Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr de Puig, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
- At a recent conference on European Defence , the NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, put forward a "vision" of the European Security and Defence Identity for 2005, setting out the following scenario:
"(...) By 2005, Europe will have developed its capabilities for military and non-military crisis management. Political and military structures will have been established to exercise political control and strategic direction over EU-led operations. The European Allies will make a more effective contribution to Alliance security and to Europe's security in general. And because of this Europe's transatlantic relations will be stronger.
And my three "I"s (inclusiveness of all NATO Allies, indivisibility of the transatlantic link, improvement of capabilities) will have been carved in stone - on a monument outside the building where joint NATO-EU Council sessions are being held (...) .
(...) By 2005, the EU will have long met its "headline goal". This will mean that we will have a 50 000 man force available, trained and equipped, ready within 60 days notice and sustainable in the field for at least a year (...)".
- Is there an equivalent scenario for the state of the European Union and its Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP)? We suggest the following for the year 2010: "At an extraordinary summit meeting, the United States and Russian Presidents congratulated the Presidency of the European Union on its success in preventing the outbreak of a further conflict in the Balkans thanks to a joint action undertaken in the European security and defence framework to which 30 European countries now belong. Supported by the presence of the European Rapid Reaction Force, the outcome of timely changes in the budget policies of EU member states and of their common endeavours to reform and restructure their armed forces in line with their "headline goal", European diplomacy has succeeded in avoiding the outbreak of a new conflict without being obliged to resort to force."
- "The European Union carried the more weight in view of the fact that its member states have agreed to sign a mutual assistance clause within the framework of the Treaty on European Union, that all of them have joined the Atlantic Alliance and that the EU has concluded an agreement with Russia and Ukraine which allows those two countries to take part in the European crisis-management policy as part of the European security and defence framework."
- "In the meantime it has emerged that a latent conflict outside Europe in the X (...) region threatens to erupt. In the United Nations Security Council, the United States and Russia are preparing a draft resolution asking the European Union to go into action. However, Europeans are still undecided. A three-way summit between Russia, America and Europe has therefore been convened (...)".
- A Utopian scenario almost certainly, but one whose plausibility rests on the real purpose of the goals that are behind initiatives taken by the European Union since the Cologne and Helsinki Summits. For the time being there are still major differences of opinion between member countries as to the aims of the decisions adopted. However, it is possible even now to distinguish elements of the scenario outlined that already exist from those still shrouded in obscurity.
- One reality is the European Council's resolve, confirmed at its Helsinki meeting on 10 and 11 December 1999, to develop an autonomous decision-making capability and "where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises". The European Council has made clear that the aim at present is to ensure that the EU can take a share of the responsibility for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis-management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, in other words the Petersberg missions.
- In order to be in a position to take such decisions, the European Union had already decided at the Cologne Summit to define "the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks". Instead of integrating WEU into the European Union as provided in the Amsterdam Treaty which came into force on 1 May 1999, the European Union decided to create decision-making structures within the second pillar in parallel to those already existing in WEU; namely:
- a General Affairs Council expanded to include defence ministers when dealing with matters concerning the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP);
- a permanent Political and Security Committee (PSC);
- a Military Committee (MC) and
- a Military Staff (MS).
With a view to the necessary preparation, an interim PSC and interim Military Body supported by military experts began work on 1 March last.
- Secondly the EU member states set themselves the "headline goal" of being in a position by 2003, to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50-60 000 strong). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining, with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member states should be able to deploy in full within 60 days and, within this, provide smaller rapid response elements at very high readiness. They must moreover be in a position to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.
II. Problems still to be settled in view of the direction chosen at the Cologne and Helsinki summits
1. Collective defence: an issue still pending
- The achievement of these two goals is, after the creation of the single European currency, one of the central tasks of the process of European unification. However, as your Rapporteur observed in his book entitled The Myth of Europa this task is but the first stage of a process which will only draw to its close once a second stage leading ultimately to the transfer of the entire defence dimension to the European Union has been completed.
- Your Rapporteur expressed his conviction in the book that the basic problem, that of collective defence, can be resolved only in the medium or longer term. The abovementioned scenario, which assumed that the problem would be settled by 2010, is therefore a hypothetical one.
- Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether one should avail oneself of the opportunity provided by the present Intergovernmental Conference to move beyond the point where the European Union governments left off at Cologne and Helsinki. Should one recommend, as the European Parliament did in a resolution containing proposals to the Intergovernmental Conference , that the mutual assistance clause under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty be the subject of a protocol annexed to the Treaty on European Union, thus leaving each member state free to sign up to it or not?
- This basic issue also has a tactical dimension. It is important to note that neither the Cologne nor the Helsinki Declaration refers to the parts of the Treaty on European Union which confirm that the gradual framing of a common defence policy could lead to a common defence if the European Council were so to decide. Conversely the Presidency report annexed to the conclusions to the Helsinki European Summit confirmed that NATO remains the foundation of a collective defence and that commitments under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty will be preserved for the member states party to that Treaty.
- On 12 April 2000 the German Government gave the following reply to a question raised by Mr Bühler in the Bundestag:
"The transfer to the European Union of Article V of the WEU Treaty is neither on the agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference at present nor included in the programme for discussions for implementing decisions taken by the European Council in Cologne on strengthening the European Security and Defence Policy.
When the European Union takes over responsibility for tasks assigned to WEU in the field of crisis management, the matter of Article V of the WEU Treaty will appear in another light. The German Government will in due course play an active part in the discussions that are to take place on the subject."
- This reply from the Government left all the options wide open, unlike Mr Verheugen who, at the June 1999 plenary session, ruled out any prospect of a collective defence within the European Union framework. However, member governments' intentions in this connection remain unclear for the present. On 21 January last, the WEU Secretary-General and CFSP High Representative, Mr Solana, still maintained that "there is no intention that the EU should take on responsibility for collective defence; this will remain the business of NATO" .
- During the Presidential Committee's meeting with the Chairmanship-in-Office of WEU and the European Union on 18 April last in Lisbon, Mr Jaime Gama, Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, said in reply to a question put by the President of the Assembly, that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty had no real substance since responsibilities under it which related to collective defence had been transferred to NATO in 1950. It was not conceivable that the European Union could take on a WEU-style contractual obligation for collective defence, in other words conceding practical implementation to the NATO authorities. The European Union was a responsible body. If it decided to take collective defence on board it should do so comprehensively, along with all the consequences that such a step entailed. According to the Minister, NATO was the appropriate framework for collective defence. Two sets of collective defence machinery operating in parallel, one within the European Union and one in NATO, were inconceivable.
- Such views are interesting but do not correspond to the facts as restated by your Rapporteur in Document 1636 adopted by the Assembly at its June 1999 session :
"Currently collective defence, although confined to the ten full members of WEU, is a political reality because it is based on an institution, WEU, which monitors the application of the relevant clause of the Treaty. Notwithstanding the fact that, in 1950, Europeans decided to assign the military implementation of a collective defence founded on Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty to NATO, the decision was still based on the assumption of the continuing presence on the continent of Europe of a credible number of adequately armed American troops.
That presence, backed up by the US nuclear umbrella, was guaranteed throughout the entire cold war period, but question marks are now being raised over it by a growing number of American politicians, owing to the profound changes wrought in the international security environment since the fall of the Berlin wall. Even though, in the present climate, the possibility of an armed attack on the territorial integrity of WEU member states seems wholly remote, it would be extremely dangerous to conclude in consequence that the European collective defence commitment is no longer necessary and can be discharged solely by reference to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty."
The commitment under Article V is therefore very specific and, furthermore, more binding than that contained in Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington. However, the foregoing gives an idea of the complexity of the discussions that lie ahead if the matter is included on the agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference. It seems entirely justified, necessary even, to remind the governments concerned that the European security and defence project should be seen through to its conclusion if true political union is the goal, and that consequently the matter of collective defence cannot be put off indefinitely.
- However, precisely because of the magnitude of the problem and the absence of a consensus among the Fifteen, it hardly seems realistic or prudent to ask now for the matter to be decided at the present Intergovernmental Conference. In any event it is not a good idea for the European Union to settle such an important matter through a protocol whose effect would be to mitigate the binding nature of a commitment to collective defence. On the other hand, it would be appropriate to ask the governments concerned for clear confirmation, when CESDP provisions are finalised, that they will stand firm in their stated resolve, as expressed in Articles 2 and 17 of the Treaty on European Union, to develop the collective defence policy into a common defence on the basis of a European Council decision. For if the European Union were to abandon that aim, the situation would appear in a wholly different light. In the meantime there is a need to look at the implications of the decision for the moment to maintain the collective defence commitment within the framework of the modified Brussels Treaty while crisis management is transferred to the European Union.
2. The implications of the transfer of Petersberg tasks to the European Union
- The Helsinki documents show that the European Union members set themselves the goal of taking responsibility for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis-management tasks set out in the Treaty on European Union. They therefore want the European Union to have an autonomous capacity to launch and then to conduct all Petersberg tasks including EU-led military operations.
- At the same time the European Union governments recognise that NATO will continue to play an important part in crisis management. This is why European capabilities must be developed "without unnecessary duplication" and the EU must go into action only "where [là où ] NATO as a whole is not engaged". According to a report on the European Union Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy submitted on 16 March 2000 to the French National Assembly by the Chairman of the National Assembly's Delegation to the European Union, Mr Alain Barrau , this wording was adopted, to France's satisfaction, in preference to "when" [lorsque], the wording used in the [French] text of the Washington Summit Communiqué on 24 April 1999.
- The French Defence Minister, Mr Richard, identifies three kinds of crisis intervention:
- intervention carried out under NATO's sole responsibility;
- European Union-led intervention with recourse to NATO assets;
- autonomous intervention on the part of the European Union.
When a choice has to be made between the three options, does NATO have to have first right of refusal, in other words, the right to decide in a crisis whether or not the Atlantic Alliance should head up any military intervention?
- In fact, the US political leadership has regularly pointed out that NATO should have priority and that it would be dangerous, in the event of a crisis, were there to be a dispute between the European Union and NATO as to which of them should lead any action proposed. In her address to the Aspen Institute's Conference in Venice, on 18 March last, Mrs Albright said "We would look to NATO as the preferred institution to act wherever possible".
- In this connection, the French Defence Minister dismisses any risk of competition between the European Union and NATO. In an address given in the United States he stated positively that "Such a decision could not be taken with pre-emption of either of them, nor can anyone imagine that Europeans will be ready to carry out an operation against American interests. ... In real life ... we all very well know that this process could take place through direct consultation and dialogue between capitals, and not through a purely institutional decision-making process ...".
- Of course, this problem is a purely hypothetical one at the moment since European capabilities are not sufficiently developed. However, on the other side of the Atlantic questions are being raised about Europeans' real intentions. Do Europeans want only, as Mr Richard said in the United States, "to be able to put out fires in their own back yards" or does the European Union want to "play its full role on the international stage", as stated in the Cologne Declaration or extend its "comprehensive external role" as described in that of Helsinki? Should the European Union put forward a strategic concept stating what its part on the international stage is and what it means by Petersberg tasks? Some hold that it is necessary for the European Union, as a strategic player, to set out its true aims for the benefit of public opinion and the electorate, in order to drum up support among the citizenry of the European Union. However, because of uncertainties over the nature of future crises and in the absence of a consensus among the Fifteen in this regard, European Union ambitions remain somewhat ill-defined. This situation seems to add strength to the arm of those who advocate that the United States should be entitled to a say in the decision-making process within the European Union where the issue is crisis management.
- The idea of various "at 23" arrangements involving the 15 European Union member states, plus the 6 non-EU European allies and the United States and Canada, are being mooted, although this is difficult to reconcile with EU ambitions for an autonomous decision-making capability in the framework of the Fifteen.
- Will geographic boundaries be fixed to delineate areas where the European Union would become engaged in crisis management? What will be the criteria the European Union would use in deciding whether it was necessary for it to intervene in a crisis which broke out in one part of the world or another? To date, the Treaty on European Union has not contained a clause comparable to Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty which provides for the convening of the WEU Council at the request of a member state with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace in whatever area this threat should arise. Should one agree on a division of labour between Europe and the United States according to geographic criteria or on the basis of their respective interests?
- Some fear that Europe's ambitions will only accentuate the transatlantic divide and run counter to the argument that the Alliance and the European Union have strategic interests in common . It seems essential, as far as crisis management goes, for Europeans to define clearly the spread of European Union engagement. Mr Richard, France's Defence Minister, recently described two peacekeeping and peacemaking mission scenarios: a lighter operation based on a possible long-distance intervention with a largely humanitarian content in a non-hostile environment and a heavier, armed peacekeeping operation on Europe's borders making call upon all our common capabilities. A priori, therefore, there is no thought of setting geographic limits to any European Union operations that may take place.
- In this context, it is necessary to take a clear stance on the importance attached to acting in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In this connection the Helsinki Summit confirmed that "The [European] Union recognises the primary responsibility (responsabilité première) of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security". The wording here is very similar (although in the French version not identical) to that used by the Atlantic Alliance at the NATO Washington Summit: "As stated in the Washington Treaty, we recognise the primary responsibility (responsabilité primordiale) of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security".
- What distinction is being made in the French text between responsabilité première and responsabilité primordiale? The Atlantic Alliance, which took action in Kosovo without a UN mandate, linked recognition of the role of the United Nations to the provisions of the Washington Treaty which merely confirm that the Allies will act in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter. The European Union in contrast does not express any such reservation, but nor does it say that it would only act upon a mandate from the UN. Mr Barrau, in the report referred to earlier, recalls that the United Nations Charter was founded on respect for state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and that even if international law was in the process of moving in the direction of practical recognition of interference on humanitarian grounds, some of the Security Council's members were extremely attached to compliance with the above principles.
- He therefore concludes that the European Union has left open the possibility of its deciding to intervene in the event of the Security Council not managing to define a position. Although such flexibility appears to have some justification it raises the issue as to whether, when the time comes, the European Union member states would be capable of taking a decision to act with or without a mandate from the Security Council in the absence of a "lead nation", after the pattern of the Atlantic Alliance.
- The matter of leadership and of how to facilitate the decision-making process are paramount when it comes to reacting swiftly and appropriately to a crisis. Neither WEU nor the European Union has up to now found an ideal solution as to how to reach a quick decision in an area where unanimity is the basis of consensus. While the modified Brussels Treaty is flexible enough for a group of WEU member countries to take action without others having to be involved (which made possible the operations in the Persian Gulf and the Adriatic) the Treaty on European Union introduces the possibility of constructive abstention. However, as far as decisions to be taken in the CFSP area are concerned, the Union has achieved no better results than WEU.
- In order to improve on this situation other proposals are under examination, one being for an informal "board of management" made up of a small number of countries selected on the basis of the size of their contribution to crisis management. This would lead inevitably to acceptance of the principle that the "larger" countries have a driving role in European security and defence that might go against the interests of the "smaller nations" and those of a non-aligned tradition, which lay stress upon the principle of political equality between member states.
- Others advocate extending the possibilities of "enhanced cooperation" to the second pillar of the European Union. However, while this instrument was strictly confined to the legal framework of the European Union institutions, it would lose much of its attraction given that it excludes certain non-EU European countries that would be wholly prepared to participate in enhanced cooperation over security and defence and are in a position to do so. One must therefore avoid limiting enhanced cooperation in this area to the exclusive framework of the Fifteen.
- A more technical aspect, but one with political implications for the decision-making process, is who should in future preside over the forums that have to take the necessary decisions on the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), specifically the General Affairs Council expanded to include defence ministers and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). A Franco-German initiative proposes that the latter should be chaired by the High Representative for the CFSP and WEU Secretary-General, Mr Solana. Some member countries are still against this solution but in order to make the PSC more coherent and effective, strong pressure should be applied for the latter to be run by the High Representative. To this end the Assembly supports the position taken by the European Parliament in its resolution containing proposals to the Intergovernmental Conference .
- However, one might go further still and propose that the High Representative also preside over the General Affairs Council in the field of the CFSP and CESDP, with a view to giving it the necessary impetus and cohesion. But here one runs up against the more general problem of coherence between the first and second pillars and how to maintain it, and between civilian and military crisis management. According to the WEU Secretary-General : "One of the European Union's strengths in the face of a crisis will be its capacity to combine military intervention directly and generically with other forms of political, economic or humanitarian action which, in the last analysis, may perhaps be even more important in guaranteeing a lasting settlement".
- In accordance with the mandate it received from the European Council, the Portuguese Presidency submitted a report in Helsinki on non-military crisis management, together with a plan of action to develop a rapid reaction force for non-military crisis management. In this context it was proposed inter alia to create by means of a decision in COREPER a committee in the second pillar for civilian crisis management and the European Commission has just created a rapid reaction fund.
- According to a press release issued after the meeting of the General Affairs Council on 20 March last "the Council considered the establishment of a Committee for civilian crisis management and agreed to define its role and competences (...) with a view to reaching a decision on the establishment of such a committee at Feira". The creation of such a mechanism that is intended to strengthen and supplement the range of European Union crisis-management instruments raises several issues.
- In order to achieve coherence between the activities of this committee and other CFSP authorities it would be desirable for it also to be chaired by the CFSP High Representative, while the European Parliament proposes that the Commissioner for External Relations be responsible for "coordinating arrangements for civilian crisis management ". Chris Patten has announced inter alia the creation of a crisis cell within the Commission parallel with the situation centre within the Council. Coordination between civilian and military crisis-management structures will obviously be essential and it remains to be seen whether the European Union's ability to combine its various instruments will in fact be a genuine strength. For there are not only those who consider civilian crisis management as complementary to military crisis management as Mrs Hanna Ojanen, of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, argued at the hearing organised by the European Parliament in Brussels on 22 March last: "Non-military crisis management may also be supported for the opposite reason: not as a step towards common security policy but in order to counteract this development, to limit the EU's activities to concrete civilian tasks and to impede it from being too concentrated on the development of a military arm of the Union".
- The Chairman of the French National Assembly Delegation to the European Union therefore sees "a risk ... that crisis management by the European Union will be flawed by the fear (on the part of the neutral countries) of a "militarisation" of the European approach, thus preventing the Union from exercising an early deterrent threat against a potential aggressor". In any event it will probably be difficult to decide upon a doctrine as to when civilian or military instruments are to be employed. However, it is absolutely essential to avoid disputes over responsibilities between representatives of the Council and the Commission, which would paralyse the European Union in a crisis situation.
- The peculiar nature of the European Union, whose military dimension forms but one part of its activities as a whole, will doubtless have implications for the way in which that institution tackles its future cooperation with NATO. Speaking at the Munich Defence Conference on 5 February last, Mr Solana pointed to the need to observe the "legal character of the Union", adding "and we also have to ensure coherence with other parallel measures in other fields".
- How much future relations between the European Union and NATO can take WEU/NATO relations as their model depends precisely on the characteristics peculiar to the Union. The Helsinki Summit makes no reference to this acquis but makes manifest an intention to develop modalities "for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO ... taking account of the needs of all EU member states".
- Moreover the European Council has asked the Portuguese Presidency to develop for the Feira Summit
"proposals on principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and recommendations on developing modalities for EU/NATO relations to permit cooperation on the appropriate military response to a crisis as set out in Washington and Cologne".
- During an EU General Affairs Council meeting, on 20 March last, which defence ministers attended, the subject of future relations between the European Union and NATO was discussed, but the outcome is not known. However, it seems that among the items discussed was the fact that NATO and the European Union were different kinds of organisation and that this should be taken into account in discussions on the possibility of using existing procedures between WEU and NATO as a basis. The European Union is also very keen in principle that it and NATO should conduct their relations on an equal footing with neither of those two organisations taking precedence over the other.
- It is probable that the European Union will suggest interim arrangements to allow NATO to be kept informed about the way the CESDP is moving, which might include, for example, informal meetings between the interim PSC and the NATO Permanent Council, with the aim of identifying areas in which agreements should be concluded with NATO pursuant to Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union .
- At the present stage of discussions, two observations are called for. First, it would appear that the European Union has no intention at present of basing its relationship with NATO on a provision in the Treaty on European Union comparable to that contained in Article IV, first indent, of the modified Brussels Treaty , which would require an amendment to the Treaty on European Union. The absence of such a provision would be indicative of the European Union's independence vis-à-vis NATO and vice versa while the agreements pursuant to Article 24 of the TEU would be easier to set up and would not require parliamentary ratification. However, one must be aware that if relations between the European Union and NATO were to be based solely on agreements pursuant to Article 24, they would be radically different in kind from those that exist at present between WEU and NATO member countries.
- The second observation is that the North Atlantic Council continues to attach a great deal of importance to the development of ESDI within the Alliance on the basis of the existing WEU/NATO machinery . Nevertheless, as yet none of the documents prepared by the European Union on the future relationship between the European Union and NATO makes reference to the term ESDI. In the same way as when the CFSP was set up, the issue arises as to whether the CESDP as framed by the European Union can be reconciled with the concept of ESDI (European Security and Defence Identity) developed by the Atlantic Alliance.
- The Assembly put this problem to the Council in Recommendation 654 and the Council's reply clearly illustrates the extreme difficulty experienced by the governments in finding a plausible and coherent explanation:
"The Council wishes to highlight the importance for the developing European security architecture of continuing collaborative efforts, as well as fostering the necessary synergies. Clearly, this evolving structure contains several multi-dimensional elements. A key aspect favouring further simplification and mutual reinforcement will be the development of the appropriate cooperation and collaboration between the European Union and NATO. WEU's politico-military experience, as well as the development of its cooperation and collaboration with NATO, will continue to be an important asset in the transition period."
- NATO invariably puts the emphasis on the need for an enhanced contribution by all European allies to joint security and stability. Thus NATO regards ESDI as the expression of the European pillar of the Alliance that needs strengthening. Up to now the endeavour has been to achieve that aim through WEU - inclusive of its associate members - regarded and acknowledged as the essential element of ESDI within the Alliance. In point of fact, although the European Union makes no reference to ESDI, NATO for its part makes mention of the CESDP and what this should not do. According to NATO:
"European strategic independence is not feasible. The US retains key strategic capabilities which may well be indispensable for all but the smallest contingencies: logistics, strategic lift , satellite reconnaissance etc. A CESDP is thus not about Europe "going it alone" but about Europe doing more. And this suggests that a CESDP must develop in conjunction with NATO ".
- This is not necessarily the perspective in which the European Union is developing its Common European Security and Defence Policy. It is being said clearly in some quarters that ESDI and the CESDP are very different concepts, especially as the European Union is not NATO's European pillar. In practice the proof of the pudding as to whether the two concepts can be reconciled lies in the conditions the EU proposes to offer to non-EU European members of NATO for their participation in Europe's project.
- The WEU Assembly has already insisted in various reports and recommendations that the acquired rights of associate member and associate partner countries in WEU must be preserved within the European Union framework when the latter body takes over WEU's Petersberg functions. In its reply to Recommendation 654 the Council merely recalls:
" ... that it is up to the EU and its members to draw appropriate arrangements regarding (...) consultation and cooperation with non-EU countries and with NATO. The Council nevertheless wishes to take this opportunity to stress the valuable asset constituted by WEU's specific politico-military expertise."
- However, it seems that the arrangements for future participation in the CESDP by the countries concerned are still a problem for the European Union, whose members feel bound to take all the necessary measures, while keeping to the single institutional framework of the Union defined in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. The Helsinki European Council agreed as follows:
"appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to EU military crisis management;".
It also asked the Portuguese Presidency to draw up appropriate proposals to be presented to the Feira European Council. However, the European Council has already laid down certain guidelines in this connection.
- First it declared that the countries concerned would be asked to contribute to the improvement of European capabilities. Regarding their involvement in decision-making, the European Council envisaged that:
"The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members, other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners in EU-led crisis management, with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union.
With European NATO members who are not members of the EU and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU, appropriate structures will be established for dialogue and information on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management. In the event of a crisis, these structures will serve for consultation in the period leading up to a decision of the Council.
Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets.
Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations where the EU does not use NATO assets."
- In the foregoing evaluation, your Rapporteur is entirely in agreement with the opinion expressed by the President of the WEU Assembly, Mr Bühler, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation held in Antalya on 10 March last:
"It is of the utmost importance, precisely in the early phases of an international crisis, for all the relevant European players to be involved. WEU has established the principle that the associate members must be involved in all crisis-management activities. The Helsinki decisions fall short of that standard. The "consultations" they refer to are the weakest form of involvement one could possibly imagine.
The same applies to the statements about involving the associate members in an actual operation. According to the abovementioned paragraph from the Helsinki Declaration, there must be a special Council decision to involve the associate members, even when the EU is conducting an operation with NATO support. Clearly, a NATO member cannot be refused early and full involvement in an operation using NATO assets. After all, NATO resources are almost exclusively national resources. This decision by the European Council needs to be carefully reviewed and amended.
Governments should abide by the consultation arrangements they agreed some time ago between WEU and NATO. Under those arrangements, NATO is involved from an early stage in the process of preparing joint operations. From NATO's standpoint as well, this is an important component of the WEU acquis which must at all costs be preserved. This applies, for example, to the creation of special multilateral formations within the second pillar of the EU. How should the consultations with the associate members countries and their participation in the new EU decision-making bodies be organised? Will the EU adopt, both for the Military Committee and the Military Staff, the system "at 21" which has proved its worth in WEU? The Assembly must warn against falling short of the WEU standard in this area. Not only would this be unacceptable for the associate members themselves, it would also be counter-productive from the point of view of the essential close cooperation between the EU and NATO.
But it is not just a question of relations with NATO. The EU has still to prove that it is as ready and willing as WEU has always been to cooperate with European states which are not full members."
- In compliance with the European Council's request, the Portuguese Presidency endeavoured to develop model "arrangements" for conclusion with the countries in question. Without calling into question the European Union's decision-making autonomy, it is envisaged that the necessary arrangements can be governed by a multilateral agreement with the countries concerned concluded pursuant to Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union, by creating a "European Security and Defence Framework" (ESDF) bringing together the 13 WEU associate members and partners and the 15 European Union member states. In this European Security and Defence Framework specific structures might be created:
- an ESDF Ministerial Council,
- an ESDF Political and Security Committee,
- an ESDF Military Committee, and
- an ESDF Military Staff.
- These would be parallel to but separate from the corresponding European Union structures. It would appear that there have been some developments since these proposals were made in that what is now under consideration is a single structure encompassing the 15 EU member states and all 15 EU applicant countries (with Cyprus and Malta) and non-EU European allies. Within this structure, meetings "at 15+6" could be held when necessary. As far as participation by non-EU European allies is concerned, they might take part in an EU-led operation with recourse to NATO assets and resources but the decision to launch such an operation would be taken exclusively in the European Union framework. The degree of participation on the part of non-EU allies will depend on informal agreements reached between the European Union and NATO on the modalities for consultation and cooperation.
- In the case of the European Union opting for an operation without recourse to NATO assets and resources, involvement of non-EU European allies and countries that are candidates for accession to the EU will depend on a decision by the European Union. The non-EU European allies will therefore not have the same participation rights in EU-led operations as those as they hold in WEU as associate members of that Organisation, pursuant to the Declaration relating to Western European Union of 22 July 1997, appended to the Amsterdam Treaty.
- However, the European Union's stated intention of settling the matter of participation in the CESDP by a multilateral agreement and exercising pressure on EU member states for that agreement to allow the countries in question the widest possible participation in those activities that are to be transferred from WEU to the European Union, in accordance with criteria drawn up within WEU, is to be welcomed.
3. The effects of creating autonomous European capabilities as per the "headline goal"
- The non-EU European allies and other countries that are candidates for accession to the EU should be able to participate as widely as possible in CESDP activities, especially as they are to be asked to contribute to the improvement of European military capabilities and to share the "headline goal", which involves the formation of a 50 000-60 000-strong European force by 2003. At a joint meeting of foreign and defence ministers held in the framework of the General Affairs Council on 20 March last, the latter approved a document entitled "Elaboration of the Ôheadline goal', food for thought" as an appropriate basis for further work.
- This document contains a programme of work intended to firm up Europe's intentions and has a number of implications. It states that:
"The Ôheadline goal' is a policy and planning commitment for the EU Member States. The scale and nature of national contributions cannot be fully addressed until the overall requirement is clearer. Additional contributions to the overall improvement of European military capabilities will be invited from European NATO members who are not EU Member States and other countries who are candidates for accession to the European Union. We would expect other European nations to participate in specific EU-led operations".
It therefore remains to be seen to what extent differing contributions might be asked of the member countries and the other countries mentioned. In this connection the European Union intends, in the context of its forthcoming work, to devise a formula as a matter of urgency. This issue is linked to the problem of how the European initiative is to be coordinated with that on defence capabilities (Defence Capabilities Initiative or DCI) launched by NATO in Washington. The "Food for Thought" paper confines itself to observing that "it will be essential for all this further work to be closely coordinated with existing NATO and PfP planning processes, since the forces involved are also being developed and held available for NATO, or NATO-led, operations".
- The document recalls that "WEU has already generated a set of illustrative Petersberg mission profiles including scenarios for European-led operations for up to corps-sized level" and concludes that the elaboration of a "headline goal" should be based on WEU's work.
- There is no mention of the financial implications of the project to create credible military capabilities but the French Defence Minister, Mr Richard, proposed at Sintra that each member state should devote 0.7% of its GDP to military investment. It would appear that everyone is aware of the budget implications of implementing the "headline goal" but up to now no effort has been put into preparing public and parliamentary opinion to that effect. However, it is perhaps still too early to establish exactly what the cost of the various measures to be taken would be, but the topic must necessarily feature on the agenda of the "forces generation conference" planned for the year-end.
4. Do changes have to be made to the treaties to implement the CESDP?
- The reason why parliamentarians are interested in whether and to what extent the European Security and Defence Policy has a legal justification in the treaties is because they fear that, under cover of facilitating the procedure and moving forward more quickly in this area, methods are being espoused which allow the process of parliamentary ratification to be circumvented. One such method could be to give an extremely wide interpretation to the existing treaties, thus sanctioning fundamental policy changes without touching the treaties themselves. Another would be to "re-work" a treaty by introducing a "catch-all" clause whereby all kinds of agreements could be concluded without parliamentary ratification. Along much the same lines are proposals that seek to limit the ratification procedure to a single section of the Treaty on European Union - that dealing with the general principles governing the way the European Union works - while the remainder could be modified at will by a simple intergovernmental agreement.
- But neither should it be forgotten that treaties can become obsolete, either because they fall into oblivion or because all the states party decide tacitly not to apply them any longer. As far as the legal consequences of including some WEU functions in the European Union go, it is interesting to note the legal opinion of the European Union. The report of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, dated 28 February 2000, containing an opinion addressed to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs makes clear that:
"A Council legal opinion of 26 November 1999 provisionally concluded that all decisions on security and defence policy, as they emerge from the Finnish Presidency's progress report, could be covered by existing Treaty articles, in particular Article 18.2 and Article 26, under which the Presidency and the High Representative are responsible for implementing decisions taken by the Council pursuant to Article 13.3."
With regard to the EU having recourse to WEU for framing and implementing Union decisions and actions with defence implications (Article 17.3), the Council's Legal Service argues that the wording of this provision makes such recourse optional and places no obligation whatsoever on the Union, which is therefore perfectly able to take decisions with defence implications on its own authority."
- If the Portuguese Presidency and the European Council support that interpretation, neither the implementation of the CESDP nor the transfer of Petersberg tasks would require any amendment to the existing treaties. Under such circumstances, European Union governments could settle matters outside the Intergovernmental Conference. However, it would be unusual for governments to opt definitively for such an interpretation. This relates specifically to Article 17.3 of the Treaty on European Union which states that "The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications".
- If this provision did not in effect place a real obligation on the European Union, it would then become necessary to question the reason for its introduction in the TEU. It is common knowledge that at the time it was deemed appropriate to adopt that provision, the European Union had no contractual or technical means of carrying out crisis-management missions itself. When the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties entrusted those tasks to WEU, Europe faced several regional conflicts, particularly in the Balkans, that led to tens of thousands of deaths.
- Had there really been a tacit agreement never seriously to envisage applying Article 17 of the TEU, governments, those of the Fifteen first among them, would bear a heavy responsibility for not wanting to make use of WEU, as would the WEU governments, because they failed to use the instruments of the modified Brussels Treaty as the Assembly repeatedly asked them to do.
- However, even the European Parliament seems not to adhere to this legal interpretation of Article 17 as it is asking for the article to be revised so as to eliminate from it any reference to WEU, following the transfer of WEU's Petersberg functions to the European Union. In fact, as the Behrendt report argues, it is difficult to imagine that WEU's Petersberg tasks can be transferred to the European Union lock, stock and barrel and the decision-making structures necessary for the CESDP can be created without amendments to the TEU. Such amendments could not moreover simply consist of eliminating all reference to WEU from Article 17. Nor, so long as certain elements of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols, whose implementation is to remain WEU's responsibility, are not incorporated into the Treaty on European Union, will it be possible to delete the content of Article 17.4 .
- This is particularly the case for Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, Protocol No. II on Forces of Western European Union, the Resolution concerning the level of forces of the seven Western European Union Powers placed under NATO command, adopted by the Council of Western European Union on 15 September 1956, and the Agreement drawn up in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II (...) signed at Paris on 14 December 1957; entered into force on 13 November 1961. Neither will it be possible to delete the other references to WEU without amending the TEU.
- Article 17 of the TEU defines the Petersberg missions but the Treaty does not stipulate the conditions to be met for the European Union to engage in action. Article 22.2 allows for the possibility of convening an extraordinary Council meeting within a short period of time "in cases requiring a rapid decision". But what criteria are to be used to define an emergency?
- If the European Union is resolved to substitute WEU completely as far as crisis management goes, it needs to base itself on an article of the TEU that draws upon Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty. In other words it will be necessary to specify that the situation is one that may constitute a threat to peace and also say whether European Union responsibilities are to be restricted to a given geographic area or whether the Union regards itself as responsible for peacekeeping in any area where the threat to peace occurs - as provided in the modified Brussels Treaty. There would then also be a need to amend Article 22 of the TEU so as to define clearly the circumstances under which the Council should be convened in the event of a crisis.
- Moreover, as we saw in Chapter II.2, it would seem essential for the European Union to incorporate a provision in the TEU dealing with general principles governing cooperation between it and NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. Up to now WEU has played a pivotal role between the European Union and NATO, on the basis of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, which made it possible to develop a system of close cooperation between WEU and NATO. With the transfer of most WEU functions to the European Union and direct relations being created between the EU and NATO, WEU's pivotal role will disappear other than in all areas connected with collective defence.
- In view of its importance, it would be a mistake for close cooperation between the European Union and NATO over crisis management to be based solely on the provisions set out in Article 24 of the TEU . Such general provisions would doubtless mean that a number of agreements could be concluded between the two organisations in order to settle points of detail, and could be amended without difficulty if necessary. However, since the prime concern is to ensure that the development of the European Union's autonomous security and defence capabilities serves to preserve and strengthen transatlantic cohesion and cooperation, an appropriately worded clause must be included within the body of the TEU.
- Another area of the TEU likely to be amended concerns the provisions on closer cooperation, at present set forth in Title VII. The possibilities for closer cooperation, limited up to now to areas under the third pillar, could be extended to the CFSP and the Common European Security and Defence Policy. It could in fact be said that WEU has to date been an ideal example of closer European cooperation in the area for which it is responsible, thereby acting as a magnet, moving Defence Europe along more quickly and drawing in a larger number of participants than is possible in the European Union framework.
- However, since the Cologne and Helsinki decisions, WEU is no longer destined to provide that impetus. All forms of closer cooperation over security and defence must now take place within the single institutional framework of the European Union and will exclude several non-EU European nations which would be ready and willing to take part in such cooperation. Support should be given to closer cooperation being extended to the second pillar, always provided arrangements can be arrived at that make such cooperation more inclusive and prevent it from being too rigidly locked into the single institutional framework of the 15 European Union member states.
- There is a need, should this prove too difficult, to retain the possibility of using the WEU framework to develop closer cooperation, as provided under Article 17.4 of the TEU. In order to strengthen coherence and continuity of action within the European Union, it is necessary to provide either:
- for the WEU Secretary-General and CFSP High Representative to preside over the General Affairs Council, expanded to include the defence ministers; or
- for the former at least to have the power to ask for a meeting of the Council to be convened, and
- for him to chair the PSC and coordination machinery for civilian crisis management. In contrast, the Military Committee should be chaired by a military officer.
III. The parliamentary dimension of the Common European Security and Defence Policy
- At the meeting between the Presidential Committee and the WEU Permanent Council in Brussels on 2 May, to deal with the matter of following up the Lisbon Initiative, several Permanent Council representatives reiterated their conviction that the modified Brussels Treaty would remain in force and that the Assembly would continue to exist for as long as the Treaty was not denounced. However, the government representatives were unable to say what sort of activity the Council would continue to exercise after the transfer of WEU's Petersberg functions to the European Union. More-over, members of the Permanent Council made clear that it had not yet collectively considered the Lisbon Initiative or Recommendation 664.
- Neither that recommendation nor Decision 23 on "European security and defence: the parliamentary dimension" calls into question the functions and tasks assigned to the Assembly since its formation. On the contrary both texts emphasise that the Assembly should continue to discharge the rights and responsibilities the modified Brussels Treaty lays down for it for as long as the latter remains in force. However, it is now a question of finding an appropriate formula to allow this parliamentary scrutiny, which should also cover all the activities and decisions of the European Union institutions in fields transferred from WEU, to continue.
- This is not a matter that should be decided exclusively by the EU institutions. The parliamentary dimension is part of WEU's heritage and is an important topic that should be included in any discussion on European security and defence which the Council is pursuing on the basis of the Luxembourg mandate.
- It should be remembered that the Council was set up specifically to promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe and closer cooperation with other European organisations. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties both state that WEU is an "integral part of the development of the [European] Union" and subscribe to the aim of its integration into the Union, at the same time assigning several additional tasks to it as defined in Article 17 of the TEU. These obligations are binding on WEU as an organisation. The Council's thinking on the parliamentary dimension of security and defence policy therefore falls within the framework of the obligations set forth in both treaties.
- Moreover, the WEU Council is responsible for the consequences of its decisions. In the Kirchberg Declaration it asked the Assembly to develop its relationship with the parliaments of associate members and partners. It is appropriate for it to include in its consideration of security and defence issues the matter of how the parliamentary dimension as a whole, which has been the vehicle for exercising scrutiny over Council policy since the Petersberg Declaration, can find its proper place in the new CFSP/CESDP institutional arrangements.
- As early as December 1991, the Council asked the Assembly to develop closer cooperation with the European Parliament. Indeed, the Assembly has long sought to develop and deepen its contacts and exchanges of view with the Parliament at every level. The Rapporteurs of the two assemblies especially stepped up their mutual contacts both before and after the Lisbon Initiative and representatives of the European Parliament were invited to state their views at recent ordinary and extraordinary Assembly sessions.
- The Assembly noted with satisfaction that the European Parliament's position in respect of the parliamentary dimension has evolved and that following the numerous meetings arranged between the two bodies since the Assembly's extraordinary session in Luxembourg, it has been somewhat more receptive. True, the European Parliament has not yet taken a definitive stance but, thanks in particular to the initiatives taken in its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, the hope is that the European Parliament will now gradually move closer to the proposals developed in the Assembly's report on "European security and defence: the parliamentary dimension".
- The Committee, in the opinion it submitted to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, put forward the following proposal:
"When the functions of the WEU for the execution of the Petersberg tasks are transferred to the EU, there will be a need for a new provision for parliamentary involvement in second pillar affairs, for example in the form of a mixed assembly of national parliaments and the European Parliament."
- This proposal did not figure in the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on the basis of the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs.
- The European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy is nevertheless in the process of drawing up a resolution to the Feira European Council in which it:
"proposes therefore that, within the framework of the CESDP, a ÔEuropean interparliamentary forum on security and defence' should be set up, where the European Parliament would be represented alongside the national parliaments and based on the model of the current 28-member WEU Assembly, with non-member states of the European Union having observer status; suggests that this forum should be set up alongside the existing COSAC by means of a protocol annexed to the Treaty on European Union;
proposes also that Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, which requires the European Parliament to hold an annual debate on the CFSP, should be amended to include specific reference to the CESDP;" .
- While this latter proposal differs from those made earlier, a comparison with the Lisbon Initiative yields the following similarities:
- the two proposals provide for participation by 28 parliamentary delegations;
- the parliamentary delegations of the 15 EU member states will have the same rights and responsibilities;
- the new parliamentary body will have a legal foundation in the form of a protocol appended to the Treaty on European Union (although insertion of a clause in the body of the Treaty would be preferable).
- Points of difference are as follows:
- the Assembly proposes that the parliamentary body in question should be called the "European Security and Defence Assembly", whereas the Parliament refers to a "European interparliamentary forum on security and defence";
- the European Parliament proposes that its representatives sit in the "forum" alongside those of the national parliaments, while the Assembly proposes "appropriate cooperation" between the new assembly and the European Parliament;
- the Assembly is adamant that the delegations of non-EU European members of NATO and those of countries applying for accession to the European Union should have participation rights at least equivalent to the rights they have acquired in the WEU Assembly as associate members and associate partners. The European Parliament, however, proposes that the representatives of the parliaments in question simply have observer status;
- the Assembly attaches great importance to the European Security and Defence Assembly receiving an annual report, while the European Parliament expresses no view on the matter.
- A number of other issues remain to be discussed, in particular criteria for membership of the Assembly, its rules of procedure, secretariat and how it is to be funded. As far as the WEU Assembly is concerned it is essential that the new forum should not be either a body of the European Parliament or answerable to it, but a separate body with its own rules and procedures. This does not mean that there cannot be appropriate representation and involvement on the part of the European Parliament in its activities. The Steering Committee that the WEU Assembly is to set up at its forthcoming session will be tasked with drawing up appropriate arrangements in relation to the areas of activity of the new assembly, in consultation with the European Parliament.
- On the basis of that work, a draft protocol annexed to the Treaty on European Union could be drawn up along the following lines:
"Protocol on the European Security and Defence Assembly
The High Contracting Parties,
Stressing the importance of joint participation by the national parliaments in the European Union's activities in the field of security and defence policy;
Anxious also to secure the collective participation in those activities of national parliaments of European countries that cooperate with the European Union in the European security and defence structure;
Have adopted the following provisions which are appended to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaties establishing the European Communities:
The Council of the European Union - without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 4 and 21 - shall make an annual report on those of its activities under the CFSP which have defence implications, to the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) composed of representatives of the fifteen parliaments of the signatory states of the Treaty on European Union, representatives of the fifteen parliaments of the EU applicant countries and the non-EU European members of NATO, and representatives of the European Parliament."
- It is not our aim in the present report to develop a broad outline of the parliamentary dimension of the European Union, based on a true European constitution. However, it must not be forgotten that the democratic dimension of European construction is not only concerned with security and defence but has wider implications. Mr Fischer, the German Foreign Affairs Minister , one of the regrettably all too few political leaders to ask questions on the subject, queries whether the Council of the European Union can continue indefinitely to discharge the dual role of supreme executive and legislative body.
- Like a number of other politicians, Mr Fischer is convinced that tomorrow's Europe will not have a parliament with just one chamber. For some, the issue is even clearer: the Council should become a genuine second chamber , while others take the view that the Council's legislative role should be exercised by representatives of national parliaments . However, the whole matter is far from being settled and the Assembly's proposal stoutly defends the option of strengthening the parliamentary dimension within the European Union.
IV. The future of the modified Brussels Treaty and WEU's residual functions
1. The transitional period and preparation of the WEU legacy
- Everything points to the conclusion that WEU should stand ready, over a transitional period whose length cannot be precisely determined, to discharge the responsibilities at present assigned to it under both the modified Brussels Treaty and the Treaty on European Union. These relate in particular to the whole area of crisis management. For this reason the Presidency report to the European Council, approved at the Helsinki Summit, suggests that during the interim period the High Representative for the CFSP and WEU Secretary-General should make full use of WEU assets for the purpose of advising the Council under Article 17 of the EU Treaty.
- The European Union will still, for some time at least, need to make use of WEU, drawing on its operational capabilities in the conduct of crisis-management operations. For this reason the Luxembourg Ministerial Council tasked WEU with:
- strengthening the assets and capabilities available for crisis-management operations;
- preparing the WEU legacy and the inclusion of those functions of WEU which will be deemed necessary by the European Union to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of crisis-management tasks;
- developing satisfactory arrangements that serve the interests of all WEU nations.
Furthermore the Ministerial Council decided that the informal reflection work on security and defence Europe, on-going since November 1998, should be pursued on that basis.
- In a difficult atmosphere in which both public opinion and many political leaders are expecting WEU to disappear by the end of the present year, it is no easy matter for the various WEU bodies and the staff to continue with their day-to-day work. However, there is still much that needs to be settled and the Assembly can but urge the Council to ensure that those bodies and WEU staff can carry out their work without being paralysed by feelings of insecurity.
- One of the tasks to be carried out is implementing the cooperation arrangements reached between WEU and the European Union in accordance with the Protocol on Article 17 of the TEU. To strengthen Europe's capability to take rapid action in a given situation, the WEU authorities should be more proactive when it comes to anticipating the possible support the European Union may require of it, as it did for example in the framework of the Mediterranean Group .
- The Assembly noted with interest that the Military Staff has developed a WEU concept for civilian/military cooperation (CIMIC) which has been transmitted to the European Union. Given the importance of the subject, it is essential for the Council to release specific information on this concept.
- During the Lisbon special session, the Assembly was informed that, during the transitional period, WEU would pursue its work in three main areas:
- current police missions in Albania and demining operations in Croatia;
- development of politico-military concepts in partnership with NATO; in fact, one of the most difficult problems is how WEU could transfer to the EU its function of "an essential element of the ESDI within the Alliance";
- the informal "reflection process" on European security and defence.
- A part of that process had taken place "at 21" on 27 January 2000 and it was planned to hold another meeting of this nature in Lisbon, early in May. It is clear that it is of particular interest to the Assembly to be informed about the results, conclusions and follow-up to such discussions. Among the subjects to be dealt with are, for example, the preparation of the WEU legacy that might be transferred to the European Union. This includes inter alia:
- the WEU/NATO cooperation machinery;
- WEU's operational experience and capabilities including the decision-making process;
- the lessons learned from WEU missions in the Balkans;
- experience gained from the CMX/Crisex 2000 exercise.
- In addition to the above topics, the following issues are to be discussed: how can WEU transfer the experience acquired through its dialogue with third countries and Russia and Ukraine in particular? Given that the European Union's dialogue with Russia is of a special nature, the Council should consider carefully whether it should not retain responsibility for relations with Russia, at least for a time. WEU has concluded an agreement with Russia to supply the Satellite Centre with images and a framework document on cooperation over airlift facilities with Ukraine.
- What is to become of the Transatlantic Forum in whose framework WEU has developed regular dialogue with the United States and Canada? Here again, WEU must decide whether to keep this acquis or whether it can pass on experience and guidance to the European Union useful to the latter in the conduct of its relations with its transatlantic allies. It would be highly desirable in any event for WEU to be represented at the forthcoming summit between the European Union and the United States which is to take place on 5 June of this year.
- The same issues are raised by the transfer of WEU's legacy in terms of its Mediterranean dialogue with Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Israel, Mauritania, Tunisia, Jordan and Cyprus.
- A particularly difficult issue is the future role of the Satellite Centre and the WEU Institute for Security Studies. In this connection your Rapporteur shares the view that the Satellite Centre and the Institute can easily work for both WEU and the European Union until such time as the numerous problems of transferring them to the European Union have been settled. As far as the Satellite Centre goes, it should be noted that it works "at 16" (10 member and 6 associate member countries) and that any transfer to the European Union may have significant consequences for the nature of its work in future, for participating states and as regards funding.
- Lastly, the Council has a particular responsibility towards the associate member and associate partner countries as a result of obligations arising from instruments signed with those countries since the Petersberg Declaration. Such obligations are not confined only to the political sphere, as became clear in the case of Germany, where the government felt the need to subject approval of documents relating to the associate members to ratification by parliament. The WEU member countries and the Council must therefore seek to ensure that those countries can continue to make a contribution to Europe's security and defence, either in a new European Union framework or in a WEU which retains certain residual functions.
- It is still too soon to make any clear pronouncement regarding the entire area of armaments cooperation (WEAG, WEAO and Eurolongterm) and whether this is part of the legacy WEU should pass on to the European Union or an area that should remain as part of WEU's residual functions. Given the complexity of this issue, it has not yet been dealt with in political consultations, but a WEAG panel of experts produced a very useful study last January which concluded that there was a need for a European Armaments Organisation (EAO) in the service of the CFSP.
- The panel of experts put forward two options in that connection:
- according to Option 1, armaments cooperation would be set up within the second pillar;
- Option 2 suggests establishing the EAO outside the EU under the auspices of a new international treaty and based on the modified Brussels Treaty, for a transitional period.
- Given that both options raise different problems, the impression given is that the entire area relating to armaments will remain for the foreseeable future within the WEU framework. The arguments put forward by the Portuguese Foreign and Defence Ministers at their meeting with the Presidential Committee in Lisbon, on 18 April last, went a long way to strengthen that impression. As a solution, it seems reasonable under the present circumstances and should also apply to Eurolongterm. However, there is a need to ensure, as of now, that more active backing and greater political impetus is given to the activities of all armaments cooperation bodies.
2. WEU after transfer of Petersberg functions to the European Union
- In the Cologne Declaration, the European Council set about taking the decisions required for the inclusion within the European Union, by the end of the year 2000, of those WEU functions necessary for the Union to carry out its new responsibilities in respect of the Petersberg tasks. The European Council took the view that, in this eventuality, WEU, as an organisation, would have completed its work. However, given the complexity of the problems to be resolved to take account of all the implications of this project, political decision-makers and the wider public have to be made fully aware of the need to ensure that WEU as a whole remains fully operational until such time as the European Union is ready to take on its crisis-management functions in their entirety. Furthermore, WEU is to retain a certain number of residual functions, as yet to be defined, beyond that timeframe, which will require an organisational structure of as yet unspecified format to be maintained.
- It is becoming increasingly clear that none of the signatory states intends to denounce the modified Brussels Treaty, which will therefore remain in force, and with it the bodies set up under it, namely the Council and the Assembly. As far as WEU's future as an Organisation is concerned, Mr Solana, WEU Secretary-General has stated as follows :
"As soon as the EU is ready, the greater part of WEU's present functions, and in practice a number of its assets, will be transferred to the Union, so that most of the Organisation's day-to-day work will cease.
WEU's ten full member states should however consider the fate of those responsibilities of the Organisation not transferred to the EU, in particular the mutual defence guarantee embodied in the modified Brussels Treaty. In this connection it seems probable that they may wish to retain a residual WEU structure to have oversight of such aspects and any practical work relating to them."
- It emerged from the meeting the Presidential Committee held with the Permanent Council in Brussels on 2 May last that no thought has begun to be given to such matters. It is therefore time to remind the member governments that they must set to work without further ado. Their discussions must cover those parts of the modified Brussels Treaty - other than Article V - which are still applicable. They include Article IV on cooperation with NATO and, specifically, the future application of Article IV.2 and related protocols.
- This also holds good for Article VIII, particularly VIII.3 , which in any event should be kept in reserve and more firmly embedded in the consciousness of the member states, for as long as the European Union is not ready to act effectively in a crisis. The Council should also consider how it intends in future to comply with its obligations under Article IX, particularly as regards the annual report it is required to transmit to the Assembly. The Council's intentions in this connection are essential for the Assembly's future work, and the latter should identify the areas on which it intends to concentrate from now on.
- Thought must also be given to the future application of Article XI, which deals with the conditions for accession to the Treaty. It would be mistaken to think that the new context renders it obsolete. On the contrary, accession to the modified Brussels Treaty could take on new interest, in view of the growing difficulties to be surmounted over harmonisation of NATO and EU enlargement.
- The member states should also consider the more general issue of the extent to which the modified Brussels Treaty can still contribute to guaranteeing security and stability at European and international level. Put another way, member states must give practical expression to their often stated view (the most recent occurrence being in the Council's reply to Recommendation 654) to the effect that "the modified Brussels Treaty continues to form a valuable part of the European security architecture, and that the obligations arising therein should continue to constitute an element in the development of European security and defence".
V. The consequences of decisions taken in Cologne and Helsinki on the way forward in strengthening security and stability at European and international levels
- The decisions the European Union is to take between now and the end of 2000 have to take account of an international climate which has moved on to a considerable degree since the Washington and Cologne Summits. The American Administration's determination to set up a national missile defence programme has not only produced growing disagreement between European and American allies but has also affected the United States' relationship with Russia. The revision of the ABM Treaty is not at all to Russia's liking and some fear that the entire system of nuclear deterrence and disarmament could be under threat.
- Russia, which has elected a new president who in terms of his political programme has not yet shown his hand, is still in the throes of deep crisis and currently experiencing the fall-out, domestic and international, from the Chechen war. While the parliamentarians of the Council of Europe suspended Russian deputies' right to vote there, the country adopted a new military doctrine lowering the threshold at which recourse can be had to nuclear weapons because it feels "threatened" by the West's attitude. Russia recently reiterated its vigorous opposition to any NATO enlargement to countries of the former Soviet Union.
- Under such circumstances, the West cannot allow misunderstandings between Europeans and Americans to grow. It is therefore essential to ensure that the ambitions Europe is intending to give shape to are indeed responsible ones leading to a situation where Europe is at last capable of achieving the "partnership in leadership" the United States has long wished to see. However, this means that all decision-makers concerned should be aware of the fact that the European project will profoundly change the nature of transatlantic relations. There is a need for both sides therefore to make quite sure that any new relationship acts to strengthen transatlantic cohesion.
- To turn itself into a partner whose consequence is acknowledged by the United States, Europeans have to take quite a few decisions that may prove painful. They must make more effort in terms of funding, if they are to close the technological gap between themselves and the United States. They need to take convincing steps towards restructuring and reorganising their armed forces so as to be in a position to respond to crises.
- Moreover the European Union faces the challenge of drawing countries with a neutral tradition closer towards the aims of the Treaty on European Union and persuading them in practice to play a full part in a Common European Security and Defence Policy. The Assembly has already taken a first step in that direction by inviting observer country parliaments to field full delegations when participating in its work.
VI. Conclusions
- Thanks to WEU's reactivation and the enormous progress it has made since the Petersberg Declaration towards becoming an organisation that is fully operational, and to the many areas of work it has engaged in since, in all areas falling within its particular remit, the Organisation, with the support of all the associate countries and the Assembly, has done sufficient spadework for the European Union to make real strides towards security and defence Europe.
- If the French Presidency succeeds in resolving most of the outstanding problems between now and the end of 2000, that will be a most welcome achievement. Nevertheless, it would be preferable if governments did not feel themselves bound absolutely by that time-frame and took the time necessary to obtain the desired outcomes, even if some problems take longer to sort out than others. Governments involved therefore need the support of their parliamentary members, which will be willingly given provided they take care to inform the relevant parliamentary authorities and make sure that the latter are able to carry out their task of scrutinising the decision-making process under conditions no less satisfactory than those that obtain in the present WEU Assembly.
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