Mr President, Members of the Assembly, guests
Predicting the future is often difficult.
Winston Churchill was once asked to list the desirable qualities for an aspiring politician - he said and I quote:
"It is the ability to foretell what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month and next year and then to have the ability afterwards to explain why it didn't happen"
Paradoxically, the inclusion of the Petersburg approach - Re Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and tasks of combat in crisis management, (including peacemaking) in the Amsterdam Treaty marked not some "pie in the sky" political prediction, but rather the real beginning of the European Union's objective to tackle European crisis management.
More importantly it gave a real and positive lead to European Nations and their allies to stop "out guessing each other" in such an important field as defence.
As we all are aware, The Treaty was followed by decisions taken by a variety of European Councils, including The Helsinki European Council, of 11 and 12 December 1999 where it was agreed that - "EU countries should be in a position by 2003 to deploy rapidly and sustain forces of upto (50 000 to 60 000 troops - for up to one year) - capable of the full range of Petersburg tasks".
As we are all now know, the Capabilities Commitment Conferences held in Brussels in November 2000 and 2001, were important staging posts in helping to translate the Helsinki objectives into operational requirements.
Proof of this was seen by decisions taken by EU ministers, following those conferences, where unanimous support for the proposals was given - first by the 15+6 group of non-EU European ministers and later by the 15+15 group of candidate countries.
However, as we all know the story neither started nor finished with Helsinki. As early as 1998, WEU ministers - and I repeat WEU Ministers, met in Rome and took the decision to draw up an audit of assets and capabilities for European crisis-management operations.
An indication in itself of the organisation's initiative, strength and innovative foresight, and efficiency.
What's more the Organisation completed the audit by November 1999 and this valuable work, providing key facts and figures, has subsequently been built upon extensively. Many delegates here today are aware that last November, another conference, attended by foreign and defence ministers of all EU countries, was held on the subject of capability improvements.
At this meeting additional commitments were made to rectify shortcomings, including the establishment of the European capability action plan to clear up a range of remaining deficiencies. More importantly, it recognised the significance of obtaining broad public support for the goals set.
So, what kind of operational needs do we require and for which purposes?
Further still: What are the problems and where are the gaps, if any?
Everyone here today will recall that Helsinki also stated: "such forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary common control, intelligence capabilities, logistics and other combat support services in being".
And that they "should be ready for deployment within 60 days".
An enormous task, given NATO's experience in Kosovo, which revealed a large number of operational weaknesses in relation to crisis management.
I refer, in particular, to the problems in, for instance,
Procurement of real-time intelligence capabilities,
Satellite guidance systems and capabilities in electronic jamming, Command, control and communication,
Air-to-air refuelling, strategic air and sea lift,
Precision strike,
Anti-air defence
Penetration and Damage assessment capabilities.
Today at this conference we are aware that the Assembly has already noted - as Recommendation 702 implies - that European nations must bring their efforts to bear, in particular in the fields of intelligence capabilities - forces projection - command and control - and communication systems, and on the means of power projection and forces protection.
Therefore the operational gaps identified in the EU's headline goal framework are well known to us all. The question that remains is how to close the gaps and secure the system.
The answer is of course by cooperation, coordination and organisation. - Yes Ladies and Gentlemen we have "to fish in the same pool and together".
Whatsmore, and here the truth has to be told - if we are to achieve the deadlines laid down, we must move forward with urgency and be ready to meet fixed targets.
A strategy that would be greatly helped if many of the tried and trusted structures and institutions already in operation were fully utilised rather than them being ignored, underused or worse still time wasted creating new ones.
I refer, of course, to organisations such as the Western European Armaments Group, - which remains the sole European forum dealing with armaments matters that includes all EU members, except Ireland, and all European NATO members, except Iceland.
This organisation, as we all know, plays a leading role in the evaluation of European armaments policy.
Conference today is aware - that one of the key recommendations in the report envisages a study "Covering European nations as a whole in order to compare operational needs - evaluate national procurement policies and submit recommendations to European governments on the most promising forms of cooperation to set in train".
An important recommendation, and I along with others hope that it gets a positive response from European governments.
Why?
Quite simply Mr President, time is rapidly running out in the battle to establish a fully functioning crisis-management structure.
A structure that meets immediate needs yes - but one that is also fluid and recognises the danger that key decisions taken on the basis of today - (or worst still yesterday) - may prove inappropriate to the changing security needs of the future.
Therefore - Common European approaches in a range of areas need to be agreed upon urgently.
Let me explain why -
For instance, in strategic transport, modes must be decided soon, and for the next 30 years, not for the next three or four, or even an election or two. Remember equipment, development and organisation programmes take time as well as money.
Interoperability of equipment must also become the norm rather than the exception.
As we all know, Petersburg missions will inevitably mean an increase in the use of ground troops.
(Ladies and gentlemen) - Allied Forces that have to be fully funded, know each other, that are trained, and as I said earlier, protected.
Last but not least, to achieve all this, new defence commitments have to be made.
Colleagues, whether Governments like it or not, zero budget increases will not deliver the Petersburg tasks.
As we all know, we are here today quite simply because the political decision has been taken to organise defence under the aegis of the European Union.
My plea today therefore is, - that in order to allow these institutional advances to go forward, they must be given resources.
The simple reality is that if this project does not materialise, we will pay in terms of delivery and of course - of public opinion.
We therefore must all urge WEU governments and in particular those of the WEAG and WEAO member nations to:
In conclusion Mr President, in order for us to deliver military crisis management in the short, medium and long term, cooperation and coordination are the key elements.
Similarly, post-11 September defence spending and strategies need to be re-evaluated in the light of events, as does the establishment of an efficient industrial and technological base.
Proof of the need for this if it were needed has been recognised if we are to believe recent reports which indicate that NATO itself is organising three rapid reaction Corps - envisaging a total force in excess of 25,000 capable of combat in three conflicts in any part of the world for upto two years.
Therefore only by taking these similar routes and thinking will a guarantee be given to future military assets, our partnership and our people's security.
Similarly, to be successful interoperability of both equipment and forces, before, during and after theatre, must become the order of today and tomorrow - not yesterday.
Ladies and gentlemen, the key message in my address today is cooperation.
Each of us together, using our knowledge and skills to deliver Petersburg.
I started my address by giving you a quote from Winston Churchill - I'm going to end by giving you two more:
Firstly - As a civilian I am well aware that this conference is full of experts and opinions. Churchill himself recognised the danger politicians face when dealing with such knowledgeable talent,
he said:
"It is dangerous to meddle with admirals when they say they can't do things. They have always got the weather or fuel or something to argue about".
However he also told us and I quote:
"You cannot ask anyone to take sides against arithmetic. You cannot ask people to take sides against the obvious facts of the situation."
We have a chance today to heed both these messages.
By using our wide range of skills in partnership, we can solve both the mathematics and the vexed problem of delivering the peace.
Thanks.
