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COLLOQUY ON NEW SCENARIOS FOR EUROPEAN COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE 


TABLE OF CONTENTS

COLLOQUY ON
NEW SCENARIOS FOR EUROPEAN COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE 

CONFERENCE

on

New scenarios for European common security and defence

22-23 September 2003


PROGRAMME

Monday, 22 September 2003

 
   

16.00

Opening session:

  • Mr Pierferdinando Casini, President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies
  • Mr Marcel Glesener, President of the WEU Assembly
  • Mr Marco Zacchera, President of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly

16.30

First session: Security in Europe and stabilisation in the Middle East

   
 

Chairman: Mr Guillermo Martínez Casañ, Chairman of the Political Committee, WEU Assembly

   
 

Addresses:

   
 
  • Mr Alfredo Mantica, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Italy
 
  • Mr Vladimir Lukin, Deputy Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation
 
  • General Franco Angioni (Italy), Deputy, Former Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
 
  • Dr Mark A. Heller, Principal Research Associate, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University
 
  • Mr Alessandro Politi, Independent strategic and open source intelligence analyst
   
 

Debate

   

Tuesday, 23 September 2003

10.00

Second session: Foreign policy and common defence in the future European Constitution

   
 

Chairman: Mr John Wilkinson, Chairman of the Defence Committee, WEU Assembly

   
 

Addresses:

   
 
  • Mrs Danuta Hübner, Minister for European Affairs of Poland, Member of the European Convention
 
  • Mr Lamberto Dini, Vice-President of the Senate, Italy, Member of the European Convention
 
  • Mr Antonio Nazaré Pereira, Member of the Convention
 
  • Dr Udo Diedrichs, Institute for European Policy, Berlin
 
  • Dr Julian Lindley-French, Centre for Security Policy, Geneva
   
 

Debate

   

14.30

Third session: European defence: operational requirements and industrial competitiveness

   
 

Chairman: Mr Francisco Arnau Navarro, Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, WEU Assembly

 

Addresses:

   
 
  • Mr Henk Kamp, Minister for Defence of the Netherlands, WEAG Netherlands Presidency
 
  • Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, National Director of Armaments, Ministry of Defence, Italy
 
  • Mr Jean Wesener, Secretary-General, EDIG, Brussels
 
  • Mr Hartmut Bühl, Vice-President and Director for EU Defence Policy and NATO, EADS, Brussels
 
  • Mr Giorgio Zappa, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A
 
  • Mr Giuseppe Orsi, Managing Director, Agusta S.p.A
 
  • Mr Burkard Schmitt, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
 

Debate

   

17.00

Conclusions

  • Mrs Josette Durrieu (France), Senator, Member of the WEU Assembly, Rapporteur on "Security in Europe and stabilisation in the Middle East"
  • Mr Giuseppe Gaburro (Italy), Senator, Member of the WEU Assembly, Rapporteur on "Prospects for the European Security and Defence Policy"
 
  • Mr Pedro Agramunt Font de Mora, (Spain), Senator, Member of the WEU Assembly Rapporteur on "Development of armaments policy in Europe"

PROCEEDINGS


OPENING SESSION

In his opening address to the 400 participants from more than 30 countries attending the conference, the President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Mr CASINI, said that "Europe's failure to act will not be seen as the result of a difficult period in its development but as a lack of interest". He called on the Intergovernmental Conference to give the EU the means to develop a coherent foreign policy and swift decision-making procedures. He also called for "adequate parliamentary scrutiny" in order to make sure that the sovereign will of EU citizens was respected in the course of the Union's political process, adding that a democratic deficit in foreign and security policy could have serious consequences.

In his view the Assembly of WEU, the institution born of the Paris Agreements, which next year would be celebrating its 50th anniversary, had succeeded in keeping alive the debate on common defence and security matters during periods when such topics had been a long way from the top of governments' agenda. It was, he said, a major parliamentary forum - the only one in Europe dealing specifically with those essential subjects - the number of whose participant states had grown steadily. It had also established strong parliamentary ties with countries, like Russia, that carried great weight in the security and defence field, thus anticipating a future configuration of Europe without walls or boundaries.

It was, however, not enough to broaden the Union: it must also develop its institutions, which would be the more effective if steady progress could be made towards the accession of new members. The new draft Constitution which had emerged from the work of the Convention was also of strategic importance in that respect. In that connection, foreign and security policy issues were an obstacle to be surmounted, as recent events had tragically served to remind us. A case in point was the Iraq crisis, which had been the cause of serious dissent within the Union.

For those reasons Mr Casini felt that the Assembly's ideas on policy could make a real contribution to the Intergovernmental Conference. Its debates were a powerful means of drawing attention to the essential role of the national parliaments, which, as representatives of the sovereignty of the people, needed to exert more pressure for greater unity of purpose when it came to fundamental issues of peace and security.

To be credible at international level, Europe must speak with one voice. The work done by the Convention had given rise to in-depth discussion and turned the spotlight on some basic aspects of the future constitutional architecture. Mr Casini's personal feeling was that it was up to the Intergovernmental Conference to put flesh on the Convention's proposals, to which the national parliaments and the European Parliament had made a signal contribution.

With regard more particularly to the common foreign and defence policy, two aspects were essential. First, it was vital for everyone to move in the one direction, and hand in hand with this must go speedy decision-making, when events so required. Second, there must be suitable forms of parliamentary scrutiny, so as to ensure that the system was fully answerable at all times to the sovereign will of the people. Mr Casini welcomed the fact that the WEU Assembly had been so quick to take on board that vitally important area, with vigorous support from the Italian parliamentary delegation. This was an area where the democratic deficit that still plagued EU institutions might have particularly serious consequences.

Europe, armed with its values, civilisation, democracy and humanity had nevertheless in recent years witnessed the unbridled explosion of conflict in its midst, in the form of the tragic events that had racked former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Clearly, what had been absent for far too long was the ability to agree on a unified stance that represented more than just a wish-list. It was also a fact, however, that an awareness of its own lack of readiness at a technical and organisational level had weighed, perhaps heavily, in Europe's reluctance to intervene decisively in that particular conflict.

Since then, major progress had been made to boost Europe's operational capabilities. However, when it came to defence budgets a paradox still remained: on the one hand, Europe spent very little on its own defence. In the continent's long history, never before had so few resources been expended on the regrettable necessity of security and defence. Yet, it could be stated with equal truth that Europe spent a great deal on not defending itself. It was a well-known fact that overall defence spending in the European Union was equal to about half the US defence budget. Yet Europe's resources could be used only to limited effect - so much so that experts estimated the EU's overall capability to be only a tenth of that of the United States.

Today, different perceptions of tensions and uncertainties on the international stage had made the public at large more aware of the need to invest in security and defence. It was necessary to devise regulations and instruments that would allow the duplication and fragmentation caused by lack of coordination among member states to be eliminated.

In that respect the research sector was a priority. By developing synergies in this field we would be making progress in a key area. One reason for the current scientific, technological and, in the last analysis, development gap between Europe and the United States was the complete lack of coordination of European effort in research, especially in defence-related sectors.

The WEU Assembly's endeavours, in this field as in others, had been well thought out and consistent, helping to concentrate national parliaments' attention in particular directions and on specific priorities directed towards achieving a security and defence system that would make Europe capable of attaining "global player status" and promoting the stability and security around it that were the essential conditions for development and social progress.

In taking the kind of initiative it was taking today the WEU Assembly, along with the national parliaments, was carrying out a further essential task: that of involving the wider public by continually raising its awareness of issues which, although at first sight seemingly directed towards only a narrow circle of specialists, were in actual fact of close concern to each and every one of us, our future and that of our children.

The President of the WEU Assembly, Mr GLESENER, welcomed the participants. He thanked the Italian Presidency of WEU and the EU most warmly for its kind hospitality, as well as the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Senate for having agreed to co-organise with the Assembly this conference in Baveno, which would launch a broad public debate on the issues that were currently of concern, given the challenges Europe faced on the international stage. He was particularly grateful to Mr Zacchera for his hospitality, as well as to the company Agusta-Westland for its kind invitation to visit its premises following the conference and for all the support it had given the Assembly.

Before discussing objectives and deciding which strategies needed to be defined, what institutional issues needed to be resolved and what assets and capabilities were required to build a common European security and defence policy, it was first necessary to analyse the crisis situations currently confronting us, in particular in Iraq and the Middle East.

It would not, said the President, be possible to contain the adverse side effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the region most closely affected by it. The optimism attached to the road map had been whittled down to a mere hope that the US Administration would take its responsibility seriously and exert on both sides the kind of pressure necessary to make progress possible. However, Europeans should not leave the action to the US alone. Instead they should "think the unthinkable" which could include a European involvement in a potential UN-mandated deployment of forces capable of securing an environment conducive to fruitful negotiations between the two adversaries. "We cannot simply stand and watch while Israelis and Palestinians continue to get nowhere and at the same time radical elements exploit the conflict to justify acts of terror", he added.

For Europeans, either members or close partners of the European Union, it meant that new scenarios for European security and defence had to be considered, which was precisely the theme of the conference and one of the priorities the Italian Government had set for its EU Presidency.

Those issues were closely related to a question which had divided European countries for decades: for the EU to become a credible player on the international stage, must it take responsibility for all areas of security and defence, and was this a realistic proposition? In July, following some 16 months of discussions, the Convention on the Future of Europe had submitted to the Italian Presidency of the European Council a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, in which it too had endeavoured to answer that question. It was well-known to everyone that a number of other fundamental questions concerning the future Constitution of an enlarged European Union had also been tackled during the debates within the Convention and its Praesidium, the issue of how to incorporate a common security and defence policy into that Constitution being but one among others.

Nevertheless, it had been clear from those discussions that we were far from having reached a consensus among all member states and accession or candidate countries, not all of which were prepared to enter into the same level of commitment with regard to security and defence. The Convention had therefore agreed to propose that a group of states be authorised to enter into a higher level of commitment for different types of special operations. Thus it made provision for special cooperation on Petersberg missions, a strengthening of military capabilities, armaments cooperation and even a mutual defence commitment.

From the stance taken by a number of countries, it was obvious that those proposals had not yet met with general assent and that defence policy would be an important issue during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). It remained to be seen whether the meeting of the French President, British Prime Minister and German Chancellor that had taken place on 20 September in Berlin would lead to an agreement among the three countries concerned, or at least bring their positions on the issue of defence somewhat closer together. It was to be hoped that they had also remembered to talk about the parliamentary dimension.

The Assembly was preparing to submit its own contribution to the IGC in its capacity as the interparliamentary custodian of the sole treaty currently providing a legal basis for a European defence: the modified Brussels Treaty. Any new European commitment in that area, possibly within an enlarged European Union, would need the support of citizens and of their elected representatives in the member parliaments to have any chance of success. The parliamentary dimension of European defence must therefore not be overlooked. Yet, on that particular point, the Convention had not been willing to give the national parliaments the collective role that would have permitted a regular institutional dialogue with the competent executive bodies. The Assembly wished to help smooth out the differences that had arisen among certain groups of member states both within the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance on the approach to be adopted to crises such as the one in Iraq. Above and beyond that, the Assembly wished to help the European Union frame a genuine common policy. From that perspective the European Council plan for a European security concept, the first draft of which had already been made public by Mr Solana at the Thessaloniki summit in June, was particularly important. Without knowing what their goals, ambitions and limitations were and without agreeing on the basic orientations of European policy, it would be difficult for Europeans to define their operational requirements and the conditions that needed to be met to make their industries competitive. In that area, the recent initiatives on the part of WEAG, the Convention and the European Council could be considered promising, provided that the well-known difficulties that had hampered all previous attempts to organise armaments cooperation could be overcome.

Mr ZACCHERA, in his capacity as Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly and Member for the Piedmontese shore of Lake Maggiore and the surrounding mountain area, welcomed the participants to the Conference. He thanked all the organisations involved in making this gathering possible, starting with the Italian Chamber of Deputies and the Senate whose representatives had given a lot of their time. He expressed particular gratitude to the Speaker, Mr Casini, for his interest in the work of the WEU Assembly, as well as thanks to the central, regional and local government authorities, all of which had contributed to the organisation of this event, in particular the Province of Verbano-Cusio-Ossola and the Piedmont Region, which geographically speaking, were practically at the heart of Europe. For centuries that area been a crossing point rather than a border, a meeting place for nations and peoples of different tongues and cultures, and the scene of major events in European history.

The meeting, he said, owed its success in part to a shared awareness of the fundamental importance of the topics it was to address for the future of Europe and its surrounding regions. "Our citizens are well aware that security and defence are a vital part of the civil life of our European homeland", he stressed.


FIRST SESSION

Security in Europe and stabilisation in the Middle East

Chairman: Mr MARTÍNEZ CASAÑ, Chairman of the Political Committee, Assembly of WEU

Mr MANTICA (Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Italy) stated that the countries on both shores of the Mediterranean should engage in cooperation, particularly over security issues, and stressed that change could be brought about only through negotiation.

The Barcelona Process was the right framework for promoting a common vision of security among all the Mediterranean countries. A ministerial conference was to be held in Naples on 3-4 December 2003 with a view to paving the way for a Mediterranean dialogue based on the principle of cooperation. The Italian Presidency set great store by the policy of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, especially for security and defence questions. Close cooperation over issues such as the lifting of the embargo on Libya would also be very worthwhile. Italy considered the "5+5" format to be of great importance. Europeans also had to take account of the practical steps their partners in the southern Mediterranean region had taken. For example, Algeria was soon to be the host country for the headquarters of the early warning centre for conflicts in the African Union.

Mutual trust and a joint understanding would bring advantages for countries on both shores of the Mediterranean. Effective solutions had to be found for practical cooperation over crisis management including its military aspects. In this connection Operation Artemis with its 3000 troops under EU auspices, operating alongside MONUC (the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo), could be said to be a success and an example to follow.

The European Union was beginning to wake up to its responsibilities. Commission President Romano Prodi had given an undertaking that the EU would be earmarking some 250 million euros as a contribution to crisis management in Africa.

It was necessary for Europe to acquire a common purpose by overcoming the various sensitivities of individual member states. WEU could make a useful contribution in this connection.

Referring to the eastern part of the Mediterranean region, the speaker said it was more difficult to take action because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the escalating violence (with Israel seeking to eliminate the leaders of Hamas, suicide bomb attacks in Jerusalem, the resignation of Abu Mazen and the Israeli Cabinet's decision of principle to expel Yasser Arafat). The objective of "two peoples, two states" must not be called into question. The process envisaged in the road map had to be followed step by step and the EU had to fulfil its responsibilities in that framework.

The European Union's role could be crucial. There was room for both modest and more ambitious initiatives. It could, for example, offer a peace prize. The root causes of terrorism needed to be analysed in depth. The EU was also in a position to organise regular meetings on the basis of a non-discriminatory dialogue. The Euro-Mediterranean process should be strengthened and EU action made more visible. Among other things, Europe's Mediterranean partners should have the possibility of taking part in exercises organised by the EU. A strategic seminar was soon to be organised for its Political and Security Committee (PSC) with a view to examining the role of multinational forces in the region.

The EU needed to come up with new scenarios for European common security and defence and involve the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean in its debates. Those countries had to be considered as partners and, as such, should also play a part in the Middle East peace process.

General ANGIONI (Member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and former Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) said it was necessary for the EU member states to adopt a unified position if they were to have any impact on the political situation in the Middle East. He welcomed the first draft of the European strategic concept presented by EU High Representative Javier Solana, which provided a basis for the EU's future role in international relations. It was necessary to improve the m7ember States' military capabilities in order to be able to achieve the military goals set out in the draft strategy.

He called on the EU to establish closer ties with Arab countries, as this would not only lead to a better understanding of the reasons behind Palestinian terrorist actions but might also be a way of cutting off external financial support for terrorist organisations such as Hamas. It was necessary to overcome the anger and hatred between the two peoples and their leaderships. It was important to forge the will to re-launch negotiations and to pave the way for concessions between the two sides. However, as things stood now, the situation was desperate.

It had been a mistake to believe the Palestinians would allow their long-time leader Yasser Arafat to be sidelined, particularly in the absence of any similar action directed at the Israeli leadership.

Any intervention by European forces was doomed to failure unless the parties to the conflict agreed to the presence of those forces in the region.

Mr LUKIN (Deputy Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and former Russian Ambassador to the United States) wanted the Quartet to make both parties to the conflict realise that they had to honour their obligations. In his view Europe could have no security until a solution was found to the Middle East conflict and this was particularly true in respect of the fight against terrorism. This was also of direct relevance to Russia as the situation in the Middle East was similar to that in the southern part of Russia.

Mr Lukin, who had attended the Madrid Summit and had also studied these questions on behalf of the Council of Europe, deeply regretted the fact that there was no peace and made four observations:

    1. The conflict had many facets and there were a number of explosive issues. There was a clear risk of civil war breaking out on either side, which accounted for the sometimes counterproductive effects of peace efforts made by parties external to the conflict.

    2. Tensions were running so high that the voice of reason was no longer being heard. Various interests were being fanned by clashes between the parties.

    3. It had proved impossible for either side to take a firm, determined line. Contradictions were rife in both Israel and among the Palestinians. This made it extremely difficult to find compromise solutions and, above all, to apply them. Witnesses to the conflict therefore often found themselves powerless to do anything.

    4. The United States' unilateralist policy was making the conflict even worse. The Bush Administration had wavered between ignoring the conflict at the start of its mandate and then becoming more involved later as elections began to loom on the horizon (and claiming all of a sudden that the issues could be solved very rapidly).

As things stood at present, the road map could still improve the situation even though there were doubts as to whether it would be implemented. The problem was how to apply the process in practical terms. The road map had to be accepted by the protagonists. The only was of making them do that was for Europe to speak with a single voice and implement a policy of rewards and sanctions. Pressure had to be put on both sides. The Quartet's role was not to cooperate but rather to take a firmer line by deciding on the distribution of tasks between the United Nations, the European Union, Russia and the United States (even if the predominant role was played by the United States).

In this context Russia wanted the Quartet to take a clear position and be ready to criticise both Mr Sharon and Mr Arafat. Russia's own stance was closer to that of the EU than the United States, but cooperation among the four members of the Quartet had to continue and indeed be strengthened.

A scenario according to which it would be necessary to take collective military action to guarantee that the road map was implemented in an appropriate fashion could not be ruled out. The possibility of providing the parties to the conflict with military guarantees must not be excluded. If "greater Europe" considered that there was a risk to its security and that the cause was just, the option of recourse to military means would have to be envisaged. If the Quartet stood firm it could take that sort of action.

Although Russia's armed forces were in the throes of a wholesale reform and the country therefore had limited means at its disposal, joint action was indispensable. However, if it was to launch into cooperation of that sort, Russia would want the EU to have some strategic prospects (however far off they may be). Mr Giscard d'Estaing had, for instance, proposed that Mr Lukin take a look at Article I-56 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which dealt with the Union and its immediate environment ("The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring States, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation."). This article was interesting but wholly inadequate. It did not open up any real prospects for EU/Russia relations. Russia regretted that it had not been invited to follow the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe as an observer. Mr Lukin saw this as a symbolic gesture of Russia's exclusion from the European project of integration in the longer term. In contrast the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, had clearly opted for a European strategic option. If the EU did not respond positively to this offer of cooperation, there was a risk of an opportunity being lost.

Dr HELLER (Principal Research Associate, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University) suggested that Europe could have a potentially significant - even critical - role to play if it could change its thinking on a number of issues. Instead of believing that foreign policy was about establishing its identity on the world stage by contradicting US policy, Europe needed to make a clear analysis of its own security interests and the threats emanating from the Middle East region. Also, it should "refrain from confusing declarations and actions". He felt that the Middle East was in fact less relevant to Europe's security than was often suggested and that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was diverting attention away from other, more fundamental issues.

In Dr Heller's view, the real security threat facing Europe was the political, economic and social dysfunction affecting the whole region and which threatened to spill over into Europe (illegal immigration, export of crime and drugs, transfer of capital from the region and export of radical ideology) because of its geographic proximity to the Middle East. Regional problems were home-grown and had their roots in the rigidities inherent in those countries' political systems. Changes were urgently needed. Outside intervention could be constructive if it did not take the form of "appeasing" Arab governments which "viewed liberal ideas as subversive" and would use financial aid to stabilise their rule. Dr Heller was particularly critical of the EU's and United States' agricultural policy, claiming that it would have a devastating impact on small businesses in the region's private sector economy. Instead, the European Union should encourage the development of private commercial activities, because the private sector could play an important role in the process of political change.

The fundamental problem in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the Palestinian leadership's refusal to accept that Israel was a nation in its own right and entitled to a homeland.

Mr POLITI (Independent strategic and open source intelligence analyst) raised an initial and vital question: was the United States really interested in the Middle East as a whole, not just in the parts of the region that were "useful"? The United States seemingly had a greater interest in the Gulf than the Levant.

Two strategies had failed to live up to expectations: recourse to conventional warfare to destroy terrorism and the use of force without a political aim. While Afghanistan could, at the end of the day, be deemed a partial success, Iraq had been a miserable failure. The strategy of waging war on terror as a means of stamping out Palestinian extremism had failed from as far back at least as 1967. Golda Meir said then that the Palestinians were just refugees; 37 years on they were still there. A leading Israeli moderate, Shlomo Ben-Ami (Foreign Minister under Ehud Barak and Camp David Chief Negotiator) hit the nail on the head when he described the goal of the Oslo Peace Process as being "to establish for the Palestinians a neo-colonial dependency which will be permanent". The land for peace strategy had proved a success. There were practically no deaths now in either the Sinai or the Lebanon. Mr Politi thought that many so-called Israeli realists should take a leaf out of Italy's book, especially in regard to the settlement of the Alto-Adige conflict. In Mr Politi's opinion, the Italians were the only ones in Europe to have ended a conflict based on nationalist terrorism. The United Kingdom, Spain and Russia were all still trying to do so. Turkey seemed to have succeeded, but at the cost of heavy loss of life. The time had come to inject realism into peacemaking. Referring to states "of concern", Mr Politi cited the case of Libya as a triumph of peaceful international legal pressure, to which Italy, with its balanced approach, had contributed down the years.

When attempting to resolve the basic economic and social problems of the region, it would be helpful to note the recent UN Arab Human Development Report.

From an ideological and religious point of view, it was not enough to say that there was no quarrel with Islam. There was a need to integrate religious dialogue into a more active strategy. As far as Islam was concerned, there should be systematic support for any religious force which had Sharia reform as its aim (there could be no question of abandoning the field to the secular conservatives and Islamic terrorists that were simultaneously the cause and the effect of the events in the Middle East). Mr Politi was emphatic that there could be no concessions to religious extremism of any persuasion.

In his view, Europe should support the "moderate" politicians work for a different mindset in the region with regard to religious extremism. Europe could exert a moderating influence through its support for religious dialogue and by incorporating it more actively into an overall strategy. In order to achieve this, the EU should endeavour to find viable interlocutors, supportive of religious values that applied to both parties to the conflict, so as to lay down a line of conduct that sought to eliminate extremism on either side fuelled by the conflict, leading eventually to the peaceful co-existence of two authentic states.

Debate

Emphasis was laid on the importance of unity among the democratic countries in their fight against terror (Mr Gunderson, Norway). Attention was drawn to the contradictions in western policy towards dictators in the past (Sir Teddy Taylor, United Kingdom) and to the fact that there were conflicts closer to the EU's borders, for example in the Balkans, that should be addressed as a priority (Mr Jelinçic, Slovenia). Mr Politi remarked that the West had won the cold war because it had told the truth about the regimes in the east. Dr Heller explained that democratisation would make it harder for Arab leaders to get away with their lies. Mr Lukin (Russia) said that elections as such could not guarantee a solution to the conflict. He predicted that if elections were held today, Palestinians would vote for a Hamas leader and Iraqis for a Shiite dictatorship. Mrs Durrieu (France) asked whether the Quartet might offer a solution. Mr Barbieri (Italy) regretted that the US intervention in Iraq had not been backed up by any political project. Mr Branger (France) remarked that the United States would not always provide a security umbrella for Europe. The Chairman of the Assembly's Political Committee, Mr Martínez Casañ (Spain), felt that the Quartet, through its combined forces, potentially had considerable political power and wondered why it had not so far made any joint move towards finding a solution to the conflict. Mr Lukin believed that the UN was "a mandate without a force", while the US was "a force without a mandate". The Quartet could produce a solution if it was able to find the political will to impose its decisions on both parties to the conflict.


SECOND SESSION

Foreign policy and common defence in the future European Constitution

Chairman: Mr WILKINSON (Chairman of the Defence Committee, Assembly of WEU)

Senator DINI (Vice-President of the Italian Senate) said that the construction of a European defence capability had to take account of three important factors: the primacy of NATO; the heterogeneity in many respects, of the European countries involved in the exercise, at present, or likely to be in the future, and current perceptions of the threat which were far less homogeneous than previously.

There could be no doubt that the starting point for European security and defence had to be the long-standing, tried and tested Atlantic Alliance. However, it obviously needed updating, not only in the light of the end of the cold war but also because of NATO enlargement, changes in transatlantic relations and the new United States national security strategy.

The Atlantic and European security frameworks need to be harmonised through a three-pronged approach. This aimed first to achieve convergence between the strategic doctrines of the United States and the European Union. The perception of the challenges in the field of security had to be the same on both sides of the Atlantic, and present divergent views ought once again to be harmonised. Secondly, the Atlantic Alliance should be re-established as the preferred forum for the analysis of threats and choice of consequent action, without rejecting the possibility of broader ad hoc coalitions. Within an Atlantic Alliance of this kind, the European Union ought increasingly to be able to speak with a single voice as it became increasingly politically integrated. Thirdly, the type and manner of application of the military resources the European Union would be able to use autonomously, after transatlantic agreement on the nature of the threat, had to be established clearly. A distinction needed to be made between European initiatives using the structures and assets of the Alliance and initiatives that relied entirely on Europe's own military capabilities. In the first case, the United States should not impose excessive conditions and should not take a suspicious attitude towards the second. A European security and defence policy required a considerable degree of homogeneity among the participating countries as they would have to share fundamental aspects of their sovereignty. Since Maastricht, WEU tasks were gradually being transferred to the European Union. The diversity of the present EU member states had always prevented this transfer from being complete. The tasks that remained outside the Community framework after the Nice Treaty were the mutual defence guarantee and the creation of a common industrial base. This was one reason why the WEU Treaty continued to exist. The draft Constitutional Treaty included the possibility of enhanced cooperation in the defence field. Further progress in this area might ultimately lead to the disappearance of WEU. The creation of an armaments agency based on a "variable geometry" approach might allow more rational use of European resources, by coordinating both supply and demand in weapons procurement.

Until such time as a new Constitution caused the situation to change, EU activities in regard to security and defence policy remained confined to the Petersberg tasks. It would become necessary, however, to make provision for a broader range of activities, including arms control and the fight against terrorism, with greater emphasis on the ability to take preventive action.

The European Convention had opened up the possibility and it was important that the Intergovernmental Conference confirm this option.

Mrs HÜBNER (Minister for European Affairs of Poland, Member of the European Convention) - The imminent enlargement of the European Union would mean it had a longer border with Russia and new borders with Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia. The EU would need to come to terms with this new situation by defining new policies.

Enlargement also meant greater diversity, which should strengthen the EU's power but nevertheless meant it having to restructure its institutions.

Indeed, the first thing to be done was to find an arrangement whereby Europe could speak with a single voice, if possible though only one spokesperson, particularly on security and defence. Europe had stood alongside the United States for more than half a century and this transatlantic partnership would continue to be crucial. The new situation should create stronger transatlantic ties and the IGC should contribute to this.

The job of European Foreign Minister should combine the functions of the CFSP High Representative and the External Relations Commissioner. These needed to be clearly defined, to avoid any duplication.

As far as institutional change went, a European armaments agency was a key stage in progress towards an arms market. Mrs Hübner was also in agreement with the wider definition of the Petersberg tasks, as proposed in the new Constitutional Treaty, and with the present wording of the solidarity clause.

The Minister dwelt on the clear need for "harmonisation of efforts" when it came to NATO and European Union military capabilities and also stressed the importance of the debates and what still needed to be done in relation to the EUMS and implementation of the "Berlin plus" agreements. She felt that the adoption of the modified Brussels Treaty in an EU format, to be open to any state seeking to commit itself to a common defence could be a reasonable solution.

Institutional arrangements apart, Mrs Hübner highlighted the need for the political will to be there to make headway on the CFSP, a political will which, for the time being, was not much in evidence. There was therefore a need for a security and defence strategy. The strategy paper Mr Solana had presented in Thessaloniki was a step in the right direction.

Mrs Hübner stressed the importance - if the CFSP was to be effective - of improved EU capabilities, of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, of the UN presence as a "centre of active multilateralism", and of crisis prevention and management and widening the Petersberg tasks.

Mr NAZARÉ PEREIRA (Portugal, Rapporteur for the WEU Assembly and Member of the European Convention), recalled that the historic transformations of the security environment that had taken place since the end of the cold war had brought home to Europe the need to develop a security and defence policy that had more "muscle". Indeed, the essential reasons for the United States to be the main provider of Europe's security no longer existed. But, without a precise idea of the nature of the future threats or of whether European citizens would be prepared to pay the cost of a common European defence, NATO remained for the moment the only credible structure for Europe's security and defence.

All proposals for building a European defence capability must take those factors into account and ensure that it was developed in close cooperation with NATO.

Under the proposals put forward by the Convention, the European Union's competence for security and defence was not exclusive to the Union, neither did it fall within the category of shared competences. It was based on capabilities provided by the member states.

Article 40 of the draft Constitutional Treaty made provision for groups of member states to organise among themselves several sorts of special cooperation. In addition to so-called "enhanced cooperation", it also offered the Union the possibility of entrusting a group of member states with the execution of certain missions, as well as making provision for "structured cooperation" on capabilities and "closer cooperation" for states willing to sign up to a mutual defence commitment among themselves.

In Mr Nazaré Pereira's view it was necessary for the criteria governing participation in such "structured cooperation" to be more clearly defined in order to avoid discrimination. Moreover such cooperation should be open to non-EU European NATO member states and other interested European countries.

Regarding closer cooperation on mutual defence, the wording proposed by the Convention omitted two principles that had always been applied by WEU:

  • the principle enshrined in the second paragraph of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty according to which the military responsibility for any European engagement in the field of defence would be assumed by the competent NATO authorities;
  • the need for all member states signing up to a European collective defence commitment to be members of NATO.

In conclusion, the Convention proposals fell considerably short of the commitments entered into under the modified Brussels Treaty and could not therefore replace it. On the contrary, there was a risk that commitments would be dispersed among:

  • the North Atlantic Treaty;
  • the EU Constitutional Treaty;
  • the modified Brussels Treaty.

Finally, the main subject of concern was the Convention's refusal to make appropriate provision for the collective involvement of the national parliaments in the external action and security and defence policy of the European Union. In order to debate those issues the Convention proposed to organise interparliamentary conferences under the auspices of COSAC on the basis of a Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. Such conferences did not provide a satisfactory solution to the problem.

Dr DIEDRICHS (Institute for European Policy, Berlin) made the point that the draft European Constitution contained more than one could have hoped. He wondered whether the role of European Foreign Minister would be an effective one and advocated flexibility in the rules governing the CFSP-ESDP, which had not been changed. The aim of enhanced cooperation was for some countries to be able to take on certain tasks.

In Dr Diedrichs's view the European armaments agency was an interesting idea. Given the absence of any similar experience in this field to go by, time would tell how it would work out.

He wondered how the criteria governing military capabilities should be defined and how compliance with those criteria could be evaluated and guaranteed, making reference in that connection, by way of illustration, to the convergence criteria for the single currency.

The European armaments agency would be open to all those who wanted to join. All the EU member states would therefore not necessarily take part in its work. Some states might commit themselves to some projects. This led on to other questions - about the relationship with OCCAR, for instance. It would perhaps be better, in the speaker's view, to bring together the existing structures.

Dr Diedrichs then spoke about the issue of mutual assistance, dealt with flexibly in the Constitutional Treaty, in both Article I-40 (7) and in Article III-214. However, in his view the two were not entirely compatible. Article I-40 referred to immediate unconditional assistance in the event of aggression while Article III-214 envisaged an entire consultation process before measures of any kind were taken. Furthermore, Article V of the WEU Treaty did not correspond exactly to provisions of the draft Constitutional Treaty. The EU should, moreover, be prepared to justify why this kind of mutual assistance clause was necessary.

Finally, a major change had been introduced in the draft Constitutional Treaty with regard to flexibility in areas relating to the CFSP and, more surprisingly still, to the ESDP, which was truly an innovation. The answer to the dilemma was enhanced cooperation and closer cooperation, implying a more coherent approach in future. Military missions would thus be governed by the consensus rule, but constructive abstention would offer an acceptable solution for some countries. When it came to implementing crisis-management measures, the formation of coalitions among countries wanting to participate would mean that those with reservations would not block decisions.

Dr Diedrichs also pointed out that aspects relating to mutual assistance and issues of cooperation between the various bodies external to the European Union (OCCAR and the LoI for example) and those falling within the Constitutional Treaty framework (such as the European Armaments Agency) needed to be improved upon and presented more coherently.

Dr LINDLEY-FRENCH (Centre for Security Policy, Geneva) suggested that both the draft Constitutional Treaty and Javier Solana's strategy paper were more like training manuals than operational plans for the progressive framing of a common European security and defence policy.

From a European defence standpoint, it was all too clear that European defence was increasingly less about security and more about the political hierarchy within the Union. His core message was that a defence and military union was not strengthened by handing more power to the member states, or at any rate to some of them. It appeared that ever closer integration would be achieved by weakening the tool of political convergence, the Commission, and strengthening the agents of political divergence, the states.

The day would come when the Union was the focal point for the security and defence of European citizens, with NATO as the indispensable interoperability nexus between Europeans and Americans. But the security and defence clauses in the draft Constitutional Treaty represented a failure on the part of the EU to move forward in defence at Fifteen. Instead of integration, it offered structured or reinforced cooperation.

Altogether therefore, the proposed Constitution far from being a visionary document was actually a holding document.

Dr Lindley-French failed to see how creating an EU President and an EU Foreign Minister would stop the squabbling with the EU Commission. He welcomed in principle the expansion of Petersberg tasks to other fields but strongly regretted that the reality of Europe's military capabilities had not even come close to fulfilling the first Petersberg tasks, let alone the missions implied in the new, extended tasks. The new common security and defence policy seemed to concentrate on pretending that capabilities commitments had been fulfilled and serious missions were being undertaken when they were not. For example, the headline goal of 60 000 troops, deployable in 60 days, to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks and be ready by 2003, had failed. Such objectives were being quietly forgotten.

Another problem was the emerging phenomenon of what Dr Lindley-French called "Broadway Operations" - which looked good but were instantly forgettable. A case in point was Operation Artemis in Bunia which had had little effect on the stated mission of stopping the killing. Young European soldiers would be put in dangerously exposed situations, ill-equipped and ill-trained, just so that a political point could be made back in Europe. The political leadership of Europe would not be forged by such strategic pretence.

He felt that the Union was worth believing in but had to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality in order to be credible.

Debate

Mr Lusnia (Poland) wondered whether the European Union would now take action with or without recourse to NATO assets. With reference to the particular situation of Norway and Iceland, he asked whether it was appropriate for the EU to take autonomous action when NATO had more than 50 years of experience. He wondered furthermore why it was necessary to allow the Nice provisions on the weighting of votes to be dropped, given that the Poles agreed with the Nice Treaty.

Senator Dini replied that no one wished the Union to act without NATO, which was the pillar of our transatlantic defence. However, this was not an obstacle to the Union developing the ESDP. Fifty years earlier the French parliament had rejected the European Defence Community, yet now it was in that direction that Europe was moving. One proposal, among others, was to have "structured cooperation". If this was not done within the Union, it would be necessary to create cooperation structures outside it, which it would be preferable to avoid. With regard to ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, it should be recalled that Poland had also signed the Treaty on enlargement. All the countries concerned had to take the existing treaties as their basis. The new Constitution took the diversity of situations into account. Those issues were now on the table of the Intergovernmental Conference whose task was to approve a finalised text which would then be submitted for ratification.

Dr Lindley-French (Centre for Security Policy, Geneva) remarked that any weakening of NATO was not the result of European initiatives in the field of ESDP, but rather of a lack of interest on the part of the United States.

Mr Nazaré Pereira (Portugal) was convinced that the interests of the non-EU European NATO member countries could not be neglected. It was important not to adopt an exclusive attitude.

Dr Diedrichs remarked that during the German Chancellor's last meeting with the Polish and Czech heads of government the differences between the two countries had persisted, in particular with regard to whether it would be expedient to unravel the whole "package".

In reply to a question from Mr Jelinçic (Slovenia), Mrs Hübner recalled that the national parliaments were represented within the Convention. However, the WEU Assembly had not been given a seat. Given the imminence of the Intergovernmental Conference, the Assembly could explain to the governments concerned the importance of the collective role of the national parliaments in the field of security and defence. Unfortunately, Poland's proposal to seek a solution based on the modified Brussels Treaty had not met with any success.

Mr Nazaré Pereira said that the attempts of the WEU Assembly to put forward a satisfactory solution to the problem of parliamentary oversight of a European security and defence policy had, until now, always failed because the Convention had not wanted new institutions. He thought, however, that work still had to be done in the present configuration of a common security and defence policy to yield a more satisfactory solution in terms of oversight by national parliaments.

Senator Dini agreed that the Convention had not wanted to create new institutions such as a kind of "third chamber". It had given only a consultative status to the European Parliament, and the promise of keeping it informed. He suggested that the WEU Assembly send a message to the Intergovernmental Conference setting out its ideas on oversight by the national parliaments.

Dr Lindley-French agreed that national parliaments had greater legitimacy than the European Parliament, certainly when it came to military action.

General Olshausen (German Military Representative, NATO) said that NATO primacy was desirable but it was less than clear how decisions would be taken in the event of a threat that had to be countered. Would each organisation decide and then see what happened? Within the EU, crisis management was still in its infancy. The EU military headquarters for crisis management and secure communications between the capitals and the military headquarters had not yet been established and there was still competition between different pillars over tasks and responsibilities in this field. European capabilities were another problem. The military forces mentioned in the headline goal were not yet operational and the EU's ability to take action outside its own territory was limited.

Senator Dini again emphasised the importance of re-establishing NATO's first responsibility for the analysis of specific threats and missions. Europe could not decide independently on these issues. Such decisions should be taken jointly with NATO. The allies could then decide whether to use the "Berlin plus" formula or whether Europe should go it alone. The "Berlin plus" formula remained vital for European action but the question was still how to put it into effect. In any event, Europe should devote more resources to improving its capabilities.

Dr Lindley-French stated that there was an urgent need for a proper strategic dialogue between NATO and the EU. At present, too many EU representatives were still prevented from talking to their counterparts in NATO. He reminded the audience that only 10% of all European soldiers were available for deployment outside the territory.

Dr Diedrichs (Institute for European Policy, Berlin) said that within the EU there were still divergent views on security and defence policy with some countries being prepared to do more than others. Many aspects of long-term NATO-EU relations were not yet explicit. The Tervuren summit had been an indication that some countries might even establish structures outside the European institutional framework.

Mrs Hübner (Polish Minister for European Affairs) said that Poland had plans to further reduce its armed forces while taking into account the possibilities technology offered to strengthen capabilities. All NATO allies should work seriously on implementing the "Berlin plus" formula.

Mr Arlović (Vice-President of the Croatian Parliament) said that, for the time being, the European Parliament was not the appropriate forum for parliamentary oversight of European military forces and EU-led military operations. Parliamentary oversight of the European Security and Defence Policy by national parliaments on an individual basis would be difficult to achieve. A parliamentary body like the WEU Assembly would be more appropriate for carrying out that work. He also suggested that in the fight against terrorism, human rights were not always respected. He thought that more respect for human rights could help contain terrorism. He wondered whether it would be possible to have a European ombudsman to deal with those rights.

Senator Dini thought that the draft Constitutional Treaty did not really deal with parliamentary scrutiny of security and defence matters and this issue clearly concerned the national parliaments. The WEU Assembly was well placed to put forward concrete proposals on this matter.

Mrs Hübner felt that this was an area in which the draft Constitutional Treaty was defective and that the major winner was the European Parliament. She too raised the possibility of the EU dealing with human rights issues.

Mr Nazaré Pereira wondered whether the draft Constitutional Treaty was in fact balanced, in terms of defence and human rights. As far as the issue of unanimity was concerned, governments were answerable to their national parliaments.

Dr Diedrichs observed that standards varied from country to country. In some, it was the government that took decisions, in others parliament had the last word.

Mr Wilkinson (Chairman) summed up by pointing out that the draft Constitutional Treaty concentrated too much on institutions. Security and defence cooperation was necessary but there had also to be real cooperation in the realm of technology. This was paramount in order to be able to make headway on the more political objectives. The area of peacekeeping was far wider than armaments issues, as the case of Iraq proved. He wound up by thanking the speakers for their contributions, those present for coming and all those who had made the conference possible.


THIRD SESSION

European defence: operational requirements and industrial competitiveness

Chairman: Mr ARNAU NAVARRO (Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Assembly of WEU).

Mr KAMP (Minister for Defence of the Netherlands, WEAG Netherlands Presidency) in his introductory remarks, set out the broad principles of European security and defence cooperation as follows:

  • Europe needed to contribute more to cooperation with the United States in NATO;
  • it should look at multinational solutions as a way of obtaining a better return on its defence spending;
  • it should establish a single European armaments cooperation framework;
  • it must be capable of managing crises on its borders; in particular, the EU should take over the NATO operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  • it should improve its ability to contribute to UN missions;

In the light of the above, Mr Kamp therefore recommended:

  • improved cooperation between the EU and NATO;
  • better coordination within European security structures: it should be possible, through ECAP (European Capabilities Action Plan), to make good deficiencies and a single armaments cooperation framework should be established within the EU. The projected European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency would be the means of achieving this goal;
  • in view of the importance of the Europe's defence industry for employment, economic growth and research and technology (R&T), stimulating European armaments cooperation in various ways; these included, first, "thinking European" and liberalising the European defence market. On this point Mr Kamp felt that the US Congress should reject the "Buy American Act" as it would be "simply unacceptable for the realisation of an open European defence market to be accompanied by the closure of the US defence market". The ability to harmonise European operational requirements was crucial to the competitiveness of the European defence industry. It should be done by focusing on the ECAP requirement, the headline goal and NATO's Prague Capability Commitment. The Agency would play an important part in this and should help accelerate the ECAP process.

The Minister concluded that the ESDP could mature only in close cooperation with NATO and with a clear commitment to the improvement of European military capabilities.

Admiral DI PAOLA, (National Armaments Director, Italy) prefaced his remarks by stressing the need both for a review of the political decision-making process in the EU and for a leading-edge military instrument. Challenges of this nature required an improvement in European military capability and hence an effective armaments policy and a robust Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB). There was now a growing awareness that strategic autonomy should no longer be perceived or achieved at national level but that it should have a broader European and transatlantic dimension. Consolidation of the European defence industry was taking place through mergers and joint ventures so as to adjust to a wider and more competitive international market. Europeans needed to accept the principle of interdependence.

On the supply side (industry), it was essential for companies to take on board the fact that their ability to survive was based on the degree to which they were able to project themselves on to the global market, with a critical mass that could support the necessary investment in technological research and sustain a position at the leading edge of technology. There had to be a corresponding awareness on the demand side (the user), at the appropriate political level, that technological development was a necessary premise for the transformation of the military instrument into a net-centric operational tool at a sustainable cost.

A key objective for an effective European armaments policy was rationalisation of the demand and the supply sides in Europe and the strengthening of the supply-side presence on the global market. Within that process, the creation of a European intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments could and should play an important part.

From the work done so far, a wide consensus was emerging for an agency to manage the activities of the existing bodies, be the active, central core of a network structure and make use of the capabilities offered by the European organisations/groups/functions in place: the EUMC, the EUMS, the ECAP Project Groups, the MCD mechanism for developing capabilities, OCCAR, the WEAO Research Cell and others for armament and R&T aspects.

Admiral Di Paola felt that while an effective DITB and European armaments cooperation policy were essential components of an effective ESDP, the temptation, and the risk, of building an Armaments Fortress Europe, so to speak, had to be avoided. An open, competitive armaments market in Europe was what was needed. However, it would not be achieved overnight; it had to happen gradually and what was neither needed nor wanted was an isolationist defence market. On the contrary, it was in Europe's interest to open up its market and pursue a balanced transatlantic armaments cooperation policy.

Representatives of the European armaments industry agreed that it was necessary to liberalise defence markets. They called for a coherent political structure providing industry with a reference for developing commercial strategies.

Mr WESENER, (Secretary-General of the European Defence Industry Group (EDIG)) said that a common European procurement market should be defined in cooperation with industry. To that end a proper reference authority for industry should be established within the EU. While Europe needed a critical mass at industrial level, which could be achieved through multinational procurement programmes, industry needed a common rather than a fragmented market that would allow further consolidation and the creation of new centres of excellence.

Mr BÜHL (Vice-President and Director for EU Defence Policy and NATO, EADS Brussels) explained that European defence should not "be an end in itself" and that it would not be realistic "for at least the next decade" to believe Europe could deal with a major conflict without military assistance from NATO. He believed that EU and NATO armaments projects were the most important ingredients for maintaining links between European and US armaments industries. Much more effort was needed to transform the fragmented European defence market and the single US market into "a normal cooperative process without administrative obstacles". Europeans needed to achieve "co-operability", which meant more than just military interoperability. It meant being politically, militarily and technologically capable of cooperating with US forces to ensure a minimum of respect for European interests in the decision-making process. If the US wanted Europeans to share the burden of dealing with today's threats, it should be prepared to consider the exchange of technology as a normal procedure and as a two-way street. More political discussions, a strategic dialogue and agreements between Europe and the US were needed to take transatlantic armaments cooperation forward. One thing was certain: a competitive European industrial base was indispensable for such cooperation.

Mr ZAPPA (Chairman of Alenia Aeronautics) was optimistic about the pace of industrial change and further consolidation within the European defence industry. The European domestic market would remain limited but provide the basis for long-term growth. Relations with the US defence industry were essential, but Europeans must be prepared to fund projects like Ariane or Galileo: they must be selective in investing in key areas and put effort into R&D, as this was not wholly a commercial sector.

Mr ORSI (Managing Director, Agusta S.p.A) said his company had decided a long time ago to move beyond the domestic market. The new international scenarios required new capabilities such as mobility, flexibility, interoperability and more effective use of helicopters, bearing in mind the three-dimensional and interconnected nature of the battlefield. The European helicopter industry ranked first (Agusta-Westland) and second (Eurocopter) in the world in terms of turnover. It was necessary to invest more resources in coordinated research and to develop the industry from a product provider to a capability provider. In any event, this type of industry could not move forward in the absence of a major programme meeting the requirements of European defence.

Mr SCHMITT (Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris), referred to current pressure for bringing armaments within the European Union. He enumerated the comparative advantage of the EU, the broad range of policies and instruments to implement reforms in those areas where action was mostly needed: procurement, research, and the market. However, there was no guarantee of success and important stumbling blocks still remained. These included political differences, bureaucratic inertia, intergovernmental decision-making. The setting up of a European defence agency would be a test. It was important for the Agency to be headed up by a major political figure.

The keys to success were as follows: more was needed than just another layer added to an already complex institutional landscape; unnecessary duplication had to be avoided and existing elements integrated. If appropriate, OCCAR should be used for programme management. There should be an autonomous budget for research projects up to the level of demonstrators. There needed to be autonomy vis á vis governments, but strong political support, a strong director, close links with Ministers and cooperation with other relevant bodies in particular the Commission.

As far as setting a European defence equipment market was concerned, the speaker made the following recommendations: using Community instruments whenever possible in order to arrive at legally binding and rapidly applicable provisions, adapting existing Community law and policies to the specificities of defence, analysing systematically which areas of the LoI Framework Agreement could be transformed into Community law.

He summed up by saying that the EU offered a framework for comprehensive and coherent reform and that innovative steps were possible, even in an intergovernmental environment. Armaments in Europe was no longer a purely national domain, member states should redefine their national interests accordingly.

Debate

Mr Compard (France) noted that the whole issue of risks from weapons of mass destruction had not been raised. The United States had virtually sole control of space and was preparing to build a national anti-ballistic missile system. Given this was the case, might it not be in Europe's interest to develop a common policy, including a policy for the defence industry? What could be done to achieve a better balance in transatlantic cooperation in this area?

Mr Cothier (CEPS) wondered how Europe could have its own armaments policy, given that the United States defence budget dwarfed spending by Europe, and even that massive budget was not enough to sort out all the problems that were cropping up in Iraq.

Mr Bühl (Vice-President and Director for EU Defence Policy and NATO, EADS Brussels) replied that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was a political issue. Close cooperation had been set up in NATO to counter the threat of ballistic missiles by setting up a missile defence system.

General Olshausen (German Military Representative, NATO) raised the matter of how to respond to the need to develop a common assessment of the threat.

Mrs Neyts-Uyttebroek (Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Belgium) observed that the Netherlands Defence Minister had insisted first and foremost on the need for the European Union to cooperate with NATO and had ruled out any suggestion about setting up a European command centre that was separate from NATO. However, "Berlin plus" notwithstanding, NATO was not always prepared to give the EU the assets it needed, for example, for Operation Artemis. What was to be done to remedy this?

The Chairman noted that the Dutch Minister had had to leave and could not therefore reply.

Mr Bühl observed that it was up to EU governments to decide whether Europe needed an independent planning and command capability. However, there was already the EU Military Staff. The capability proposed by the "four nations" should therefore be set up within that framework. In this way, it would be possible to avoid further duplication and some countries being left out.

Mr Bozhok (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine) thanked the Assembly for its invitation to attend the conference. Ukraine had a strong interest in the subjects under discussion, but at present it was only an observer. What were the views on the possibility of the defence industries of non-EU member states taking part in armaments cooperation?

Mr Bühl said that some NATO tasks provided for US involvement when this seemed militarily appropriate and that there was no problem about this. Whether or not there was such involvement was decided on an ad hoc basis.

Mr Bruce (United Kingdom) took up the NATO Secretary-General's point that despite the total of 1.4 million troops belonging to the European nations - far too many of which were conscripts - the European Union was unable to intervene effectively in and manage crises. In all likelihood Europeans would also lose out from any "Buy American" Act, even if the US Administration were not in favour of such legislation. The US invariably imposed political conditions in arms negotiations.

Mr Orsi (Managing Director, Agusta S.p.A) responding to the issues raised, felt that it was up to Europeans to endeavour to take the necessary political decisions. Transatlantic relations were of paramount importance, but there had to be two-way traffic. We were in competition with the Americans vis á vis third countries like Japan and the central and eastern European countries. Agusta had managed to sell helicopters to Japan notwithstanding fierce American competition. The "Buy American" Act was still an open question. But if the European defence industry succeeded in developing quality products it would be able to hold its own against the Americans.

Mr Bühl reminded everyone that 150 000 troops were needed to have a force of 30 000 standing ready. While the British and French had expanded their military strengths in order to be able to deal with new risks, Germany had begun its reforms later and its forces were not yet properly equipped for the new tasks. Europe's defence industry was well able to provide what was needed. But it had to consolidate to penetrate the US market. According to some American industry representatives in Brussels, a "Buy American" Act would mean that the Americans could not do business with other countries at all.

Mr Branger (France) asked Mr Bühl to explain further the approach he was suggesting, involving the need to develop leading-edge technology so as to be able ultimately to become a partner of the United States.

Mr Bühl replied that one had to look at the overall context - the goal was a European defence. Even with its advanced technology, US capabilities were not sufficient in all fields. There was therefore an opportunity for European industry to grasp by acting in concert. Where European industry had technologies it could offer, it should discuss them with the Americans.


CONCLUSIONS

First session - Security in Europe and stabilisation in the Middle East

Mrs DURRIEU (France, Senator, Member of the WEU Assembly and Rapporteur on Security in Europe and stabilisation in the Middle East) summing up, said that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a threat to Europe's security because of its geographic proximity (Dr Heller) and because it was a breeding ground for fundamentalism of all kinds. It was therefore a matter of urgency for the world to arrive at a settlement. The conflict had dropped from view during the war in Iraq and it could be asked whether the same thing would occur during the forthcoming US presidential campaign.

The question had been raised as to whether the United States was interested in the Middle East as a whole, or only in particular parts of that area (Mr Politi). It was also interesting to have an insight into Russia's position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (ideas put forward by Mr Lukin).

Lastly, the role Europe could or should play in the conflict and whether it was capable of taking the initiative were matters for conjecture.

There was a consensus in favour of getting the Quartet's (United Nations, European Union, Russia and the United States) "road map" up and running. This action plan had initially been greeted with enthusiasm, which had subsequently given way to indifference, then pessimism. However, it was clear beyond doubt that Mr Arafat and Mr Sharon were condemned to live with one another and together find a solution to the crisis. (General Angioni).

Under the circumstances, there were various prospects open to the advocates of the peace process: they could either negotiate with the parties with a view to implementing the road map, or enforce peace through a non-negotiable global agreement backed by an international mandate and forces.

For the time being the Quartet should stand firm and positions should be clarified. The European Union should be more involved. It would also be a helpful if a religious dimension were incorporated into any European Middle-East global peace strategy (Mr Politi).

The ultimate aim must be implementation of the road map between now and 2005, with two viable states, a lasting peace and international monitoring mission.

Second session - Foreign policy and common defence in the future European Constitutio

Mr GABURRO (Italy, Senator, Member of the WEU Assembly and Rapporteur on Prospects for the European security and defence policy) summing up, said that the first thing to emerge from the debate based on the very interesting presentations by the five speakers was that the Convention's proposals for creating a true defence dimension in the European Union continued to be a matter of considerable controversy. The decision of the Assembly's Political Committee to draft a special contribution to the Intergovernmental Conference on the subject during October was therefore an extremely valid one. A contribution of this nature from the Assembly was absolutely vital.

In this respect, the presentations and discussions had brought to the fore a number of unanswered questions and unresolved problems which would provide matter for discussion within the Political Committee over the coming weeks.

Dr Lindley-French had reminded those present inter alia of the gap that still existed in the European Union between rhetoric and reality. The Convention proposed expanding the Petersberg tasks but the European Union was not yet sufficiently operational to fulfil even the full range of "traditional" Petersberg missions. All the speakers had raised the fundamental issue of whether the European Union was capable of taking on every area of defence. In that connection, Mr Dini had referred on several occasions to the differences that still existed between European Union member states. Mrs Hübner had rightly pointed out that the European Union was soon to have new borders with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, which would radically change the security position. She had also made the point, as had Mr Nazaré Pereira, that European defence must be founded on the principle of inclusivity.

Especially interesting had been the analyses by Mr Nazaré Pereira and the German expert, Dr Diedrichs, of the provisions included in the draft Constitutional Treaty for allowing groups of states to establish special forms of cooperation among themselves, including in regard to mutual defence. This had also been another of Mrs Hübner's concerns. Mr Nazaré Pereira had suggested that there was the risk of a three-way split in the defence commitment, with part in the EU framework, part in the modified Brussels Treaty framework and part in that of the Atlantic Alliance. What was not in question was that purely symbolic commitments could neither strengthen the EU's credibility nor provide greater security for Europe's citizens.

Finally, Mr Gaburro again stressed the fundamental importance of reinforcing the democratic character of the European Union by securing a parliamentary dimension for the European defence policy. He felt that in this respect only Mr Dini seemed more or less satisfied with the outcome of the Convention. Most of the other contributors had concluded that the Convention's refusal to give national parliaments a proper collective role in this sphere, through an interparliamentary body, was totally unacceptable. One idea Mr Dini had put forward was that collective representation of the parliaments would constitute a sort of "third chamber". Mr Gaburro wondered how that could be so. Others took the view that the member governments already constituted a "second chamber" within the Council framework. Mr Gaburro said he was not entirely convinced by the argument.

He called on Assembly members to continue - notwithstanding the difficulties ahead - to try and persuade their governments that a defence policy could only operate in the European Union if it were supported by all the national parliaments. To ensure this was the case, there would still need to be an interparliamentary body so as to make possible information-sharing between parliamentarians and an institutional dialogue with the European executive. This issue would feature as a major area of concern in the work of the WEU Assembly's Political Committee during the second half of the year.

Mr AGRAMUNT FONT DE MORA (Spain, Senator, Member of the WEU Assembly and Rapporteur on The development of armaments policy in Europe), who was to sum up the session, was unfortunatly absent. Mr Arnau NAVARRO therefore closed the debate by thanking the Italian Presidency, and especially Mr Zacchera, for the warm welcome and wonderful surroundings in which it had been possible to hold this conference on "New Scenarios for European common security and defence".


LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Speakers

Mr

Pierferdinando CASINI, President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies

Mr

Marcel GLESENER, President of the WEU Assembly

Mr

Marco ZACCHERA, President of the Italian Delegation

Gen.

Franco ANGIONI, Deputy, Former Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL)

Mr

Hartmut BÜHL, Vice-President, Director for EU Defence Policy and NATO, EADS, Brussels

Dr

Udo DIEDRICHS, Institute for European Politics, Berlin

Mr

Lamberto DINI, Vice-President of the Senate, Member of the European Convention, Italy

Adm

Giampaolo DI PAOLA, National Director of Armaments, Ministry of Defence, Italy

Mr

Mark HELLER, Principal Research Associate, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University

Mrs

Danuta HÜBNER, Minister for European Affairs of Poland, Member of the European Convention

Mr

Henk KAMP, Minister for Defence, Netherlands, WEAG Netherlands Presidency

Mr

Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH, Centre for Security Policy, Geneva

Mr

Vladimir LUKIN, Deputy Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation

Mr

Alfredo MANTICA, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Italy

Mr

Giuseppe ORSI, Director General, AGUSTA-WESTLAND

Mr

Alessandro POLITI, Independent Strategic and Open Source Intelligence Analyst

Mr

Burkard SCHMITT, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Mr

Jean WESENER, Secretary-General EDIG, Brussels

Mr

Giorgio ZAPPA, Chairman, Alenia Aeronautica S.p.a.

Members

Belgium

Mr

Gerolf ANNEMANS

Mr

Jurgen CEDER

Mrs

Josey DUBIE

Mr

Stef GORIS

Mr

Jean-Pol HENRY

Mrs

Mimi KESTELIJN-SIERENS

Mr

Philippe MONFILS

Mr

Francis POTY

Mr

Jacques TIMMERMANS

Mr

Luc VAN DEN BRANDE

France

Mr

René ANDRÉ

Mr

Jean-Guy BRANGER

Mr

Michel DREYFUS-SCHMIDT

Mrs

Josette DURRIEU

Mr

Jean-Pierre KUCHEIDA

Mr

Guy LENGAGNE

Mr

François LONCLE

Mr

Jean-Pierre MASSERET

Mr

Philippe NACHBAR

Mr

Marc REYMANN

Germany

Mr

Ulrich ADAM

Mr

Klaus-Jürgen HEDRICH

Mr

Gerd HOFER

Mrs

Jelena HOFFMANN

Mr

Peter LETZGUS

Mrs

Christine LUCYGA

Mr

Helmut RAUBER

Greece

Mr

Aristotelis PAVLIDIS

Italy

Mr

Emerenzio BARBIERI

Mr

Domenico CONTESTABILE

Mr

Giovanni CREMA

Mrs

Tana DE ZULUETA

Mr

Giuseppe GABURRO

Mr

Gennaro MALGIERI

Mr

Andrea MANZELLA

Mr

Giuseppe MULAS

Mr

Pasquale NESSA

Mr

Piero PELLICINI

Mr

Calogero PISCITELLO

Mr

Andrea RIGONI

Mr

Dario RIVOLTA

Mr

Gianpietro SCHERINI

Mr

Francesco TIRELLI

Mr

Marco ZACCHERA

Luxembourg

Mr

Emile CALMES

Mr

Marcel GLESENER

Mr

Gusty GRAAS

Netherlands

Mr

Dick DEES

Mr

Bart Van WINSEN

Portugal

Mr

Miguel ANACORETA CORREIA

Mrs

Maria Eduarda AZEVEDO

Mr

Antonio BRAGA

Mr

Antonio NAZARE PEREIRA

Spain

Mr

Pedro AGRAMUNT

Mrs

Cristina AGUDO

Mr

Francisco ARNAU NAVARRO

Mr

José Manuel BARQUERO VÁZQUEZ

Mrs

Alicia CASTRO

Mr

Adolfo FERNÁNDEZ AGUILAR

Mr

Ignasi GUARDANS

Mrs

Maria LOPEZ GONZALEZ

Mr

Guillermo MARTÍNEZ CASAÑ

Mr

Julio PADILLA

Mr

Gabino PUCHE

Mr

Lluís Maria de PUIG

Mr

Luís YAÑEZ BARNUEVO

United Kingdom

Baroness

BILLINGHAM

Mr

Malcolm BRUCE

Lord

BURLISON

Sir

Sydney CHAPMAN

Mr

Tom COX

Mr

Bill ETHERINGTON

Mr

Paul FLYNN

Mr

George FOULKES

Ms

Jane GRIFFITHS

Mr

Mike HANCOCK

Lord

KILCLOONEY

Mr

Khalid MAHMOOD

Mrs

Christine McCAFFERTY

Mr

Kevin McNAMARA

Mr

Humfrey MALINS

Mr

David MARSHALL

Mr

Alan MEALE

Mr

Edward O'HARA

Lord

RUSSELL-JOHNSTON

Sir

Teddy TAYLOR

Mr

John WILKINSON

Mr

Jimmy WRAY

Associate Members

Czech Republic

Mr

Martin DVORAK

Ms

Zuzana ROITHOVA

Norway

Ms

Marit NYBAKK

Mr

Aage KONRADSEN

Mr

Rolf REIKVAM

Mr

Per Ove WIDTH

Poland

Mr

Janusz LORENZ

Mr

Robert LUSNIA

Mrs

Joanna SENYSZYN

Mr

Wojciech ZARZYCKI

Associate Partners

Estonia

Mr

Robert LEPIKSON

Mrs

Maret MARIPUU

Latvia

Mr

Janis STRAZDINS

Mr

Dainis TURLAIS

Lithuania

Mr

Algimantas MATULEVICIUS

Mr

Rimantas SINKEVICIUS

Mr

Arunas VAZBYS

Romania

Mr

Theodor CIOCARLIE

Mr

Cristian DUMITRESCU

Mr

Constantin GAUCAN

Mrs

Lucia LEPADATU

Mr

Napoleon POP

Mrs

Nora Cecilia REBREANU

Mr

Karoly SZABO

Mr

Ioan TIMIS

Mr

Nicolae VASILESCU

Slovenia

Mr

Zmago JELINCIC

Mr

Tone PARTLJIC

Mrs

Majda POTRATA

Mr

Bogomir VNUCEC

Observers

Austria

Mr

Walter MURAUER

Finland

Mr

Mikko ELO

Ms

Maija-Liisa LINDQVIST

Ireland

Mr

Joe JACOB

Mr

Michael NOONAN

Mr

Ned O'KEEFFE

Chairmen of National Defence, Foreign Affairs and European Affairs Committees

Mr

Rogelio BAON, Chairman of the Defence Committee, Chamber of Deputies, Spain

Mr

Mario GRECO, Chairman of the European Affairs Committee, Senate, Italy, Chairman of COSAC

Mr

Razvan IONESCU, Chairman of the Defence Committee, Chamber of Deputies Romania

Mr

Tudor MARIUS MUNTEANU, Member of the Defence Committee of the Senate, Romania

Mrs

Annemie NEYTS-UYTTEBROECK, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Belgium

Mr

Wieslaw PIETRZAK, Chairman of the National Defence and Public Security Committee, Senate, Poland

Mr

Radu PODGOREANU, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Chamber of Deputies, Romania

Mr

Roberto SORAVILLA, Vice-Chairman of the European Affairs Committee, Chamber of Deputies, Spain

Mr

Giacomo STUCCHI, Chairman of the European Affairs Committee, Chamber of Deputies, Italy, Chairman of COSAC

Mr

Konstantinos VRETTOS, Chairman of the Committee on European Affairs, Greece, Past Chairman of COSAC

Parliamentary Guests

Croatia

Mr

Mato ARLOVIČ, Vice-President of Croatian Parliament

Mr

Nenad STAZIC, MP, Committee on Interior Affairs & National Security

Macedonia

Dr

Kenan HASIPI, MP, Macedonia

Mr

Zoran KRSTEVSKI, MP, Macedonia

Russian Federation

Mr

Vladimir LUKIN, Deputy Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation

Mrs

Elena KARELSKAYA

Mr

Mikhail GRISHANKOV

Mrs

Natalia MIRZA, Assistant Head of Delegation

Mr

Ivan NIKITCHUK, MP

Mr

Alexander SHUBIN, MP

Mr

Eduard VOROBIEV, MP

Honorary Members

Mr

Jacques BAUMEL, France

Mr

Jan Dirk BLAAUW, Netherlands

Mr

Armand DE DECKER, Belgium

Mr

Fridtjof Frank GUNDERSEN, Norway

Sir

Dudley SMITH, United Kingdom

Local Authorities

Ten Col

Angelo CINCOTTA, Commanding the Carabinieri of the Province of Verbano-Cusio-Ossola

Dr

Ivan GUARDUCCI, President of the Province of Verbano-Cusio-Ossola

Ing

Arturo LINCIO, President of the Distretto dei Laghi

Mr

Ettore LOMAGLIO SILVESTRI

Avv

Paolo MARCHIONI, Mayor of Baveno

Ten Col

Pasquale MAROTTA, Commander of the Guardia di Finanza of the Province of Verbano-Cusio-Ossola

Dr

Alfonso PIRONTI, Prefect of the Province of Verbano-Cusio-Ossola

Dr

Ettore RACCHELLI, Director of Tourism, Piedmont Region

Mr

Roberto REBECCHI, Vice-President of the Distretto dei laghi

Mr

Aldo RESCHIGNA, Mayor of Verbania

Brig. Gen.

Mario RIGHELE

Parliamentary Staff

Mrs

Maria Valeria AGOSTINI, Italy

Mr

Igors AIZSTRAUTS, Latvia

Ms

Corinne ASTI, Italy

Dr

Paul BARNETT, Germany

Mrs

Audra BIELINIENE, Lithuania

Mr

Davide CAPUANO, Senate, Italy

Mr

Federico CASELLI, Italy

Mr

Marc DE ROUCK, Belgium

Mr

Rainer DORNSEIFER, Germany

Mrs

Claire DOSSIER-CARZOU, France

Mr

Daniel DULCA, Ch. of Deputies, Romania

Mrs

Ivana DULCIC, Interpreter, Croatia

Mr

Semyon DZAKHAEZ, Adviser, State Douma

Mrs

Teresa GOMEZ-BERNARDO, Spain

Mr

Andy HUBNER, UK

Ms

Lucie KARLOVA, Czech Republic

Mrs

Dragojla KUPRE_ANIN, Head of the Vice-President's Office, Croatia

Ms

Anna LABEDZKA, Poland

Mr

Guy LINDSTROM, Finland

Mr

Marijan LUKETIC, Croatia

Mrs

Angelika MATZAVINOS, Greece

Mrs

Barbara MALAGNI, Italy

Mr

Gianfranco NERI, Chamber of deputies, Italy

Mr

Diego NOVELLI, Italy

Mrs

Andrina PAVLINIC, Croatia

Mr

Jovan PEJKOVSKI, Macedonia

Mrs

Stefania PEROZZI, Italy

Ms

Adriana PESCARU, Senate, Romania

Mr

Josip PISKOR, Croatia

Ms

Elisabetta POLESE, Italy

Mrs

Vincenza PROIETTI BEFANI, Italy

Mrs

Nadia QUADRELLI, Italy

Mr

James RHYS, UK

Mrs

Ene RONGELEP, Estonia

Mrs

Monserrat SANTOS, Spain

Mrs

Sara SCRINZI, Italian Senate

Mrs

Martina SLANCAROVA, Czech Republic

Mr

Alberto SOLIA, Italy

European Parliament

Dr

Norbert GRESCH, Deputy Head of División, Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament

Permanent Council, Brussels

Mr

Anthony W.P. AGOTHA, Deputy Permanent Representative, Netherlands

Amb.

Janis LUSIS, Latvian Permanent Representative

Amb.

Dirk WOUTERS, Belgian Permanent Representative

Military Staff, Permanent Delegations, Brussels

Mr

Oivind BAEKKEN, Defence Adviser, Mission of Norway to the WEU and the European Union

Dr

Klaus OLSHAUSEN, German Military Representative, NATO

Mr

Adam MISZTAL, Deputy Military Representative, Polish Military Representation to WEU and NATO Military Committee

Mr

Urik JAROSLAV, Deputy Military Representative for EU, Czech Republic

Embassies in Rome

Amb

Cristian COLTEANU, Embassy of Romania, Italy

Mr

Mircea GHEORDUNESCU, General Consulate of Romania, Italy

Mr

Ivan GOJAK, Embassy of Croatia, Italy

Amb.

Drago KRALJEVIC, Embassy of Croatia, Italy

Mrs

Laura MIRCEA, Second Secretary, Embassy of Romania, Italy

Mr

Adam PIESIEWICZ, General Consulate of Poland, Milano

Mrs

Miriam RAFAJOVA, Embassy of the Slovak Republic, Rome

Mr

Vladym SABLUK , Counsellor, General Consulate of Ukraine , Milano

Mr

Volodymyr VILSKYIY, General Consulate of Ukraine, Milano

WEU Secretariat-General, Brussels

Mr

Luis BALSELLS-TRAVER, Executive Officer, WEAG

Mrs

Hilary DAVIES, General Manager, WEAO

Mr

Francis GEVERS, Head Armament Secretariat

Mr

Arnaud JACOMET, Head Secretariat General

Mr

E. VAN HOEK, Chairman WEAG, Brussels

EU Satellite Centre, Torrejón

Mr

Fernando DAVARA, Director

Ministries

Mr

Yehor BOZHOK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine

Dr

Sergio BURRACCINI, Ministry of Defence, Italy

Col

Luigi EPIFANIO, Ministry of Defence, Italy

Mr

Umberto GATTO, Ministry of Finances, Italy

Mr

Wolfgang HERMANN, Chief of Branch International Armaments Cooperation, Ministry of Defence, Germany

Dr

Thomas PANKRATZ , Ministry of Defence, Austria

Mr

Nicolas MAFFERT, Directeur adjoint DGA/DCI, Ministère de la défense, France

Cap

Antonio MAROTTA, Ministry of Defence, Italy

Mr

Kamil SIERSZAK, Ministry of European Affairs, Poland

Mrs

Joanna STEMPINSKA, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland

Mr

Gorazd VIDRIH, Defence Adviser, Republic of Slovenia

Institutes

Mrs

Céline BOUHEY, Chargée de mission UE, CNES, Paris

Mr

Didier COMPARD, Senior Advisor, ECTI, L'Isle-Adam

Mr

Philippe COTHIER, President of CEPS, France

Mr

Luca DEL MONTE, Strategy Officer, ESA, Paris

Mr

Bauke SNOEP, President, European Organisation of Military Associations, Brussels

Industry

Mrs

Annalisa BIONDI, Vice-President Governmental Affairs, FINMECCANICA

Mrs

Ena BJERREGAARD, DI/FAD Danish Defence Industries Association, Copenhagen

Mr

Fabrizio BRAGHINI, Business Development, ALENIA AERONAUTICA, Italy

Mr

George C. CASS, Area Vice-President, LOCKHEED MARTIN GLOBAL, France-Benelux

Mr

Viktor CHEREDNICHENKO, Chief of Division, "UKRSPETSEXPORT"

Mr

Serafino D'ANGELANTONIO, Deputy Managing Director, EADS, Rome

Mr

Philippe FARGE, Directeur Relations Institutionnelles, AMARIS, Paris

Mr

Carlo FESTUCCI, Secretary General AIAD, Italy

Mr

Michel FOUQUET, Directeur des Relations extérieures, EUROCOPTER

Mr

Karl-Erik GOFFINET, Directeur des Relations internationals et des affaires stratégiques, GICAT

Mr

Simone GUERRINI, Institutional Relations Dept, ALENIA AERONAUTICA, Italy

Mr

Tom GUNNER, Society of British Aerospace Companies

Ms

Isabelle JULIEN, Strategy Manager EADS, Vélizy

Mr

Francesco LALLI, Institutional Relations Director, ALENIA AERONAUTIVA, Italy

Mr

Gianni MAGGIOLI, AGUSTA-WESTLAND, Italy

Mr

Remo PERTICA, CEO, Marconi Selenia Communications Spa, Italy

Mr

Patrick RUDLOFF, Deputy Managing Director ARIANESPACE

Mr

Pierre SABATIÉ-GARAT, Senior Advisor, EADS, France

Mr

Stefano TAGLIANI, Head of Communication, ALENIA AERONAUTICA, Rome

WEU Assembly Secretariat

Mr

Colin CAMERON, Clerk/Secretary-General

Mr

Eike BURCHARD, Clerk Assistant/Deputy Secretary-General

Mr

Roger LOUTZ, Clerk Assistant/Deputy Secretary-General

Mr

Floris DE GOU, Head of Political Section

Mr

Gilles COMBARIEU, Head of the Defence Section

Mr

José Manuel PEDREGOSA, Secretary of the Technological and Aerospace Committee

Mrs

Marisa NUDDA, Secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

Mrs

Corine CABALLERO-BOURDOT, Assistant Secretary to the Political Section

Mrs

Maureen BASSE, Private Office of the President

Mr

Michael HILGER, Press and External Relations Counsellor

Mrs

Catherine FOUCHER, Assistant

Mrs

Viviane LACHOWSKI-FAVRE, Interpreter

Ms

Isabel TARAZONA, Assistant

Ms

Federica DI CAMILLO, Stagiaire

Ms

Aleksandra SZCZEPANSKA, Stagiaire

Press

Mr

Martin AGÜERA, Defense News, Washington

Mrs

EWA HACZYK, Press, Poland

Mr

Rudolph HAMMERL, l'Abécédaire parlementaire, France

Mrs

Christina MACKENZIE, Flight International, France

Mr

Lieven TAILLIE, La Quinzaine européenne, Brussels


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