of a crisis-management operation involving the deployment of several battlegroups, followed at a later stage by the 50 000 to 60 000 troops foreseen by the 2003 Headline Goal.

44. However, the perception of the problem is gradually changing within the EU. Indeed, at the Brussels European Council in December 2003, the decision was taken to set up a civil-military planning cell, composed of some thirty-five civilian and military staff members, within the EU Military Staff in Brussels. An EU document issued in November 2004¹¹ stipulates the following: “Mission: The Civil/Military Cell (Civ/Mil Cell) will enhance the EU’s capacity for crisis management planning. It will reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU autonomous operation, assist in coordinating civilian operations and have the responsibility for generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous EU military operation, once a decision on such an operation has been taken. Crisis management activities are complex and, in most cases, call for the use of civilian and military means. The creation of the Civ/Mil Cell is a step in the EU’s efforts to harness the wealth of civilian and military instruments at its disposal in responding to crises. The operation of the Civ/Mil Cell should lead to greater coherence of the civilian and military structures under the SG/HR”.

¹⁰ See Appendix II.

¹¹ EU Council document 13990/04 EXT 1 (28 January 2005).

45. In practice the Cell is responsible for political and strategic level planning and for developing a body of doctrine founded on its experience of civil-military operations. In a crisis¹² “the Civ/Mil Cell is responsible for generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous EU military operation, in particular where a joint civil/military response is required and where no national HQ has been identified, once a decision on such an operation has been taken. There is not a standing HQ. Instead there is a capacity rapidly to set up an operations centre for a particular operation. This level of readiness will be ensured through the establishment and maintenance of facilities for an operations centre (premises and necessary equipment) and through a permanent key nucleus within the Civ/Mil Cell. Once the decision to activate the operations centre has been taken by the Council, normally through a Joint Action, the permanent key nucleus will be reinforced essentially by double-hatted personnel from the Council General Staff (CGS) (principally the EUMS including the Civ/Mil Cell and DGE¹³) and Member States”.

46. In addition, the European Council decided in December 2004¹⁴ to “take forward work on establishing an operations centre and agreed that the ability rapidly to set up an operations centre should be available by 1 January 2006 at the latest¹⁵. The European Council invited the SG/HR to provide a detailed proposal to that effect, as the basis for further discussion in the PSC”.

47. Furthermore: “Even though not a standing HQ, the operations centre has to be capable of being set up rapidly for a particular operation. This level of readiness will be ensured through the establishment and maintenance of dedicated facilities for an operations centre (premises and necessary equipment) and through a permanent key nucleus, which would be reinforced with double-hatted personnel from both within the Civ/Mil Cell and the EUMS as well as from DGE, other CGS bodies and Member States upon a Council decision to activate an operations centre. This Council decision, normally in the form of a Joint Action, will include the appointment of the Operation Commander. In accordance with standard augmentation timelines and by using the key nucleus reinforced, the operations centre should achieve an Initial Operating Capability (IOC)¹⁶ within 5 days”.

48. Hence it is envisaged in some cases to activate an operations centre¹⁷ which, it is stipulated, “becomes fully operational when augmentees from EUMS, DGE, other CGS bodies and Member States are added to the key nucleus reinforced. Under direction of the Operation Commander, it conducts the mission at the strategic level¹⁸. When the operations centre is activated, double-hatted personnel will be under the control of the Operation Commander and will work permanently on the operation as long as necessary”.

49. Hence this operations centre, once operational, will *de facto* fulfil the function of operation headquarters at strategic level.

3. Forces

50. *Headline Goal 2003*: as recalled above, the Headline Goal 2003 set out at Helsinki (December 1999) translated the resolve of the EU to be able to deploy a 50 000-60 000-strong force in less than two months and sustain it for at least one year.

51. It led to the introduction as of 2000 of procedures based on the principles of forces catalogues and voluntary contributions by the member states. There are three catalogues: the “requirement catalogue”, identifying force requirements on the basis of generic scenarios; the “forces catalogue”, listing the contributions of the member states, and the “progress catalogue”, identifying shortfalls and the action being taken to remedy them. Those catalogues drawn up under the responsibility of the EU

¹² EU Council document 13990/04 EXT 1 (28 January 2005), paragraph 3.2.

¹³ The External Relations Directorate General attached to the Council Secretariat.

¹⁴ Document 13990/04 EXT 1, page 15 “European defence operations centre configuration”.

¹⁵ Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 17-18 June 2004 (Document 13990/04 EXT 1-Annex I to the Annex).

¹⁶ IOC in military terms is the ability to plan.

¹⁷ Document 13990/04 EXT 1 “European defence operations centre configuration”, page 18.

¹⁸ For civilian aspects, direction at strategic level remains with the DGE (the principle of civilian control of civil crisis management will be respected).

Military Committee (EUMC) are regularly updated in cooperation with groups of military experts from the member states. Some of the main areas where further efforts are required are command and control, strategic lift and ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance).

52. *Battlegroups*: as specified in the Headline Goal 2010, the forces' responsiveness needs to be improved so that the EU can take the decision within five days and deploy forces within ten days. That requirement gave birth to the concept of the battlegroup, "the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations. The battlegroup is based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. A battlegroup could be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of member states. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria. A battlegroup must be associated with a Force Headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics"¹⁹.

53. The same document specifies that those groups are to be "built on assets and capabilities held at a readiness of 5-10 days. This readiness criterion applies as a benchmark to Member States as a whole. Battlegroups will be employable across the full range of tasks listed in the TEU Art.17.2 and those identified in the European Security Strategy, in particular in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their size. Battlegroups need to be sustainable until mission termination or until relief by other forces. They should be sustainable for 30 days initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately". Furthermore, "to qualify as an EU Battlegroup force packages will meet commonly defined and agreed, detailed military capability standards. These overarching standards and criteria concern: availability, employability and deployability, readiness, flexibility, connectivity, sustainability, survivability, medical force protection and interoperability".

54. In practice, the member states have agreed that the EU should be able to conduct at least one rapid response operation involving a battlegroup over the period 2005 to 2006 (see Appendix I).

55. Full operational capability – the ability to conduct two simultaneous operations involving battlegroups – should be reached on 1 January 2007. Since some 20 EU member states have announced their intention to participate in the battlegroups, the EU has 13 battlegroups at its disposal as of November 2004.

56. There is, however, one weak point as regards the implementation of this concept: the risk of a lack of homogeneity, hence of interoperability, within certain multinational battlegroups, which are small-sized units composed of about 1 500 combatants with the relevant support capabilities. Up until now military experts, citing the example of the Franco-German Brigade, have taken the stance that the multinational dimension should not apply below the level of a brigade (4 500 to 5 000 men). It will therefore be necessary to pay careful attention to the training of those multinational battlegroups during the period prior to their activation.

57. At the present time a lot of work is being done on the battlegroup concept order to develop the following aspects: standards and criteria, certification and training, logistic concept, force generation modalities, and complementarity with the NATO Response Force (NRF).

58. *Deployability*²⁰: for the battlegroups to be genuinely operational, it is essential for the EU to improve its strategic transport capabilities. The Global Approach on Deployability (GAD) is designed to make more effective use of existing capabilities. The Military Committee has been given five tasks for that purpose: to develop the role of the EU Movement Coordination Cell (EUMCC); analyse the existing capabilities in the member states (the European Airlift Cell (EAC) and the Sealift Coordination Cell (SCC) in Eindhoven and the Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre (MSCC) in Athens); analyse the need for land transport coordination; identify areas of harmonisation of procedures with NATO's Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC) and develop effective links between these different centres.

¹⁹ Presidency report on the ESDP (EU Council Document 16062, 13 December 2004), Annex I to the Annex.

²⁰ Document 16062, Annex C of Annex I to the Annex, paragraph 7.

4. The European Defence Agency (EDA)

59. The creation of the EDA, agreed in principle by the Thessaloniki European Council and formally decided by a Joint Action on 12 July 2004, was an important step in the development of an autonomous ESDP.

60. The EDA has a very broad role. The EU Council set it the following tasks:

- developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management;
- promoting and enhancing European cooperation on armaments;
- working to strengthen the Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) and for the creation of an internationally competitive European Defence Equipment Market;
- enhancing of the effectiveness of European Defence Research and Technology .

61. For that purpose the EDA is divided into four Directorates (Capability Development, Research and Technology, Armaments, Defence Industry and Market). Furthermore the Steering Board will in principle hold at least two meetings each year at the level of the Defence Ministers. It is chaired by the EU Council Secretary-General/CFSP High Representative himself.

62. The Steering Board decided in November 2004 to increase the Agency staff to 77 in 2005 and to set an initial work programme for each of the four Directorates.

63. It is most important to introduce the idea of decision by qualified majority into the decision-making process within the Agency. While political decisions may require consensus, this should not be the case for decisions concerning the technical implementation of programmes

64. “The Agency should develop close working relations with existing arrangements, groupings and organisations such as LoI, OCCAR, WEAG/WEAO, with a view to assimilation or incorporation of relevant principles and practices as appropriate. The non EU-WEAG members shall be provided with the fullest possible transparency regarding the Agency’s specific projects and programmes with a view to their participation as appropriate”.

65. Moreover, relations between the EDA and the relevant NATO bodies will be defined through administrative arrangements in full respect of the established framework of cooperation and consultation between the EU and NATO. The twofold principle of coherence and transparency in the field of capabilities shall be ensured by the application of CDM procedures.

5. The European Capability Action Plan (ECAP)

66. In 2001, in order to implement the 2003 Headline Goal, the EU member states launched a process known as the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) in order to remedy European capability shortfalls. It involved initially some 20 panels composed of military experts from the member states which put forward plans and proposals in order to fill the identified shortfalls (e.g. by acquiring new equipment or optimising existing capabilities, in particular through cooperation at European level.). In April 2003 the “Way Forward for the ECAP” process was launched, creating the ECAP Project Groups in order to advance the implementation by those member states concerned of selected solutions identified initially by the ECAP panels.

67. The main tasks of the project groups is to tackle the following questions: headquarters, interoperability, ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance), strategic air and sealift, space, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), theatre missile defence etc.

68. The latest progress report in November 2004 announced that although they had made definite headway since 2003, the member states still needed to make a considerable effort in order to meet the Headline Goal 2010.

69. The latest Presidency report on the ESDP calls for a strengthening of the ECAP process and underlines the need for the defence ministers to become actively involved, in particular as members of the European Defence Agency (EDA) Steering Board. The Military Committee (EUMC) remains responsible for drawing up the progress report as well as the requirements, forces and progress catalogues.

70. The EDA, in its role as a catalyst, will make recommendations to the Council and its experts will participate in the ECAP activities. Through that participation it will be able to evaluate the member states' efforts in the light of the Headline Goal 2010.

71. For the purpose of that evaluation the EDA will need to focus on the action taken by the member states, while the EUMC will need to ascertain to what degree the member states' capability commitments match the EU's overall military requirements.

72. The EUMC and EDA will therefore need to work in close cooperation in order to examine all the ECAP project groups and define how the process for enhancing the EU's military capabilities is to be organised in the future.

6. An industrial armaments policy

73. Hence the EDA, among other things, must serve as an instrument for the Union's industrial policy:

“In fact the defence technologies are perceived by several states as likely not only to bring major spin-offs for the civilian sector, but also to check the process of de-industrialisation that is affecting our continent. Indeed, the high level of qualifications required by defence companies and the need to guarantee armed forces' security of supply justify from both the economic and strategic standpoints maintaining and developing the relevant industrial activities on European soil (...) What is at stake here is the credibility of European defence, as well as the capacity of our industry to remain competitive in a perpetually unfavourable transatlantic context. An American defence market that is more open to non-American firms – which although sought after by several European groups is far from having been achieved (see the recent proposals put forward by Representative Duncan Hunter²¹) – would not be enough to preserve our industrial and technological base in any lasting fashion. Given that it would ineluctably lead to a shift of the centre of gravity of the European groups' military activities towards the United States, it would in any case not be desirable from the EU member states' point of view for the European groups to be overly dependent on that market. Conversely, the creation under the future Agency's auspices of a dynamic European market benefiting from a European priority that would be granted by all 25 EU governments for the creation and maintenance of autonomous defence capabilities would open up clear technological and commercial prospects for our industry. Indeed, the creation of a sounder, more coherent European base than that which results from simply juxtaposing heterogeneous national markets that are insufficiently linked among themselves will enable our companies to maintain, or, where necessary, restore their competitiveness in the field of exports. Only in that way will the European groups be able not only to compete with their American rivals, but also enter into alliances with them on an equal footing”²².

IV. Civilian crisis-management capabilities

74. In order to meet effectively the challenges of crisis management in the ESDP framework, the European Union embarked in 1999 on a process of developing the necessary assets and capabilities to enable it to conduct the full range of civilian and military crisis-prevention and crisis-management missions. The purpose of civilian crisis management is to take forward the process of demilitarisation and normalisation that will make it possible to rebuild a civil society founded on the rule of law and integrated in the international community.

²¹ Duncan Hunter, Member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, tabled an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 with a view to considerably toughening up the United States' protectionist laws in the area of defence. He wished not only to significantly lengthen the list of components that had to be purchased from US suppliers, but also to generalise the use of American-made industrial equipment (machine tools in particular) among the Pentagon's suppliers. After a heated debate a considerably watered-down version of the amendment was approved.

²² Laurent Giovachini in *Politique Etrangère* 1/2004.

1. Commitments in the area of civilian crisis-management capabilities²³

75. The civilian crisis-management concept drawn up by the EU is based on the guidelines defined at the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils in, respectively, June and December 1999. At the Feira European Council in June 2000, four priority action areas were defined with a view to strengthening the Union's civilian capabilities: police, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. European capabilities in those four areas will be available either for autonomous EU-led missions or for operations conducted under the aegis of other organisations such as the United Nations or the OSCE.

76. As regards the first of those areas, the EU aims to be capable of the full spectrum of police missions ranging from advice, assistance and training to standing in for the local police forces. Member states pledged in 2004 to supply up to 5 700 police officers, of whom 1 400 would be deployable within less than 30 days.

77. Secondly, regarding the rule of law, international efforts to strengthen or rebuild credible local police forces can only succeed if the police forces are backed up by a properly functioning judicial and penal system. The member states have therefore undertaken to provide some 630 experts – public prosecutors, judges, prison officers – to deal with those aspects of crisis-management operations.

78. In the area of civil administration, a pool of experts has been set up to deal with the administrative tasks associated with crisis-management operations. They can, if necessary, be deployed at very short notice.

79. Finally, in the field of civil protection, the objective (a total of 4 988 people) has also been attained. It entails:

- two or three assessment and/or coordination teams composed of ten experts each that can be mobilised twenty-four hours around the clock and deployed within three to seven hours;
- rapidly deployable task forces of up to 2 000 people;
- additional or more specialised capabilities that can be deployed within two days to a week in accordance with the particular requirements of a specific crisis situation.

80. In addition, observation capabilities (505 people) and a support staff for the EU representatives (391 experts) have been set up to cover various areas (human rights, political affairs, reform of the security system etc.).

81. In conclusion, the 2008 Headline Goal for civilian capabilities finalised at the December 2004 European Council sets out the EU's ambitions for the coming years as regards the civil aspects of the ESDP and provides a sound basis on which to define and create the requisite capabilities. It also defines a systematic approach to the further development of civilian crisis-management capabilities.

2. Police and gendarmerie

82. In order to meet the new security challenges the EU has decided to increase the numbers of police and *gendarmerie* available for civil crisis-management missions. The member states have undertaken, in particular, to provide larger numbers of police officers for international police operations to which they may decide to contribute on a voluntary basis. In June 2000 the Feira European Council set the objective of creating a pool of 5 000 police officers available for and able to meet the specific requirements of international crisis-prevention and crisis-management missions. The EU police capabilities will be deployable either in response to a request from an international organisation (UN, OSCE) or for an autonomous EU-led mission. To guarantee rapid deployment the member states have pledged to take the necessary steps to be able to make available within 30 days 1 400 policemen or *gendarmes* capable of conducting operations as well as advisory, training, monitoring and management tasks.

83. In June 2002 the Göteborg European Council adopted a Police Action Plan for the purpose of mobilising the 5 000 police officers and taking into account possible contributions from non-EU

²³ Presidency report on the ESDP (EU Council Document 16062 , 13 December 2004), Annex II to the Annex.

states. The EU launched its first police mission²⁴ on 1 January 2003, when it sent 500 policemen to take over from the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its second police operation – Operation Proxima – was deployed on 15 December 2003 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the Ohrid Framework Agreement as part of a broader rule-of-law operation.

84. The EU Chiefs of Police, in a declaration²⁵ adopted in October 2004, recalled the central role of police in international crisis-management operations and the ever-increasing importance of the contribution being made by the EU in this regard. At the Brussels Council in December 2004 the Ministers welcomed the initiative taken by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain with a view to creating a European *gendarmerie* force and the contribution that such a force could make to the ESDP. Those five countries have agreed to make that force, which has military status, available to the EU for the most demanding missions. It will be rapidly deployable for public security and law and order missions.

85. The development of police and *gendarmerie* capabilities for crisis-management operations began when the Feira Council decided that the EU should acquire the necessary machinery and doctrines to deal with that new aspect of crisis management.

3. The 2008 civilian Headline Goal

86. When it adopted the European Security Strategy in December 2003 the European Council signalled its resolve to shoulder its share of responsibility for global security. To achieve its aim of building a safer and more united world it saw the need for enhanced civil crisis-management capabilities, which was why in June 2004 it endorsed a “civilian Headline Goal” for 2008, building on the experience acquired since 1999.

87. The 2008 civilian Headline Goal sets out the EU's main tasks and objectives in the field of civilian crisis management. The EU's approach is global, drawing on all civil and military means available to the ESDP in order to respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis-management situations, from conflict prevention to peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation. The civilian Headline Goal specifies that “in addition to the priority areas for EU civilian crisis management agreed at Feira (police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection), the EU must be able to conduct various types of monitoring missions as well as to provide support to Special Representatives of the European Union. It will, *inter alia*, contribute to activities such as security sector reform and support disarmament, demobilisation/reintegration processes”. Furthermore, the EU must be able to conduct concurrent civilian missions at different levels of engagement, and indeed at the present time it is conducting three civilian ESDP missions and one monitoring operation. As regards its rapid reaction capacity it must be able “to deploy civilian means simultaneously with military means at the outset of an operation”. Finally, civilian crisis-management operations under the ESDP must be deployable autonomously, jointly or in close cooperation with military operations.

88. In order to comply with those objectives, a step-by-step approach comparable to the headline goal for military capabilities has been adopted for the development of civilian crisis-management capabilities in 2005: it entails the definition of planning assumptions on the basis of scenarios, the elaboration of capability requirements lists, the assessment of national contributions and the identification of capability shortfalls.

89. The civilian Headline Goal process will be supervised by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) assisted by the committee in charge of the civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM).

90. During the process of developing its capabilities to achieve the 2008 civilian Headline Goal the EU will consult other international organisations, in particular the United Nations and the OSCE, and take account of lessons learned from ongoing operations and exercises.

²⁴ EU Police Mission (EUPM).

²⁵ Presidency report on the ESDP (EU Council Document 16062, 13 December 2004), Annex II to the Annex.

V. Other aspects of the ESDP

1. The fight against terrorism

91. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and 11 March 2004 in Madrid marked a crucial turning-point in the political, economic and social spheres. The attacks brought to light two distinct realities: that the face of terrorism and its mode of action had evolved from a vague and disorganised existence to a real global threat with the determination and the means to cause chaos at any point around the globe, and that the international community was not doing enough to combat this threat. The time had come for organisation, solidarity and action.

92. The European Security Strategy²⁶ adopted by the EU member states in December 2003 placed terrorism at the top of the list of “key threats”. Identified as global and linked to violent religious extremism, the perpetrators of terrorism are committed to maximum violence. Terrorism therefore poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe, seeking to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies.

93. The European Security Strategy’s plan of action to address the new threats concentrates mainly upon building on what has already been achieved (greater solidarity and more global cooperation in the intelligence, police, judicial and military sectors) but also on Europe’s whole approach to terrorism. The “balance of power” between East and West has faded; the threat of terrorism is not military and there are no longer enemy armed forces, but rather a network of cells which operate globally in the very countries they aim to attack. In adopting the Security Strategy, Europe is calling for more capabilities, the transformation and enhanced flexibility of existing military capabilities and the use of pooled and shared assets, as well as for stronger diplomacy and cooperation with regional organisations, NATO and the United States²⁷.

94. The European Union’s determination to act more effectively following the terrorist attacks in Madrid led it to place the fight against terrorism on its priority list of actions. Although up to that point a considerable amount of effort had gone into showing solidarity with the United States and fighting the funding of terrorism, it had also become obvious that Europe was in need of a home policy to tackle the new threat head-on and prevent similar attacks on the European mainland. Meeting in Brussels on March 2004, the EU leaders adopted the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, a detailed study of measures concentrating upon combating the new wave of terrorism. The Declaration focuses on the following measures²⁸:

- building on existing cooperation across three sectors: legislative measures; reinforcing operational cooperation and maximising the effectiveness of information systems;
- strengthening border controls and document security;
- EU guidelines for a common approach to combating terrorism;
- strategic objectives for a revised EU plan of action to combat terrorism;
- sharing of intelligence;
- preventing the financing of terrorism;
- measures to protect transport and members of the population;
- international cooperation;
- cooperation with the US and other partners;
- establishment of the position of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to “co-ordinate the work of the Council in combating terrorism and, with due regard to the responsibilities of the Commission, maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union’s disposal”.

²⁶ European Security Strategy, <http://ue.eu.int> (see documents section).

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Declaration on Combating Terrorism. <http://ue.eu.int>

95. In December 2004 the European Council presented its initial conclusions and a plan of action to combat terrorism. It assessed the progress that had been made and vowed to continue fighting the new threat with unyielding determination. It called for a long-term strategy to be drawn up by June 2005 and stressed the importance of promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Member states were urged to focus more upon the roots of terrorism, primarily: radicalisation and recruitment. The revised EU action plan included the following practical measures²⁹:

- reinforcement of practical and operational cooperation through Europol and the Police Chiefs Task Force;
- in the area of judicial cooperation: an improved exchange of information from criminal records;
- as regards border and document security: enhanced security of EU passports and the establishment of the European Border Agency;
- in the field of intelligence: the establishment of links between the Counter-Terrorism Group and the re-enforced EU Situation Centre;
- to combat the financing of terrorism: agreements on controls over cash entering or leaving the Union and the third Money Laundering Directive.
- in the area of civil protection: the establishment of a solidarity programme to deal with the consequences of terrorist threats and attacks;
- as regards external policies: agreements with third countries on terrorism clauses (expected to be operational soon), intensified transatlantic cooperation and strengthened cooperation with priority third countries.

96. The December 2004 Presidency Report on the ESDP³⁰ also defined a set of actions for using the ESDP to fight terrorism. Taking as a basis the existing ESDP principles and the mechanisms for mobilising both civilian and military crisis-management and conflict-prevention capabilities in support of the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it outlined the following main areas of action: prevention, protection, response/consequence management and support to third countries in the fight against terrorism.

2. Cooperation among international organisations

97. *EU/NATO relations*: EU/NATO cooperation is the manifestation of the official resolve expressed by the member states at the NATO Washington summit in 1999, although it was only in March 2003 that the two organisations arrived at the so-called “Berlin plus” arrangements founded on the following four principles:

- guaranteed access to NATO operational planning capabilities;
- NATO common assets and capabilities to be made available to the EU;
- European command options within NATO for EU-led operations (role of DSACEUR³¹);
- adaptation of the NATO defence planning system so as to take account of the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

98. Furthermore, the final, “framework” agreement makes provision for:

- a NATO/EU security agreement;
- procedures for the release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;
- EU/NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led operation using NATO assets;

²⁹ Presidency Conclusions 16/17 December 2004

³⁰ ESDP Presidency Report issued in December 2004 (Document 16062, 13 December 2004).

³¹ Deputy SACEUR: a British General at present.

- arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements.

99. In line with the Berlin plus arrangements the Union is conducting Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina making use of NATO assets and capabilities.

100. *EU/UN relations*: there have been enhanced cooperation contacts between the two organisations since they signed a joint declaration on 24 September 2003, and a text defining the “modalities for practical cooperation between the EU and the UN in civilian crisis management” was adopted by the EU Council in December 2004³².

101. In June 2004 the Council adopted a document on “EU-UN cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations”³³ which envisages two possibilities:

- national capabilities being made available to the UN by the member states, whereby the EU could provide a centre for the exchange of information among the participating states in order to coordinate those national contributions;
- an EU-led operation in support of the United Nations, whereby various configurations are envisaged: operations led by the EU under a UN mandate, or as an EU component in a UN operation. The EU’s rapid-reaction capability would provide particular added value. The “continuity of operations” model is designed to give the UN time by deploying an EU rapid reaction force. The exit strategy for such an operation is to have the EU force replaced by a UN force. The EU declares its readiness to assist the UN in order to facilitate the deployment of its forces.

102. The UN for its part would like to see the EU set up a reserve force or an extraction force to support UN operations, particularly in Africa. The two organisations are currently working together in order to improve the conditions for cooperation

3. EU training in the field of the ESDP

103. The Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 agreed on the need to foster the development of a European security culture under the ESDP, encompassing both civilian and military dimensions and thus extending in many cases to civilian-military and inter-pillar areas. In this context a training policy was agreed in November 2003, setting out the guiding principles and responsibilities. This training policy reflects a holistic and coordinated approach to EU crisis management and contributes greatly to creating a European security culture.

104. Following on from this EU training policy a training concept was drafted providing the necessary measures and procedures to implement the policy. The concept also defines the principles for the establishment of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). On this basis the first EU Training Programme in ESDP for the years 2005-06 was agreed in December 2004.

105. Whereas the first ESDP Orientation Course was held in the first half of 2003, the first activity under the Training Concept and Programme has only recently been conducted and is now being evaluated.

4. Network-centric operations

106. The concept of “network warfare” or “network-centric operations” is crucial to the process of transforming western armed forces in order to adapt them to the new strategic environment.

107. The key determinant in transformation is information, in the sense of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence. The widespread use of new Information Communication Technology (ICT) – its best-known practical application being the “network of networks”, the Internet – is intended to make possible better exploitation and faster dissemination of intelligence in support of military operations so that political and military decision-making is more authoritative and practical outcomes more effective. Hence the description of these new forms of military action as “effects-based”.

³² Annex IV of the Presidency report, Council Document 16062/04, 13 December 2004.

³³ Annex II of the Presidency report, Council Document 10547/04, June 2004.

108. However, although transformation begins life first and foremost as a national undertaking, NATO or EU-led military operations are increasingly proving to be variable geometry coalitions. Some countries can cover all or a large part of the spectrum of requirements, others contribute highly specialised capabilities, numerically of lesser significance but which may be of considerable added value. Hence the importance of conceptualising, developing and applying joint or shared methods and standards to avoid the emergence of technology or operational “gaps” opening up between European forces.

109. While differences are inevitable, they need as far as possible to be ironed out, to avoid future impairment of the coherence and efficiency of the whole. This much is clear already from combat operations involving a combination of American and European forces and assets. From a military point of view complementarity is an advantage, but it may be experienced politically as giving rise to subordination or the loss of joint decision-making power. The capability to undertake network-centric operations is thus becoming as much a criterion for strategic autonomy as the defence industrial and technology base (DITB) that underpins it.

110. Transformation, whether national or achieved jointly through NATO and the EU, is now, in 2005, a strategic consideration, both for maintaining and seeking a better balance in regard to the transatlantic ties on which security and defence cooperation in both organisations is based and in order to enable European nations deal more effectively with the challenges and threats of the 21st century. Technology is not an end in itself but rather a means of achieving that particular political objective. Transformation at national level will not be wholly successful unless it extends to the European level. Alternative approaches are not ruled out but the outcome, at the end of the day, has to be a Europe “United in Diversity”³⁴ and able to act effectively in military terms.³⁵

VI. Possible improvements

1. Mutual assistance for an autonomous ESDP

111. The Constitutional Treaty in no way ties the hands of the member states in the area of mutual defence since it does not contain any binding commitment. Yet the EU cannot have an autonomous foreign policy without an automatic mutual assistance clause to protect the member states from the possible consequences of such a policy. The only such guarantee is to be found in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, which will remain in force for as long as no signatory state denounces it. In order to forge a spirit of solidarity and mutual defence within the EU, the current EU treaty will one day need to be modified by adding a protocol signed by those member states which accept the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. Rapid decision-making capability

112. All EU decisions on CFSP and ESDP matters have to be taken unanimously. Even if the decision-making procedures are improved upon, in particular by speeding them up, the risk of paralysis in a time of crisis will remain as long as there is no genuine European political authority. At the present time the concept of constructive abstention makes it possible for a member state to allow the EU to act without that state having formally approved a joint action. But to effectively develop a genuine CFSP the EU will need to introduce a qualified voting procedure in this area.

3. EU crisis management: the extended Petersberg missions

113. The aim of autonomy and responsiveness solemnly proclaimed by the European Council remains out of reach for the moment. The capacity to plan an operation in less than ten days in accordance with the Headline Goal 2010 calls for a permanent multinational operational headquarters. As things stand the EU can have recourse to NATO and lose its autonomy, or call on a framework nation whose designated headquarters will probably not be multinational and operational in less than ten days. Therefore, the development of the civil-military Cell within the EU Military Staff and its

³⁴ Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: Part I, Title 1 “Definition of the Objectives of the Union”, Article 1-8, The symbols of the Union: European Union, 2004, <http://europa.eu.int>.

³⁵ See Assembly Document [1899](#) adopted on 12 May 2005: “Network-centric operations: European capabilities”, submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Klaus Werner Jonas, Rapporteur (Germany, Socialist Group).

ability to turn itself into a permanent operational headquarters will enhance EU capability to face a crisis, particularly in an emergency.

114. Furthermore, an autonomous capacity to assess a situation and to decide on and command an operation requires the creation of a European intelligence policy founded on European space-based capabilities and the use of the Torrejón Satellite Centre, which needs to be made more operational.

115. While the battlegroup concept appears to be a good way of achieving the necessary degree of responsiveness and corresponds to the volume of forces that can be provided by the member states, it will nevertheless be necessary to set very high standards regarding the composition and training of such multinational groups.

116. Your Rapporteur would highlight the efforts being made by a number of countries to set up *gendarmerie* forces that can be deployed in external theatres of operation. However, further work needs to be done within the EU on the concept for deploying *gendarmerie*-type law and order units for peacekeeping purposes to take over from the initial combat units.

117. Europe must have all the means it needs to manage crisis situations. It is not enough to focus solely on the Headline Goal 2010. The gaps identified during the process which led to the definition of the Headline Goal 2003 must be filled and the ECAP process must give rise to tangible decisions on the development and hence funding of equipment in the framework of European cooperative programmes.

118. Two points should be stressed as far as forces are concerned:

- deep strikes involve the use of deployable air forces and naval air groups;
- special forces need to be equipped with state-of-the-art equipment that is compatible with other European and also, if possible, American equipment.

119. The Council document of December 2003 on a European Security Strategy merely sets out the aims to be achieved in this area. The EU does not have a “military strategic concept” which would translate into military capabilities the political resolve expressed in the document “A secure Europe in a better world” and would entail the definition of a genuine European defence planning process.

4. Permanent structured cooperation

120. The desire expressed by the majority of EU member states to be involved in setting up the battlegroups shows that almost all of them are willing to participate in the rapid intervention phase of a crisis by contributing military units.

121. Permanent structured cooperation should therefore bring together those member states that have even loftier ambitions for the ESDP and desire to provide a nucleus which can be joined later by other states not involved at the beginning.

122. It is therefore necessary to define demanding criteria in the area of military capabilities that cannot be met by some states at the present time, but which will give them a goal to strive for.

123. Targets could be set – in the form of a percentage of GDP – for the main items of expenditure: global defence budget, investments in armaments and defence research and technology. Furthermore, in order to guarantee the desired level of responsiveness in the area of crisis management, the group of member states engaging in such cooperation should set up a permanent multinational operational headquarters ready to be made available to the EU.

APPENDIX I

Commitments in the area of EU battlegroups (December 2004)

For the moment, the following member states have announced their participation in the EU battlegroups, which will be composed as follows:


- France;
- Italy;
- Spain;
- United Kingdom;
- Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and possibly Spain;
- Belgium and France;
- Finland, Germany and the Netherlands;
- Austria, the Czech Republic and Germany;
- Hungary, Italy and Slovenia;
- Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain;
- Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia;
- Finland and Sweden, with Norway and a third country;
- The Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Specialised capabilities

For the moment the following member states have proposed special capabilities to support the EU battlegroups:

- Cyprus (a medical group);
- France (a deployable headquarters structure for multinational forces);
- Greece (Sealift Coordination Centre in Athens);
- Lithuania (a water purification unit).

APPENDIX II

Command and control structure for EU operations

PSC:	Political and Security Committee
EUMC:	EU Military Committee
EUMS:	EU Military Staff
OHQ:	Operation Headquarters (strategic)
FHQ:	Force Headquarters (operational in the Joint Area of Operation)
DSACEUR:	European general who is Deputy SACEUR at SHAPE (Mons)
CJTF HQ:	Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters

