Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, good morning. The war in Afghanistan, which is clearly by no means over, and the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has underscored the need for European defence, be it organised through NATO or the EU, to move away from the supply-side of defence to the demand-side. For too long the European effort has been focused more on the institutional aspects of defence and less on preparing effective forces for dealing effectively with threats.
Today, I am going to stick my neck out and question priorities and identify shortcomings at three levels of European defence: the military strategic, the operational and support levels. Whilst I accept and actively support the need for Europe (that is Europe at 15 plus) to develop high intensity capabilities over time I am focused on interim measures that could enhance operational effectiveness and add value to US capabilities, when Europe so chooses.
In an ideal planning world it should be the threats that drive the capacities. Unfortunately, that has not been experience of the ESDP which has been constructed thus far on the premise of what is possible rather than what is needed. The tragic events in the US on 11 September re-arranged the hierarchy of threats that we face. Consequently, the Grand Strategic threat for which much of the US military seems to be preparing is still a long way off. China will not be another Soviet Union, at least not for the foreseeable future. There are more immediate threats that could be posed by mid-strategic challengers, such as Iraq, North Korea and possibly Iran. We are simply not sure of their intent or the level of their capability. Certainly, in the wake of 11 September these so-called irrational actors seemed remarkably rational. What 11 September did do was to bring threat back into our lives with an immediacy that reinforced the shock of the tragedy and ended a strategic vacation that we had been enjoying by and large for ten years. It brought home to us all just how vulnerable are our societies to asymmetric attacks on our infrastructure, health, food and water supplies, information networks etc. We were all suddenly in the front line. So, first and foremost, Europe must concentrate on deterring, disrupting and destroying terrorist activity.
That means effective homeland defence and a European ability to project certain types of power pre-emptively, if needs be, to underpin our security. As the UK's revised Strategic Defence Review says, "we will need to be able to strike very rapidly". Unfortunately, if US policy tends on occasions to recognise only the threats that it can deal with, most Europeans seem only to recognise as much threat as they can afford. Consequently, there are two core problems from which European defence suffers; poor organisation and insufficient investment.
At the military-strategic level, given the threats I outlined above, the Headline Force with its focus on a corps-sized rapid reaction force is only the beginning. The war in Afghanistan has once again demonstrated the utility of immediate reaction Special Forces and forces equipped for multiple intensity peacekeeping/making missions ranging from short duration peace support operations in high risk environments to low duration peace support operations in low to medium risk environments.
The success of the United Kingdom over the past twenty years has been built around the strategic leverage it has gained from the use of relatively small numbers of Special Forces backed up by medium sized specialised forces. This has been reinforced by specialist peacekeeping experience. We are seeing it in Afghanistan today. Given the nature of emerging conflict Europe could produce an elite number of Special Forces (say 5000) relatively cheaply and back them up with sufficient specialised forces and peacekeepers to meet most operational requirements for the short to medium term. Unfortunately, Europe often seems strategically confused, caught between a desire to keep the Americans happy and yet unsure about the validity of the American strategic analysis. Therefore, I question whether Europe should try to simply produce smaller versions of what the US possesses just to keep the US happy. Indeed, one wonders what the US Army is for these days. By the way, the gap will not be closed. It will get wider. What matters, therefore, is how we manage the gap.
The result of such an approach would represent two force structure peaks on the spectrum between low intensity and high intensity warfighting. The objective would then be to even out the intensity profile by progressively enhancing operational capacity between peacekeeping and special operations through the planned and progressive expansion of the military tasklist built upon the Petersberg Tasks.
This would require significant changes at the operational planning and command level. Given the picture I have just painted it is vital that Europe can plan and command coalitions. To this end, the planning and command functions of the Alliance at SHAPE must be progressively `Europeanised'. SHAPE must be better able to plan and command variable European coalitions of the willing and able undertaking multiple intensity missions and yet, at the same time, preserve the vital escalation ladder to US warfighting capabilities. To that end, the US Army must stop blocking the reform of SHAPE, primarily because the US is unlikely to ever again be part of a military coalition. It will lead such coalitions from time to time but it will not submit itself to multilateral strictures. Moreover, the EU needs an operational planning and command cell that is compatible with the new SHAPE.
Coalitions will be a European thing and there are only two, maybe three, European countries that could effectively act as lead nation for coalitions, France, Germany and Britain (even though there are six operational headquarters on offer there are only three PJHQs). Such a cell would enable the French and the non-NATO, EU four (and the EU) and new members to `plug' into SHAPE systems without the political baggage of joining or rejoining the Integrated Military Structure of the Alliance. Moreover, NATO must be refocused on its essential military function. NATO is not a transatlantic EU - nor will it ever be. Enlargement of both the Alliance and the Union will help this process by adding to the force pool available for European operations although much will depend on clearly defined Permanent Arrangements between the two organisations.
At the support level, Europe's deficiencies are well known, but let me quickly run through them, because their improvements are the key to the progressive expansion of the military tasklist. I will also suggest some ideas for offsetting weaknesses in the interim.
First, at the strategic support level, Europe needs its own C4ISR to improve autonomous situational awareness, and that includes some form of strategic intelligence capacity. It may or may not need designated systems but could be provided by UAVs such as Global Hawk. Civilian satellite capability does not as yet provide sufficient resolution for real time intelligence and it is difficult to task such assets but in time that may change. Then again, Europe has better human intelligence capabilities than the US. We just fail to use them properly because of continued mutual mistrust over information security. Something not helped by events this week in Bosnia.
Second, Europe needs enhanced deployable command, control, communications and computer capability.
Third, Europe lacks any significant Battle management capability although NATO's Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES) could be made available.
Fourth, deficiencies in air-to-air refuelling, heavy strategic and tactical lift (both sea and air), suppression of enemy air defences and offensive electronic warfare are well-documented.
For some of those weaknesses Europe could at least explore more aggressively offsets than has hitherto been the case. Bespoke systems do not need to be purchased all at once. Europe has also failed to properly explore the potential of pooling and creative financing and revenue generation techniques and joint civil/military research and development, such as that envisaged for the Skynet V milsatcom system with its dual civil-military capacity. Instead of using civilian assets why not generate civilian revenues from military assets?
We could also make better use of the developing high-speed rail network to move European forces to ports of embarkation nearer to theatre for operations in and around Europe. Europe also has fleets of civilian air and sea-lift. For Operations Other Than War we need to develop the capacity to acquire such logistics more effectively to support European operations.
Europe's deficiencies in Amphibious Assault Capabilities, as well as Battlefield Mobility and Fire support are more serious, although there is a steady programme of improvements underway. The same can also be said for the lack of Multi-Service Naval Air Platforms and, of course, PGMs and effective force protection. However, they are directly linked to the troughs in European capacities that will need to be ironed out over time and could be with more efficient planning and a recognition that we are not trying to match the US. European capacities for European needs.
In conclusion, if these deficiencies are to be overcome the current incremental approach to European defence is unlikely to prove effective. First, there will be a need to promote greater conceptual convergence between political leaders and their militaries about the role and utility of military power. We have a generation of leaders in some European countries who have never served in the armed forces and for whom, all too often, the political interpretation of military utility is different from the military interpretation, implying a mismatch between the ends and the means.
Second, we Europeans need to start thinking about an effective `one stop shop' (not talk shop) approach to security that combines more traditional defence with the need for homeland security, and vital defensive elements such as civil defence, critical national infrastructure protection, critical information infrastructure protection, CW/IW, Information Assurance etc. etc.
Third, public opinion in vital. European politicians will need to explain to their respective publics why they have to increase security investment. Sadly, Europe is now full of re-structuring plans that look great on paper but which lack one vital ingredient - money. Sure we can make one off cash windfalls by closing redundant bases and downsizing forces but modernisation and professionalisation, do not come cheap and many European countries are re-structuring on the basis of defence budgets still founded on the fantasy of the post-Cold War defence premium.
It simply will not work if European states continue to set expenditure benchmarks of around 1% GDP and then look around the world to see what they can do with it. Indeed, if the ESDP is simply to be yet another metaphor for certain European states to avoid the hard realities of security and defence by continuing what have been lamentable levels of security investment over the past decade then however one dresses it up - European defence will fail. It is not simply any longer a question of spending better, but spending more and better.
I do not underestimate the challenge that Europe faces but I do think that a bit more creativity in the use of existing assets and the development of others could see a rapid improvement in European capacities to meet Europe's operational needs.
Julian Lindley-French
March 2002
