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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 749-758

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
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**REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL¹
TO RECOMMENDATIONS 749-758²**

RECOMMENDATION 749³

*on European security policy fifty years after the signing of the
modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the annual report of the Council⁴*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting with satisfaction that, with the signature of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, many of the aims defined fifty years ago by the Paris Agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty with a view to promoting the unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe have been achieved, marking the culmination of a half-century of efforts by the member states of WEU;
- (ii) Welcoming the new prospects that have been opened up in the fight against international terrorism by the inclusion of a solidarity clause in the Constitutional Treaty and the decision of the European Council to act from now on in keeping with the spirit of that clause;
- (iii) Noting with interest that the Constitutional Treaty offers the WEU countries the possibility of participating in missions conducted by a group of member states and in the various forms of structured and enhanced cooperation in the area of the ESDP;
- (iv) Strongly hoping that the European Union will offer to all non-EU European NATO member states an associate status within the ESDP that will enable them to participate fully in all activities planned in this area, including structured and enhanced cooperation projects, as well as in the decision-making process;
- (v) Considering, on the one hand, the EU's loftier ambitions of becoming a global player – which necessarily exposes its member states to increased risks – and on the other hand, the unforeseeable dangers and threats arising out of the existence, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery;
- (vi) Convinced therefore of the need to maintain an unconditional security guarantee in the form of a binding mutual assistance commitment in the area of defence, such as that contained in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (vii) Noting that the provisions on common security and defence policy in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe contain no such binding commitment or any military guarantee as to the security and territorial integrity of those European Union member states that are not members of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (viii) Recalling that neither does the Constitutional Treaty make provision for cooperation between the European Union and NATO, and that the confidential “Berlin plus” arrangements, which are confined to specific aspects of crisis management, cannot replace a more general treaty-based agreement conducive to the development of a climate of trust and cooperation between the two organisations in areas of mutual interest and in the interests of European security;
- (ix) Regretting that the Constitutional Treaty makes no provision for any obligation on the part of the EU Council to engage in an institutional dialogue in the area of the ESDP with a body composed of representatives of the national parliaments, despite the fact that the latter have the task of scrutinising the policy of their respective governments, which in most cases is based on decisions taken at European level, and of voting their budgetary allocations for defence;

¹ Replies to Recommendations communicated to the Assembly by the Council on 17 March 2005.

² Recommendations communicated to the Council on 14 December 2004.

³ Adopted by the Assembly on 29 November 2004 (6th sitting).

⁴ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr António Nazaré Pereira (Portugal, Federated Group) on behalf of the Political Committee (Document [1878](#)).

- (x) Noting that there is for the moment no consensus within the Council on the consequences for the future of the modified Brussels Treaty of the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty;
- (xi) Recalling in that regard the arguments put forward in Recommendation 748, which strengthen the Assembly's conviction that the modified Brussels Treaty remains an essential part of European security;
- (xii) Deploring the Council's persistent refusal to offer all new EU and/or NATO member states that are prepared to expose themselves without reservation to the increased risks linked with ESDP missions the possibility of acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty in order to benefit from Article V, or of changing their status within WEU, despite the fact that those countries meet the criteria defined by the WEU member states in December 1991;
- (xiii) Noting that the EU heads of state and government have appended to the Constitutional Treaty a protocol in which the EU and WEU are invited to draw up arrangements for improving cooperation between themselves;
- (xiv) Extremely disappointed at the scant contents of the first part of the 50th annual report of the Council to the Assembly and of its replies to Recommendations [742](#) to [748](#), which cannot be deemed to comply with the institutional obligations placed on the Council by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Maintain the modified Brussels Treaty and fully apply its provisions, including those whereby interested countries may be invited to subscribe to it for as long as the European Union has neither the legal means nor the equivalent instruments necessary for replacing the Treaty and all the organs of WEU;
2. Keep the promise made in its reply to Recommendation [736](#), in which it states that "as in the past, the Council will continue, through its Annual Report, to keep the Assembly informed of all developments liable to affect either the modified Brussels Treaty or the WEU organs (...) in the context of the progress being made in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union";
3. Reply to paragraphs 6 to 8 of Recommendation [748](#);
4. Encourage all WEU member states to participate in the structured and enhanced cooperation provided for in the Constitutional Treaty and be prepared to propose WEU as the most suitable framework for such cooperation projects and their parliamentary scrutiny, given the protection provided by the mutual defence commitment contained in the modified Brussels Treaty;
5. Inform the Assembly of the way in which it intends to implement the protocol on cooperation arrangements between the European Union and WEU appended to the Constitutional Treaty;
6. Make efforts within the European Union to ensure that all European NATO member states that are not members of WEU, such as Bulgaria, Iceland, Norway, Romania and Turkey, are able to be participate fully in the ESDP and in enhanced and structured cooperation projects, as well as in the activities of the European Defence Agency;
7. Launch within the EU a study on the evolution and scope of the right of individual and collective self-defence in the context of the preventive engagement proposed by the European Security Strategy and of the "projection of stability" doctrine developed within NATO;
8. Inform the Assembly about the ESDP Action Plan on Combating Terrorism and more particularly about the content of the Conceptual Framework for the ESDP and Terrorism;
9. Support the Assembly more vigorously in its efforts to seek, together with the governments concerned and with other interparliamentary bodies, between now and the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty, an appropriate solution for the collective participation of the representatives of the national parliaments in all ESDP activities that the European Union inherited from WEU.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 749

The Council thanks the Assembly for its pertinent recommendations and wishes to confirm that as long as the modified Brussels Treaty is in force, its provisions will be applied as has been the case so far.

As exemplified by the second part of its 50th Annual Report, the Council continues to keep the Assembly informed of all developments concerning the WEU organs. If and when the Council decides to address the issue of the future of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Assembly will be informed of the outcome.

The Council also wishes to confirm the terms of its replies to Recommendation 745 and previously to the Assembly's Written Question 384.

RECOMMENDATION 750⁵
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 2004⁶

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the Council has conveyed to the Assembly the budgets of the ministerial organs for the financial year 2004,
- (ii) Considering that the approved operating budgets concern the Secretariat-General, the Paris Administrative Staff and WEAG/WEAO;
- (iii) Considering that the approved budgets also cover pensions for retired staff of the ministerial organs, i.e. the Secretariat-General, Institute for Security Studies and Satellite Centre (WEU status) and the Paris Ministerial Organs (PMO, former WEU agencies in Paris);
- (iv) Considering that the total of all the budgets of the ministerial organs for 2004 as approved to date amounts to 8 386 980 euros, a reduction of 1.7% compared with 2003;
- (v) Recalling the efforts made in previous years to reduce the cost of managing the WEU ministerial organs (a reduction of 13.9% in 2003 compared with 2002),

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take into account, when drawing up the budgets, not only the rate of inflation but also the increase in remuneration as decided in the framework of the Coordinated Organisations⁷, so as to guarantee at least that the capacities of the WEU ministerial organs are maintained at their current level.

⁵ Adopted by the Assembly on 30 November 2004 (7th sitting).

⁶ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs Christina Lucyga (Germany, Socialist Group) on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1870).

⁷ NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, European Space Agency, WEU, etc.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 750

The Council thanks the Assembly for its recommendation and wishes to confirm that the budgets of the WEU intergovernmental bodies have in the past and will continue in the future to be prepared and considered by the Budget and Organisation Committee of the WEU Council or the relevant administrative and financial authorities. This ensures that those bodies have at their disposal the necessary resources efficiently to perform their tasks in accordance with the mandates given by ministers.

RECOMMENDATION 751⁸
on stability and security in the South Caucasus⁹

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the present government of Georgia's intention to re-establish the rule of law, reduce corruption and tackle all the other problems which, since independence in 1991, have stood in the way of the establishment of viable state institutions and any realistic prospect of the country's integration into European structures;
- (ii) Aware of the importance for Georgia's long-term stability and security of the central government regaining control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but considering that the time may not yet be ripe for major change in those regions and that the restructuring of state institutions and the re-imposition of the rule of law in government-controlled territory must currently take priority;
- (iii) Considering that, meantime, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States, together with the OSCE and the United Nations Security Council, should make sustained efforts to prepare the ground for a future comprehensive and peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia;
- (iv) Noting that Russia has not yet withdrawn its troops from its remaining military bases in Georgia, as it agreed to do in Istanbul in November 1999, and that it maintains a close relationship with both the Abkhazian and South Ossetian leaderships;
- (v) Considering therefore that Russia, given its insistence on central government authority at home, has a specific responsibility to act in such a way as to help consolidate stability and security in Georgia, thus avoiding the inconsistency of a policy that supports breakaway regions in neighbouring countries;
- (vi) Noting that the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus might also play a role in promoting good-neighbourly relations between Georgia and Russia;
- (vii) Considering that the government of Armenia has not yet introduced a number of necessary major reforms to establish good governance, transparency and accountability, and the rule of law;
- (viii) Regretting that more than a year after the most recent parliamentary elections, the opposition is still refusing to participate in parliamentary proceedings, also that it has very little opportunity to make its views known to the wider public through the electronic media;
- (ix) Aware that the unsolved problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the fact that Armenia occupies some 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan, is dominating Armenia's internal policy and external relations, with largely negative consequences for much-needed social, economic and political development within the country;
- (x) Regretting that for a number of reasons, which include ethnic affinities and the events of history, bilateral relations between Armenia and Turkey appear to be deadlocked, with neither party capable of taking a first courageous step, while an open border between the two countries – conducive to economic development and rebuilding mutual trust – would be in the interest of the whole region;
- (xi) Considering that if Azerbaijan is to achieve stability and balanced economic development in the longer term, its political and socio-economic systems need to be made more transparent and accountable, the more especially in view of the current leadership's preference for the continuation of secular state structures within a Muslim territory;
- (xii) Recognising that Azerbaijan's oil fields are a very important factor in the country's economic development but regretting that only a relatively small section of the population is able to benefit from

⁸ Adopted by the Assembly on 30 November 2004 (7th sitting).

⁹ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Marco Zacchera (Italy, Federated Group) on behalf of the Political Committee (Document [1879](#)).

this new wealth and that the government is not doing enough towards modernising and developing further other sectors of the economy to make sure the country is less vulnerable to crises in the energy sector;

(*xiii*) Regretting that ten years after the ceasefire agreement the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved, notwithstanding the many multilateral and bilateral efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution; aware too that this is the main obstacle standing in the way of vital regional cooperation;

(*xiv*) Considering that the allies of all sides in this unresolved conflict should make every effort to prevent the present stalemate leading to attempts to impose a solution by force and the consequent risk of an arms race that this implies;

(*xv*) Considering that the leadership of both Armenia and Azerbaijan will have to make determined efforts to prepare public opinion to accept a peaceful settlement with give and take on both sides, leading eventually to enhanced stability and economic development throughout the region;

(*xvi*) Aware that for the EU, the countries in the South Caucasus have a strategic importance in their own right, as a point of contact between different cultures, as transit countries for energy supplies and as the gateway to Central Asia;

(*xvii*) Welcoming, therefore, the European Council's decision to include them in the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the European Commission's specific action plans which should offer incentives for reform and contribute to regional cooperation;

(*xviii*) Considering it is premature to think of a stability pact for the Caucasus region while the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh remain unresolved;

(*xix*) Considering that in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia:

- stability would be greatly enhanced by increasing the transparency, effectiveness and accountability of public institutions;
- the fight against corruption should be a priority, as visible success here would do more than anything else to stabilise society and attract foreign investors;
- much remains to be done in order to guarantee the freedom and independence both of the press and the electronic media;
- the establishment of a judicial system in accordance with European standards is essential for the development of civil society and a healthy economy;

(*xx*) Conscious of the fact that the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe is one of the cornerstones of European security and regretting that in both Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh there are large amounts of treaty-limited equipment still unaccounted for;

(*xxi*) Welcoming the South Caucasus countries' involvement in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, but regretting that the partners do not always live up to their partnership commitments;

(*xxii*) Hoping that Russia will come round to the view that it has an interest in stability in the South Caucasus and will be prepared to make a positive contribution to the solution of the conflicts that still exist in the different breakaway regions,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL URGE THE EUROPEAN UNION TO:

1. Keep a strong European multi-dimensional effort, using all the available instruments, at the forefront of its priorities for the region so as to increase the prosperity, stability and security of the South Caucasus as a whole;
2. Make every effort to prevent Armenia and Azerbaijan starting an arms race in an attempt to solve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh by force or through the threat of the use of force;

3. Develop an action plan that helps the peoples of both countries understand that relations between neighbours should be based on concepts of cooperation and the peaceful resolution of conflict;
4. Convince the governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia that the immediate priorities for government action are the further development of efficient and transparent state institutions and of democratic governance, the establishment of the rule of law and the fight against corruption;
5. Continue to insist on the closure by the end of the present decade of the Medzamor nuclear electricity plant in Armenia, while making every effort to assist with the provision of an alternative energy plant for that country;
6. Encourage Turkey to work constructively for stability in the South Caucasus, *inter alia* through the progressive reopening of its borders with Armenia, whilst reminding Armenia that it must recognise the existing border with Turkey as delineated by the international Kars Agreement of 1921.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 751

The Council agrees with the Assembly on the importance and relevance for European security of stability in this region. As the Assembly is well aware, WEU member countries are addressing their concerns regarding the security aspects of the evolution of the South Caucasus within the relevant fora of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, where they are closely monitoring strategic and political developments.

RECOMMENDATION 752¹⁰***on cooperation on defence systems procurement in Europe –
reply to the annual report of the Council¹¹***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the *acquis* of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO) are soon to be transferred to the European Defence Agency (EDA), which will enable the Agency to start work more quickly and efficiently;
- (ii) Taking the view that the EDA should also incorporate OCCAR (Joint Armament Cooperation Organisation) and the principles set out in the Letter of Intent/Framework Agreement on restructuring the European armaments industry;
- (iii) Stressing that the European Commission has recently launched an albeit modest but nonetheless significant security research programme;
- (iv) Noting that another aspect of action taken by the Commission in this area is the organisation of a European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) that will be based on rules governing intra-European competition and cooperation, which may also extend to transatlantic competition and cooperation;
- (v) Recalling that the purpose of the Headline Goal 2010 is to identify areas in which more work is needed such as strategic lift, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities (ISTAR) and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities;
- (vi) Considering that a distribution of R&T and R&D projects among the 25 EU member states would add to the fragmentation and dispersal of defence companies, whereas what is required is more of an emphasis on mergers and groupings;
- (vii) Deeming that such mergers and groupings are crucial for producing “heavyweight” European consortia able to compete effectively within the EU and tackle the problem of competition and cooperation with American companies;
- (viii) Observing that transatlantic relations in the field of armaments suffer from a considerable imbalance, with the United States having extensive access to the European market whereas European companies run up against what are essentially political hurdles;
- (ix) Considering, furthermore, that the EDA has a remit to create and develop the conditions necessary for setting up a European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDITB) and a competitive European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM);
- (x) Stressing that in contrast to the European aerospace sector, which has a considerable lead in terms of consolidation based on key cooperative programmes, the land defence sector is suffering from a split in its industrial fabric and a lack of major European programmes, and also that there is an acute need for consolidation in the naval defence sector;
- (xi) Taking the view also that as far as defence equipment procurement is concerned, the EDA should be able to manage national and cooperative equipment programmes and off-the-shelf procurement;
- (xii) Deeming that the incorporation of OCCAR in the EDA would ensure that the latter is able to carry out its role as an agency for acquisitions and the management of procurement programmes;

¹⁰ Adopted by the Assembly on 30 November 2004 (8th sitting).

¹¹ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Edward O'Hara (United Kingdom, Socialist Group) on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document [1885](#)).

(xiii) Strongly regretting that in its reply to Recommendation [747](#) the Council did not take a position on any of the Assembly's proposals and did not act upon the request to allow the President of the Assembly to address the WEAG ministerial meeting,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Update, in the second part of its 50th annual report, the information it was unable to provide in its reply to Recommendation [747](#);
2. Urge the member states to take account of the following points with a view to the European Defence Agency becoming operational:
 - the EDA should have the financial and human resources corresponding to its needs by drawing on the expertise of organisations such as WEAG and WEAO, which will be incorporated in the Agency;
 - the interests of Denmark, Norway and Turkey should be fully taken into account;
 - Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community should be amended so as to promote the emergence of a competitive and open European armaments market;
 - there should be a productive dialogue between Europe and the United States with a view to establishing and maintaining a proper balance in transatlantic relations;
 - the EDA should become a driving force in the transformation of the EDITB and to that end the member states should make every effort to ensure that the Agency is able to fulfil its role;
 - the drive to transform the EDITB, which has produced positive results in the aerospace sector, should be continued in the land defence and naval defence sectors;
 - the principle of non-duplication should be applied and care taken to ensure that countries do not develop, either jointly or severally, European capability solutions already put forward by other European partners;
 - guaranteeing access to optimum capability and technology solutions is the corollary of that principle, bearing in mind that in order to avoid duplication states must have unrestricted access to such solutions;
 - national markets need to be opened up to European solutions;
 - the setting-up of cooperative programmes for remedying European armed forces' capability shortfalls is to be encouraged.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL***to Recommendation 752***

The Council thanks the Assembly for its Recommendation and refers it to the relevant chapters of the second part of its 50th Annual Report, which provide the requested update on the evolution and tasks of the WEU bodies competent in the field of armaments cooperation. The Council notes the Assembly's recommendations, which WEU Member States may use as they see fit in their work related to the development of the activities of the European Defence Agency.

RECOMMENDATION 753¹²

on transatlantic cooperation in the field of defence technology¹³

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the importance of good relations for transatlantic cooperation in the field of defence technology;
- (ii) Noting, nevertheless, that this relationship, which is one of cooperation but also competition, suffers from an undeniable imbalance;
- (iii) Stressing that the consequence of that imbalance is that the US market is closed to European equipment;
- (iv) Noting that another problem is that of interoperability, in particular between European and American weapons systems;
- (v) Welcoming the alliance formed by a number of American and European high-tech companies with a view to developing technological standards that will improve communications among future weapons systems;
- (vi) Considering, furthermore, that the United States sells almost sixteen times as much defence equipment to the European Union than it buys from it;
- (vii) Stressing that in spite of the restructuring of Europe's defence aeronautical industries in recent years, those industries, like the EU states themselves, remain obsessed with the fear of United States domination of the European market;
- (viii) Noting that US companies in this sector have a number of advantages, such as greater financial resources, particularly in the area of technological research and development, a domestic market shielded by a whole arsenal of protectionist legislation, and a captive customer in the US Department of Defense;
- (ix) Considering that European companies are not on an equal footing with US firms, since they must compete with them on the EU market;
- (x) Taking the view that although the EU states have signed up to joint programmes, their diverging economic and political interests and disparate budgets contribute to the difficulties of the European defence industries;
- (xi) Recalling that it is the responsibility of the public authorities to monitor the balance of economic relations in the defence technologies sector;
- (xii) Stressing, furthermore, that given the large-scale investments made by a number of European states in the American Joint Strike Fighter JSF/F35 programme, those sums cannot be used for a European fighter aircraft programme;
- (xiii) Considering that, as a consequence, technological research and development will be the hardest hit by the lack of those investments which could have been used to develop a European programme for the European forces;
- (xiv) Noting, in that regard, that the legal constraints affecting technology transfers, particularly in the area of stealth, make it unlikely that such technology could be re-used for a European programme;
- (xv) Noting that the United States legislation strictly regulates foreign investments, while American companies face no such constraints on the European market, and that technology transfers in the United States are also subject to legal constraints that make it impossible to guarantee security of supply;

¹² Adopted by the Assembly on 30 November 2004 (8th sitting).

¹³ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Philippe Monfils (Belgium, Liberal Group) on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document [1883](#)).

(xvi) Considering that the United States controls strategic exports and that American legislation on the export of dual-use materials is extra-territorial in scope, which means it also applies to goods produced in Europe using American technologies;

(xvii) Recalling that the European Union suffers from low and piecemeal defence spending and above all, from a lack of concerted action and harmonisation as regards both requirements and the development of the relevant industries;

(xviii) Welcoming, nevertheless, the efforts undertaken within OCCAR (Joint Armament Cooperation Organisation) and the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA), which show that when its resources are mobilised in a coherent fashion, Europe seems able to propose competitive solutions allowing a balanced strategic partnership with the United States;

(xix) Considering that the EDA will bring together the existing organisations and initiatives in the defence equipment and R&T sectors and that it will be in charge of cooperation with third countries, in particular the United States;

(xx) Stressing that the European Commission is in charge of trade negotiations and industrial and technological cooperation programmes with the United States, and that the EDA must find a role in that cooperation;

(xxi) Recalling, finally, Assembly Recommendation [681](#) concerning the gap between Europe and the United States in the field of defence research and technology,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE EUROPEAN UNION TO:

1. Encourage the member states to take action to ensure that the European Defence Agency (EDA) takes on responsibilities in the field of international cooperation, and transatlantic cooperation in particular, bearing in mind the following:

- governments should reach agreement as quickly as possible on the sharing of responsibilities for the running of the Agency;
- the current imbalance in transatlantic cooperation could have socio-economic repercussions in Europe, in terms of jobs and foreign trade;
- the EDA could contribute to a more balanced role for the different partners, particularly in view of the fact that one of its aims is to create an internationally competitive European Defence Equipment Market;
- the European defence industrial and technological base must not be used only for one-way transatlantic cooperation, sacrificing Europe's strategic autonomy to Euro-American interoperability;
- if European policy on these issues is not redefined, the Union runs the risk of becoming a pool of sub-contractors to be drawn upon by the United States;
- the EDA could help check such a development provided it is given the political and financial means to do so;
- with a view to more effective transatlantic cooperation, the EDA could encourage the EU member states to enter into a commitment similar to the Prague Capabilities Commitment, in order first and foremost to be able to meet the European forces' equipment requirements;
- the EDA should provide a channel for concerted action, leading to a better flow of information among the member states, but it could also help increase interoperability between European and American equipment, particularly in order to narrow the technology gap separating them and develop new joint approaches on equipment;
- the EDA should ensure that European investments do not benefit only American companies or joint programmes which are not conducive to developing a more autonomous European defence industry.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 753

The Council thanks the Assembly for its recommendations, which WEU member countries may wish to take into account in their joint efforts to implement the ambitious work programme of the European Defence Agency (EDA), approved for 2005. The EDA is rapidly progressing towards full operational capacity, an important objective being the definition of suitable administrative arrangements to ensure cooperation with the non-EU WEAG members.

RECOMMENDATION 754¹⁴***on unmanned combat air vehicles and military aeronautics of the future¹⁵***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that the aerospace sector with its specific technical constraints and requirements is a driving force for progress and innovation;
- (ii) Noting that the technological challenge posed by UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles) is mobilising increasing resources in the United States, Europe and other states with advanced defence industries;
- (iii) Considering that the emphasis placed on future military UAV (Unmanned Aerial Air Vehicle) and UCAV programmes in terms of investments and research, technology, development and evaluation (RTD&E) will inevitably have an impact on the civilian component of that industry;
- (iv) Considering that tactical UAVs have always been and continue to be regularly deployed by the armed forces of European countries for operations in Europe (Kosovo war) and elsewhere (Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq) and that their transportability and ease of use, as well as their modular structure and cost-effectiveness have made them indispensable and unavoidable;
- (v) Recalling that UAVs have up until now been used for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance missions;
- (vi) Noting that the advent of UCAVs opens a new chapter in the history of military and civilian aeronautics, because more than remotely controlled machines, they are genuine multi-mission, multi-role combat aircraft that are autonomous and capable of adapting to their specific environment;
- (vii) Considering that the UCAV concept constitutes a new weapons system whose introduction will significantly change military doctrines and the rules of engagement for military forces, and that the use of this technology is perceived as a means for rationalising air forces by limiting human intervention and the corresponding constraints;
- (viii) Noting that there are a number of different European UCAV projects or ongoing programmes, such as the *Neuron* programme led by France with the participation of Belgium, Greece, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland;
- (ix) Considering furthermore that the use of UAVs is a logical development arising out of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and technological progress, particularly in the fields of information technology and miniaturisation;
- (x) Noting that only those countries that have a well-developed aeronautics industry and technological/IT base will be able to play any decisive role in the area of strategic UAVs and UCAVs;
- (xi) Stressing the need to avoid a dispersal of European efforts in this area as has often been the case in the past for other weapons systems;
- (xii) Stressing that these questions are relevant for a crucial aspect of the ESDP: the European defence industrial and technological base (EDITB) and European research, technology, development and evaluation (RTD&E) capabilities;
- (xiii) Noting that the industrial effort that is under way also requires staunch political support and an overall vision of the integration of these new weapons systems and that the ECAP (European Capability Action Plan) project groups and the European Defence Agency (EDA) are responsible for that integration;

¹⁴ Adopted by the Assembly on 30 November 2004 (8th sitting).

¹⁵ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Antonio Braga (Portugal, Socialist Group) on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document [1884](#)).

(xiv) Underlining the importance of continuing the ETAP programme (European Technology Acquisition Programme) for future combat aircraft, among which the UCAV demonstrators are one of the most promising elements;

(xv) Recalling furthermore that interoperability is essential for UAV/UCAV systems and that at Euro-Atlantic level, NATO bears the responsibility for defining a “common language” among the allies and for designing the architecture of a common operating system;

(xvi) Considering, finally, that unless there is a common effort – which also requires a readiness on the part of the United States to cooperate with Europe on all types of unmanned vehicle projects – American and European forces will no longer be able in the medium term to conduct joint operations in low-to-medium intensity conflicts,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WEU COUNTRIES

1. To actively support European efforts to design and develop UAV and UCAV technology demonstrators by increasing their political, financial, technological and industrial participation;
2. To take account in this regard of the following factors:
 - the concept of unmanned remote-controlled or autonomous vehicles applied to air-based, land-based or naval weapons systems will have repercussions for defence doctrines and the operational engagement of forces;
 - it is necessary to have an overall vision of the integration of these new weapons systems designed to augment and/or supplant existing manned systems;
 - European countries must avoid a fragmented approach, competition among themselves and a duplication of efforts, for these are costly and ineffective in the long term;
 - some degree of specialisation and interdependence must be accepted in order to avoid these programmes becoming bogged down in conflicting requirements;
 - Europeans must develop their own networks that can be adapted in modular fashion to European or transatlantic coalitions in keeping with the effective multilateralism advocated by the European Security Strategy of December 2003;
 - maintaining an optimum level of transatlantic interoperability is essential and the responsibility for finding a common operating system among the United States and its allies lies first and foremost with NATO;
 - it is up to the European military bodies and the European Defence Agency (EDA) to develop a common, interoperable and interchangeable European standard which could provide a reference for interaction between European and American systems.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
to Recommendation 754

The Council thanks the Assembly for its recommendations and wishes to remind it that member countries of the Organisation are addressing those issues in their technical and strategic dimension within the relevant fora of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.

RECOMMENDATION 755¹⁶

on the space dimension of the European Security and Defence Policy¹⁷

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that recent international crises have shown that space systems play a key role in situation assessment and in ensuring the effectiveness of the forces engaged;
- (ii) Considering that it is not possible to guarantee the autonomy of the ESDP in the longer term without a comprehensive space component including ground stations and space-based systems, satellite data-processing centres and all-weather observation, communications and navigation satellites;
- (iii) Considering that the only way for Europe to begin closing the technological gap between it and the United States as regards network-centred capabilities – and in particular intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities (ISTAR) – is to make a substantial financial, research and industrial investment and develop a European defence space capability to be used by the ESDP and by NATO;
- (iv) Stressing the growing trend of integrating modern weapons systems – aircraft, unmanned observation and combat vehicles, robotised and autonomous systems, command and control (C2) ground, air and sea systems – through interdependent networks handling an increasing flow of computer, audio and video data;
- (v) Considering that space-based assets, particularly observation and communications satellites, are essential for those defence networks to operate correctly and effectively;
- (vi) Regretting that European cooperation in the field of defence space capabilities is still suffering from duplication of effort and the fragmentation of financial and technical resources invested in projects which, though useful, have a very limited scope in terms of what they actually achieve, notwithstanding all the research, technological and development work and defence tests carried out;
- (vii) Taking the view that it will not be possible for the European defence industrial and technological base (EDITB) to develop its full potential and be competitive internationally in leading-edge and added value defence technologies without a proper space component;
- (viii) Welcoming the launch of Europe's dual-use Galileo (satellite navigation) and Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) programmes and fully supporting its declared resolve to maintain an autonomous satellite launch capability;
- (ix) Deeming that the European Defence Agency should give priority, in the framework of its remit, to space programmes and related technologies in close coordination with the relevant European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) project group and in cooperation with the EU Military Staff, which consults national experts and representatives of the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD);
- (x) Noting the declared resolve of the European Union member states to acquire enhanced political and military capabilities for international crisis management and the conduct of Petersberg tasks;
- (xi) Welcoming the recent decisions of the European Council to give the EU a rapid reaction capability for international military crisis management missions, in particular through the creation of battle groups consisting of 1500 troops ready to be deployed at very short notice;
- (xii) Underlining NATO's efforts to make the troops at its disposal more dynamic by setting up the NATO Response Force (NRF), a high-tech, rapid reaction force;

¹⁶ Adopted by the Assembly on 30 November 2004 (8th sitting).

¹⁷ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Renzo Gubert (Italy, Federated Group) on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document [1881](#)).

(xiii) Convinced that if these two initiatives are to succeed, they must fulfil very high intelligence and data-processing criteria which require, among other things, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and recourse to space-based observation and communications systems;

(xiv) Considering that the only way in which these requirements can be met effectively, in view of the scale of all the economic, defence, industrial and technological challenges involved, is through enhanced European cooperation;

(xv) Taking the view that this issue should be the subject of a broad discussion not only between governments and industry but also with the national parliaments which vote the relevant budgets, so as to obtain the support and approval of European voters and tax-payers,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL REQUEST THE WEU MEMBER STATES TO ENDEAVOUR WITHIN THE EU FRAMEWORK TO:

1. Establish without delay a close link between the European Defence Agency, which should have its own "space" division, and the European Space Agency in order to deal with the specific requirements of space-based systems for the ESDP;
2. Develop a policy of interoperability and of exchanging capacities between existing European space-based observation and telecommunications systems;
3. Improve the responsiveness of the EU Satellite Centre (Torrejón) by giving it a proper military cell;
4. Study how space-based observation systems can be used for border surveillance, especially in maritime zones, in order to prevent illegal immigration and drug trafficking;
5. Energetically support the Galileo system and, more particularly, define what services it is expected to provide for the ESDP, and set up the funding needed for the PRS (Public Regulated Service);
6. Establish a policy for the long-term preservation of Europe's autonomous satellite launch capability;
7. Support efforts to develop European cooperation on space systems, in particular through the technology demonstrator programmes under way (electronic surveillance, early warning, laser links, etc.);
8. Develop these space system programmes for the ESDP with a view to giving the European Union the instruments it needs to obtain autonomously information that will form the basis for political decisions in a crisis, in accordance with the Headline Goal 2010.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 755

The Council thanks the Assembly for its topical recommendation and wishes to point out that, since the approval in November 2004 by the European Council of a document entitled “*ESDP and Space*”, the European Union has at its disposal a comprehensive roadmap addressing the role of space applications in the ESDP framework. This provides for identified and agreed upon requirements to be reflected in the global EU Space Policy and its corresponding Space Programme. The EU Military Committee is working on defining its own requirements as a first step in that respect. Also under consideration are arrangements for EU access to existing and planned military systems or data registered from such systems belonging to Member States.

RECOMMENDATION 756¹⁸***on the European Union and peacekeeping in Africa¹⁹***

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing historical, cultural and economic ties between the states of sub-Saharan Africa and many European nations, and the European Union;
- (ii) Preoccupied by the absence of a lasting solution to problems of instability and the conflicts endured by many African states, particularly Côte d'Ivoire, the Darfur region in Sudan and the Great Lakes Region (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda) and expressing its concern at the deteriorating political and economic situation in Zimbabwe;
- (iii) Considering that the situation as regards peace and security remains highly unstable throughout Africa, due to the persistence of flash-points for armed conflict, large numbers of refugees and displaced persons and the difficulties standing in the way of the continent's economic and social development which is being held back partly as a result of the damaging consequences of the AIDS pandemic;
- (iv) Considering that it is the responsibility first and foremost of African states themselves to resolve their quarrels and internal differences according to whatever principles and methods they regard as most appropriate and having due respect for international and international humanitarian law;
- (v) Pointing to the African Union's increasing involvement in resolving conflicts in Africa, usually by peaceful means and by consensus;
- (vi) Supporting the efforts being made by the African Union to develop its conflict resolution and crisis-management capabilities;
- (vii) Considering that this process can be carried out quickly and satisfactorily only by stepping up bilateral and multilateral cooperation over crisis management between African countries and the European countries concerned, and between the EU and the AU;
- (viii) Considering that the EU, with its special relationship with sub-Saharan Africa, should implement a coherent and coordinated multi-dimensional peace and security policy for Africa, in cooperation with the United Nations, NATO and other organisations and countries concerned;
- (ix) Taking the view that the institutions responsible for the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy should have a subsidiary role in coordinating bilateral and multilateral initiatives to support African military crisis-management capabilities;
- (x) Considering that the EU also has a particular responsibility to provide economic assistance towards the development of sub-Saharan Africa, in particular by means of fair trade and cooperation agreements and by opening up its markets to African products, all of which would make a major contribution towards stability;
- (xi) Expressing its support for European troops currently being deployed as part of stabilisation, buffer or peacekeeping forces in Africa,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage WEU nations to provide support to African countries' military crisis-management capability through education and training and technical assistance (equipment and logistics) programmes;

¹⁸ Adopted by the Assembly on 1 December 2004 (9th sitting).

¹⁹ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr Stef Goris (Belgium, Liberal Group) on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document [1880](#)).

2. Improve coordination between the security and defence support programmes currently linking some WEU nations with countries in Africa;
3. Ensure that WEU nations have the necessary operational capabilities to intervene rapidly, if necessary, in any crises affecting regional and international peace and security and in particular when human rights are infringed;
4. Encourage the European Union to increase cooperation with the African Union in the area of civil and military crisis management;
5. Keep the Assembly informed of initiatives taken by WEU nations towards peace and security in Africa.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL***to Recommendation 756***

The Council thanks the Assembly for its timely recommendations and wishes to recall that WEU Member States are fully involved in the implementation of the European Union's "*Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa*". Through internal and external coordination the EU can focus its efforts on short-term practical actions made possible by recently agreed institutional, legal and budgetary guidelines. Among the targeted objectives are the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants with special attention being paid to child soldiers and the reform of the security sector. The EU has enhanced its partnership with both the African Union and African sub-regional organisations in the field of reinforcement of African capacities for peace and security. The form of support the EU can provide is well illustrated in the efforts to resolve the Darfur conflict.

RECOMMENDATION 757²⁰
on new challenges for transatlantic security cooperation²¹

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising that the United States and Europe have in common vital interests such as safeguarding democratic values and combating threats to security and prosperity;
- (ii) Noting that the United States National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy both have a fairly similar analysis of the security threats their respective continents face but that the United States and the European Union are often at variance over methods and ways of dealing with common threats;
- (iii) Expressing their deep concern over the danger of terrorist attacks such as occurred, on both American and European soil, in the appalling events of 11 September 2001 in the United States and of 11 March 2004 in Madrid;
- (iv) Confirming that solidarity between Europeans and Americans in the fight against terrorism is indivisible;
- (v) Confirming also that it is essential to conduct the fight against terrorism in a manner that respects fundamental rights and freedoms and the right to a fair trial, and therefore expressing concern with regard to the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay;
- (vi) Aware of the importance of better consultation between both sides of the Atlantic, particularly in the NATO framework, and stressing that dialogue can be usefully conducted only when undertaken in a spirit of openness and mutual understanding;
- (vii) Considering the common interest the United States and Europe have in promoting the benefit of political systems that are transparent and respectful of human rights, and of healthy and prosperous economies;
- (viii) Bearing in mind change within NATO and in particular efforts to adapt its military capabilities to the new security challenges and extend the geographic limits of NATO action;
- (ix) Regarding it essential for the transatlantic allies to continue to be able to operate alongside one another, while recognising that high-technology arms and equipment are not a universal remedy against all threats;
- (x) Regretting that some US authorities are highly critical of European security and defence policy and that even many political analysts have mistaken views about where Europeans stand on issues, and vice versa;
- (xi) Emphasising the importance of all members of the United Nations complying with all of its resolutions and in that connection deploring the United States' recent unilateral recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as the "Republic of Macedonia" as running counter to the spirit of UN Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993);
- (xii) Recalling the European Council's determination that the European Union have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces in order to respond to international crises;
- (xiii) Stressing that by reinforcing solidarity between European Union member states so that Europe can have more influence in world affairs, EU countries can contribute to the vitality of a renewed Atlantic Alliance and to strengthening the authority of the United Nations;
- (xiv) Recalling the predominant and constructive role being played in Afghanistan by the United States and European allies, particularly through NATO, welcoming the election of President Karzai,

²⁰ Adopted by the Assembly on 1 December 2004 (10th sitting).

²¹ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs Elsa Papadimitriou (Greece, Federated Group) on behalf of the Political Committee (Document [1877](#)).

but concerned nevertheless at the worrying upsurge in the powers of the warlords and the further extension of opium production;

(xv) Considering European-American cooperation to be necessary for rebuilding Iraq's economy and improving security conditions in the country, in particular by strengthening the Iraqi army through NATO's training mission;

(xvi) Considering that any viable solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must include all the parameters of the Road Map and concerned too about the route taken by the security barrier currently under construction, but welcoming the adoption by the Knesset of the plan for Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip;

(xvii) Considering it essential, following the death of President Arafat, for the transatlantic allies to coordinate closely in supporting the holding of the elections scheduled for 9 January 2005 and in promoting a renewal of the peace process in the region;

(xviii) Considering that Iran has admitted concealment of an ambitious nuclear programme and having engaged in enriched uranium production without notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency, and taking account of recent demands made of Iran by the IAEA Governing Council in connection with the country's nuclear programme;

(xix) Hoping earnestly that Americans and Europeans will combine their political offices to secure compliance with, and a strengthening of the existing treaties, in order to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction;

(xx) Stressing that transatlantic cooperation is the more justified as the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is further amplified by the risk that terrorist groups may try and produce such weapons themselves or procure them illicitly for their own ends,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL URGE WEU MEMBER GOVERNMENTS TO:

1. Undertake, following the recent presidential elections in the United States, to work closely with President Bush and the new administration, including in multilateral institutions, to promote the rule of law and create a just, democratic and secure world;
2. Deepen the dialogue in NATO which continues to be the main forum for transatlantic consultation;
3. Ensure that the efforts the EU and NATO make towards securing the new military capabilities that both genuinely require for dealing with new security challenges complement one another, and endeavour to make good shortcomings and eliminate duplication in this sphere;
4. Undertake to explain more clearly to the US authorities the mutual advantage to be had from the development of the European Security and Defence Policy and of that policy being complementary to NATO policy;
5. Strengthen cooperation between the United States and Europe over intelligence;
6. Make serious efforts to ensure American public opinion is better informed about major developments in Europe, and vice versa;
7. Deploy within the ISAF framework the requisite peacekeeping forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams needed on the ground in Afghanistan, and provide Afghans with additional funding towards economic reconstruction;
8. Give an undivided commitment to setting up a robust NATO mission for training Iraqi security forces and act together in the EU and UN frameworks to contribute both to political stability in Iraq and to the reconstruction of its economy;
9. Urge the parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to apply all the measures contained in the Road Map, with the aim of achieving permanent settlement of the conflict on the basis of two states, Israel and a sovereign Palestine, living side by side in peace and security;

10. Draw up, with immediate effect, a closely targeted strategy to assist the Palestinian Authority with policing and political and economic reform and to support the electoral process;
11. Put pressure on Iran to conform to demands made of it by the International Atomic Energy Agency and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol providing for a stricter inspection regime at nuclear sites;
12. Convince the United States to support the establishment of a permanent, independent international agency for verifying disarmament, able to come rapidly to the assistance of the United Nations Security Council and urge the US authorities to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
13. Reach agreement with the United States on giving priority to the fight against the causes of terrorism, in particular by working for greater political openness and economic development in the Islamic world.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL***to Recommendation 757***

The Council thanks the Assembly for its interesting recommendations and wishes to underline that WEU Member States are fully involved in the development of transatlantic relations, based on shared values and mutual interests, in the relevant fora of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. In the latter, they fully support the strengthening of the strategic partnership in crisis management with NATO through closer consultation within the established cooperation framework under the Berlin Plus arrangements. WEU Member States also contribute to a dynamic bilateral relationship between the United States of America and the European Union.

RECOMMENDATION 758²²

on the deployment of European forces in the Balkans²³

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the achievement of peace, security and stability in the Balkans is an essentially European responsibility to be comprehensively fulfilled;
- (ii) Bearing in mind the decision of the EU Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003 that the EU is committed to supporting the reform process and international cooperation in the region and that it is open for the accession of all South-Eastern European countries provided they meet the Copenhagen criteria;
- (iii) Aware that the deployment of military forces in the Balkans must remain, for the foreseeable future, a crucial element in an overarching Alliance strategy to secure long-term European integration and prosperity for the Balkans;
- (iv) Believing that NATO and EU forces must coordinate responsibilities and roles within the Balkans whilst, over time, increasing the EU component and decreasing that of NATO in line with the conferral of a growing authority upon the EU in the Balkan peninsula;
- (v) Reiterating its commitment to the full eventual participation in the Euro-Atlantic partnership of all the countries of the Balkans and convinced that the European military model of armed forces under civilian and democratic control has an important part to play in this process;
- (vi) Conscious that a shared goal of EU membership politically underpins, through economic development, as well as governmental and judicial reform, the inter-communal and inter-state confidence-building presence in the Balkans of European troops;
- (vii) Insisting that the deployment in the Balkans of substantial numbers of forces from many European nations, including states outside the European Union and NATO, has to remain a major priority notwithstanding other pressing commitments in Africa, South-West Asia and the Middle East;
- (viii) Alert to the ever possible eventuality of violence especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro with the concomitant necessity of available, rapidly deployable forces both within and outside this theatre;
- (ix) Deeming that for the time being only the presence of KFOR, reinforced in qualitative and quantitative terms, can guarantee peace in Kosovo, and that it should not be reduced in size or capability until a political agreement on the status of Kosovo containing international security guarantees has been concluded at the highest level;
- (x) Appreciating the politico-military lessons which have already been learned in operations mounted by the armed forces of many European nations since the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation, most particularly in the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its aftermath, in Kosovo and above all from the deployment of an EU force to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003 for Operation Concordia;
- (xi) Welcoming the decision of the European Council in December 2003 to conduct Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a first step towards the creation of a European security area in the Balkans;
- (xii) Convinced that the efficacy of European force deployments to the Balkans in sustaining peace will prove a crucial determinant in the credibility of the European Union's security and defence policy,

²² Adopted by the Assembly on 1 December 2004 (10th sitting).

²³ Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr John Wilkinson (United Kingdom, Federated Group) on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document [1882](#)).

(xiii) Taking the view that Operation Althea is an important and decisive step for the development of the EU's military crisis management capabilities both in terms of the personnel and materiel deployed and as regards the force's command and control structures;

(xiv) Determined that European forces deployed in the Balkans should always be subject to a clear chain of command with the necessary numbers, equipment, logistic support and reserves as well as appropriate rules of engagement;

(xv) Deeming that proper application of the Berlin plus agreements by both organisations is indispensable for developing and strengthening a strategic European security and defence partnership between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance and for helping to redress the balance in transatlantic relations;

(xvi) Taking pride in the sustained involvement of WEU in the Balkans from the police mission in Albania to a constant series of reports on and missions to the area on the part of the Assembly;

(xvii) Considering that the support of citizens in the individual member states and in Europe as a whole and of their Members of Parliament is essential for launching military and civil crisis management operations led by the EU and/or NATO and for ensuring their success, and that this requires the national parliaments and the competent European interparliamentary assemblies to exercise their role of scrutiny of the conduct of governments and the Euro-Atlantic institutions,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge the member Governments of WEU nations to maintain substantial, well equipped, highly trained and rapidly deployable forces both within the Balkans and immediately available for Balkan operations;
2. Encourage the EU to assume prime responsibility for the preservation of peaceful stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Operation Althea whilst pursuing effective liaison with the residual NATO presence in that country;
3. Ensure that the WEU nations in KFOR maintain strong forces in Kosovo until a definitive political settlement for Kosovo has been implemented with the consent of all parties, communities and interested states;
4. Encourage the WEU nations to pursue an active policy of involvement in police training in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with an additional presence of European gendarmerie where organised crime and low-level violence are prevalent;
5. Ensure that the WEU nations work to secure the fullest participation of European military personnel in the NATO Partnership for Peace programme to inculcate common standards and operational procedures in the armed forces of Balkan states;
6. Encourage the WEU nations to develop flexible force arrangements to meet local requirements, ranging from Joint European Task Forces to Battle Groups and local liaison and observation teams so as to work more closely in the communities;
7. Continue to promote cooperation and coordination among the WEU nations with a view to guaranteeing the availability of mobile headquarters, framework nations, and adequate reserves ready for deployment at the shortest notice both into and across the theatre so as to thwart any outbreak of violence by swift intervention;
8. Utilise the Berlin Plus arrangements to fill those gaps in military capability and equipment which, prior to the fulfilment of the Headline Goal 2010, remain areas of military deficiency in European forces;
9. Ensure that the necessary sea and air power are held available for the potentially drastic actions required for the pacification of any serious violence that could degenerate into open military conflict;

10. Encourage the WEU nations to instil at all levels of command an awareness of the need for interaction of the political, economic and social dynamics of Balkan peacekeeping for Europe to achieve a lasting "*pax Balkanica*";

11. Keep the Assembly informed of European and Euro-Atlantic developments in military crisis management capabilities, in which all the WEU nations should be encouraged to play a full part.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL***to Recommendation 758***

The Council thanks the Assembly for its helpful recommendations concerning the further stabilisation of south-east Europe thanks to the continued and increasing commitment of the European Union in peacekeeping missions aimed at improving the political, economic and social foundations of an enduring peace. The successful start of the EU military Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 2 December 2004 underlines the determination of the EU in that respect, which is fully supported by WEU Member States as illustrated by their individual involvement. The same observation applies to both EU police missions in the region: EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUPOL PROXIMA in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are playing a decisive role in the strengthening of law and order, the containment of organised crime and border policing.

